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A World History of Our Own Times

VOLUME ONE: FROM THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY
TO THE 1918 ARMISTICE

BY

QUINCY HOWE

SEP 15 1949



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FOREWORD

• I •

THIS is the first volume of a projected three-volume world history of the first half of the twentieth century. It has three purposes: to depict from a contemporary point of view the events and personalities that shaped the past fifty years; to relate these events and personalities to one another on a world scale; to draw conclusions from this material in the hope of stimulating the reader to do the same.

The rapid pace of the twentieth century compels the journalist to write history and the historian to write journalism. Historians of an earlier day reinterpreted the past to the present. We measure their achievement by how successfully they bring the dead to life. Journalists have always written the autobiographies of their times. We measure their achievement by how completely we recognize their features as our own. I call myself a journalist because I am dealing only with contemporary events and personalities. But I call this work a history because so much that has happened during this crowded century already seems to belong to another age.

I have also been inspired by the pioneering work of two other journalists, Mark Sullivan, who wrote *Our Times*, and Frederick Lewis Allen, who wrote *Only Yesterday*. Not until after the first World War did we Americans become fully conscious of ourselves as citizens of the mightiest of nations, and those two works brought that awareness home to us by recapturing the spirit of our recent national past. In this work I hope to recapture some of that past on a world scale in such a way as to remind Americans that events abroad as well as at home have gone into the making of our world, our country, and ourselves. And while I am citing models, I can do

no better than quote what Bernard Shaw wrote at the turn of the century: "The man who writes about himself and his own time is the only man who writes about all people and all time. Let others cultivate what they call literature. Journalism for me."

The reasons Shaw gave more than fifty years ago for taking up journalism persuaded me to attempt this world history that opens in the year of my own birth. For I speak as a child of this century, born in 1900 in Boston, Massachusetts, where I received all my early vivid impressions. The parents and teachers of my generation belonged to the nineteenth century, and they tried to pass its values on to us, but before we had completed our adolescence and youth the first World War destroyed the world of our childhood. We also discovered that just as the sick and the well live in two different worlds, so a world at war has little in common with a world at peace. Most of us accepted the war in Woodrow Wilson's terms; his failure turned many of us into cynics. We remember the 1920's as a period of reaction against the war and of revolt against the nineteenth-century standards that had remained current until 1914. The world depression—everything seemed to be happening on a world scale—then liquidated the 1920's as completely as the first World War liquidated the last vestiges of Victorianism.

Our contemporaries in Europe and in many other parts of the world had gone through a roughly similar experience. By and large, those of us born before 1905 or 1910—it varied from country to country—received our first instructions about life from a generation that accepted certain fixed standards, usually as a matter of religious faith. Our own first experiences with life did not always bear out the teachings of our parents, but thanks to them we did feel we had been born into a stable world of settled values. It was quite a different world into which we began bringing up our own children during the 1920's and 1930's, and few of us could give them the assurance that our parents had given us. We had lost the faith of our fathers, but we still clung to the forms that went with that faith, because we knew no others. If the postwar world had only lasted as long as the prewar world had lasted, we might have adjusted ourselves—or at least helped our children to make an adjustment—but nothing stood still. The world depression confounded the cynics as much as the reaction against the first World War had confounded the idealists. New faiths made new converts: the Communist faith in Russia, the Nazi faith in Germany, and

they had repercussions everywhere. Ten years after postwar prosperity reached its peak, German armies invaded Poland and the second World War began. It did not end until the atomic bomb blasted us into the present era of uneasy peace. And now, the generation that received its training from us and that fought the greatest war in history has begun to raise its own children.

What will this new generation of parents tell the next generation of children to believe? Our generation passed on the moral code we learned from our parents, without the faith that inspired that code in the first place. What code, what faith, remains for our children to pass on? Priests and psychiatrists, sociologists and statesmen, artists and historians all have answers to these questions, but the individual does not always know whom or what to believe. He knows only that he must believe something because human beings cannot live without beliefs any more than they can live without air, food, or drink. That is why the journalist, who is nothing but the common man, wired for sound, presumes to speak.

• II •

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY has put the human race on trial for its life. By 1900 man had won his ancient war of survival by harnessing the once hostile forces of nature to serve his own needs. During hundreds of thousands of years of unrecorded history, primitive man barely succeeded in maintaining his kind. The discovery of fire lit the first spark of civilization, and from then on man's conquest of nature proceeded at accelerating speed. Yet as recently as two hundred years ago, almost all the people on earth devoted almost all their time to maintaining themselves and their offspring. Man had become the lord of brute creation, but most men led brutish lives. Human beings did the bulk of the world's work. Only a tiny, privileged minority enjoyed the better things of life.

A new chapter in world history began when the people of Western Europe proceeded to conquer both nature and most of the rest of the earth. Power-driven machinery helped them to bring much of Asia and most of Africa under their control. Europeans also subdued, colonized, and developed the Western Hemisphere and Australia. Then, as Europe's population doubled and trebled, as new classes emerged and won new privileges, as the tide of emigration swelled, the Western Hemisphere broke away from European

control. But for the mass of mankind everywhere existence remained hard and precarious; living standards did not rise so fast as population grew; most of the newly tapped sources of energy went into expansion for expansion's sake.

The advance of science accounted for this expansion, especially the advance of the physical sciences, with their emphasis on the search for power and ever more power, from coal, oil, electricity, and water. Indeed, by 1900 the physical sciences and the science of medicine had made such headway that the living standards of the masses had begun to rise measurably in many parts of the world; the life span was increasing, general health improving. As the possibilities of a better life for all here on earth increased, most of the traditional religions found themselves on the defensive. Hindus and Buddhists assumed that life was one long misery and that the best man could hope for was a sublimated nothingness known as Nirvana. Islam and Christianity held out hope of a happy hereafter by way of compensation for man's hard lot on earth. "My kingdom," said Jesus, "is not of this world."

The founders of the great religions did not administer spiritual opium to the people. They possessed unique capacity for contemplation and abstract thought, plus the ability to transmit their own faith to others. The primitive conditions under which they lived forced them to assume that most people here on earth must always have a tragic destiny, and they shaped their faith accordingly. The modern scientist, living under quite different conditions, can make no such assumption. He addresses his capacity for contemplation and abstract thought to the material world. Who cares how many angels can dance on the point of a needle? The nature of the atom seems much more important. And as inventors applied the new principles that scientific researchers established, more and more people found themselves spending more and more time trying to master and improve their physical environment. They became so busy getting ahead, they created such a complicated world, that they had little time to consider where they came from or where they were going. Modern man had not become disillusioned about religion; he had no time for it. Science had not replaced religion; it had crowded religion out of more and more people's lives.

Long before the nineteenth century and right on into our own time, certain timid religious leaders, fearful of human curiosity,

have raised artificial barriers between science and religion. In many backward parts of the world, privileged classes still use a priesthood to keep the masses in subjection. Moreover, in so far as science has freed mankind from some of the fears to which religion has ministered—fear of the unknown, of pain, of death—it has weakened those religions that exploited such fears. But there is no inherent conflict between religion and science. Religion, in its fullest sense, concerns itself with the relationship between man and God and therefore touches the universe in all its aspects. Science, on the other hand, restricts itself to the world of our five senses. Science tries to change, improve, and adapt forces already operating in the physical universe around us. Its whole function is to apply a method of inquiry and measurement to one part of God's creation. But because of the practical uses to which the findings of the scientist have been put, he seems like a stark materialist to those religious people who instinctively fear what they will not understand.

• III •

AS THE twentieth century has run its course, the tensions between science and religion have eased. When the physicists broke down the atom and reduced matter to sheer energy they confirmed, in a sense, the faith of the "God-saturated" Spinoza, who believed that the divine spirit permeated everything. In releasing the energy inside the atom, the physicists also completed a whole cycle of research. Man had at last begun to harness the almost limitless power of the universe.

For what purposes would he apply this new knowledge? Religious and scientific leaders suggested various answers. Sometimes they agreed; sometimes they disagreed. It did not seem to matter too much because the conflict between them had subsided, along with their influence. People paid more attention to social reformers and national fanatics, who suddenly came into their own during the first World War. In 1917 Woodrow Wilson put new life into the Allied cause by calling for a world made safe for democracy. At almost the same moment Lenin called for world revolution. A new type of leader had appeared: the world statesman as world messiah. Two towering individuals possessed by the kind of fervor that religion once inspired offered rival utopias to the whole world.

The war which had laid so much of Europe low raised an American and a Russian to new heights of eminence.

During the next three decades four more world messiahs appeared and vanished from the scene: Sun Yat-sen in China, Mahatma Gandhi in India, Adolf Hitler in Germany, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States. To the masses everywhere all these leaders offered assorted varieties of worldly salvation. To their closest disciples, on the other hand, they held out no promises of comfort and ease, either here on earth or beyond the grave. Instead, they offered power through individual sacrifice and group effort, and their universal prestige suggested that most people in most countries yearned for a leader to assume their responsibilities and embody their hopes, whereas a small minority preferred to exploit this yearning, thus adding to their messiah's power and hence to their own.

The first volume of this projected trilogy introduces three of these six messiahs: Wilson, Lenin, and Sun Yat-sen. It also begins to explain why Western Europe produced only one messiah—the disastrous Adolf Hitler. For this first volume sets forth a relatively simple theme. Its opening section surveys the world of 1900 in which Western Europe reached the summit of its glory. The second section shows all of Europe approaching its doom while the United States prepares to assume a greater role in the world and China enters the most extensive revolution of our century. The third section emphasizes how the first World War wrecked Europe and made the United States the mightiest nation on earth.

India, Latin America, and the Middle East do not figure much in these pages. Not until the 1920's did they begin to play active parts in world affairs. I have also deliberately stressed the role of the individual—not by way of tribute to Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship* but because such emphasis accords with the spirit of the times in which we live: witness the six world messiahs already listed and such national messiahs as Theodore Roosevelt, Clemenceau, Mussolini, Stalin, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek. But the historian of the future, as contrasted with the contemporary journalist, may well devote more attention to any one of these changes than to the individuals associated with them:

1. The decline and fall of West European civilization.
2. The liquidation of the British Empire.

3. The Russian Revolution.
4. The emancipation of Asia.
5. The meteoric rise of the United States.

Of course, Western Europe may recover from two world wars and a depression, as it recovered from the Thirty Years' War three hundred years ago. But the liquidation of the British Empire in our own time almost matches the much slower decline of the Roman Empire fifteen hundred years ago, and the major Continental nations have lost precious overseas possessions, too. While much of Europe was destroying itself in a new Thirty Years' War, much of Asia was using knowledge, ideas, and wealth that originated in Europe to free itself from foreign control. Many different revolutions have swept across Asia; a single revolution has brought two fundamental changes to Russia. First, the Bolsheviks created the first one-party totalitarian state, and the only one that survived the second World War. Second, as a result of Russian victories in the second World War, Eastern Europe has fallen for the first time into the Russian orbit. All this may seem remote from the United States, yet how many Americans can get far away enough from themselves to see how rapidly their country's power and prestige have increased in the eyes of the world? Unfortunately, we have even less conception of the dangers to which this sudden rise has exposed us. Nothing stands still, especially in the twentieth century, and what has come up so fast during the past fifty years could go down just as fast before the present century ends.

After the first World War, Clemenceau wrote: "It is the glory of our civilization that one is occasionally able to live a normal life." A few years later Trotsky observed, "The twentieth century is the most disturbed century in the history of humanity. Any contemporary of ours who wants peace and security above everything else has chosen a bad time to be born." Yet the insecurity and violence that characterize our century are symptoms, not causes. What sets the twentieth century apart from others is the swiftness of its changes, the rapid pace of its events. This has given rise to a universal affliction, peculiar to our era, known as time lag. A generation brought up to live in one kind of world finds itself living in another, and this new world, too, does not stand still. So far, the human race has survived because it has known how to adjust itself to changing conditions. But when the rate of change

accelerates as it has during the past fifty years, the challenge becomes sharper.

In 1944 this challenge led me to start work on this journalistic history of our times. To complete it by 1952 is my present intention. Now, the chief value of such a work does not lie in the author's opinions or conclusions. It lies in the material he selects, in the way he uses it, and in his underlying assumptions. The substance and style of this work speak, I hope, for themselves; only the assumptions require a final word of explanation.

Man is at once a creature of faith and a creature of change. He must always believe something and yet at the same time he must always adapt himself and his beliefs to changing conditions. The "as if" philosophy of Hans Vaihinger, a nineteenth-century German, offers an ingenious solution of this dilemma. Vaihinger maintained that we base everything we think and do on a series of assumptions that we accept only so long as they work. For thousands of years, mathematicians assumed that the last word lay with Euclid—and they made remarkable headway. Now, however, they proceed "as if" the last word lay with Einstein.

The Marxist approach to history corresponded roughly to the Euclidean approach to mathematics in that it gave us new insights and opened new perspectives. But history is not a science, and those who accepted Marx "as if" he had spoken the last word found it hard to give up an article of emotional faith even when events no longer confirmed that faith. The mathematician, on the other hand, had no emotional attachment to Euclid, especially after Einstein provided a more convincing alternative.

This journalistic venture of mine does not accept or set forth any broad philosophy of history. It covers the past fifty years from a strictly contemporary point of view and therefore presents these years "as if" a limited number of commanding personalities had dominated them. For we have lived through a time of such rapid change that more and more people everywhere have looked to commanding personalities for guidance. If failure, disaster, and disillusionment have resulted, this does not reflect upon the leaders or the led. Still less does it imply that the author claims any superior insight. Perhaps one or another of the vanished "world messiahs" will come into his own again; more likely, new messiahs will appear. Of one thing only can we be sure: people will

continue to act "as if" somebody or other had hit upon the ultimate truth.

Far be it from me to cast aspersions at past illusions or to warn against new ones. My sole concern is to recapture the recent past in terms that now seem valid to one who has lived through this confused and crowded era. Yet the historian who writes "as if" he could pass final judgment on the past may find himself, in reality, throwing light chiefly on his own time, whereas the journalist who writes "as if" he were dealing only with his own experience may, in reality, create the living substance of which history is made.

A World History of Our Own Times

Part One

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THE WORLD OF
1900

1

Europe and Germany

How Germany planned to surpass and supersede the other European empires by making applied science serve as an instrument of national policy.

PREVIEW

THE CONTINENT OF Europe overshadowed the world of 1900, and the German Empire which Bismarck had created almost single-handed overshadowed Europe. Because the Germans took little interest in politics, they put few restraints upon Bismarck; because Europe glorified nationalism, it permitted the new Germany to flourish. One German, Nietzsche, foretold disaster. Ignored by his fellow countrymen, he died insane. At the same time Bismarck's Germany turned against its creator. The young Kaiser dismissed the Iron Chancellor, wrecked the alliance with Russia, rebuffed a limited alliance with Britain, supported the new Pan-German cause. As Bismarck had unified Germany under Prussian leadership, so the new Pan-German movement sought to consolidate Europe under German leadership. As other European nations had built empires overseas, so the Pan-Germans sought more and better colonial possessions, too, and thus found themselves challenging Britain's naval supremacy. On the glittering world stage of 1900, the German Empire played a leading role. But the curtain went up on the new century to the music of *The Twilight of the Gods*.

• I •

EUROPE LOOMED large in the world of 1900—not in population, not in territory, but in other more important ways. Nature had favored Europe with a temperate climate, fertile soil, and ample resources, and the peoples of Europe had seized the opportunities nature offered. Over a span of a thousand years, they had created by all odds the richest civilization in history—rich in variety, which breeds conflict, and rich in quality, which magnifies the individual. Thus the history of Europe became a history of mass conflict and individual achievement.

Three major, distinctive racial groups went into the making of Europe. Over the centuries, Latins, Teutons, and Slavs had cross-fertilized one another and occupied overlapping territories. But this did not make Europe homogeneous; rather, it accentuated diversity. Most Europeans called themselves Christians, the Latins preferring the Roman Catholic Church, the Teutons preferring Protestantism, and most Slavs preferring the Eastern Orthodox faith. But national spirit overrode religious spirit. Europe's three chief racial families split into more than a score of separate nations or would-be nations, each with its own claim to national sovereignty.

Although no single race or nation had ever dominated all of Europe, although no single church ever claimed the allegiance of the whole Continent, all the peoples of Europe nevertheless shared a common, cosmopolitan civilization. The writings of Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Voltaire, Goethe, and Tolstoy became the general property of Europe. The paintings of Velasquez, Vermeer, Titian, Rembrandt, Ingres, and Holbein hung in the galleries of Europe's capitals. European audiences applauded the music of Beethoven, Mozart, Debussy, Chopin, Liszt, and Tchaikovsky. Moreover, a growing minority in all nations, large and small, tended to regard themselves as "good Europeans," even as citizens of the world.

As modern science developed, European physicists, chemists, and engineers pooled and applied their findings, just as European poets, painters, and musicians had come to share theirs. In knitting Europe more closely together, the scientists reinforced Europe. They made possible a Continental system of railways, highways, and waterways and a Continental division of industry. Yet Europe did not try to become self-sufficient. Instead, it extended its domination over other continents and the intervening seas.

Behind Europe's expansion lay industrial power and armed force. Europe led the world in many of the arts of peace and all the arts of war. Each European nation, jealous of its own sovereignty, maintained its own separate military establishment. By 1900 all the major nations on the Continent had adopted universal, compulsory, peacetime, military service. The seagoing British kept their Navy larger than the combined fleets of any two potential rivals. With force and threats of force, the nations of Europe preserved a world-wide balance of power, banding themselves into groupings so formidable and evenly matched that fear of general war preserved the peace.


Almost all the people in all the countries of Europe wanted two simple things: continuing peace and increasing prosperity. Could they have both? That depended partly on the goals they sought, partly on the methods they used to attain them. The needs of the people deter-

mined the goals; the decisions of their rulers determined the methods. The existence of the British Empire, for instance, depended on control of the seas. The security of the Russian Empire required warm-water ports. The German Empire needed expanding production and trade. Already, in the space of less than thirty years, this newly unified German Empire had become the controlling power in Europe, and its rulers now proposed to make it the controlling power in the world. Other European nations had built great empires overseas, and the rulers of the new Germany felt that they, too, had earned what one of their Chancellors called "a place in the sun." They proposed to win through to that place by the same methods that had brought them so far in so short a time.

• II •

GERMANY OWED its outstanding position in Europe largely to one man, Otto von Bismarck, who had died three years before the new century began. Bismarck had mastered first himself, then Prussia, then Germany, and then Europe. At this point he wanted to stop. But the extreme methods he had used to reach a limited goal got out of hand. The means became more important than the end; they even created a new end that, in turn, called for new means and exposed Germany to new risks on which Bismarck himself had never calculated.

Bismarck's father belonged to the landowning Prussian aristocracy. The Junkers, as they called themselves, lived on barren sandy estates originally owned by Slavs, some of whose blood still ran in the Junkers' veins. Frederick the Great, the man who had created Prussia and its military tradition, had once spoken to Bismarck's father, and the son always regarded himself as a Prussian of the Prussians. He felt proud to belong to a frugal aristocracy that had produced faithful, if myopic, civil servants and brave, if brutal, soldiers. From his mother Bismarck inherited a different tradition. She belonged to the German Mencken family, which ran to college professors and from which H. L. Mencken also traces his ancestry. As his Prussian father's son, Bismarck somewhat resented his mother's love of society, city life, and liberal doctrines, but, thanks to her, he received a thorough cosmopolitan education. At the University of Göttingen Bismarck dueled and drank with the best of them, yet he spent most of his time with foreign students and roomed with the future American historian John L. Motley. From this point on, Bismarck developed slowly. It took him a full ten years to break away from his routine of reading, drinking, and managing his father's estate, but once he entered public life he made up for lost time.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Iron Chancellor: Prince Otto von Bismarck in his later years



BROWN BROTHERS

*Emperor William I of Germany:
formerly King of Prussia*

Bismarck attached himself to King William I of Prussia, who came to the throne in 1861 after having served as Regent for three years. First as Foreign Minister and then as Prime Minister, Bismarck set out to create a new German Empire around a hard Prussian core and to build a new European balance of power on a firm German foundation. Under Bismarck's direction the little Kingdom of Prussia waged three deliberate wars of expansion—for limited, not universal, objectives—seizing the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in 1864, driving Austrian influence from northern Germany in 1866, and annexing the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France in 1871. These were wars of conquest, not wars of annihilation. They led, first, to the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership and then to the establishment of a new European balance of power, with the new Germany in the controlling position. Bismarck spent twenty-two years—from 1848 to 1870—making a Prussianized Germany the mightiest power in Europe. He spent the next twenty years trying to congeal this new Germany and this new European balance of power into a permanent mold.

When Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862 he declared, "The great questions of the day will not be settled by resolutions and majority votes—that was the mistake of the men of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron." Yet after Bismarck had used blood and iron to make Germany the dominant power in Europe, he expected diplomacy and the threat of force to preserve the new equilibrium. And his recipe

for German survival ran this way: "Always try to be *à trois* (or three against two) as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers." He referred here to Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, and Germany.

It was under Bismarck's sponsorship that King William I of Prussia proclaimed the new German Empire, with himself as Emperor, at Versailles in 1871, after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War. It was under Bismarck's sponsorship as "honest broker" that the major European powers met at Berlin in 1878 and brought about a peaceful settlement of the Russian-Turkish War. The next year, Bismarck concluded a defensive alliance with Austria. Three years later Italy also joined, and the arrangement became known as the Triple Alliance. The British regarded it as the chief bulwark of European order and became vaguely associated with it by agreeing with both Austria and Italy to maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean.

With infinite patience and unscrupulous guile, Bismarck then sought protection in the East. Behind the backs of his Austrian allies he signed what he called his "Re-Insurance Treaty" with Russia, promising to remain neutral if Austria attacked Russia and securing in exchange a Russian neutrality pledge in the event of a French attack upon Germany. Bismarck saw no contradiction between this and the Triple Alliance, which committed Germany to help Austria only if Russia attacked. Just as Bismarck regarded the Hohenzollern dynasty as the surest guarantee of a strong Germany, so he regarded his alliances with the two great Empires of the East as the surest guarantee of European peace.

• III •

BISMARCK EMBODIED the contradictions of his time with all the force of his unique, truculent genius, conspiring with his country and his time to leave the impress of his personality upon Europe more clearly than any man since Napoleon. Having made a Prussian King into a German Emperor, Bismarck courted popular support by putting through a Constitution that granted universal suffrage and by establishing the most generous and comprehensive system of social insurance in the world. Yet the German people did not possess democracy. Their Reichstag, or lower Parliament, could hold debates and pass laws, but it rarely initiated new legislation and its authority over finances was limited by the fact that it voted army appropriations for periods of five and seven years. A Bundesrat, or Federal Council, represented the German states.

Bismarck's beloved Prussia, which embraced two-thirds of Germany

dominated the other states of the new Empire, large and small. The Kaiser appointed his own Chancellor, who could always dismiss the Reichstag and order new elections, provided his sovereign consented. Still more important, the Kaiser appointed the Chief of the General Staff, a kind of state within the state, dating back to the days of Frederick the Great and dominated by the Prussian aristocracy. Outsiders had little chance of admission, less of advancement.

The economic interests of these Prussian aristocrats lay in their barren soil. Their professional interests lay with the German Army, which furnished German industry with a great and growing market at prices that the state fixed artificially high. This assured subsidy made it easier for German industry to dump goods at cut prices abroad. The heart of German heavy industry lay in the Ruhr and Rhineland valleys. The brains of German heavy industry lay in the laboratories of the steel, dye, and electrical trusts and in the research departments of the great universities. To compete against the old, established industries of Great Britain, the Germans had to mobilize their best scientific brains and apply the latest discoveries of their researchers. It was in the up-and-coming chemical and electrical industries that German science made its greatest progress and that the German genius for organization created the greatest trusts.

The old Prussian landowners and the new German industrialists, who already had much in common, struck this bargain. Since the Prussian-controlled Army paid inflated prices for war equipment, the industrialists supported high tariffs for foodstuffs as well as for industrial goods, and thus kept the inefficient Prussian farms in production. The General Staff approved because a Germany contemplating war dared not become too dependent on imports.

Although the German people had to foot the bill, Bismarck had brought them prosperity as well as glory. Even the Social Democrats had no stomach for militant opposition to a system under which the trade-union movement had flourished. The prosperous middle classes saw no need to support a progressive, democratic program such as British Liberals, French Radical Socialists, and American Populists were pushing in their countries. New careers abounded. "With us," wrote Werner Sombart, a leading German economist of the period, "there is no diversion of talent into the field of politics as in other countries. Neither the rich nor, what is more important, the gifted members of the middle class are drawn from economic life to devote themselves to politics."

These conditions did not come about of their own accord, as Sombart rather implied. Much of the credit for Bismarck's social-welfare program belonged to the Social Democrats with whom it originated and


whom he tried to outbid. He also had to compromise with the Catholic Center Party. From 1871 to 1887 he fought a long-distance war with the Vatican and a hand-to-hand struggle, known as the *Kulturkampf*, with leaders of the Center Party—especially the Poles and Bavarians—over the control of education and the conflict of powers between church and state. Here, too, he had to meet his opponents more than halfway. He could not prevent the Socialist and the Center Parties from becoming the two largest in the country. He did, however, make it difficult for their leaders—or anybody else—to build strong, popular opposition to the general direction he had given German policy at home and abroad.

• IV •

JUST AS one man's political genius did much to create the new German Empire, so another man's poetic insight foresaw the doom of that creation. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, the poet-philosopher-prophet, with his glorification of the Superman seemed to out-Bismarck Bismarck. Politically, however, Nietzsche opposed everything Bismarck stood for. But just as Bismarck put his superior German gifts in the service of the provincial Prussian cause, so Nietzsche used the tawdry blood-and-iron lingo of his time to celebrate the older German—not the newer Prussian—virtues.

In 1873 Nietzsche lamented "the extirpation of the German soul for the benefit of the German Empire." Then came his war with Richard Wagner, whom he accused of betraying Europe to glorify Germany. Nietzsche constantly attacked the Prussian, military tradition. He assailed, before Hitler was born, the perils and implications of anti-Semitism. The Superman Nietzsche celebrated was no brown-shirted Storm Trooper but the man of reason, intelligence, and insight who scales new heights. The generation of Nazis, as yet unborn, drew its recruits from the ranks of the *Sklavenmenschen*, the slave-men, whom Nietzsche derided. And in preaching the doctrine of Anti-Christ, he simply went further than any of his contemporaries in attacking the cautious, hypocritical Christianity of the time.

Philosophically, too, Nietzsche rejected Christianity and all religions that sanctify forgivingness, meekness, and nonviolence. But he did not stand alone. Like William James in the United States, like Henri Bergson in France, he made a cult of the irrational rather than the logical. He saw human beings driven by a will to power which he described in these brutal terms: "Wherever I found a living thing, there I found the will to power, and even in the will of the servant, there I found the will to be a master. Neither necessity nor desire, but the love of power is the demon of mankind. You give men everything possible—health,



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

food, shelter, enjoyment, but they are and remain unhappy and capricious, for the demon waits and waits, and must be satisfied."

Whereas Bismarck was half Prussian, Nietzsche—as his Slavic name suggests—had more Polish than German blood. His father and both grandfathers had been Lutheran pastors. Nietzsche led the life of a latter-day saint, wholly devoted to the pursuit of wisdom and to the proclamation of his tortured gospel. He enraged his compatriots with this kind of abuse: "The Germans are

always so badly deceived because they *try* to find a deceiver. If only they can have a heady wine of the senses, they will put up with a bad head; that is the hook they will always bite on. A popular leader must hold up before them the prospect of conquests and splendor. They always obey and will do more than obey provided they can get intoxicated in the process." Nietzsche had no use for the German intellectuals of his time: "The invariable success of intellectual charlatanism in present-day Germany hangs together with the desolation of the German mind, and I trace it all back to a diet overloaded with newspapers, politics, beer, Wagner's music—not forgetting the condition precedent to this diet, national vanity: '*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles.*'" And hardly any non-Germans went so far as Nietzsche did when he warned: "Europe's rulers must become good Europeans and form an anti-German league to encircle the Reich."

When Nietzsche wrote—as he usually did—about European themes, his apocalyptic visions foreshadowed the end of an era: "Where," he asked, looking ahead to the coming century, "are the Vandals of the twentieth century? Evidently they will appear and establish themselves only after violent Socialist revolutions." Again: "Distrust all those who jabber about justice; when they call themselves good and just, do not forget that they fall short of the Pharisee in one thing only: Power." And again: "Regimentation has grown very strong in this democratic Europe; people who learn easily submit easily; the herd animal—an extremely intelligent one—is being reared. Those who can command will find those who can obey."

Attraction toward Jesus and revulsion against Christianity tore Nietzsche this way and that. "It is possible," he wrote in a burst of

unconscious self-revelation, "that beneath the holy fable and the lineaments of Jesus' life, one of the most agonizing instances of the knowledge of love lies hidden: a heart most innocent and eager that never had enough human love, that demanded to love and to be loved and nothing else, always demanded it with hardness, with madness, with terrible outbursts of fury against all those who denied him love." Nietzsche, too, demanded love, but because he could not get it on his own, impossible terms he turned against the world around him: "One is sick of the sight of man. What is nihilism today if not that? We are tired of man. We must get beyond him." But he saw no hope in Europe: "We sense that everything is going downhill and getting more and more stupid, good-natured, mediocre, indifferent, Chinese, Christian—man without a doubt is getting better. Herein lies Europe's doom."

Nietzsche's words roused immediate echoes in France, England, and other countries where "*fin de siècle*" rather than "Gay Nineties" summed up the forebodings of an anxious time. No contemporary European, at the turn of the century, had become the subject of so many books and articles as this warped product of a warped society. The Germany of Bismarck, itself a hothouse growth, produced everything under pressure. Even its greatest—its only—philosopher had no time to reconcile the conflicts around him. He had to assimilate more than human flesh and blood and nerves could stand, in one short span of life. The vision of the future took ever clearer form until, aided by disease, it blinded the sensitive eye of genius. Ten years before the nineteenth century ended Nietzsche went mad. He died as the twentieth century began.

• V •

THE DISASTERS that Nietzsche foresaw presently occurred. The first came in 1888 with the death of the beloved Emperor William I. His son, Frederick, reigned for only ninety-nine days and then died of cancer of the throat—an ailment that a good diagnostician might have checked. King Edward VII of England lamented, long afterward, "Ah, how different everything might have been if the Emperor Frederick had lived. That man was a true friend, and with my sister who is so clever, I think we might have done great things."

Edward's sister, who was also Frederick's wife and the mother of the twenty-nine-year-old Kaiser William II, remarked after her husband died, "My son will be the ruin of Germany." Thanks to the Constitution that Bismarck had given Germany, the young Kaiser had more than enough authority to rule or ruin, and since he did not know how to rule, he steered straight for ruin. He felt himself overshadowed by the mighty Bismarck, who remained as Chancellor until 1890, when the



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"Dropping the Pilot": Punch's famous cartoon at the time Kaiser William II dismissed Bismarck as Chancellor

Kaiser, impatient to display his talents and independence, replaced him with a professional soldier, General Caprivi, who presently—on the Kaiser's orders—permitted Bismarck's Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia to lapse. The German Ambassadors to Austria and Russia both opposed continuing the arrangement, and even Bismarck himself had never intended to give Russia priority over Austria. At most he had hoped to remain on good terms with both and hold each somewhat in check, while keeping France isolated.

The delicate balance that Bismarck had struck could not, of course, last forever. The South Slavs, inside and outside the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were establishing closer and closer ties with the Pan-Slav movement inside Russia. French bankers had


begun lending money to the Russian Government in 1888, after Bismarck himself had put a virtual embargo on any German credits in that direction. As soon, therefore, as the Kaiser cut his ties with Russia, the French and Russian Governments concluded a secret agreement to aid each other in the event of a German attack.

Bismarck, from his retirement, stormed and raged. He did not argue that the Kaiser should have sacrificed the Austrian alliance for an alliance with Russia. He did argue that nothing but personal vanity had caused the Kaiser to move when and as he did. For the Kaiser had burned his bridges to the east before making any preparation to build a new bridge to the west, in the direction of England. Although the Kaiser rightly feared that the British hoped to use Germany as a make-weight against Russia, he also assumed that British hostility toward Russia would eventually bring Britain into a full alliance with Germany, on Germany's terms. When, therefore, Prime Minister Salisbury suggested an Anglo-German agreement in 1895 for the partition of the Turkish Empire among most of the major powers, the Kaiser turned him down. Early in 1898 Salisbury suggested to the Russians a "partition of preponderance" in Turkey and China. The Russians rejected the

idea. Two months later Britain's aggressive Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, proposed an Anglo-German alliance. At this point the Kaiser—ignorant of the previous British offer to Russia—wrote to his cousin, the Tsar, telling "dear Nicky" that the British had offered him an alliance and asking advice. Nicky replied that Willy would have to make up his own mind.

Two neurotic forces caused the Kaiser to rebuff these British advances. Nature had endowed the young Kaiser with a striking countenance and a quick mind. His handsome profile and his upturned mustaches became the trade-mark of the new Germany. He also spoke well and knew how to impress his personality on small groups or large. But he suffered from a physical flaw that may have contributed to a far more disastrous flaw of character: a withered left arm marred his otherwise noble bearing. He bore his handicap so pluckily that it hardly seemed to exist, but either this affliction or certain family influences or a combination of the two made him at once arrogant and undecided, blustering and timid, impetuous and unsure. The family influences that warped the Kaiser came from his English mother, the daughter and namesake of Queen Victoria. The German Empress loved her husband more than her eldest son and her native land more than her adopted one. Before she died she ordered her body to be wrapped only in the Union Jack and buried in England. The Kaiser had always resented her dominating personality. At the same time he took a certain pride in his British inheritance. He adored Queen Victoria and called himself her favorite grandson. His uncle, the Prince of Wales, who later became King Edward VII, got on his nerves. The distaste was mutual.

The Kaiser's romantic imagination conjured up a grand drama of Anglo-German reconciliation, with himself in the central role. He did not want to avenge himself on the British; he sought their admiration. And he believed he could win this admiration, first by creating a solid bloc of Continental powers, including France and Russia, grouped about Germany, and then by approaching England not with threats of war and destruction but with proposals of peace and concord. When in this mood, he liked to think of himself as the *Friedenskaiser*, the Peace Emperor. But his rude, awkward methods obscured his confused, romantic intentions. Far from impressing the British, he succeeded only in alarming them and raising doubts about his own sanity. As time went on, the Kaiser emerged more and more clearly as an irresolute man with superficial gifts and surface charm, pathetically eager for applause and affection, but perversely set on gaining his ends by threats and boasts. Bismarck once said that the Kaiser wanted to have a birthday every day—that same Bismarck who had devoted his life to building up the dynastic powers that the Kaiser so soon turned against him.



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Prince Otto von Bismarck (left) in Retirement at Friedrichsruhe Receives Kaiser William II

If the Kaiser was his own worst enemy, two of his closest advisers served him little better than he served himself: Baron Holstein and Count von Bülow. In the German Foreign Office, as Permanent Secretary, sat the bearded, bespectacled Baron Holstein, whose frock coat, choke-collar, and furtive, fussy ways made him the physical embodiment of the German bureaucrat. He worked unceasingly. He had no personal, private life. Passions, suspicions, and fears possessed him. All his energies went into the fanatical pursuit of obsessions and delusions related to his job. Over the years he had come to hate Bismarck, who called him crazy, but who eventually fell victim to one of Holstein's intrigues.


Holstein's antagonism toward Bismarck put him on the Kaiser's good books and his industry made him indispensable. The Kaiser did not direct the day-to-day activities of the Foreign Office. He lacked the time, the industry, and the skill. But he meddled intermittently in foreign affairs, sometimes without informing subordinates or consulting experts. Holstein flourished in this atmosphere, blackmailing his many enemies, shrewdly playing upon the Kaiser's weaknesses. Holstein expressed the views of the whole German ruling class when he wrote in 1899: "The state regards itself as an end; not as a means to the attainment of higher aims lying outside. And the higher the state the greater this truth. There is no higher aim for the state than the protection of its own interests."

These views naturally commended themselves to the Kaiser. So did

Holstein's almost psychopathic suspicion of the British. But where the Kaiser had visions of himself in the role of great conciliator, Holstein saw Britain and all Europe accepting German dictation. Yet Holstein had worked out a strong, if rigid, set of political convictions for himself; he possessed wide knowledge and considerable native shrewdness. He had little imagination and still less moderation. His mind moved on a single track. He both distrusted and ignored the ideas of others. In his eyes, the conflicting interests between the British and the French and between the British and the Russians overshadowed the entire European horizon. He refused to believe that Britain could ever come to terms with France or Russia, except as the prelude to ultimate betrayal. He saw in every British approach to Germany a trap to involve his country in war with Russia—a war in which the German Army, not the British Navy, would do all the fighting, a war from which Britain would gain rich rewards in Asia while the Germans would bleed themselves white fighting in Europe.

By 1897 the Kaiser saw that he could not continue to depend, as he had since Bismarck's dismissal, on superannuated generals and furtive civil servants to aid him in the direction of German affairs. Holstein cut no sort of public figure. He did not ooze the adulation that his sovereign craved. The Kaiser therefore appointed as his Foreign Secretary the professional diplomat Count Bernhard von Bülow, member of a distinguished family and husband of a gifted Italian wife. "Bülow, be my Bismarck," urged the Kaiser, hinting of greater things ahead. Bülow came to the German Foreign Office from the German Embassy at Rome. Witty, handsome, vain, and lazy, he jokingly described himself as "*pomadig*," like hair oil. One of his successors always called him "The Eel." Bülow acted on impulse and sought only to gratify his sovereign. He fancied himself as a diplomat, and he had more experience and flair than most of his colleagues, but it was as a courtier, not as a diplomat, much less as a statesman, that he chiefly excelled.

At the time of his promotion to the post of Foreign Secretary in 1897, Bülow wrote this description of the Kaiser in a letter to his friend Count Eulenburg, then serving as German Ambassador to Vienna—confident that Eulenburg would arrange to have the Kaiser see it: "I hang my heart more and more every day on the Emperor. He is so remarkable! Together with the Great King [Bülow referred here to Frederick the Great] and the Great Elector [Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg], he is far and away the most remarkable Hohenzollern who ever existed. He combines in a manner that I have never seen before the soundest and most original intelligence with the shrewdest good sense. He possesses an imagination that can soar on eagle wings above all trivialities, and with the soberest perception of what is attainable; and



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*Baron Friedrich August von Holstein,
Permanent German Undersecretary of
State for Foreign Affairs*

—what energy into the bargain! What a memory! What swiftness and sureness of apprehension!”

Bülow loved to dish out flattery as much as the Kaiser loved to take it. Their views on England also coincided. “It is generally true to say,” Bülow advised the Kaiser in 1898, “that John Bull stands firmly resolved to patronize and protect his poor German cousin and even to let him do the rough work now and then, but not to recognize him as an equal.” Bülow, like Holstein, made no mistake in his judgment of British motives. His mistake, like Holstein’s, lay in permitting British condescension to get on his nerves. Concerning

Germany he predicted, in 1899, “In the coming century, the German people will be either hammer or anvil.” He took office confident that he could succeed, where Bismarck had failed, in remaining on good terms with the Kaiser. He also relied on his own cleverness as the sure defender of his country’s welfare and of Europe’s peace.

• VI •

THE IRONIES crowded thick and fast upon Bismarck during the years between his retirement in 1890 and his death in 1898. Having staked everything on the cause of monarchy, he saw his own Prussian Hohenzollerns leading themselves and Germany to ruin. Russia’s House of Romanov had tied itself to the libertarian French Republic. Austria, Germany’s first line of defense in the 1870’s, had become Germany’s Achilles’ heel. Old Emperor Francis Joseph was waging a losing, defensive battle against Slavic influences inside and outside his Empire. And the new Germany had swallowed up the old Prussia. Thanks to Bismarck, the Prussian aristocrats achieved all they ever wanted—and more. But the Germany that they now ruled faced world problems beyond their experience.

Bismarck’s strategy had two flaws. First, he ignored the French Revolution and tried, in effect, to create a new Germany based on the divine right of kings. Second, his horizon did not extend beyond Europe at a time when all the major nations of Europe had vital interests all


over the world. Bismarck tried to make history stand still, but the system he had built proved as dynamic as the world in which he had built it.

Prussian nationalism soon swelled into German imperialism. The Prussians supplied the necessary military traditions. The Ruhr and Rhineland valleys plus Alsace and Lorraine yielded the coal and iron ore required for heavy industry. Germany's military and industrial leaders mobilized Germany's scientists, with the result that Germany soon became Europe's principal workshop. German goods, superior in quality and low in price, flooded the world. More German shipping appeared on the high seas. More German bankers appeared in the Balkans, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Orient.

The men around Bismarck and Emperor William I came from the Prussian aristocracy, which had given Germany the finest army and civil service in Europe. The men around the new Kaiser belonged to a new generation of bankers, industrialists, and shipping magnates. Because Bismarck had no further territorial ambitions for Germany in Europe and because he had no great enthusiasm for colonial expansion, they opposed him. They favored expansion of every kind in every direction and modeled themselves on the British imperialists who were calling for a "Greater Britain" and opposing the "Little Englanders."

In 1893 the most extreme of the German expansionists founded the *Alldeutscher Verband*, or Pan-German League. The idea originated with Carl Peters, who had studied British colonial methods in London during the early 1880's and then headed an expedition to East Africa which led to the establishment of a German colony there. The Pan-Germans never became a mass party; they concentrated on spreading the most violent and extreme propaganda, exercising an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. The Pan-Germans wanted, among other things, to incorporate the German Swiss and German Austrians into the new and expanding German Empire; to assert Teutonic dominance over the Slavic peoples of Southeastern Europe and over the Moslems of the Middle East. It might even become necessary to teach the decadent French another lesson. And, in good time, Germany would perhaps surpass Britain as a world power.

A professor of Slavic origin from the state of Saxony and a renegade Englishman gave the Pan-Germans their ideology. Professor Hans von Treitschke, the son of a Saxon general who had fought against the Prussians, taught history at the University of Berlin from 1874 until his death in 1896. He preached the doctrines of German and state supremacy. Of the annexation of Alsace he wrote: "We Germans who know both Germany and France know better what is good for the Alsatians than they do themselves, who in the perverse conditions of a French life



From Prussian Kingdom to German Empire: The growth of Imperial Germany

have been denied any true knowledge of modern Germany. We desire, even against their will, to restore them to themselves." He also preached the glories of war and of the state's power to make war: "The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the state, and it brings out the full magnificence of the sacrifice of fellow countrymen for one another. In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat." Treitschke influenced the intellectuals. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who dropped his British citizenship to become a German and wrote in the German rather than the English language, reached a wider public with his doctrine of the superiority of the Teutonic race. "We live today in a Jewish age," wrote Chamberlain in 1899 in his *Foundations of the Twentieth Century*. "This alien people has become precisely in the nineteenth century disproportionately important and in many cases actually a dominant constituent in our life." Basing his arguments not on the facts of science but on the declarations of Count Arthur de Gobineau, a French poet and diplomat whose book *The Inequality of Human Races* became the Bible of a whole racist school, Chamberlain went on to declare: "The Teuton is the soul of our culture; Europe today with its many branches over the whole world represents the checkered results of an infinitely manifold mingling of races. What

binds us together and makes an organic unity of us is Teutonic blood. If we look around we see that the importance of each nation as a living power today is dependent upon the proportion of genuinely Teutonic blood in its population." That the Pan-Germans derived their teachings from men of Slavic, Latin, and English descent did not diminish their zeal or disturb their faith.

Bismarck had prepared the way for the Pan-Germans. Although he had declared that all the Balkans were not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, he had allied himself closely with the Austrians, who regarded the Balkans as a life-and-death matter and thus found themselves in conflict with the Russians. All this eventually gratified and vindicated the Pan-Germans, but while Bismarck remained Chancellor he tried to divert attention from the Balkans and from Russia by setting out on a limited program of colonial expansion in Africa and the South Seas.

What began as a limited program under the Kaiser's grandfather and Bismarck became, under the Kaiser and the Pan-Germans, an unlimited affair. Before Bülow took office, Caprivi had already ceded Zambesia in East Africa to Great Britain for the little North Sea island of Helgoland, giving up an almost valueless stretch of distant jungle for what later became an invaluable advance naval base. At the time, however, the Pan-Germans felt that Britain had got the better of the bargain—especially after Sir Henry Stanley, the British explorer who opened up so much of Africa, said so. Bülow, taking his cue from the Kaiser and the Pan-Germans, therefore went out after bigger, more exotic game. When Chinese bandits killed two German missionaries in 1897, Bülow demanded and received a ninety-nine-year lease on China's Kiaochow Peninsula by way of compensation. The next year he thought he had made a firm deal with the British to partition Portugal's African possessions and felt betrayed when an Anglo-French loan rescued the Portuguese overseas empire from liquidation.

Bismarck had looked upon Germany's colonies as a dubious safety valve for the release of surplus energies. Even by 1914 these colonies cost six marks in taxes for every mark they yielded in business profits, and only five thousand Germans had settled permanently in their country's new possessions overseas. But the Pan-Germans attached great importance to colonies, partly for reasons of prestige, partly because they believed Germany needed a world-wide network of bases to protect and promote its expanding trade. The young Kaiser agreed. He made much of that part of his title which called him *Mehrer des Reichs*, Enlarger of the Reich.

The same forces that impelled the Pan-Germans to look abroad had already driven the other industrial nations of Europe in the same direc-

tion. All these nations needed foreign markets; they all needed raw materials from abroad; they all had surplus funds to invest overseas; their people wanted steady jobs and rising wages. Holland and Belgium as well as Britain and France possessed valuable colonial empires. They had gained these possessions by force and threats of force. The Germans, who had lately come ahead with a rush, proposed to expand in the same way. The older nations feared the power of the upstart Germans. They suspected the crude, German methods. Whereupon the Pan-Germans redoubled their zeal. As the rest of Europe had already gone, so Germany hoped to go. And as Germany went, so the rest of Europe would have to follow.

It was a new Germany that had prepared itself for European leadership. Until William I proclaimed the Empire at Versailles in 1871, the old Germany had taken its character and its culture from a number of distinctive cities—Munich, Frankfurt, Dresden, Breslau, Hamburg. Now all roads led to Berlin, the ugly, new imperial capital where the children and grandchildren of the new-rich were settling and patronizing the arts. Yet Berlin never developed a character of its own, like Vienna; neither did it become a cosmopolitan center, like Paris. At best it could only cultivate a certain tolerance that the older provincial capitals had lacked. German Jews played an increasing role at the turn of the century. Excluded from the Army, the Navy, and diplomacy, they made careers for themselves in banking, business, and the professions. Albert Ballin, the foremost shipping magnate, had become a close friend of the Kaiser. Emil Rathenau organized the largest trust in Germany, the General Electric Company, with affiliations all over Europe. Other German Jews went into publishing, journalism, the arts and sciences. Some became baptized Christians, married into old German families, moved in top social circles.

The German Jews prospered under the Empire because it gave new scope to all members of the professional classes. The Prussian aristocrats did not resent the new dispensation: they still dominated the court and the Army. Trade unionists had also done well, and received a growing share of Germany's growing income. They did not, however, swallow the more extreme nationalist and racial doctrines that had originated with von Treitschke and Chamberlain. This propaganda had its greatest effect upon the lower middle classes, who accepted the old aristocracy but felt themselves superior to the trade unionists and resented the new aristocracy of wealth and talent. It was to this large, new class that a new type of popular newspaper addressed itself, full of nationalist aspirations, expressed in such terms that the little bank clerk, government functionary, or office worker felt important and even heroic.

Most members of the lower middle classes and nearly all the more successful business and professional people found the new Kaiser to their liking and inspired him with new schemes. He looked with special favor on the projected Berlin-Bagdad Railway, which seemed to hold out to Germany in the Middle East the same prospects that Cecil Rhodes's projected Cape-to-Cairo Railway held out to Britain in Africa. In 1886, two years before the Kaiser came to the throne, a German Orientalist had declared—and his words carried weight in Pan-German circles: "Asia Minor is the only territory in the world which has not yet been monopolized by a great power; and yet it offers the finest field for colonization. If Germany does not miss this opportunity, and if she seizes it before the Cossacks clutch hold, she will have secured the best part of the division of the world." Influenced by this line of reasoning, the young Kaiser lost no time in visiting the Sultan of Turkey. He also delivered a flamboyant speech at Jerusalem, the cradle of the Christian religion, proclaiming himself the protector of Islam. But as a piece of advance promotion for the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, the Kaiser's oratory fell flat. The German public did not invest enough money to finance the venture and the British refused to put up the money for the Germans to do the job.

The Kaiser's determination to make Germany a great naval power completed the follies of the 1890's. German heavy industry welcomed the prospect of a big navy as a guarantee of further profits that would subsidize a further expansion of Germany's cut-price export trade. As for Bülow, he believed that the threat of German naval power would make the British more amenable to his ideas. But the British could interpret this new German gesture, which began in 1898, only as a direct threat to their own security. In 1900 German iron and steel production surpassed British iron and steel production for the first time in history. In 1900 the German Reichstag approved a vast twenty-year program of naval construction. And on January 1, 1900, the Kaiser greeted the new century with these words:

"Even as my grandfather labored for his Army, so will I, in like manner, unerringly carry on and carry through the work of reorganizing my Navy, in order that it may be justified in standing beside my Land-Army and that by it the German Empire may be in a position to win the place it has not yet attained. With the two united, I hope to be enabled, with a firm trust in the guidance of God, to prove the truth of the saying of Frederick William the First: 'When one in this world wants to decide something with the pen, he does not do it unless supported by the strength of the sword.'"

SUMMING UP

THE IMPRINT of Europe lay as heavy on the world of 1900 as the imprint of Germany lay upon Europe. National spirit ran strong in all the major European powers, and not in Germany alone. For national causes, Europeans would sacrifice and die as they had once sacrificed and died for religious causes. It is true that the Germans had the best army in Europe, but they did not have the only one—just as the British had the best, but not the only, navy. In one respect, the Germans did stand apart. Their Empire had come last of all to the ranks of the great powers. Although their competitors had long since acquired the choicest overseas possessions, the Germans took advantage of their late start to build the most up-to-date industrial plant in Europe, outstripping all rivals, during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, in scientific research and industrial development. Setting out under Bismarck's leadership, the Germans had fused industry, science, and politics to make their country dominant upon the European Continent. The Kaiser and the Pan-Germans then followed the example of their neighbors and adopted a world policy, still applying the same methods to which Bismarck had introduced them. They committed themselves to making their country mighty at sea as well as invincible on land. This created a state of tension, not peculiar to Germany, but more typical of Germany than of any other country. And as the new century began, this tension increased not only inside Germany but throughout the rest of Europe, too.

2

The Lesser Two-Thirds of the Triple Alliance

*How Germany's Austrian and Italian allies made
the Triple Alliance serve conservative purposes
in Europe.*

PREVIEW

WHILE Germany's leaders prepared to dominate the future, Austria's leaders tried to preserve the past, as the Emperor Francis Joseph used eighteenth-century precautions to quarantine his people from twentieth-century influences. His Slavic subjects demanded the right of self-determination. Old Vienna seethed with new ideas. Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, straddled past and future, avoiding wholehearted commitments anywhere. Officially, the Vatican refused to recognize the newly unified Italian Kingdom; unofficially, the Vatican encouraged and welcomed the decision of Italy's leaders to strengthen their ties with the German and Austrian Empires. The Triple Alliance, originally the chief support of European stability, became more and more the chief support of European reaction. The main threat, both to stability and to reaction, lay in the explosive Balkans, where the Austrian and Russian Empires agreed, in 1897, to support the *status quo*. But could old empires keep new forces permanently in check?

• I •

IN 1900 the men who led Germany hoped soon to lead the world. They saw the new century as the German century. They looked to the past only for what it could teach them to prepare themselves and their country for the years ahead. They hoped to continue the course on which Frederick the Great and Bismarck had launched them. In 1900 the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire looked as longingly to the past as the German leaders looked to the future. They were more interested in restoring the eighteenth century than in dominating the twentieth. Primarily, they sought only to survive—if possible on their own terms. Let the Germans follow their young Kaiser on his career of expansion. Let

the world admire and fear the achievements of the new German Empire. The aged Emperor Francis Joseph had forgotten more than the Kaiser could ever know. The miracle of Austria's survival surpassed the miracle of Germany's expansion.

By 1900 Emperor Francis Joseph I had ruled over the ancestral Hapsburg lands for fifty-two years. He had come to the throne at the age of eighteen in the revolutionary year of 1848. After crushing republican uprisings in Vienna and subduing the Hungarian nationalists with the aid of the Russians, he spent the rest of his long life fighting a losing defensive battle against almost every change since the French Revolution. The Austrian Emperor had little in common with Kaiser William II of Germany. Francis Joseph belonged to the ancient and devoutly Catholic House of Hapsburg. He had lost one war to Italy and another to Germany. Tragedy had blighted his personal life. An assassin had killed his beautiful, unhappy Empress. His only son and heir, Rudolf, had committed suicide, together with his mistress, under circumstances that long remained mysterious.

Through all vicissitudes the old Emperor always held himself fast to the same rigid routine. He slept in the cot of a common soldier, rose at four every morning, bathed in a wooden tub that attendants wheeled into his room. He spent a full day reading and signing innumerable documents, holding conferences, attending official functions. He dined at five and retired at half past eight. Francis Joseph fought modernity in all its forms. He refused to use a telephone. Only once in his life—which did not end until 1916—did he ride in an automobile, and then only to oblige King Edward VII of England. He spoke German with the provincial accent of Vienna and said of himself that he was perfectly equipped by nature to arbitrate court etiquette. He agreed with his ancestor Emperor Joseph II, who once jokingly remarked that if he were to avoid his social inferiors he would have to spend his life in the Hapsburg burial vaults.

Shortly after the turn of the century Francis Joseph himself summed up his Empire this way: "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is no fanciful work of art, but an absolute necessity for the present and future existence of her peoples. It is a refuge for those fragmentary nations of Central Europe which, without a common home, would have a deplorable existence and be tossed about by all their more powerful neighbors; whereas so long as they are joined together, they themselves constitute an imposing power." Or, as an Austrian essayist summed it up, "If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her."

A common frontier and a common language brought the German and Austrian Empires into their anachronistic alliance. Their combined territories formed a solid, strategic unit, extending from the

North Sea to the Mediterranean; from the Vosges to the Carpathian Mountains. Austrian power had extended over most of Germany before the new Germany made itself felt in any part of Austria, and Emperor Francis Joseph never forgave or forgot Bismarck's six weeks' Blitzkrieg of 1866. The next year, hoping for future revenge, Francis Joseph made extraordinary concessions to his troublesome Hungarian subjects. He set up, with the full co-operation of the Hungarian leaders, the so-called Dual Monarchy in which he performed three separate functions—as Emperor of Austria, as King of Hungary, and as Joint Monarch in matters affecting finances, defense, and foreign relations.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

*Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria
During His Later Years*

As Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph made himself benevolent despot of a primarily Slavic state. He appointed his own Prime Minister, but he relied much more on the so-called "Iron Ring" of German Catholics and certain selected Slavic leaders, especially Poles. As King of Hungary he functioned more or less as a figurehead. Feudal landowners still dominated the country, governing through a strong Prime Minister and a compact Parliament. The Rumanian minority in Transylvania and the South Slav minority in Croatia counted for far less than the Slavic majority in Austria. As Joint Monarch, Francis Joseph gave his Empire every attribute of a great power except the most important one of all—unity of spirit.

Although the Dual Monarchy kept the Slavs in their place and gave the Germans and Hungarians a privileged position, it did not achieve its original purpose of bringing Prussia to heel—just the opposite, in fact. Austria-Hungary could not possibly bend the new German Empire to its will. Instead, Austria-Hungary relied increasingly on the new German Empire for protection against the rising power of Russia and the Slavic world: the simultaneous rise of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism forced the young Kaiser and the old Emperor closer together. "Prussia has not enough body for her soul; Austria has no soul for her very ample body," announced the German nationalist writer Lagarde. His

words appealed more strongly to the young Kaiser than to the old Emperor, who tried only to hold his own.

• II •

FRANCIS JOSEPH had almost as little use for his Pan-German friends as for his Pan-Slavic enemies. He regarded his own ancient House of Hapsburg as greater and more deserving of support than any national group. Striving to hold his ramshackle, mongrel Empire together, he nevertheless saw the handwriting on the wall: "God grants me this long life," he declared, "in order that the end of this ancient Empire may be delayed a little while. After my death it is sure to come."

Yet this outdated, limited old man had made himself, long before 1900, the sole if insufficient symbol of unity for his forty-five million subjects—Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Croats, Serbians, Italians, Jews, and Ukrainians. At its best, the Austro-Hungarian Empire foreshadowed a genuine, multinational United States of Europe, held together by economic interest yet permitting wide local autonomy. At its worst, it perpetuated feudal privilege, national repression, and clerical reaction.

In 1871 the Austrian essayist Ferdinand Kronberger summarized the Austrian character as follows: "Austria is not really unintelligible; it must be comprehended as a kind of Asia. 'Europe' and 'Asia' are really very precise ideas. Europe means law; Asia means arbitrary rule. Europe means respect for facts; Asia means the purely personal. Europe is the man; Asia is at once the old man and the child." He continued: "The way our people, lively, light-living, changeable, dance up to all things with verve and grace is very like a children's ball. But note well that in all this South German liveliness and Slav changeability, in this rapid whirl of *persons* the thing itself remains Asiatically stiff, inert, conservative, dead as the Sphinx and spectrally hoary, not having budged an inch since Biblical times."

A quarter of a century later the Social Democratic leader Dr. Viktor Adler offered another interpretation, this time on the theme of Austrian liberty: "Austrian liberty is a hybrid creature, midway between Russian liberty and German liberty. Apart from France and England, Austria has perhaps the most liberal legislation in all Europe and seems almost to be a republic with a crowned head instead of a president at the summit. Unfortunately, in practice it is not the provision of the law but the whim of the police officer in question which counts. The police officer is empowered to suspend all legal liberties, and as you may imagine, he uses and misuses this power abundantly. The Austrian Government is equally incapable of performing an act of justice or of re-

pression with thoroughness. It sways hither and thither. It is a system of despotism, tempered by mismanagement."

The new German Empire had emerged suddenly; the old Hapsburg Empire had evolved gradually. But Europe had produced them both, and both were equally typical of Europe, in different ways. Under the Kaiser's leadership the German Empire had embarked on an expansionist course, following in the wake of the maritime nations of Western Europe, most of which had tried at one time or another to build themselves empires overseas. The Empire of Austria-Hungary had taken a different road. It had never gone in for overseas expansion; it had but one seaport, Trieste, on the land-locked, British-controlled Mediterranean, and no merchant marine or navy to speak of. Most of Francis Joseph's subjects lived, not too well, off the land. Unlike the more highly industrialized peoples of Western Europe, they did not depend on world trade or foreign investments. But if the Austro-Hungarian Empire had escaped some of the class conflicts that had broken out from time to time in Western Europe, it had also failed to put through the democratic reforms to which these conflicts had given rise. And if Austria-Hungary had also avoided the risks of colonial imperialism, it practiced an imperialism of its own within its own frontiers, by treating various national minorities—and even one national majority, in the case of the Slavs—as second-class citizens.

Not forever could the Hapsburg lands escape the revolutions in agriculture and industry that were changing the world. The farm lands of Central and Southeastern Europe, from Poland down across Austria-Hungary and on into the Balkans, could no longer support all the people who tried to live on them. They could not compete on world markets against the more and more efficient methods of the Western Hemisphere and Australia. The feudal system still generally prevailed, forcing more and more landless peasants to seek jobs in the towns and cities or to emigrate overseas. Industry throughout most of the Austro-Hungarian Empire lagged far behind industry in Western Europe, but the urban population was increasing. Industrial workers joined trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. The lower middle class sought more violent remedies for its deeper frustrations.

Demagogues and nationalists appealed to this middle-class discontent. Three times, before the turn of the century, the populace of Vienna elected one of these demagogues, Dr. Karl Lüger, as Mayor. Three times the Emperor prevailed on him to take the position of Vice-Mayor. Finally, in 1900, the Emperor gave way to the will of the people. Yet Lüger, the people's choice, owed much of his popularity to his anti-Semitism. He declared that two million Austro-Hungarian Jews had wormed their way into positions of money and power; that 75 per cent


of the journalists in Vienna and 90 per cent of the journalists in Budapest were Jews. Lügér appealed to the same elements in Austria that later followed Hitler in Germany. These people, clinging or trying to rise to shabby gentility, felt that society had conspired against them. They resented the newly rich; they despised the Social Democrats; they knew the aristocrats despised them. Many who did not accept Dr. Lügér's rabid racial doctrines became equally rabid, but more respectable, nationalists. Those who came of German stock feared and hated the Slavs. Many Austrian Poles feared and hated the Russians. The old Emperor had no use for fanatics of any kind and did what he could to preserve peace in Europe and order at home. The ponderous forces of inertia and lethargy worked on his side.

• III •

OLD FRANCIS JOSEPH'S power rested on four time-honored foundations: the Army, the police, the Church, and the bureaucracy. The Army differed radically from the Kaiser's Prussian-controlled military machine. It had old-fashioned equipment. Its officers did not come from any one privileged caste or national grouping. They had to speak many languages and dialects in order to command their polyglot troops. A career in the Austro-Hungarian Army meant hard work, low pay, and slow promotion by merit. Few Austrians, from the Emperor down, looked upon war as a useful instrument of national policy. The Germans had made war pay; the Austrians had suffered nothing but losses in every war they fought during Francis Joseph's reign. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of Staff, repeatedly advised the Emperor to launch a "preventive war" against his Italian ally or to crush his smaller Serbian neighbor—advice that the Emperor, citing past experience, resisted.

Although the Army had no responsibility for the domestic peace, its multinational character promoted popular unity. To maintain order Francis Joseph looked elsewhere—to the police. This all-pervasive organization kept watch over religion, education, the press, and the theater. In fact, the official Austrian handbook, *Polizeiwissenschaft*, written in the early nineteenth century by a man named Sonnenfels and still the standard work in Francis Joseph's time, defined police rule as everything having to do with the internal safety of the state. The Austrian police maintained thousands of informers and other hirelings who checked up on individuals and launched rumors and news items favorable to the established Hapsburg order. The Austrian police seldom resorted to violence. Warnings and minor reprisals generally sufficed. The proper approach to the right person usually cleared up any difficulty.

"Among the most efficacious means of maintaining good morals and manners," wrote Sonnenfels, "religion undoubtedly deserves the first place. Religion supplies the deficiencies of legislation. Wherever the eye of the legislator and the penalty of the judge cannot reach, religion is present to check by her threats the evil enterprises of the individual. Therefore the ruler must not neglect this rein and must carefully see that every citizen has religion." And he added, "Control of the clergy is an essential feature in the policing of religion."



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Cathedral of St. Stephen, Vienna

Although the Hapsburg Emperor had to belong to the Roman Catholic faith, the Church in Austria was not a state church but an ecclesiastical department of the Empire. Francis Joseph recognized his obligations to the Vatican; he and his court observed the letter and the spirit of their religion. But he had his imperial obligations, too, and as Emperor he granted his subjects complete freedom of worship, nor did he take after some of his ancestors and proselytize for his Church. He played the part of an eighteenth-century, not a sixteenth-century, ruler. At the same time, the power of clerical politicians and Jesuit priests ran strong throughout the Hapsburg lands.

Wickham Steed, in *The Hapsburg Empire*, defines clericalism as "the abuse of religious allegiance and of legitimate ecclesiastical organization for political and economic purposes." The Christian Social Party, which drew its following from the peasants and the lower middle classes, combined loyalty to the Emperor with reverence for the Pope. It provided the throne with its widest popular support and received its own inspiration from the Jesuit order, whose motto "*Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam*" does not imply that the end always justifies the means, but does assume that anything done for the greater glory of God justifies itself.

Politics in the parliamentary sense counted for little in the Austria of 1900. In fact, it required the combined pressure of the Emperor and the anticlerical Social Democrats to establish universal suffrage, five years after the turn of the century, and even then the public officials elected by the people had little real power. Nor had the clerical and Jesuit

leaders done much better in their chosen field. A devout foreign friar who visited the Hapsburg capital at the turn of the century lamented, "In all Vienna I have not found a single human soul."

In his determination to preserve things as they were and always had been, Francis Joseph came to depend more and more upon the bureaucracy. In theory, the Austrian bureaucracy acted as the civil service through which the Emperor transacted the business of the state. In practice, the Austrian bureaucrat differed from the civil servant in that the civil servant, as his name suggests, acts as the servant of the people whereas the bureaucrat regards himself as the source of power and considers the people mere objects of government. Under Francis Joseph's interminable reign, the Austrian bureaucracy steadily extended its power. An elaborate hierarchy spread its spiderlike network across the Hapsburg lands, entwining and entangling individuals and institutions in its endlessly spreading web of red tape. The simplest transaction required either the personal good offices of the right official—who could often circumvent his own routine—or, failing that, an elaborate ritual in which every document—to quote the original and untranslatable German—had to be *präsentiert*, *exhibiert*, *indiziert*, *prioriert*, *konzipiert*, *revidiert*, *approbiert*, *mundiert*, *kollationiert*, *expediert*, and *registriert*. Thus the bureaucrat achieved his two life purposes: he asserted his authority and kept his job.

By 1900 private enterprise as well as affairs of state had become largely bureaucratized throughout the Hapsburg lands. Many bureaucrats served their country only long enough to become entitled to a pension, whereupon they would exploit their connections by taking well-paid positions with the larger banks, industries, and businesses, which swallowed up the smaller ones as more and more bureaucrats divided their careers between serving the state and amassing private fortunes. The same strait jacket which had sustained the old Austria warped and stunted the new.


• IV •

THE HISTORY of the Hapsburgs' imperial capital dated back to the days of ancient Rome. In outward appearance it looked more German than Latin, but it possessed a cosmopolitan soul. Vienna in 1900 had become the capital of a United States of Eastern Europe; it was the commercial and cultural center of the Balkans as well as of the Hapsburg lands. Vienna had never produced a poet, a painter, or a philosopher of world stature, but it had brought forth more than its share of great composers. At the turn of the century Vienna still led the world in music and had become almost equally celebrated for its medical research.

The year 1900 witnessed the publication of a book that made its author famous: *The Significance of Dreams*, by Dr. Sigmund Freud, a Viennese neurologist of Jewish descent in his middle forties. Freud had spent a year in France studying under Dr. Charcot, the foremost neurologist in Europe, and had put in the next decade working on the treatment of hysteria with Dr. Breuer, one of the top neurologists in Vienna. Freud did not hypnotize his patients; he urged them to talk to him freely, fully, without inhibition, and from this "free association of ideas" he reconstructed and restored shattered personalities. His lectures and writings on this new therapy attracted universal attention. Freud was the first man to demonstrate that our dreams release our suppressed emotions, and he traced most of these suppressions back to sex and earliest infancy, when sex life begins.

"We believe," said Freud, "that civilization was forged by the driving force of vital necessity, at the cost of instinct satisfaction, and that the process is to a large extent constantly repeated anew, since each individual who newly enters the human community repeats the sacrifices of his instinct satisfaction for the sake of the common good. Among the instinctive forces, the sexual impulses play a significant role. They are thereby sublimated, that is, they are diverted from their sexual goals and directed toward socially higher ends that are no longer sexual." Neurosis threatens when "each individual who wishes to ally himself with the achievements of civilization is exposed to the danger of having his sexual instincts rebel against this sublimation."

Freud created his own Esperanto that intellectuals the world over soon learned. Complexes, fixations, sublimations, and repressions acquired new meanings and overtones. Terms like "id" and "superego" made their way into all languages. Yet only a handful of people could afford to submit themselves to "deep psychoanalysis," and at first only the medical profession studied the words and works of the master—usually with disagreement and disapproval. Speaking in 1910 before a small congress of psychoanalysts in the German city of Nuremberg, Freud blurted out a fear that he rarely revealed: "Most of you are Jews and therefore you are incompetent to win friends to the new teaching."



CULVER SERVICE

Dr. Sigmund Freud in Later Life

Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form ties in the world of general science. I am getting on in years and am weary of being perpetually attacked. We are all in danger. They won't leave me a coat to my back."

Freud felt nothing but pride in his own Jewish ancestry; he even remarked that it was "perhaps no mere chance that the first psychoanalyst was a Jew." But the atmosphere of Vienna made him fearful for the future of his race; the reception that greeted his new theories made him fearful for the future of his doctrine. Some bigoted converts to Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy's "Christian Science" spoke scornfully of the "Jewish Science" of Dr. Freud. Nietzsche had described psychoanalysis as "a Jewish transvaluation of all values," but the witty German historian Egon Friedell pronounced this verdict on psychoanalysis in his *Cultural History of the Modern Age*: "Psychoanalysis is in truth a sect, with all the signs and symbols of one—rites and ceremonies, exorcisms and cathartic consultations, oracle and mantic, settled symbolism and dogmatism, secret doctrine and popular edition, proselytes and renegades, priests who are subjected to tests, and daughter sects which damn each other in turn. Just as the whale, though a mammal, poses as a fish, so psychoanalysis, actually a religion, poses as a science."

Would the psychoanalyst's couch someday replace the priest's confessional box? The parallels and conflicts between psychoanalysis and religion received wide attention, and the decision of Freud, the religious agnostic, to bring up his six children in the Jewish faith showed the importance he himself attached to religion as an institution. He never doubted that persons of Jewish ancestry must keep alive the faith of their fathers, especially in twentieth-century Vienna, where the Jewish community had reason to fear the future.

How appropriate, then, that the same Vienna which produced Dr. Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, also produced Dr. Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Zionism. Herzl, a rising journalist and playwright, still on the sunny side of forty, had seen anti-Semitism spread from Russia to Austria and from Austria to France, where, as a working newspaperman, he had covered the first trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus in 1894. In fact, it was the impact of the Dreyfus case—which belongs with the history of France—that led young Herzl to propose a revival of the Zionist movement which had periodically excited various Jewish communities for more than a thousand years. The Zionist program called for the mass migration of Jews to Palestine. In 1897 the Zionists held their first international congress in Switzerland for the purpose of "establishing for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine." At that time the Holy Land belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and Sultan Abdul Hamid sought to wipe out the

memory of recent Turkish massacres of Armenians by hinting that he might support the Zionist program. It soon appeared that the Sultan had no intention of granting the Jews any concessions, but Dr. Herzl's movement snowballed and received financial support in Western Europe and the United States while arousing wide enthusiasm among the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe.

It was no accident that Vienna gave birth to both psychoanalysis and Zionism. Only a worldly-wise capital, steeped in religious tradition and half atrophied with self-consciousness, could produce the



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Dr. Theodor Herzl, Founder of Modern Zionism

father of modern psychoanalysis. And this same atmosphere responded to the first stirrings of modern anti-Semitism—not the ignorant prejudice of the Russian peasant but the violent neurosis of a frustrated middle class. On its engaging surface, however, the Vienna of 1900 seemed a center of gaiety. Thirty years later the Austrian artist Paul Cohen-Portheim, looking back on the Vienna of his boyhood, recalled its spirit in *The Discovery of Europe*:*

"Vienna was the last great aristocrat among the European capitals in a bourgeois age; it had not moved with the times, it had ignored them. It had an inimitable flavor of its own, compounded as autumn is of surface gaiety and underlying *Wehmut*, which means nostalgia but remains untranslatable. It is a mixture difficult to describe but easy to illustrate for it is that of all great and typically Austrian music from Mozart and Schubert to Johann Strauss, and even Lehár. When gay, it is never exuberant, never a whirl (and at the opposite pole from a scream or a screech); there is always an undertone of melancholy, of the sense of instability, of approaching end, whether it is a dance tune like "The Blue Danube" or Schubert's "Unfinished" Symphony. But if it is nostalgia, it is never desperate; it is resigned; it dissolves in harmony. Autumn lingered long in Vienna and it was sunny and beautiful, but one knew that winter was bound to follow. There was plenty of the joy of life, but it was aware of the threat of death, and of the two was made the peculiar atmosphere of all that was Viennese and of most of what was Austrian."

And, referring to the turn of the century, Cohen-Portheim wrote:

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
Austrian Rathaus (Parliament), Vienna

"About 1900, the atmosphere of Vienna was that of Paris before the Great Revolution; there were that same incomparable refinement and elegance, mixed with forebodings of disaster."

• V •

GERMANY'S SOLDIERS and sailors, bankers and industrialists harnessed twentieth-century science to their aggressive purposes. Austria's aristocrats and bureaucrats, police and prelates tried to press the hands of the clock back as strenuously as the Germans tried to press them forward. But even in Austria the new century refused to be denied. Thus it was old-fashioned Vienna, not modern Berlin, that produced two of the most revolutionary doctrines of the new century: psychoanalysis and Zionism.

Francis Joseph felt no need for psychoanalysis. He saw no need for Zionism. All he wanted was to extend to all his subjects the right to elect local officials and a national legislature; he did not, however, propose to surrender any of his own powers. He knew that the chief, immediate threat to his Empire came from Slavic nationalists at home and abroad, but he disagreed with those, like Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, who wanted to appease the Slavs by giving them equal



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Neptune Spring and Gloriette from Imperial Palace of Schönbrunn, Vienna

representation with the Germans and Hungarians and transforming the Dual into a Triple Monarchy. More sensitive than his superannuated uncle to the popular movements of his time, the Archduke saw no future for the House of Hapsburg unless it could attract the support of its Slavic subjects. His wife may have influenced his views on this matter, because Francis Ferdinand had married a Czech baroness, Sophie Chotek, who had no royal blood in her veins. Tradition therefore forced him to renounce his children's rights to the succession, and his wife had to accept an inferior status at the Vienna court. The Emperor detested his nephew for having contracted such a misalliance; the Kaiser, on the other hand, always cultivated the Archduke and delighted in according his wife honors in Berlin that Francis Joseph had denied her in Vienna.

The Archduke's plan to transform Austria-Hungary from a Dual into a Triple Monarchy did not interest the Kaiser one way or the other. He simply enjoyed playing the Archduke off against the Emperor. The Kaiser's diplomats followed a more devious course. Some students of the period believe that the Germans virtually forced the Austrians to maintain their dual system in order to keep them weak and subservient. Certainly German diplomats played a double game with their Austrian and Italian allies. Count Bülow once declared that Austria and Italy had only two alternatives—alliance or war. He therefore tried to prevent



The Hapsburg Lands and Their Peoples: Principal nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire

the Austrians and Italians from getting along together so well that they would be able to get along without Germany but at the same time played the part of indispensable mediator whenever trouble threatened. Austria and Italy had a common interest in preventing Slavic influence from overrunning the Balkans. On the other hand, several million Italians still lived in *Italia irredenta*—"Unredeemed Italy"—under Hapsburg rule. The Italian city of Trieste belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary and served as Central Europe's chief trade outlet on the Mediterranean. But the Pan-Germans also had their eyes on Trieste and therefore used their influence to block any general Austro-Italian settlement that might have thwarted their own ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe.

Italy in 1900 amounted to no more than the lesser half of the lesser two-thirds of the Triple Alliance. Its people grew most of their own food, but they had to import almost all their coal, oil, and raw materials. They also lay at the mercy of the British fleet, which controlled the Mediterranean. Italian diplomats could not, therefore, follow an independent foreign policy but had to play one great power off against the other. Minor powers have done this repeatedly; none for a longer time or with more success than Italy.


The fact that the Vatican lay inside Rome gave Italian diplomats a

further and unique advantage, an advantage that the Vatican shared. To begin with, Italians formed a majority of the College of Cardinals, which had elected Italian Popes for centuries. This meant that Italian influence ran strong at the Vatican. But the influence of the Vatican did not run with corresponding strength in Italy. By 1870 the newly unified Kingdom had stripped the Pope of his temporal power over Rome and the surrounding Papal States, and established "a free church in a free state." Pope Pius IX, however, refused to recognize the claims of the new Italian state; he preferred to regard himself as the prisoner of that state. Appeals went out from the Vatican to the faithful, all over the world, picturing the Pope as a prisoner, lying on a bed of straw, begging for Peter's pence—which duly arrived in a broad, golden stream.

Soon the Vatican and the Kingdom of Italy found it to their mutual advantage to agree to disagree. The anticlericals who had led the fight for Italian unification felt reassured. They opposed anything resembling appeasement of the Pope. Non-Italian Roman Catholics also approved. They felt that Italy had enough influence at the Vatican already. Closer relations between their Universal Church and the Italian national state might compromise their Church's universality. Even the Vatican found that the new arrangement had its points. The Pope in the role of martyr evoked a sympathy that he had not enjoyed as long as he had remained a temporal ruler who often had to turn to the temporal rulers of other states to defend his absolute powers in Rome and the papal lands.

Two remarkable Popes steered the Vatican through the difficult second half of the nineteenth century. In 1870 the Vatican proclaimed the doctrine of papal infallibility, declaring that when the Pope spoke *ex cathedra* on matters of faith and morals he spoke with final authority. This proclamation seemed to fall in with the same world-wide trend that had given the Union victory over the Confederacy in the American Civil War and that had unified Italy and Germany. Organizations that did not tighten their bonds during the latter half of the nineteenth century could hardly expect to survive the stresses and strains of the twentieth.

Neither Pope Pius IX nor his more gentle successor, Leo XIII, ever abandoned his temporal claims to the former papal lands. Neither of them ever recognized the claims of the Italian state. But Leo XIII accepted the inevitable and later became known as "The Workingman's Pope" because his encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, recognized the rights of labor unions and called upon employers to show more consideration for their employees. Pope Pius was the first Pope since medieval times to exercise his duties for more than a quarter of a century. Pope Leo, who succeeded him in 1878, lived until 1903, when at the age of ninety-three




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St. Peter's, Rome

he too celebrated his twenty-fifth anniversary in office. As had frequently happened before, a liberal Pope replaced a conservative Pope, and between them these two remarkable pontiffs brought the Vatican into the twentieth century with improved organization and enhanced prestige.

In relation to the Triple Alliance the Vatican played a special role. It looked with favor upon the royal houses of Spain and Austria, both of which traditionally adhered to the Roman Catholic faith, and both of which had also kept their countries largely uncontaminated by the French Revolution and its doctrine of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The Vatican had always fought the French Revolution and still regarded it as the most dangerous source of modern heresies since the Protestant Reformation. The German Empire, in spite of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, seemed a lesser evil—partly because of its good relations with Austria and the Italian clericals, and partly because it opposed Republican France and Tsarist Russia, which persecuted Roman Catholic Poles and made the Eastern Orthodox Church its official religion.

In 1900 the British also continued to approve the Triple Alliance. It still seemed to them a stabilizing force, whereas France and Russia appeared dissatisfied and even hostile—France because of Britain's strong position in Africa, Russia because of Britain's strong position in Asia. As for the growing faction of Italian expansionists, they resented French influence in Africa much as the French resented British influence. An Italian attempt to conquer the independent African kingdom of Abyssinia had ended disastrously in 1896 at the Battle of Adowa, where native forces won their first victory in history over a modern European army and forced Italy to respect Abyssinian independence. The Italian expansionists blamed their humiliation on the refusal of the French to support their campaign and concluded that they had no choice but to keep at least one foot firmly planted in the camp of the



BROWN BROTHERS

Pope Pius IX

BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Pope Leo XIII in 1878


Triple Alliance. This left the other foot free to kick or run in any convenient direction.

• VI •

MANY ITALIANS took pride in their newly recovered unity, but the peasants lived hardly better than the peasants of Eastern Europe, and unrest ran strong among the industrial workers. Even those who called themselves socialists preferred the anarchism of Bakunin to the socialism of Marx. The anarchists—or syndicalists—believed only in their own trade unions. They had little use for democracy and reform. They opposed state power as such and many regarded assassination as a necessary political weapon. After one Italian anarchist failed to kill King Humbert in 1897, another—who had spent some years in the United States—succeeded on July 29, 1900. But the assassination boomeranged. It stirred wide popular sympathy for the House of Savoy and brought the promising young Victor Emmanuel III to the throne.

Italy lived under a constitutional monarchy, and at the time of King Humbert's death the Liberals had just formed a ministry that a majority in the Chamber of Deputies supported. The anarchists had turned many trade unionists against parliamentary democracy, whereupon the Liberals and their middle-class supporters turned imperialist and joined the clericals in supporting the Triple Alliance. All this played into the hands of the Pan-Germans, who hoped to dominate the crumbling Hapsburg Empire in Southeastern Europe, as they hoped to dominate the crumbling Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor.

During the nineteenth century "the unspeakable Turk"—later known as "the sick man of Europe"—had received extraordinary favors from many of Europe's best people. The British and French had fought on the side of the Turks against the Russians in the Crimean War; twenty years later the British concentrated their Mediterranean Fleet at the



BROWN BROTHERS

King Victor Emmanuel of Italy and His Wife Take a Spin in an Early Electric-Powered Automobile

Dardanelles when the Russians threatened to follow up their land victories over the Turks with a naval attack upon Constantinople. Bismarck and Disraeli then worked together at the Congress of Berlin to compel the Russians to hand back some of the concessions they had just won from the Turks in the Balkans.

It was not that the British or anyone else hated the Turks less: it was that they feared the Russians more. Turkey in charge of the Dardanelles menaced no major power directly. Russia at the Dardanelles would become a new, potent factor in the Mediterranean, outflanking the Austrians in the Balkans and threatening the British lifeline to India and the British position in the Middle East. Turkey, as the lesser evil, therefore had powerful friends in Europe. Moreover, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the prospect of a Turkish collapse alarmed all the major powers. The Austrians feared that the expulsion of Turkish influence from the Balkans would strengthen South Slav nationalism inside and outside the Hapsburg lands. The Germans wanted Turkey shored up so that they could increase their growing influence with the Sultan and build their Berlin-Bagdad Railway. The British feared that Russia would fill the vacuum that the liquidation of Turkey would leave behind. The French and the Russians dreaded the possibility of a general European war in the scramble that would inevitably follow if the ex-

tensive Turkish Empire in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa suddenly collapsed.

In 1897 the prospect of trouble in the Balkans forced even the Austrians and the Russians to get together. Ever since the Austrian leaders had discovered that Bismarck made a treaty with Russia behind their backs they had wanted to give the Germans a small dose of the same medicine. The chance came after Tsar Nicholas II of Russia visited Vienna in 1896. The next year, while Emperor Francis Joseph paid a return visit to St. Petersburg, the Austrian and Russian Foreign Ministers announced that the Emperor and the Tsar were determined to maintain peace, order, and the *status quo*. A few months later the "two powers principally interested in the Balkans," as they called themselves, followed up this general proclamation with a specific agreement repudiating conquest and endorsing the *status quo*.

During the course of the negotiations Austria's genial Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, suggested that the Hapsburg Empire annex the Balkan provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Berlin Congress of 1878 had assigned these two regions to Austrian administration but had left them nominally under Turkish rule. Any change in this dual status required the previous consent of all the major European powers that had signed the Treaty of Berlin. The Tsar, however, refused to consider the Austrian request, and the Austrians gladly signed the new agreement anyway.

The 1897 agreement between Russia and Austria had two merits. It showed that two rival Empires, with clashing ambitions, could reach agreement to maintain the *status quo*. It also showed that the sovereigns and statesmen of these two Empires recognized the importance of Southeastern Europe. They had met and mastered a major, not a minor, problem—at any rate for the time being. But could these autocratic sovereigns and reactionary statesmen preserve the *status quo* at all times and in all places?



CULVER

"The Unspeakable Turk": Gladstone's name for Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey

SUMMING UP

THE MIRACLE of Austria's imperial survival more than matched the miracle of Germany's imperial expansion. Both Empires breathed the spirit of Europe: Austria the spirit of the cosmopolitan, tolerant, aristocratic eighteenth century, Germany the spirit of the nationalistic, aggressive, scientific twentieth. Austria's old Emperor Francis Joseph relied on old institutions to preserve old ways of life, but new ideas broke through just the same. Vienna had far more intellectual vitality than Berlin. It produced Dr. Freud and psychoanalysis, Theodor Herzl and Zionism.

Italy, not Austria, formed the weakest link in the chain that held the Triple Alliance together. To begin with, Italy did not pledge the Triple Alliance full support. In the second place, the warmest Italian adherents of the Triple Alliance were also the coolest adherents of the national movement that had once again unified the Italian people. The chief threat to the Triple Alliance came from Russian and Pan-Slav expansion in Eastern Europe, and it was this threat that held Germany, Austria, and even Italy together. All Europe feared the impending breakup of the Turkish Empire and the subsequent scramble for the spoils. Indeed, the fear became so great that the Austrian and Russian Empires concluded a surprise agreement to preserve the *status quo* in the explosive Balkans. German ambitions in Western Europe and overseas caused less alarm than the fears, suspicions, and rivalries of all the major powers of Europe in the Balkan peninsula and the Middle East.

3

The Russian World

How Russia, which had tried to remain a world unto itself, became an active force in both Europe and Asia as the twentieth century began.

PREVIEW

FOR ALMOST A thousand years the Russians had lived in a world of their own, half European, half Asiatic. They got their Eastern Orthodox Christianity from Byzantium, their Tsarist despotism from the Mongols, but they created their own system of collective farming and co-operative industry. The Russians did not emerge from their Middle Ages until the eighteenth century. They had their Renaissance in the nineteenth. The Russia of 1900 ran to extremes. The absolute rule of the Tsars produced violent reactions among the peasantry, the proletariat, and the intellectuals. Russian nationalists preached Pan-Slavism, but a sudden crisis in Asia forced them to concentrate for the moment on the Far East. The weak young Tsar Nicholas II hopefully summoned an international peace conference at The Hague to promote disarmament and compulsory arbitration. Its failure showed Russia and the world that power politics still prevailed.

• I •

TO THE PEOPLE of Europe, Russia seemed more than half Asiatic. To the people of Asia, Russia seemed more than half European. The Russians knew themselves to be a Eurasian power with interests in both Europe and Asia, primarily concerned with developing their own vast continental homeland on both the European and the Asiatic sides of the Ural Mountains, which formed the backbone of their Empire.

The population of the Russian Empire in 1900 numbered some one hundred and thirty million. Eighty-five million of them were Great Russians. The remaining forty-five million included other Slavic peoples—Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles—as well as Finns, Jews, Georgians, Mongols, Tatars, and dozens of smaller groups. It was the Great Russian majority that had begun building the Russian Empire, before the

year 1000, moving eastward against the sun, and gradually extending their power until it covered more than one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. The nations of Western Europe built colonial empires overseas. The Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians had imposed their systems on their neighbors and founded empires based on national and racial discrimination. The Russians had assimilated the more primitive peoples of Asia into their domain and by sheer force of numbers had subjected the more advanced people of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states to their Empire's comparatively backward rule.

Nature had shut off Russia from the outside world. No major river emptied into the ice-free waters of any open sea. It was not for want of trying that the Russians had failed to break through these geographic barriers. Peter the Great had given his country a "window on Europe" when he established the city of St. Petersburg on the Baltic. Other Russian Tsars had tried in vain to push their way to Constantinople and to the Persian Gulf. But the path of least resistance lay eastward, across Asia, and finally ended at the ice-free port of Vladivostok on the Pacific.

For almost a thousand years three influences continued to pervade Russian civilization. First, the Russians got their Christianity from Byzantium, not from Rome. Second, many Russians had lived for generations under the absolutist rule of the Mongols. Third, the Russians had remained banded together from time immemorial in collective, socialized communities.

The Eastern Orthodox Church, which had converted Russia to Christianity before the year 1000, refused to recognize the Roman Catholic Pope as the sole Vicar of Christ on earth. It never laid claim, as the Vatican did, to independent, temporal authority. The decentralized, spiritual Eastern Orthodox Church proved less able to weather the storms and stresses of the modern age than the centralized Church Militant of Rome, with its continued interest in temporal power. Just before the beginning of the eighteenth century Peter the Great coolly made the Orthodox Church in Russia a department of the state, and in the early nineteenth century "The Tsar is the head of the Church" became one of the laws of the Russian Empire. Francis Joseph of Austria knew his Vatican too well and respected it too much to go to such lengths. And, logically enough, the complete subjugation of the Russian church to the Russian state led, not to the reform of the state but to the corruption of the church. More different sects had always flourished within the lax Eastern Orthodox fold than under the tighter discipline of Rome, but with an autocratic state taking over, organized religion in Russia lost much of its spiritual appeal and most of its spiritual integrity.

The absolutist traditions and practices of the Tsars further weakened the power of religion. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Russians had lived under Mongol rule, based on unquestioning obedience—first to the family, then to the clan, then to the state. From the Mongols the Russians also got the idea of developing their state on the basis of universal service. These Mongol practices suited the conditions under which the Russians themselves lived, and the Russians developed them in their own way. Russian peasants banded together in *mirs*, or collective farms; Russian city dwellers lived and worked in groups known as *artels*, or co-operative communities. At the same time an all-powerful state demanded unquestioning obedience from all its subjects—for their own good.


During the nineteenth century, racial and national feeling became more and more pronounced in the Russian Empire. On the positive side it took the form of Pan-Slavism. On the negative side it took the form of anti-Semitic pogroms and persecution of the Polish and Finnish minorities, whom the dominant Russians feared because—like the Jews—the Poles and Finns had long and proud traditions. The strength and weakness of the Russian people lay in the fact that most of them still lived a primitive life, close to the soil. They had the vigor of an earth-bound people, but they had not yet developed much immunity to the diseases of civilization. The spirit of the modern age which had successively inspired the Spanish, the French, the British, and the Germans had reached the Russians at a time when the older cultures of Western Europe were showing their first signs of degeneration and decay.

The primitive condition of the Russian masses and the corruption and inefficiency of their rulers made a deceptive impression on the outside world. In 1900 four out of five Russians could neither read nor write. No wonder many Europeans regarded them as backward, degenerate, or both. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Europe “discovered” Russian “culture,” largely through the Russian ballet. The fact was that for centuries the Russians had excelled in many branches of the theatrical arts. Their actors performed European classics and native dramas, too. Russian composers—Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov—won European reputations. And although the Russians lagged behind Europe and the United States in the sciences, their literary output during the nineteenth century rivaled, if it did not surpass, the achievement of any other country during a comparable period of time. In Tolstoy, Russia produced a world genius on a par with Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, or Goethe. Nor did Tolstoy stand alone. Many Russians still regard Pushkin (whose poetry loses much in translation) as a writer of equal rank. Pushkin’s contemporaries, Lermontov



SOVFOTO

Maxim Gorky (right) Visits Count Leo Tolstoy on His Eightieth Birthday at the Tolstoy Estate of Yasnaya Polyana



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

*Feodor Dostoevsky, One of the Titans of Russian Literature.
From a contemporary painting*

and Gogol, remain Russian classics. Their successors, Turgenev, Andreev, and Chekhov, have become world-renowned.

As Tolstoy earned a place in world literature comparable to Goethe's, so Dostoevsky earned a place comparable to Nietzsche's. As Nietzsche's cult of the Superman and his doctrine of the will to power reflected the German obsession with brute force, so Dostoevsky's sympathy for the insulted and injured and his mystical faith in the power of Christian forgiveness reflected Russia's messianic complex. Dostoevsky led as neurotic a life as Nietzsche, but a less monastic one. He drank, gambled, suffered from epilepsy. During a period of several years' exile in Siberia, his jailers tortured him by making him face a firing squad, reprieving him at the last moment. Yet Dostoevsky triumphed over every handicap and hardship, turning them all to account. He looked as deeply as Nietzsche into the darkest corners of the human soul. He foresaw the evils of the Russian Revolution as clearly as Nietzsche foresaw the evils of Germany's counterrevolution; witness this outburst from one of the would-be revolutionaries in *The Possessed*: "Culture is unnecessary; we've had enough of science! Without science we have material enough for a thousand years, but one must maintain discipline. The only thing that is lacking in the world is discipline. The thirst for culture is an aristocratic search. The moment you have a family or love, you get a desire for property. We will destroy that desire: we will make use of

drunkenness, slander, spying; we'll make use of incredible corruption; we'll stifle every genius in its infancy. Everything to one common denominator, complete equality."

This same character—like his creator—believed in Russia as passionately as Nietzsche disbelieved in Germany: "If a great people does not believe that the truth is to be found in it alone (in itself alone and exclusively in itself), if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to raise up and save all by its truth, it at once ceases to be a great nation, and at once turns into ethnographical material and not into a great people. A truly great people can never reconcile itself with a secondary role in humanity, or even with the first, but without fail must exclusively play the first role. A nation which loses this belief ceases to be a nation."

Spoken like a jingo. But what a difference between Dostoevsky's doctrine of Christian meekness and Bismarck's blood and iron. The character of Father Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov* summed up the essence of Dostoevsky's philosophy in these few words: "The truth is that everybody is guilty of everything, only people do not know it: if once they did we should at once have paradise on earth."

• II •

THE RUSSIA of 1900 did not look much like an earthly paradise. During the previous fifty years its population and area had almost doubled, yet the condition of the masses grew steadily worse. Between 1861 and 1892 even the landowning aristocrats had to sell one-third of all their great estates. Destitute peasants flocked to the cities. Funds from abroad financed a belated, breakneck industrial development. Until the 1880's most of these funds came from the Germans and the British. By the 1890's the French Government and private French investors took over. The French Government insisted that its funds go into the construction of strategic railways near the German frontier, while the Russian Government financed the Trans-Siberian Railway, extending six thousand miles to the Pacific coast. By this time the Russians were building more new railways—most of them state-owned—than any other people in the world. These railways had a wider gauge than those in Europe. The Russians did not expect their rolling stock to carry their troops beyond their own frontiers; they also hoped to increase their security by making it impossible for foreign rolling stock to travel on Russian rails.

A witty Frenchman described the Tsarist system under which the Russians lived as "tyranny tempered by regicide." The Romanov dynasty had ruled Russia for almost three hundred years without the benefit of any kind of Parliament. In 1900 that dynasty shared its power



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Tsar Nicholas II of Russia: An early photograph

with an hereditary landowning nobility that Count Witte, the most enlightened Russian statesman of the time, called "a mass of degenerate humanity which recognizes only the gratification of its selfish lusts and which seeks to obtain all manner of privileges at the expense of the taxpayers generally—that is to say, chiefly of the peasantry." Until Tsar Alexander II freed the serfs in 1861, slave labor had performed half the work in Russia.

In 1881 an assassin murdered Alexander, who had installed universal military service and freed the serfs. Alexander III, who succeeded him and died a premature but natural death in 1894, opened up the empty spaces of Siberia to free settlement, enabled peasants to buy land more easily, and had working conditions improved in the factories. But he forbade Jews to settle on the land or buy farms; he ordered fifteen thousand Jews deported from Moscow; he forbade any Jew to practice law; he restricted the number of Jews in government-controlled schools.

Nicholas II came to the throne at the age of twenty-six unequipped by education or temperament to rule. He had served with a Cadet Corps and received some instruction from private tutors, who, however, were forbidden to ask him any questions. As a Cadet he made friends among the most colorless, conventional members of his regiment. His father, expecting a long life, ignored him. So did many important figures at court. He therefore began his reign filled with grudges and resentments that he did not forget. He covered up his weakness with stubbornness as he concealed his undistinguished features beneath a modest, pointed beard.

Shortly before his father's death, Nicholas had become engaged to his cousin, Princess Alix of Hesse, and shortly afterward they married. Princess Alix had been orphaned as a child and spent much time in England under the eye of her grandmother, Queen Victoria, who urged her to accept Nicholas's hand. Princess Alix was three-quarters German, one-quarter British. Neither the German public nor the Russian public welcomed her marriage to the young Tsar, but Alix tried to make the best of it. She adopted her husband's Eastern Orthodox religion and with true German thoroughness sought to become more Russian than the Russians. But her cold manner and her grim, angular appearance

antagonized the Russian court. Her mother-in-law snubbed her, and she turned more and more to mysticism for escape. Her young husband's shy, stiff, proud nature became the foil for her own. Gradually, the marriage released her latent energies and ambitions. More and more she dominated the weak Tsar. The Eastern Orthodox faith, as practiced in Russia, encouraged superstition and sensuality. The incense, the vestments, the music, created a voluptuous atmosphere that acted upon the lonely, neurotic Tsarina like a drug. She and her weak, devoted husband withdrew into themselves and into the society of a degenerate court camarilla.

Bad fortune hounded the royal couple. When more than three thousand persons were crushed to death at the Tsar's coronation ceremonies in Moscow, he tried to show firmness by ordering the celebrations to continue. The Tsarina never troubled to visit any of the surviving victims in the local hospitals. By 1900 she had given birth to two daughters and was to bear still another before she produced a son and heir to the throne. The Tsar attributed all his misfortune to bad luck and stubbornly continued to abuse his authority. He antagonized his Finnish and Polish subjects by forcing the Russian language, Russian education, and Russian culture upon them. He limited the rights of the Jews still further. Most Russian aristocrats approved, but they had little confidence in their country and their people. They thought to display their culture by speaking French in their salons and their homes; often they married Germans, and they relied on German technologists to build and organize their industries. They modeled their system of education on German originals, and they asked for no greater privilege than to "travel to Europe," on which they looked with envy and awe.

Between Russia's decadent aristocracy and illiterate peasantry rose an increasingly rebellious class of intellectuals—"the intelligentsia." Most of them were the educated children of impoverished nobles, small landowners, rising merchants, civil servants, and professionals. They organized mass strikes in the universities and idealized the Russian peasantry and the Russian proletariat. Those who idealized the peasants supported the Social Revolutionary Party and leaned toward anarchy, nihilism, and the violent doctrines of Bakunin, himself a Russian. Others idealized the proletariat, supported the Social Democrats, and leaned toward the "scientific" socialism of Marx and Engels. The Social Revolutionaries stressed Russia's Asiatic heritage. The Social Democrats looked westward, to Europe.

Other members of the middle-class younger generation and many of the younger aristocrats turned to the Pan-Slav movement. This had a longer history and a looser organization than the Pan-German League. In 1848 a Pan-Slav Congress in Prague called for the unification of all

the Slavic peoples, but by 1900 Russian nationalists had appropriated Pan-Slav doctrines to justify Russian expansion. Like the Pan-Germans, they operated as a pressure and propaganda group, not as a mass party; and like the Pan-Germans, their influence far exceeded their numbers. A sense of burning urgency animated the Pan-Germans. They felt they had to make up for lost time, to strike while the iron was hot. A deeper smoldering discontent animated the Pan-Slavs. They remembered that Russia had saved Europe from enslavement at Napoleon's hands. They resented the British for having fought against them in the Crimean War and the Germans for having robbed them of the spoils from their war against Turkey. They saw fellow Slavs living under German, Austrian, and Turkish rule. But the Pan-Slav neurosis differed from the Pan-German in that it sprang from latent strength and untapped power. Both as individuals and as a people the Russians had shown themselves capable of rising to extraordinary heights of achievement. They had always proved themselves dogged, defensive fighters. They had yet to show themselves capable of sustained effort. The Germans, on the other hand, lived in a constant state of tension. As long as everything went according to plan they appeared invincible and inexhaustible. The Russians could and did absorb any amount of punishment and then come back for more. But the rising Russian generation in 1900 believed their country had taken enough punishment. Some members of this rising generation believed that only drastic social revolution could release the energies of their people. Others believed that the time had come for the Russians to lead the whole Slavic world, to put the decadent West Europeans in their place, and to bring civilization to all Asia as well.

• III •

BISMARCK once said, "Russia has nothing to do with the West. She only contracts nihilism and other diseases. Her mission lies in Asia. There she stands for civilization." A certain amount of wishful thinking went into these words. Bismarck always hoped to keep Russian expansion turned eastward, and his successors tried to continue that part of his grand design. The Russians needed no prompting from Bismarck or any other German to recognize the importance of Asia. When the Japanese, following their defeat of China in 1894, gained a foothold on the Asiatic mainland, it was the Russians who took the lead in persuading all the other European powers to force the Japanese to drop their claim. The Russians then followed up by lending China four hundred million francs and signing a treaty of friendship guaranteeing China against the aggression of any third power—meaning, of course,

Japan. The Chinese reciprocated by granting the Russians the right to build a railway, known as the Chinese Eastern, across Manchuria. Two years later the Russians sent troops into the Liaotung Peninsula, which they took over from China under a twenty-five-year lease. It was this series of deepening involvements in the Far East that led Tsar Nicholas to approve the 1897 agreement with Austria endorsing the *status quo* in the Balkans. Even mighty Russia could not be strong everywhere at once.

The decision had not come without a struggle. To begin with, the small group of the Tsar's advisers could not agree among themselves. Count Witte, the Finance Minister who had put the currency on the gold standard in 1896, favored eastward expansion. He had supervised the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and organized a Russian-Persian Bank to develop the Middle East. The Pan-Slavs, on the other hand, favored closer ties with Eastern Europe. Above and beyond all else, they wanted Russia to seize Constantinople from Turkey, and in 1897 they nearly got their way. A local war had broken out between Turkey and Greece for the control of Crete, and the Pan-Slavs won the Tsar's support for a scheme to have Russian warships seize the Straits of the Dardanelles. At the last minute, however, the Tsar listened to the moderate counsels of Witte and signed the agreement with Austria instead.

A year later—in 1898—the Tsar made a gesture as characteristic of his own temperament as of the Russian national tradition. Acting quite on his own initiative and against the advice of his own officials, he invited the nations of the world to send delegates to a conference at The Hague to discuss world disarmament and peaceful arbitration of international disputes. The Tsar, to do him credit, at least had a soft heart to go with his soft head. He also felt he owed it to his people and the world to use his autocratic powers for peace. Although the Kaiser ridiculed “the humanitarian nonsense of the Tsar,” and Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, described the whole project as “not serious,” it did accord with the messianic aspirations that periodically excited the Russian people.

Count Witte regarded the conference as visionary and futile, but saw no particular harm in it. Russian finances were in a bad way. Other nations had begun to make costly, heavy artillery that the Russians could not afford. Perhaps the Hague meeting might curtail or delay these preparations and not put the Russians at such a disadvantage. But Foreign Minister Delcassé of France minced no words in discussing the prospects with the German Ambassador to Paris. “We are both in the same position,” said Delcassé as both men agreed not to consider any disarmament at all, although Delcassé thought they might consent



TRIANGLE

Moscow Street Market

TRIANGLE

Outside the Moscow Kremlin's Walls

to some move in the direction of arbitration. The British and American delegates to The Hague proposed setting up a permanent court of international justice there. The Germans led the opposition. Everyone opposed compulsory arbitration. As Henry White, the American delegate, put it, "Not a single power was willing to bind itself by a hard-and-fast rule to submit all questions to arbitration—and least of all the United States."

The conference met—and adjourned—in 1899 with twenty-six nations agreeing to set up the machinery to arbitrate disputes, though each nation reserved the right to decide what disputes it would submit. Arbitration, in and of itself, was nothing new. Most of the major countries and many smaller ones had submitted various disputes to arbitration during the course of the nineteenth century. The Tsar's proposals had merely set up permanent machinery to handle such matters in the future. It failed to establish the principle of compulsory arbitration. It did nothing about disarmament.

Yet the First Hague Peace Conference represented a measurable advance. The nations of the world and the peoples of the world had at least faced the questions of disarmament and arbitration, even though they quickly looked the other way. Their representatives had also set a new precedent that might in time become a habit—the precedent of general consultation. To some, it seemed a paradox that the inspiration for this enlightened move had come from the most autocratic ruler on earth. To others, it suggested that the Russian Tsar, in his own strange

way, had for once identified himself with the aspirations of his people.

The Russians had postponed or avoided the social and political reforms that Western Europe had adopted, along with industrialization. They had tried to make their vast Empire a world apart, but history was catching up with them in both Europe and Asia. The rise of the German Empire had created an overbalance of power that forced Russia and France together in Europe. The declining power of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires created uncertainty in the Balkans and the Middle East, where the Russians had vital interests. The increasing strength of Japan and the increasing weakness of China were completely upsetting the balance of power in Asia. The outside world was impinging upon the Russian world with a pressure that the Russian world could not resist. The men around the Tsar could not put his good intentions about arbitration and disarmament into effect without undermining the foundations of Russian power and undermining the confidence that Russia needed to instill abroad.

SUMMING UP

THE MODERN AGE was beginning to overwhelm Russia as it had already overwhelmed Germany, but with this difference: the Germans felt time running against them; the Russians had time on their side. In Europe the Slavs were multiplying while the Latins and Teutons were entering a relative decline. In Asia Russia had more experience, more contacts, more interests than all the nations of Europe put together. Russia's day would surely come, in spite of an illiterate peasantry, a backward industry, a corrupt ruling class, and the barriers of geography. However, Russia could not be strong everywhere at once, and the new century posed new problems at home and abroad. The nineteenth century ended with Russia making what arrangements could be made in Europe—with France, with Austria, at The Hague. Conditions in Asia seemed more urgent than conditions in Europe as the twentieth century began.

The Pleasant Land of France

*How the moderate people of France prepared to
meet the impact of an immoderate century.*

PREVIEW

IN FRANCE mother nature smiled on human nature and encouraged the most balanced way of life in Europe. The French had tasted glory and experienced revolution. In 1870 they suffered defeat at the hands of Germany and then built a strong Republic from the rubble of that defeat. A quarter of a century later the Dreyfus case marked the last, vain assault of the old order upon the new. By 1900 the middle class had come completely into its own in France, but world problems threatened its security. The French Foreign Office tightened its ties with Russia and prepared and hoped for eventual agreement with England, too. To hold their own in the new century, the French had to do more than prepare for the worst. They had to attract allies by making their cause appear to be the cause of Europe, too.

• I •

"EVERY MAN has two countries—France and his own" has become an English proverb. The Germans have a saying that God lives in France, and if good Americans no longer believe that when they die they go to Paris, they have only themselves to blame. No other country in Europe and few other parts of the world offer human beings such favorable conditions for a balanced existence as the pleasant land of France. Its temperate climate, its fertile soil, its navigable streams, its mild Mediterranean coastline, and its many outlets on the rugged Atlantic make it at once self-sufficient and accessible to the outside world.

Yet the temperament and history of the French people did not always accord with their balanced environment. The French virtually invented European nationalism and remained its fervent exponents. They crushed the Reformation only to give birth to a Revolution that destroyed the feudal order in many parts of Europe and shook it everywhere. Under the first Napoleon, France set the pattern of "the nation in arms" that

the other major powers of Europe followed as they, too, adopted universal military service. The British historian Lord Acton once wrote: "Of all civilized countries, France is the one least able to contend with decency that compulsory annexation is a crime. For the most intense desire of almost all Frenchmen has been the acquisition of territory not their own." Although the British, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, proved far more successful at this form of crime than the French, Lord Acton's judgment made up in truthfulness for its want of tact. In the Napoleonic Wars, the French made their final, futile bid for grandeur and conquest. When Napoleon III tried to succeed where Napoleon Bonaparte had failed, Karl Marx commented, "History repeats itself; first as tragedy, then as farce." By 1900 the French had lost some, but not all, of their taste for glory. They had become the middle-class nation par excellence. Even to fight a successful war of revenge against Germany, they required extreme provocation from the German side and strong allies on their own.

What victory had done for Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, defeat did for France. The collapse of Napoleon III's Second Empire cleared the way for the Third Republic, in which the genius of France accommodated itself to the spirit of the times.

A majority of the French people had given Napoleon III a vote of confidence at the polls less than a year before his collapse. Within another year, they found themselves accidentally projected into a republic. "Since 1789, France has had only one king—Paris," lamented the Royalist propagandist Louis Veuillot shortly after a small group of Paris revolutionists, with some support from the masses, had tried and failed to establish Communism in the French capital. The violent destruction of the Commune wrecked much of Paris and cost more French lives than any single battle of the Franco-Prussian War. It gave the Germans another chance to gloat; the French, another cause for shame. But it marked the temporary breaking of the ascendancy of Paris over the rest of France. This ascendancy had rested on two foundations: one material, the other spiritual. Economically, Paris overshadowed all other French cities and thus became the one center of banking, transportation, business, industry, and government. Culturally, Paris loomed still larger by reason of its universities, its theaters, its concert halls and art galleries, its newspapers and magazines, its salons and its politics. In 1900 the culture of Paris remained pre-eminent, but other cities had asserted themselves in other ways: Marseilles with its shipping, Lyon with its textiles, and the manufacturing centers of the north with their industries.

The end of the Paris Commune also cleared the ground for a conservative Republic. The German victory of 1871 had discredited the



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Photograph of Paris Street Barricade during the 1871 Commune

Empire and the Bonapartists. The leading candidate for the throne—Henri V, he called himself, of the House of Bourbon—lost what little chance he ever had when he refused to recognize the red, white, and blue tricolor as the national flag. By 1875 a group of weary Conservatives and disillusioned Royalists had completed the “Organic Laws” of the Third Republic, which had no “Constitution.” Bonapartist officials clung to most of the administrative jobs and Bonapartist officers still dominated the Army. “We are entering the Republic backwards,” announced one of the more radical newspapers of the time. “In France nothing lasts so long as what is only temporary,” remarked a wise observer.

In spite of its leaders at home and because of its enemies abroad, the Third Republic survived. Perhaps the Paris masses could not have their Commune, but the middle classes and the peasants preferred a republic to an empire or a monarchy, and even the most radical workers considered parliamentary democracy a lesser evil than Bonapartist, Bourbon, or Orléans rule. The anticlerical tradition that dated back to the Revolution of 1789 remained strong in France, and the fact that Pope Pius IX favored some kind of monarchist restoration strengthened the Republic. The King of Italy had just stripped Pius of his papal lands, and some of the more fanatical French Catholics wanted to see their country fight Germany to regain Alsace-Lorraine and at the same time



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Photograph of Artillery Park at the "Butte Montmartre" in Paris, March 18, 1871

fight Italy in behalf of the Pope. Thanks to their influence, a French warship had stood by at Civitavecchia, near Rome, ready to transport the Pope to safety during his negotiations with the leaders of the new, united Italy. But this affinity between the Vatican and the enemies of of the Third Republic helped the Republic a lot more than it helped the Vatican.

Count Albert de Mun, one of the Catholic Royalist leaders, declared quite frankly at the time, "Between the Church and the Revolution there remains absolute incompatibility. The Church cannot perish and therefore it will kill the Revolution." The Republicans, for their part, regarded themselves as the custodians of the Revolution, and when men like Count de Mun spoke out against them they would reply, "*Cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi*," or—referring to the Vatican—"Ecrasez l'infame." For, under the Third Republic, the Catholic Church provided the only rallying ground for the opposition, while the Republic, feeling itself constantly menaced by the clerical enemy within the gates, favored anticlerical politicians. The teachers in the local primary schools were almost always anticlerical and even had to parade their Republican orthodoxy to hold their jobs. Any servant of the Republic who showed partiality to the Vatican became suspect.

Nevertheless, the educational system of France still permitted Catholic influence a wide scope. Under the Concordat with the Vatican,

Catholic schools and Catholic teachers enjoyed special privileges and received direct financial aid inasmuch as the state recognized Roman Catholicism as the official religion of France. In 1900 more than half the teachers in the French secondary schools were Catholic priests or brothers. The Vatican also maintained in France a large number of orders whose members, unlike regular priests and bishops, were responsible only to the Vatican and not to the civil authorities. Moreover, the descendants of the Bourbon, Orléans, and Bonaparte dynasties had always sought and usually received Vatican support.

The attitude of Pope Pius IX did not help matters. He did not expect either the Italian Monarchy or the French Republic to last long. Since the French Revolution abolished the divine right of kings in France, no regime had lasted more than twenty years. But by the 1880's, Pius's successor, Leo XIII, became convinced that the Republic had come to stay and that he should make the best of things. The Vatican rallied to the Republic and withdrew support from those who would restore the Monarchy or the Empire. When General Boulanger—whom Bismarck denounced as "General Revenge" before the Reichstag in 1887—seemed likely to establish a dictatorship, Pius feared for a moment that he had backed the wrong horse, but the Boulanger coup collapsed and the Republic overcame its most serious adversary.

Some friends of the Republic made more trouble than its enemies. In 1891 the French Parliament began to investigate why French investors had lost three hundred million dollars on a projected Panama Canal. Prince Victor, the current Bonapartist pretender, commented, "The Empire built Suez; the Republic, Panama." The "Panama scandal" presently revealed that many leading Republican politicians and several prominent Jews had turned a disastrous enterprise to their own account at the expense of the French investing public. But these politicians, as confident as any Catholic dignitary that their position gave them both immunity and virtue, managed to outface the opposition. At worst they had proved themselves successful scoundrels. At best their clerical opponents had proved themselves unsuccessful fools.

A far more serious crisis followed Panama. In 1894 a court-martial of high French officers sentenced Captain Alfred Dreyfus of the French General Staff to Devil's Island for life on charges of espionage. Dreyfus came of a well-to-do family of Alsatian Jews; he was a shy, proud, unprepossessing character whose ability had won him access to the highest military circles. His colleagues resented him as an upstart, and when evidence that he had betrayed confidential information to a foreign power was produced, neither he nor his counsel was permitted to see it. Even the judges took the prosecution's unsupported word, on the theory that any disclosure would threaten the safety of the country.

The anti-Semitic press, recalling the Panama scandal, used the Dreyfus affair to spread more hatred of the Jews, and the general public found it easy to assume that the Army knew how to deal with traitors in its ranks.

But a vigilant minority of honest officials, Republican politicians, and high-minded intellectuals became disturbed. They made so much clamor and stirred up so much popular support that Dreyfus received a new trial in 1899.



Captain Alfred Dreyfus

ACME

This time, two of the nine judges voted for acquittal and the court reduced his sentence from life to ten years. This came so close to a reversal of the original verdict that the President of the Republic ordered Dreyfus pardoned at once. The full story did not come out until 1906, when Dreyfus won total vindication. Two, higher, non-Jewish officers had made a regular business of selling military secrets to Germany and had forged a document that seemed to implicate Dreyfus.

The Dreyfus affair marked the coming of age of the Third Republic. Civilians had successfully challenged the authority of the Army. Republicans and anticlericals had routed clericals and anti-Semites. Nothing of the sort could have happened in Germany, Russia, or Austria-Hungary, where the military caste reigned supreme—at least over its own domain—and where Jews remained second- or even third-class citizens. The victory of the *Dreyfusards* in France did not, of course, mean that the power of the Church and the Army had evaporated, that anti-Semitism no longer existed, or that the Third Republic had won more than a temporary triumph. Plenty of hidden scars remained. Every country has its injustices and prejudices, but few countries ever aired those injustices and prejudices so openly as France aired them in the Dreyfus affair, even at the apparent risk of its own national security. The Third Republic won—and won handsomely—in the final showdown because it had dared to assert the eternal spirit of France, at its best.

• II •

NATURALLY, the Third Republic shared the foibles of the people it claimed to represent. Unhappy experience with Emperors and Kings

had led the French to distrust a strong executive: the President of the Republic therefore had far less power than the President of the United States. The Chamber of Deputies ruled France, with some assistance from the Senate, but the French never developed the two-party system which puts responsibility for government on the majority party and requires the minority to develop a co-ordinated opposition. French parliamentarians worked with blocs and coalitions, embracing half a dozen different parties. Moreover, in the early days of the Third Republic, they learned that they could not dissolve the Chamber as the British were always able to do at times of crisis and hold new elections. Like the Constitution of the United States, the Organic Laws of the Third Republic called for elections at regular intervals.

The Third Republic had produced several brilliant politicians but no national leaders. Nor had France developed many outstanding figures in other fields. The French knew their empire did not match the British in size any more than their country matched the Germans' in power. One thing, however, the French did know. The best in civilization bore a "Made in France" trade-mark. The British might have created a finer literature; the Germans might have written better music; the Spaniards might have painted finer pictures. The French not only ran all other countries a close second in all the arts: the French had achieved such balance and moderation in all things that they had made an art of life itself.

The French, like other Latin peoples, also had developed a pattern of sex morality that aroused mingled envy and disapproval in other lands. The Kaiser spoke for many Germans when he declared that women were fit only for *Kinder*, *Kuchen*, and *Kirche* (childbearing, cooking, and church-going). The British did not take quite such a brutal attitude and allowed their womenfolk somewhat more scope than the Germans permitted. But in both Germany and England, boys received a far better education than girls. They lived apart during their adolescent years, and when they married they ruled the home as husband and father. The Frenchwoman—especially in the dominant middle class—did not enjoy equality with men, but once she got a husband she came into her own. Her parents usually arranged her marriage and always provided a *dot*, or dowry. From that point on, the French wife and mother possessed considerable authority, and even some freedom. Her husband had already acquired sex experience—perhaps with girls of a lower class, perhaps with prostitutes, perhaps with older women of his own class. But his wife, who came chaste to the marriage bed, did not necessarily remain faithful. She might—especially if her husband's own infidelities gave her cause—take up with another married man or initiate a young bachelor to the mysteries of love. French novelists and


dramatists lavished their comic gifts on the character of the deceived husband, or *cocu*. But neither the wife nor the husband would consider giving up *le mariage* for *l'amour*. The security of the home always came first.

For it was a life of bourgeois security that the representative Frenchman of 1900 aspired to lead. The Revolution had liquidated the big landowners. The nineteenth century had weakened the peasants. Some banking and industrial families had come up in the world, but not so fast as the foreign millionaires. The Socialists put more energy into backing the Republic and promoting reform than they did into fighting the bosses and promoting revolution. The abler sons of the aristocracy found the Army offered the best—almost the only—field for their talents. It was the great middle class that held most of the key positions in the Third Republic. It was for the benefit of the middle class that the Third Republic existed.

The bourgeois, especially the French bourgeois, was a man of security. He suspected Jesuits and Jews, Socialists and Royalists. He revered learning. He disliked violence and tyranny. To him France meant civilization. He relished the delicate irony of Anatole France—who, himself, spoke no word of any living language except his own. Anatole France overshadowed all his literary contemporaries, but his genius lacked fire as well as scope. Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, who were as characteristic of their countries as Anatole France was of his, not only possessed far more vitality: their influence became world-wide.

Yet it was not the classical ironist Anatole France who wrote the autobiography of his period; it was the neurotic aesthete Marcel Proust. Both men were of partly Jewish descent; both frequented the Paris salons at which the literary and political careers of the time were made and unmade. Whereas Anatole France was primarily a product of the salon of Mme. de Caillavet, who took him up and became his mistress, Marcel Proust belonged to the world that created the salons. It was a world that revolved around a few highly educated, attractive women who made their houses centers of social life and conversation. They brought together politicians, scholars, artists, scientists, soldiers, writers, men of affairs. One gained access to such circles on one's merits. Family and wealth counted for something, but talent counted for more. At these gatherings governments were formed and overthrown; foreign policy was discussed and projected; writers and scholars came in contact with the men who wielded the real power in the land, and these men, in turn, came in contact with outstanding figures in other fields.

In most other European countries at the turn of the century power belonged to those who had inherited position or acquired wealth. Of course, wealth and position counted in France, too. But the institution



UNDERWOOD

Anatole France

of the salon had no equivalent elsewhere. Striving as they always did for the balanced, complete life, the French encouraged men of action to mingle with men of contemplation; men of thought and men of action had much to share, much to learn from one another, and the salon provided the ideal meeting ground, part social and part professional. Ideas and actions, like men and women, live in the same world: the French salon tried to include them all.

To gain admittance to a salon signified that one was on the way up in the world. To gain admittance to the Académie Française signified that one had arrived. The French Academy, a self-perpetuating body of "Forty Immortals," drew its membership from the top ranks of all the professions, sciences, and arts. The newspapers and the salons loved to make fun of the Academicians, who got themselves up in cocked hats and green robes for their formal meetings, but the ridicule usually had an undertone of envy. During the early 1900's the French Academy used to be cited, along with the German General Staff and the College of Cardinals, as among the three most perfect and complete expressions of contemporary civilization in Europe: intellectual, material, and spiritual. Nor was it a provincial intellectual leadership that France gave to Europe at this time. For all their own provincialism, the French did welcome foreign talent to their capital—and that talent met them, only too gladly, on their own terms. Although the French produced few creative geniuses of the first rank in any field, many foreigners of the first rank preferred the ways of France to the ways of their own native lands. Thus Paris in 1900 had become the most cosmopolitan of capitals. It encouraged, trained, and assimilated painters, musicians, architects, and writers from all over the world. Parisian audiences discovered the Russian ballet, Wagnerian music, the plays of Ibsen. But France was living on its traditions. The twentieth century did not speak French, except in a foreign accent.

• III •

NEVERTHELESS, the French entered the new century convinced that their country remained a world power. After the defeat of Napoleon III they compensated for some of their losses in Europe by shifting their

energies to North Africa. By 1900 Algeria had become a department of the French Republic. One-fifth of its population consisted of Europeans who superimposed a separate economic and social order of their own upon the Arabs. In theory, the natives could become French citizens; in practice, their Moslem religion forbade them to take advantage of the opportunity. In 1870 the so-called Crémieux decree extended French citizenship to the North African Jews, most of whom quickly took advantage of the opportunity, since their religious faith did not stand in their way. This added to the power of French rule in North Africa but further antagonized the Moslem majority.

The Third Republic also brought Indo-China, Madagascar, Tunis, and much of West Africa under the tricolor and in 1894 created a Minister of Colonies. The French had long enjoyed special privileges in Egypt, where they thought to entrench themselves further by building the Suez Canal during the 1860's. But in 1874, five years after the official opening of the Canal, the British secured the controlling interest by buying up the Khedive of Egypt's shares. It was a logical move. The British had more interests than the French in the Middle East; the shortest route to India went by way of Suez; British shipping provided 80 per cent of the Canal's traffic.

Bismarck had shrewdly encouraged the French to increase their colonial empire, a policy that soon paid dividends to Germany in the form of French distrust of Britain. In 1898 a small French expedition made its way from the west coast of Africa to the town of Fashoda on the upper Nile and ran up the tricolor. This looked like a threat to British interests in Egypt because the waters of the upper Nile control the flow of the entire stream. General Kitchener presently appeared at Fashoda with a small army; the British Foreign Office threatened war; Captain Marchand and his handful of French troops withdrew. The French had intruded upon a region vital to the security of the British Empire but lacked the power to remain. The incident rankled, and when the British fought the South African Boers a year later the French press featured scurrilous cartoons of Queen Victoria.

Not all Frenchmen joined the anti-British crusade. Foreign Minister Delcassé, for example, always regarded Germany as his country's hereditary enemy. He therefore favored a general agreement with England on all colonial questions and hoped eventually to bring England into the Franco-Russian Entente. From the French point of view, in 1898, the Russian Alliance appeared unfavorable and one-sided. It gave the Russians the immediate benefit of French financial support. It gave them the promise of French military aid in the event of trouble in Eastern Europe. But it was to last only as long as the Triple Alliance lasted. This meant that if the shaky Austro-Hungarian Empire

fell apart, the Russians could make new arrangements in Eastern Europe.

The French, in exchange for their promise to back Russia in the explosive East, received a pledge of Russian backing in the much more stable West. The power of the Triple Alliance outweighed the power of Russia in Eastern Europe, where the Russians cherished several unfulfilled ambitions—notably at the Dardanelles and in the Balkans. Given the right kind of incident—and Austrian nationalists might easily provide such an incident—the Russians could declare themselves victims of aggression and demand that France attack Germany in the West.

The French derived no corresponding advantage from their Russian arrangement. They had little desire to provoke a quarrel with Germany over Alsace-Lorraine, and the Germans, satisfied with their western frontiers, had little desire to attack the French. France could hope for a successful war of revenge against Germany only if the British joined the anti-German coalition, and the British would not join such a coalition unless they believed that Germany threatened their vital interests. As for war, it would take more than German aggression in Eastern Europe to bring the British in. They would fight only to ward off a clear and present danger to their Empire or to their island home. Unlike the Germans and the Russians, the British had no unsatisfied ambitions. Unlike the French, the British had suffered no recent, rankling defeat. But Delcassé foresaw the possibility of eventual conflict between Britain and Germany and shaped French foreign policy accordingly.

Having accepted, in 1898, what looked to most Frenchmen like a diplomatic defeat at British hands in connection with Fashoda, Delcassé paid a secret visit to Russia in 1899. He returned with a Russian pledge to enlarge the scope of the Entente with France in two directions. First, the two countries agreed to support not only the *status quo* in Europe but the balance of power on which the *status quo* rested. Second, they changed the terms of their agreement so that it no longer would expire automatically with the Triple Alliance. With this accomplished, Delcassé took thought about improving relations with England. But the British still hoped to reach an agreement with Germany; moreover, the war they declared against the South African Boers in November, 1899, temporarily immobilized the diplomats.

On balance, the French could look back with satisfaction on the thirty years that had passed since they suffered defeat and mortification at the hands of the Prussians. They had paid off their billion-dollar war indemnity ahead of schedule. They had set up a Republic which survived the Boulanger and Dreyfus crises. They had developed a colonial empire second only to the British. They had emerged from the isolation into which Bismarck had thrust them in 1871 and had concluded an



FRANCE AND ENGLAND ON THE UPPER NILE—MAJOR MARCHAND'S CRITICAL POSITION AT FASHODA.
From *Fair Game* (London).

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France and England on the Upper Nile: Major Marchand's Critical Position, from Fair Game, London


alliance with Russia. Their people shared the general improvement in living standards. The Third Republic therefore decided to welcome the new century by staging a great international exposition at Paris in 1900. The French Republic had proved itself stronger than the Second Empire of Napoleon III; wiser than the Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The second line of the incomparable "Marseillaise" summed up the most dangerous illusion in the France of 1900:

*"Allons, enfants de la patrie,
Le jour de gloire est arrivé."*

Glory, to which the French still attached such importance, came high in the twentieth century. Could they pay the price? Population pressure had forced other European countries to seek foreign territories and markets. The French, with their low birth rate and stagnant population, depended on Belgian, Italian, and Polish immigrants to man their factories. The French Revolution had given the peasants their own small farms, and a century later France remained more nearly self-sufficient than any other major country in Europe. But the balance-seeking French lived in an ill-balanced world. The competition of foreign agriculture and the slow exhaustion of the French soil made land values fluctuate. The peasants began to lose confidence in their ancestral acres. An insect pest known as phylloxera ravaged the vineyards of central and southern France, ruining thousands of small winegrowers. French capitalists found it profitable to plant tougher vines in Algeria. The number and vitality of the French peasants declined as the younger generation drifted to the cities.

France had gone into a relative—not an absolute—decline. Luxury exports of wines, silks, and cosmetics increased. The tourist trade boomed. But the strength of Germany was increasing more rapidly than the strength of France. The Slavs of Eastern Europe were reproducing themselves more rapidly than the Latins of the West. And the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine still rankled. Ferdinand Foch,



BROWN BROTHERS

The Paris Exposition of 1900 as Seen from beneath the Eiffel Tower

the coming man on the French General Staff, once confessed, "From the age of seventeen I dreamed of revenge after having seen the Germans at Metz. And when a man of ordinary capacity concentrates all of his abilities upon one end, and works without divergence, he is apt to be successful." And Raymond Poincaré, who had been born in Lorraine ten years before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and lived to become both French President and French Premier, once described his decision to enter French politics as follows: "When I descended from the metaphysical clouds, I could discover no other reason why my generation should go on living except in the hope of restoring our lost provinces."

The turn of the century found Foch, Poincaré, and a minority of like-minded zealots hard at work for the glory of their country and its heavy industries. In 1886 large deposits of sulphurous iron ore had been discovered in the part of Lorraine that the Germans had left in French hands. German steel industry needed this ore and soon French and German steel trusts had begun to work together and even to set up interlocking directorates. French heavy industry went ahead and provided more and better equipment to the French Army. But always German industry and the German Army grew faster. Unless the leaders of France proposed, voluntarily, to make their country a second-rate power, they had no choice but to follow the same course that their ancestors had followed in past centuries and that the Germans were following in the century that had just begun.

SUMMING UP

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY placed a special burden upon the French people. Their virtues of moderation became vices in an immoderate time. Their relative self-sufficiency did not protect them from attack. Their industry did not ensure sufficient defense. Their agriculture and population stagnated. Measured by standards of human happiness, the French had more cause for thankfulness than any people in Europe. But to cultivate happiness was to weaken one's self in the struggle for twentieth-century survival—and the French proposed to survive. Nobody understood better than the French themselves what a challenge the new century presented. The Germans had recently come ahead with a rush. Their scholarship had long commanded wide admiration; their recent scientific achievements had enhanced their prestige; their organization of scholarship, science, and industry inspired awe and even alarm abroad. If the Germans appeared morbidly eager for the world's esteem, the French appeared smugly provincial. They took the world's good opinion for granted; they knew that they had contributed more than any people on earth to the civilization of Western Europe. They did not need to advertise themselves; for centuries, the civilized world had been beating a path to their door. What the new century might bring forth, no one could yet say. This much, however, seemed sure. As long as Western civilization itself endured, France could not die.

Where the Sun Never Set

How the British combined control of the seas and control of the balance of power in Europe to build and maintain an empire on which the sun never set.

PREVIEW

GREAT BRITAIN owed its commanding position in the world of 1900 to overwhelming sea power and skillful diplomacy. The British people enjoyed political democracy but not the social or economic kind. Each class had its preordained place in a fixed hierarchy. As Queen Victoria's long reign drew to a close, the Conservative Party ruled the land, and a new type of imperial statesman had come to the fore. Although the Boer War, which began as the old century ended, disclosed startling weaknesses, the Conservatives took advantage of the excitement and of the split among their Liberal opponents to hold a general election and win another five years in office. Literature, always mirroring British life, reflected the changing scene. The voice of Rudyard Kipling made itself heard around the world, but other voices proclaimed other doctrines. Tolerance remained, as always, the saving British grace—a tolerance born of success and security. Would this virtue and the security that had given it birth continue to serve the British in an unknown future as it had served them in their glorious present and past?

• I •

THE ISLAND HOME on which the British people dwelt and the overseas empire on which their lives depended gave them a character all their own. Surrounded by water and obscured by fog, they felt remote from Europe. The Empire and the Dominions on the other side of the world somehow seemed closer, more important. The sun never set on the Union Jack, and men of the British race ruled a quarter of the earth's surface and a quarter of its inhabitants. The British imported most of their food, exported most of their factory products. They also received

large revenues from shipping, insurance, and investments overseas.

British statesmen never underrated the importance of Europe. Although they had held aloof, throughout most of the nineteenth century, from Europe's alliances, they had not kept out of Europe's wars. "Splendid isolation," as they called their policy, did not mean self-sufficiency or indifference. The words described a world strategy that had served them well. It was a strategy based on overwhelming superiority at sea and complete freedom of diplomatic action. But it was a strategy that the new century might make obsolete.

Harold Nicolson, in his life of Lord Curzon, who became British Foreign Secretary in 1919, gave this definition of the policy that Curzon's predecessors had followed for generations: "For them the central purpose of British foreign policy was the maintenance of Empire and the security and prosperity of the British Isles. They sought to achieve this purpose by an undeviating adherence to three principles. The first was command of the seas. The second, the balance of power in Europe. The third, defense of imperial frontiers and communications. To these three principles they added a corollary, namely that our security must be maintained without resort to war, and with the least possible expenditure of men and money." By 1900 the decision of the Germans to build a large modern navy challenged the first of these principles. The Franco-Russian Entente, with its threat to the Triple Alliance, jeopardized the second. The two independent Boer Republics had threatened the third by defying the privileged position that Britain claimed in South Africa. In the closing weeks of the year 1899, the British therefore declared war on the Boers. They hoped that a quick, localized conflict would forestall a long, general one.

As long as the British could maintain a navy larger than the combined fleets of any other two powers, they felt secure from attack or blockade and in position to defend their overseas Empire. Here lay one of the fundamental differences between Britain and its Continental neighbors. No successful invasion of the British Isles had taken place since the Norman Conquest in 1066. The countries of Europe, on the other hand, had invaded each other again and again. They required mass, conscript armies to feel any sense of security at all. Armies had unified Germany and Italy. Armies had kept France and Austria-Hungary strong. Armies had made it possible for the Russians to extend their rule over one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. But the British, with their Navy, which controlled all the seven seas, had done even better.

Nations that required large armies developed powerful military castes. War seemed a legitimate and normal instrument of national policy. War preparations became the biggest of businesses. A religion

of patriotism glorified the war spirit from earliest childhood. Armies proved their worth in their ability to attack. Offensive warfare was the only kind of warfare that paid off on land. But to control the seas, the British did not have to make themselves a nation in arms. They did not need to bow down before a naval caste as so many Europeans bowed down before military castes. The British could put more of their energies into manufacturing, banking, and trade. Nor did the successful exercise of naval power necessarily entail offensive action. Blockade produced the same results at far less cost. Britain's defensive naval strategy also created a different psychology from Europe's offensive military strategy. And this sometimes made it hard for Britons and Europeans to understand one another.

Britain's naval power had more than once played a decisive part in Europe's history. It had helped ultimately to strangle Napoleon. It had kept Russia from Constantinople and the Dardanelles. It had enabled professional volunteer British armies to fight on European soil, although no Continental army had fought on British soil for more than eight hundred years. The British had no permanent attachment to any one European power, but used their control of the seas and their limited land forces to prevent any one nation from dominating all Europe. In pursuing this policy, the British never had to stand alone. They counted on allies, limited their own commitments, and always assumed that Europe could never unite.

The British built up their Empire with similar prudence. Unlike the Germans, they felt no need to subdue any of their immediate neighbors. Unlike the French, they did not live in constant fear of attack. They still had their troubles ruling Ireland, but nothing like the troubles the Austrians had ruling their Slavic subjects. Britain's self-governing Dominions had more than enough empty land to accommodate the surplus population of the home country. The nature of naval power was such that the British became its masters, not its slaves. In the major countries of Europe, on the other hand, the army became a state within the state, an end in itself, a constant drain upon the treasury and a burden upon the people.

The development of British sea power and the growth of British industry had gone hand in hand. Thanks to their comparative immunity from attack, the British concentrated on the development of productive industries; thanks to their Navy and merchant marine they built up a growing export and import trade. India they governed outright. In China they acquired special privileges. In Argentina they built the railways and the refrigeration plants. The kind of control they gained over various backward countries varied. Only one thing really mattered: commercial advantage. British merchant shipping carried British manu-

factures and British coal to the four corners of the earth. Since the 1840's, the British had bought their food as well as all their raw materials in the world markets, duty free. The pound sterling became the standard currency everywhere; but it took a Britisher to translate the mysteries of pounds, shillings, and pence into double-entry book-keeping. British investors put their newly gained fortunes to work for them abroad. Even foreign shippers and manufacturers used the services of British insurance companies. British interests built and controlled most of the transoceanic cables.

The Bank of England, a private, self-perpetuating organization, issued all British currency and fixed the interest rate. Its powers rivaled, in their own way, the powers of the German General Staff. But the British people enjoyed a degree of political democracy unknown in Germany or any other European Empire. Most adult British males had the right to vote. All power resided in the two Houses of Parliament—the elected House of Commons and the largely hereditary House of Lords. The British had no written Constitution. Parliament made its own rules, set its own precedents. In like manner, British courts followed the common law, consisting of a vast body of previous judicial decisions which combined respect for precedent with consideration for change.

Social democracy lagged far behind political democracy in the Britain of 1900. The ruling class consisted of the old landowning families and other families who had made greater, more recent fortunes in industry, shipping, and banking. The British aristocracy had always excelled at the breeding and training of horses, and they bred and trained their own offspring with the same care. The old landed aristocracy and the new aristocracy of wealth intermarried. Members of the nobility married actresses, chorus girls—even Americans. Lord Randolph Churchill, descendant of the Duke of Marlborough, married Miss Jennie Jerome, of New York's Four Hundred. Lord Curzon—who wrote of himself while at Oxford, "My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, and I am a most superior person"—married the daughter of the Chicago millionaire Levi Z. Leiter.

Britain's ruling families trained their sons to become rulers, too. Before most of these boys had reached the age of ten, they entered private boarding schools, staffed by men teachers. Then they spent their last six years, before attending Oxford or Cambridge, at one of the large "public schools"—preferably Eton, Harrow, or Winchester, where the masters had the right, even the duty, to cane the boys in their charge. The younger boys acted as servants, or "fags," to the older ones. The public "board schools" outlawed such practices as inhumane and undemocratic. But the private "public schools" operated on the



ACME

Lord Curzon in His Official Robes as
Viceroy of India

tested theory that those who would command must first learn to obey.

The curriculum stressed sportsmanship as much as scholarship, manliness as much as godliness. The secondary schools of France admitted all comers on the basis of intellectual performance and gave the boys the stiffest kind of training in the humanities. German education stressed the sciences, modern languages, and military discipline. The British public schools went in for Greek

and Latin and for English literature and history. They also made much of the Latin motto *Mens sana in corpore sano* and turned out much more rugged physical specimens than the schools of France. It was not until the young Englishman went on to one of the two great universities that his intellectual life began. He had learned discipline—and how to work. If he had mental aptitude, he had every opportunity to cultivate any field of knowledge. At the Oxford and Cambridge Unions young men who aspired to careers in the House of Commons learned the art of debate under the eyes of outstanding graduates who had already made their mark. Those with less serious interests could spend three or four pleasant years, cultivating friendships that would serve them well in after life. If they planned to enter government service they required an independent income and had to pass difficult examinations and earn further promotion on the basis of merit.

Members of the British ruling class dressed, spoke, acted, and even looked like a race apart. One had to be both born and trained to rule, and those young men of good family who could qualify never forgot that their privileges entailed corresponding responsibilities. The other classes in the elaborate social hierarchy of Great Britain also knew their places and found what satisfaction they could within their pre-ordained spheres. Women of all classes occupied the status of second-class citizens, as compared with their menfolk, and their resentment began to express itself in agitation for the vote. The industrial workers who had built a strong trade-union movement during the latter half of the nineteenth century were organizing themselves for political action also and had established the Independent Labor Party in 1893.

The organization of religion followed the same pattern. Only the privileged minority—and its hangers-on—felt at home in the state-sup-

ported Church of England. Most of the churchgoers of England and Wales preferred to worship in Nonconformist Protestant chapels. In Scotland the Presbyterian Church was the established religion. Only about two million of Britain's forty million people belonged to the Roman Catholic faith. No-Popery prejudice ran strong. But the attempt to impose Protestantism upon Ireland had helped to keep the great majority of the Irish people fanatically Catholic. Great Britain's class and national differences thus extended beyond this world and on into the next.

• II •

IN 1900 the entire population of the British Isles belonged to a hierarchy that culminated in a little old lady of eighty-one whose reign had begun in 1837. Queen Victoria received her first instruction in politics from Ministers who had begun their careers during the Napoleonic period and could therefore remember the shock that the French Revolution had created throughout Europe. She had married her first cousin, the second son of the German Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who, as Prince Consort, became known as "Albert the Good." They had four sons and five daughters before Albert's death, in 1861, left Victoria a disconsolate widow who never again lived in London. But, thanks to Disraeli, the Queen became a considerable figure in her own right. In 1876 he persuaded her to have herself proclaimed Empress of India. Her Golden Jubilee in 1887 and her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 added to her glory. Her children—as prolific as her husband and herself—intermarried with most of the leading dynasties of Europe. Her grandchildren included the German Kaiser and the Russian Tsarina.

Queen Victoria embodied more than the British Empire. She gave her name to the age in which she lived, and—like herself—that age continued beyond its normal span. As her long life neared its end, the Queen had close relations and intimate friends in every European court. She gave the tradition of monarchy respectability, substance, cohesion. She took a maternal, proprietary interest in her innumerable family connections and kept up a personal correspondence with them all. Any affront to any royal personage anywhere in Europe affronted her. Any dissension within the European family of nations seemed, to her, a family feud—almost a matter of *lèse majesté*. Most of Europe, much of the world, stood in awe of the little black-swathed "widow of Windsor."

In the British people the Queen inspired reverence and adoration: reverence for her long and successful reign, adoration for her embodiment of what they most admired in themselves. Queen Victoria's great-



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Four Generations of British Royalty. Queen Victoria and her great-grandson, later Edward VIII. Standing are her grandson (left), later King George V, and her eldest son, later King Edward VII

est strength lay in the middle classes, for whom she had an instinctive understanding and who thrived so greatly in her day. A young American lady wrote from London in 1900, "Queen Victoria is not in society." But if the Queen did not spend her time with swells, she had much less contact with the coal miners, factory workers, and the rest of the industrial proletariat. She read but one daily paper, the ultra-Conservative *Morning Post*. Arthur J. Balfour, the rising young Conservative statesman of the time, summed up her views on war this way: "She has the utmost horror of war on the simple but sufficient reason that you cannot

have a war without a great many people being killed. No better reason can be given for this laudable sentiment, but she expresses it with singular naïveté."

The Conservative Party for which Queen Victoria always felt a natural affinity controlled the House of Commons in 1900. Its chief strength lay with the landed aristocracy, the rural population, and the lower middle class. The Conservatives favored a firm policy toward Ireland, imperial expansion, and no entangling al-




BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Joseph Chamberlain

liances. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, drew its support from the upper middle class and the industrial workers and favored home rule for Ireland, domestic reform, and closer relations with France. Both parties had their internal differences. A substantial minority of Liberals opposed home rule for Ireland and helped bring the Conservatives to power in the general election of 1895. More and more Conservatives were losing faith in splendid isolation.

A single family dominated the Conservative Government at the turn of the century. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, made his nephew, Arthur James Balfour, Conservative leader in the House of Commons. His Cabinet of twenty members also included the Prime Minister's eldest son, his son-in-law, and another nephew. But "Hotel Cecil," as some people called the Cabinet, also included a recent convert from the Liberal Party who had become the most dynamic figure in British public life.

By the standards of the time, Joseph Chamberlain did not qualify as a gentleman. He called himself a Unitarian and had not attended any of the great public schools, nor had he gone to either Oxford or Cambridge. Coming of middle-class Birmingham stock, he entered the family business at eighteen. Politics soon attracted him and he started in as a Liberal. In 1870 he said he did not fear the prospect of a British Republic. He admired Henry George's single-tax theory, which would have derived all taxation from land values, and favored breaking up Britain's big estates. "The politics of the future are social politics," Chamberlain declared in 1883. The next year he denounced the House of Lords: "It has protected every abuse and sheltered every privilege. It has denied justice and delayed reform. It is irresponsible without independence, obstinate without courage, arbitrary without judgment, and arrogant without knowledge."



The World of 1900: Showing the Empires and possessions

"Brummagem Joe," as Chamberlain's opponents called him, quit the Liberals when they favored home rule for Ireland, and by the 1890's he had become one of the most fervent Tory imperialists. His passion for reform at home gave way to a greater passion for expansion abroad. The state of the world disturbed him more than the state of the nation. "Since the Crimean War, nearly fifty years ago," he declared at the turn of the century, "the policy of this country has been one of strict isolation. We have no allies. I am afraid we have no friends. All the powerful states of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside those alliances—as long as we are envied by all and suspected by all—and as long as we have interests which at one time or another



Britain, France, Germany, and the United States

conflict with the interests of all, we are liable at any moment to be confronted with a combination of the great powers. We stand alone."

Joseph Chamberlain differed with most Liberals and many Conservatives in that he favored a straight Anglo-German alliance. In 1898 and 1899 Prime Minister Salisbury let Chamberlain make two approaches to the Germans, both of which came to nothing, partly because the Germans felt the proposals should have come from the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary rather than the less important Colonial Secretary. Even Chamberlain took the rebuffs rather lightly; he regarded good relations with the United States as far more important, and on that most Conservative and Liberal leaders agreed with him.



BROWN BROTHERS

Cecil Rhodes Roughing It on the African Veldt

Chamberlain's first years as a Conservative leader coincided with the last years of the greatest British imperialist of them all—James Cecil Rhodes. As the fifth son of a Nonconformist clergyman, Rhodes was as much a social maverick as Chamberlain. In addition, bad health forced him, before he had completed school, to move to South Africa, where doctors gave him only six months to live. Rhodes not only lived. At the age of nineteen he had made himself financially independent as a diamond prospector. He then put himself through Oxford, with some interruptions due to illness, returned to South Africa, and before he was thirty had amassed an enormous fortune and entered public life. At that time the Cape Colony belonged to the British Empire, while to the north lay two independent Boer Republics which the Dutch had settled and which enjoyed almost complete independence, subject to a special treaty with the British.

In 1890, shortly after receiving a charter from Queen Victoria to develop parts of British South Africa, Rhodes became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. When he returned to England in 1891 Queen Victoria asked him, "What are you engaged on at present, Mr. Rhodes?" He replied, "I am doing my best to enlarge your majesty's dominions." Rhodes tried to bring the South African Dutch and the British together, but he had a much wider ultimate purpose, that of establishing British

dominance over the entire world. "I contend," declared Rhodes, "that we are the first race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race. I contend that every acre added to our territory provides for the birth of more of the English race, who otherwise could not be brought into existence." Rhodes also believed in eventual union between the British Empire and the United States, and he favored building an imperial tariff wall that would make all British possessions self-sufficient. "The curse is that English politicians cannot see into the future," Rhodes wrote the Prime Minister of Canada in 1891. "They think they will always be the manufacturing mart of the world, but do not understand what protection, coupled with reciprocal relations, mean." He therefore predicted, "The politics of the next hundred years are going to be tariffs and nothing else." On another occasion—extolling the glories of empire—he remarked, "Philanthropy is all very well, but philanthropy plus five per cent is better." Rhodes shared Chamberlain's belief in Britain's mission, and during the final decade of the nineteenth century world events furthered their aims.

• III •

IN 1895 a group of British settlers in South Africa made an unsuccessful attack on the headquarters of President Paul Kruger of the independent Boer Republic of Transvaal. Their leader, a certain Dr. Jameson, had hoped to launch an insurrection, but it failed to come off. Rhodes and even Chamberlain appeared for a while to have been implicated in the affair, and some doubts persist to this day. British public opinion generally condemned the "Jameson Raid," until the bumbling Kaiser played into the hands of Rhodes and Chamberlain by dispatching a telegram of congratulation to Kruger. This silly gesture caused indignation and alarm throughout England. When war finally broke out between the British and the Boers, four years later, the Kaiser tried to make up for his mistake by supporting the British, but again irked them with his gratuitous advice on how to run their campaigns.


The events leading up to the Boer War throw light on the way the British built and held their Empire. Already they had established their rule over the Cape Colony. They occupied a privileged position in Egypt. All the other nations of Europe were staking out claims for themselves on the African continent, but the British—thanks to their control of the sea—had been there longest and had acquired the best land. Rhodes had become obsessed with his vision of a Cape-to-Cairo Railway, and his scheme had gained important support in London. It also aroused increasing fear and jealousy in Germany.

The Boer Republics lay across the projected railway route. The Dutch, who had settled them, stubbornly persisted in trying to farm their extensive lands, whereas the British preferred to exploit South Africa's gold and diamonds, hoping later to develop trade and bring in foreign capital. By 1899 the Uitlanders, or foreigners, outnumbered the Boers in the Transvaal, and most of the Uitlanders were British. The Boers not only blocked British ambitions in South Africa. Their independence threatened the security of British South Africa and its vital lines of supply. For the Boers could always invite some other European power in—if, indeed, some other European power did not invite itself in on its own terms.

In 1897 Prime Minister Salisbury decided that the time for action had come. He shrewdly appointed Sir Alfred Milner, a member of the Liberal Party, fresh from four years' administrative experience in Egypt, to the post of British High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony. The Conservatives were already committed to expansion; the Liberals were split, and Milner belonged to the expansionist faction. He went to South Africa ostensibly to persuade the Boers to make reforms, but his attitude toward Kruger at a conference in 1899 caused the Boer leader to burst into tears and exclaim, "It is our country you want." Milner broke off the meeting without consulting his home government, but the majority of the British people backed him. "There is no peace at any price party," one British observer commented at the time; "there are only parties which disapprove of each other's wars."

When war came, during the closing weeks of 1899, the Boers proved surprisingly strong. They at once invaded the Cape Colony and Natal, where their open tactics bewildered the orthodox British commanders, who made the mistake of having their troops fight in close, mass formation. The foreign press gloated over Britain's embarrassments, thereby consolidating all British parties and classes behind a war that had started as badly at home as in the field. By February, 1900, reinforcements had arrived and by March the tide had turned in Britain's favor. Although it was costing two million pounds a week, even the collapse of organized Boer resistance and the flight of President Kruger on a Dutch ship did not end the fighting. During the closing months of 1900 younger Boer leaders took over and resorted to guerrilla tactics. Lord Roberts, the supreme British commander, assigned the difficult mopping-up task to his Chief of Staff, General Kitchener, who had already distinguished himself in the Sudan.

The Conservative Party turned the Boer War to quick account. At the instigation of Joseph Chamberlain, the Government resigned during the summer of 1900 and called for a general election. The Conservatives



ACME

A Group of Boer Commandos, Many of Whom Later Captured Uniforms and More Equipment from British Troops

claimed that their leadership had virtually won the war, but that they required a new popular mandate to finish the business and make peace. The Liberals assailed the "Khaki Election" as a political fraud designed to take advantage of the general support of the war—and the split in their own ranks—to fasten Conservative rule upon the country for perhaps another seven years. Their worst fears came true. The Conservatives gained the popular mandate they sought.

Perhaps it was all for the best. The Liberals still remained too divided to offer clear, strong leadership. The Conservatives recognized the need for certain reforms and had the power to put them through. Before the Boer War the Duke of Cambridge, who had charge of training British cavalry recruits, declared they did not need to know anything about European methods because Britain already had the best cavalry in the world. The Boer War shattered this and other illusions. The Conservatives at once began to reorganize the whole military establishment. They also recognized that the Boer War had ended the myth of splendid isolation. The hostile attitude of the outside world raised fears of a new European balance of power, heavily loaded against Great Britain. Liberals as well as Conservatives disliked the prospect, but only the Conservatives had the power to do anything about it.

An accumulation of troubles hampered the Liberal Party. By the end of the nineteenth century the British public had become increasingly weary of the increasingly smug leadership that William E. Gladstone had so long imposed on his fellow Liberals. In 1886, at the age of seventy-five, Gladstone took office as Prime Minister of a Liberal Government, committed as usual to social reform. But after coming to power, Gladstone split his own Party by endorsing a program of home rule for Ireland which he had not mentioned during the campaign. Gladstone wanted Ireland to have its own Parliament instead of having a sizable bloc of votes in the British Parliament. He said that it did not seem to him "square and honest" to bring up the issue during the campaign because the final choice should lie with the Irish people. Balfour commented, "Were I hunting words to describe the Prime Minister's reticence, I have to own that 'square' and 'honest' are not the first that would occur to me."

With the tenacity of the self-righteous, Gladstone had clung to power for so long that he left no trained successor. He had also divided his Party on the question of Irish home rule and had driven a group of "Liberal Unionists," as they called themselves, over to the Conservatives. Sir William Harcourt, who had followed Lord Rosebery, created still another split when he opposed the Boer War. So did Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the next in line. They found a fervent disciple in a young self-made Welsh lawyer, David Lloyd George, who also identified himself with the "pro-Boers" and "Little Englanders." But Lloyd George owed his popularity and power less to his anti-imperialism than to his zeal for radical social reform.

To most British voters in 1900 conditions abroad appeared more menacing than conditions at home. They preferred the straight imperialism of the Conservatives to the divided counsels of the Liberals. The cool arrogance of Balfour inspired more confidence than the

radical rhetoric of Lloyd George. Chamberlain's jingo speeches drowned out the humane utterances of Campbell-Bannerman. Even the British trade unionists who had begun to organize for political action saw their immediate welfare wrapped up in the preservation and extension of the Empire rather than in the adoption of Socialism. For Great Britain, the nineteenth century and splendid isolation ended together. The twentieth century had lost no time in bringing world problems violently home to the British people.

• IV •

THROUGHOUT most of the nineteenth century the British had isolated themselves from European alliances but not from the rest of the world. They had avoided commitments in Europe not in order to live unto themselves alone but in order to promote and protect their world-wide Empire. Because the end of the nineteenth century saw changes in Europe that threatened the security of the British Empire, the rulers of that Empire prepared to meet the new situation with new policies.

The Boer War had already revealed one weak spot in Britain's imperial structure. Another weaker spot, nearer home, had caused more trouble for a longer time. In 1798 the British had crushed the last large-scale rebellion in Ireland. Three years later, Parliament absorbed Ireland into the United Kingdom by approving the Act of Union which Lord Byron once referred to as "the union of the shark with its prey." Having absorbed Ireland politically, the rulers of Britain proceeded to destroy it economically. Tariff restrictions on Irish factory products wrecked Irish industry and compelled the people to live on the land, most of which was owned by absentee English landlords. During the first half of the nineteenth century the population of agricultural Ireland increased from five to eight and a half millions; the population of industrial Great Britain from ten to twenty millions. Then came a series of Irish famines in which a million and a half people starved to death. By 1900 the population of Great Britain had increased to thirty-five millions; the population of Ireland had sunk to four and a half millions. During the nineteenth century more than four million Irish had emigrated, most of them to the United States, taking their bitterness against England with them and passing it on to their children and their children's children.

The people of Ireland had little reason to celebrate Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897. Her sixty-year reign had seen four million Irish families evicted from their homes. The cash income of Ireland's two million landless peasants averaged twenty-five dollars a year for each member of the family. Only 12 per cent of Ireland's arable land

was used to raise food for the Irish people. Livestock, destined for export, was pastured on the rest. The Presbyterians in Northern Ireland, outnumbered eight to one by the Catholics in the south, had their own government-endowed university at Belfast; the Catholics in Dublin had none. It cost the overburdened Irish taxpayer more than five million dollars a year to maintain a local constabulary to preserve order. The eighty-six Irish Members of Parliament in London who wanted home rule could accomplish little by political means. Up to 1900 Queen Victoria had spent only fifteen days of her long reign in Ireland. She had not set foot on Irish soil between 1861 and 1900, when she paid a last brief visit to encourage Irish volunteers to fight the Boers.

The mass of the Irish people felt that they suffered the same oppression at the hands of the English as the Poles suffered at the hands of the Russians and the South Slavs at the hands of the Austrians. But there was this difference. Widespread sympathy for Ireland did exist in England, and some reforms and concessions were granted. During the closing years of the nineteenth century home rule for Ireland became the paramount issue in British politics, with the Gladstonian Liberals championing home rule. In 1895, however, agitation for home rule passed its peak and the Unionists won the general election. The victorious Unionists did grant some land reforms, but by 1900 the Boer War had forced the perennial Irish question temporarily into the background.

The Anglo-Saxon complex of racial superiority, as expressed by Cecil Rhodes and Chamberlain, accounted in part for Britain's high-handed treatment of Ireland throughout the nineteenth century. It also helped to account for the much more tolerant attitude that successive British Governments took toward British settlers in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Nor did the British forget the lesson of the American Revolution; indeed, they came to regard George Washington less as the Father of *his* Country than as the Father of *their* Empire. In any event, the outcome of the American Revolution did make Canada safe for British rule. Although many loyalists emigrated from the American colonies to Canada, where their support of the mother country justified itself when American troops tried to invade and annex Canada during the War of 1812, the American Revolution and the War of 1812 taught both the British and Americans the virtues of mutual forbearance. The long American-Canadian frontier remained unarmed, and the British granted concessions to the Canadians that they had withheld from the American colonists.

The French inhabitants of Canada, who outnumbered the British during the early years of the nineteenth century, presented a special problem. Fortunately for Great Britain, this large, prolific, and undigested mass of French-speaking Roman Catholics lived so much to

themselves that they made little trouble. Approximately ten thousand French immigrants originally came to Canada; none came after the defeat of France by Britain in 1763. British immigration, on the other hand, steadily increased. By 1900 Canada had a population of close to six millions—more than half of them of British descent, more than one-third of French descent, most of the rest assorted Slavs, Scandinavians, Italians, and Germans. Canada had held together and grown because, in 1867, its four provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia had been permitted to federate into the Dominion of Canada. As the rest of the century ran its course, the western provinces joined and all of them enjoyed far more self-government than Ireland. A Governor General, appointed by the King of England, held office for five years and performed about the same functions in Canada that the King of England performed in the mother country. In Canada, as in England, most of the power lay with a House of Commons, elected on a representative basis by all the electorate. Although Canada had no real initiative in matters of foreign policy, no British Government could ignore any of the self-governing Dominions overseas.

Economically, Canada remained more closely tied to Britain and the Empire than to the United States, and this dependence slowed down its development. Between 1881 and 1891 the population of Canada increased 12 per cent, while the population of the United States increased 25 per cent. In 1890 the number of Canadians and their descendants living in the United States amounted to one-third of Canada's total population. In 1900 most Canadians made their living from the soil, but industry had begun to develop. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the French-Canadian Liberal who served as Prime Minister from 1896 to 1911, once declared, "The nineteenth century was the century of the United States; the twentieth century will be the century of Canada." Laurier believed in closer trade relations with the United States; he refused to go along with Joseph Chamberlain's imperial protection program. When Lady Minto, the wife of the Governor General of Canada, called Laurier "a great gentleman," Chamberlain replied that he would rather do business with a cad who knew his own mind. But Laurier did know the mind of Canada. He hoped to steer his country on an independent middle course between American nationalism and British imperialism.

As Canada had already gone, Australia hoped to follow. In 1900 Australia's five separate states agreed to federate themselves into a single continental Commonwealth. Although the Australian states had more sovereign rights than the Canadian provinces, New Zealand held aloof, preferring to remain a self-governing colony that finally called itself a colonial dominion in 1907. The Australian continent, with almost as much territory as the United States, had three and a half million inhabitants

at the turn of the century, of whom 98 per cent claimed British descent. Organized labor had gained more power in Australia than in any other part of the world; it was also the Australian Labor Party that fought hardest for the so-called "White Australia" policy barring immigration from near-by, overcrowded Asia. Some Australians traced their descent back to transported British convicts; others to gold prospectors; others to pioneers willing to travel halfway around the world to build new lives for themselves and their families. These seekers for a new life found themselves on the oldest of the continents inhabited by a few hundred thousand aborigines who still dwelt in the Stone Age. Fifty thousand of them lived on into the twentieth century.

The task of transplanting British civilization to this ancient, barren, remote continent consumed all the energies of the thin stream of immigrants who made their way to Australia during the nineteenth century. At first they took up mining, sheep raising, or farming until hostile nature, empty space, and violent price fluctuations drove tens of thousands from the land into a few great cities. Here they began to develop some small industries of their own, but Australia as a whole continued to depend on exports of wool and grain. The Australians regarded themselves as a race apart, even as a separate nation, yet their very distance from "home" made them strangely close to the mother country. Whereas the Canadians took up baseball and adopted a dollars-and-cents currency, the Australians still played cricket and toted up their accounts in pounds, shillings, and pence. Thanks to Britain's control of the seas, Australia had become a vast, empty, privileged backwater with no more initiative in world affairs than the smallest European principality or the most backward tribe in darkest Africa. Yet Australian social legislation led the world.

In Canada and Australia the British Empire had developed new sub-civilizations of its own. In Ireland, on the other hand, the British had acted in much the same way that the Russians behaved in Poland and the Austrians in Southeastern Europe. What made the British Empire a going concern was not Ireland, the Dominions, or such minor Crown Colonies as Jamaica, British Guiana, Hong Kong, or Bermuda. It was the subcontinent of India. Just as the nerve and brain center of the British Empire lay in London, just as the Royal Navy assured the control of the seas on which the security of the Empire rested, so the wealth of India provided the Empire with its lifeblood. The defense of India determined British policy everywhere—at Gibraltar and Suez, in Egypt and the Middle East, toward Russia and toward Germany.

Few Indians knew that either Britain or the Empire existed. More than 90 per cent of India's population consisted of illiterate, half-starved peasants who could see no connection between their brief,

poverty-stricken lives and their unknown rulers in far-off London. It must, of course, be acknowledged that to Britain, India possessed unique, transcendent importance and that no survey of the British Empire in 1900 can underestimate India's importance to the Empire. But other points of view also exist—notably the point of view of India and the point of view of Asia, and from those points of view India must be regarded as part of the Asiatic world that most Europeans in 1900 chose to ignore.

• V •

THE CULTURE of any people—its music, painting, literature—offers the clearest clue to social trends. The national genius of the Germans has run to music, of the Spaniards—in their heyday—to painting, of the British to literature. The poetic Welsh, the introspective Scots, the imaginative Irish have all contributed over the centuries to that great cultural storehouse known as English literature. The Victorian age more than held its own. Dickens, Thackeray, Tennyson, and Browning of course stand out. But Charles Darwin—more scientist than man of letters and more prophet than scientist—had, perhaps, a greater effect on the minds of men than any of his contemporaries.

By the end of the nineteenth century English literature had moved far in new directions. Walter Pater and Algernon Charles Swinburne tried to escape from their times to the days of ancient Greece and Rome. Dante Gabriel Rossetti preferred the pre-Raphaelite period. The influence of the decadent *fin de siècle* French poets crossed the Channel. Oscar Wilde rocketed across the sky until his conviction on homosexual charges brought his career to a sudden, ignoble end, while the satirical essays of Max Beerbohm testified to the abiding common sense and fundamental humor of English literature. Beerbohm, the most talented of the young aesthetes, devoted his gifts to ridiculing the very movement to which he belonged.

The main stream of British literature followed a different course. Thomas Hardy, "the last of the Victorians," wrote novels of farm life until the mid-1890's, when the attack upon his frank treatment of sex in *Jude the Obscure* caused him to abandon fiction and turn to poetry and epic drama. Hardy's pessimism, simplicity, and economy all marked him as a late-comer who preferred the timeless aspects of his native countryside and the eternal theme of love to any contemporary topic. The scandal created by *Jude the Obscure* also suggested that the last Victorian dared to write about sex as boldly as any younger writer of a newer age.

The first voice to proclaim this new age in accents everybody could



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Oscar Wilde:
A drawing by Max Beerbohm

understand came from the other side of the world, and it paid little attention to sex. Rudyard Kipling was born in Bombay of British parents; he received his early upbringing in England, going back to India in 1882 at the age of seventeen to become editor of a small paper in Lahore. His first book of verse appeared during his twenty-first year. By the time he had reached the age of twenty-five, six volumes of short stories made him world-famous. Returning to England, he attacked "the sheltered life" and "Little Englandism." He reverted to ballads and popular verses, many of them written in the slang of soldiers. In 1894 and 1895 his two *Jungle Books* won him a new audience—posterity. He had meanwhile married an Ameri-

can wife, lived for a few years in her native state of Vermont until he quarreled with her family and left for England deeply embittered against the United States, where he continued to enjoy as great a fame as in England. In 1898 a visit to South Africa made him more imperialist than ever, yet on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, the year before, he wrote the most celebrated of all his poems, "Recessional," with its "Lest we forget" refrain.

Kipling owed his immense success to the sheer, bold magic of his stories and verses. Few writers in any tongue have come into the world with such a God-given facility and few have used their gifts with such conscious cunning. Kipling addressed himself to the nonliterary public; his verses made music of everyday speech; his short stories transformed journalism into literature. Those critics who accused him of harnessing his muse to Britannia's imperial chariot might as well have attacked Oscar Wilde for not writing temperance tracts. Kipling could conceive of no cause more worthy of his great gifts, and to question that cause is not to question his gifts or the effective use to which he put them. In addition, Kipling was more than the poet of Empire. He was the first writer of outstanding talent to make that talent the vehicle of political propaganda. Or, if you like, Kipling was the first modern propagandist to produce literature for the masses.

He was not the last. At the same time that Kipling shot to fame as the fugleman of the triumphant British imperialists, the struggling British Socialists were preparing to counterattack. Before the Independent Labor Party had elected a single member to Parliament, a group of talented, ambitious young men and women formed the Fabian Society and adopted a program of gradual but radical social reform. They took their name from the Roman general Fabius, who kept postponing combat with Hannibal until he felt sure he could strike hard and win. The Fabians, in like manner, saw no prospect of immediate social revolution in England.

The early members of the Fabian Society included Sidney Webb, a young social worker, and his attractive well-to-do wife, Beatrice. They wrote tracts and made speeches; they preferred their doctrine of "the inevitability of gradualness" to the dialectics of Karl Marx; they enlisted the support of two of the most popular and promising young writers of the day—the novelist H. G. Wells and the playwright George Bernard Shaw. Wells, the son of a professional English cricket player, had studied science; Shaw, the son of genteel, impoverished Irish Protestants, first wrote music criticism, then essays and plays. Wells soon made a great success with scientific romances, showing in exciting fiction how applied science would continue to revolutionize human life. Shaw used the shock of laughter and paradox to make the English public think—about Socialism, the single tax, women's rights, Wagner, Ibsen, Nietzsche. He lived to surpass all his contemporaries as a master of English prose.

Shaw owed his success to his exploitation of the English sense of humor. Just as the German word *Weltschmerz* and the French expression *savoir faire* have no equivalents in other languages, so "sense of humor" remains untranslatable from English. Wells used to accuse the English of using their sense of humor to escape from reality. Shaw, on the other hand, forced the English to think by making them laugh first. "England in Ireland," said Shaw, "is the Pope's policeman."

Paradox lies at the heart of the English character. What other people could have produced such different yet typical national geniuses as Dr. Samuel Johnson and John Keats? Some foreigners admire the English instinct for the



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Thomas Hardy, the Last Victorian



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*"Scenes from the Lives of the Poets": Rudyard Kipling, composing
"The Absent-Minded Beggar"; drawing by Max Beerbohm*

practical; others see only hypocrisy. When young Henry Adams first visited England during the 1860's, he could not get over the eccentricity of his hosts, their tendency to depart from their own conventions. But the British ruling class not only felt secure enough to tolerate eccentricities: it recognized that eccentrics have their uses.

British society remained as sharply stratified in the 1890's as it had been in the 1860's. Trade-union members had gained a larger share of the national income and a greater sense of dignity and power, but the working class had its own code of morals, its own way of life, even its own habits of speech just as the farmers, the middle class, and the ruling groups had theirs. All classes shared a live-and-let-live attitude toward one another and toward life in general, but the ruling class cultivated a special kind of tolerance. It had always admitted men of talent to its ranks—witness Disraeli—safe in the knowledge that they would prove more royalist than the King. At the same time, the British ruling class also permitted the widest liberties to those born into its ranks. Just as the minority party in Parliament called itself "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition," so each individual was presumed to accept an unwritten code as binding as Britain's unwritten Constitution.

Most of us have applied the term "inferiority complex" to individuals, groups, and even whole nations. We use the term "superiority complex"

more sparingly, if at all. Yet it describes as well as any other the distinctive quality of the British ruling class at the end of Queen Victoria's reign. Often—too often—this British sense of superiority expressed itself as smugness. More often—and more happily—it also expressed itself as tolerance. The British ruling class felt so sure of itself that it tolerated and even encouraged heretics, eccentrics, and rebels. The same conventional majority that kept falling back on such phrases as "It's not cricket" or, more simply, "It isn't done," roared with laughter at violations of its own code: partly because their own quaint ways amused them, partly because anyone who presumed to challenge them seemed funny, too. Unlike any other people, the English therefore produced two distinctive national types—the one conventional, the other eccentric.

Heretics in other lands became rebels, revolutionaries, even. The English upper-class heretic did not turn against society—with a small "s." More often than not he continued to frequent Society, with a large "S," as before. The late Victorian poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt offered an almost perfect case in point. He came of a well-to-do Sussex family, spent some years in the diplomatic service, married Lady Anne Noel—the granddaughter of Lord Byron—and retired on her fortune, which he spent traveling in Egypt and the Middle East and raising Arabian steeds on the fine estate he inherited from his older brother.

During his travels Blunt became a supporter of the budding Pan-Islam movement and denounced British imperialism. In 1885 and 1886 he ran unsuccessfully for Parliament as a Conservative anti-imperialist who also favored home rule for Ireland. In 1887 his agitation for Irish home rule earned him a two months' sentence in an Irish jail. But this did not prevent him from resuming his personal friendships with the leading Tories of the day, nor did his sympathy for the oppressed lead him to modify his own costly life of leisure. A Russian with Blunt's convictions would have spent most of his days in Siberian exile. A German or Austrian could hardly have frequented aristocratic society. A Frenchman would have become a violent partisan of Captain Dreyfus. But Blunt showed the same tolerance for his imperialist friends that they showed for him. He wrote prose as well as love poetry and devoted much of his time to keeping a frank, full diary in which he recorded an uncensored political history of his times along with his own heretical comments. The following epitaph on the nineteenth century, written on December 22, 1900, and printed in his celebrated *Diaries*, draws up as sweeping a condemnation as any revolutionary ever composed, but only an English aristocrat could have presented so evenhanded a judgment of all forms of contemporary injustice, including England's own:

"All the nations of Europe are making the same hell upon earth in



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Mr. H. G. Wells, Prophet and Idealist, Conjuring up the Darling Future: drawing and caption by Max Beerbohm



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George Bernard Shaw: drawing by Max Beerbohm

China, massacring and pillaging and raping in the captured cities as outrageously as in the Middle Ages. The Emperor of Germany gives the word for the slaughter and the Pope looks on and approves. In South Africa our troops are burning farms under Kitchener's command and the Queen and the two Houses of Parliament and the bench of bishops thank God publicly and vote money for the work. The Americans are spending fifty millions a year slaughtering the Filipinos; the King of the Belgians has invested his whole fortune in the Congo where he is brutalizing the Negroes to fill his pockets. The French and the Italians are for the moment playing a less prominent part in the slaughter, but their inactivity grieves them. The whole white race is reveling openly in violence as though it never intended to be Christian. God's equal curse be on them all. So ends the famous nineteenth century in which we were so proud to have been born."

Young Laborites and aging Liberals had their doubts about what lay ahead for the Empire; even Kipling expressed some misgivings. But it remained for a devout Tory aristocrat—not a middle-class progressive or a working-class radical—to express the deepest pessimism and to release the most sweeping attack on things as they were. "I bid good-bye to the old century," wrote Blunt on December 31, 1900. "May it rest in peace

as it has lived in war. Of the new century I prophesy nothing except that it will see the decline of the British Empire. Other worse empires will perhaps rise in its place, but I shall not live to see the day." Most of Blunt's contemporaries in all parties and classes ignored his predictions. He seemed less a menace than a bore, born out of his time. The glittering present made the future, also, appear bright.

The voice of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt denounced the late Victorian age; the voices of the D'Oyly Carte Light Opera Company praised it. All the paradox and humor, all the self-assurance and self-awareness of the last years of Victoria's reign found inimitable expression in the operettas of Gil-

bert and Sullivan. These collaborators of genius ticked off the trends and fads of their times. They were social philosophers in cap and bells, using music, verse, and laughter to convey the essence of a period and even of a civilization. Surely Rhodes, Chamberlain, and Kipling had inspired the song from *Pinafore*, "For he is an Englishman." Yet it was a happy, almost a flattering irony. It left no scars—perhaps because it wounded no vital parts. The House of Lords song in *Iolanthe*, "Bow, bow, ye lower middle-classes. Bow, ye tradesmen. Bow, ye masses," satirized the British social hierarchy and at one point touched the House of Lords itself at a tender spot:

*"The House of Lords throughout the war
Did nothing in particular,
And did it very well."*

But Gilbert and Sullivan also turned their humor on the inverted snobbery of democratic reformers when the aristocratic lover sang,

*"Spurn not the nobly born .
Nor treat with virtuous scorn
The well-connected."*



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Sir Arthur Seymour Sullivan: drawing
by "Spy"

And they turned the tables on Oscar Wilde and the aesthetes in the lines, "When I walk down Piccadilly with a poppy or a lily in my medieval hand."

Only a superbly self-confident, secure society could have produced a Gilbert and Sullivan. Few contemporary Germans would have dared to ridicule "the very model of a modern major general" or poke fun at how one becomes "the ruler of the Queen's Navee." And if any German had dared to resort to such ridicule, both the public and the public authorities would have taken him seriously. As for the police states of Russia and Austria-Hungary, they automatically suppressed even the mildest criticism of things as they were. The French—as free as the British—had serious, unsolved social problems on their hands. The Dreyfus case did not lend itself to operetta. The clerical and anticlerical pamphleteers did not write light verse. Happy Britons. The operettas of Gilbert and Sullivan delighted them all—before, during, and after the Boer War. With good sense and good humor, the British Empire had met and mastered the problems of the nineteenth century. The leaders of that Empire had adapted themselves more successfully than any of their contemporaries to an era of unprecedented change.

SUMMING UP

THE CLIMATE of the nineteenth century favored Britain's national virtues and imperial interests. Under the protection of commanding sea power, British trade and industry prospered. No major European power put so large a share of its energies into the arts of peace, so small a share into the arts of war. But by 1900, Britain's sources of past strength threatened to become causes of future weakness. During the first half of the nineteenth century the British built and overbuilt their industry to lead the world; by the opening of the twentieth, the newer nations—especially Germany—had developed more modern plants and processes against which the British were finding it more and more difficult to compete. The mushroom growth of German industry had also shifted the balance of power in Europe to Britain's disadvantage. The Boer War raised the fear of a hostile Continental coalition. Even the most enthusiastic expansionists feared trouble. The age of "splendid isolation" had ended. Confidence, which had encouraged the national virtue of tolerance, might give rise to a national vice of complacency. The future of the Empire no longer depended on the British people alone, but on world forces, many of them beyond their control.

The Other Powers of Europe

A tribute to the smaller European states and a review of Europe's artistic and scientific powers at the turn of the century.

PREVIEW

THE EUROPE of 1900 consisted of much more than the five "great powers." The smaller democracies of the West had already evolved a higher form of civilization than their larger neighbors. Spain, on the other hand, offered a case history of the decline and fall of an Empire, and there seemed good reason to believe that several of the newer, larger Empires were headed in the same direction. They showed the same processes of growth and decay, the same inability to learn from the experience of others. Certainly, the writers, painters, and musicians who embodied the spirit of Europe expressed a sense of confusion and impending doom. As for the scientists to whose achievements Europe owed its commanding position in the world, they had no political power in their own right and their creations had passed into the control of other hands.

• I •

THE MAJOR POWERS of Europe presented a mixed picture in 1900. France had a glorious past; Britain, a glorious present. Germany looked forward to a glorious future. The Austrian and Turkish Empires, on the other hand, showed symptoms of decay, and Italy could not hope to recapture the glory of ancient Rome. Russia's ruling classes had evolved from barbarism to decadence in record time, while the Russian masses and the other Slavic peoples, too, showed more vitality than any other racial or national group in Europe.

Although the major nations of Europe possessed a near monopoly of power, they had no monopoly on civilization. Indeed, if nations could be marked for their Civilization Quotient as individuals are marked for their Intelligence Quotient, the C.Q. of the little democracies of Western Europe would have led the world of 1900. During the seventeenth

century the Sweden of Gustavus Adolphus took a brief fling at military expansion but soon thought better of it. By 1900 the three Scandinavian countries—Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—surpassed their far more powerful neighbors in almost every field of social welfare. In 1905, when the great European powers were becoming increasingly nationalistic and warlike, Sweden voluntarily and peacefully permitted Norway to split off and become an independent kingdom. At a time when the mighty Emperors of Eastern and Central Europe were asserting their divine right to rule, the Scandinavian monarchs welcomed and encouraged the extension of democracy in all its forms.

The other small nations of Western Europe also gave a good account of themselves. Switzerland, the oldest Republic on earth, had created a miniature European confederation of German-, French-, and Italian-speaking citizens. The Belgians and Dutch lived at peace with their neighbors and among themselves. Both depended on British and French sea power to hold their possessions overseas, but the British might well have learned lessons in racial tolerance from the Dutch record in the East Indies, just as the French and Germans might have learned from the Swiss and Scandinavians how to become better Europeans. These little democracies of the West had also contributed more than their share to the growing store of European science, art, and scholarship. Nowhere had the civilization of Europe vindicated itself more completely. Nowhere did it hold out greater promise for the future.

Spain, in 1900, seemed equally remote from the great powers and the small ones. The Spaniards had possessed a world empire that rivaled England's until the Napoleonic Wars, when a series of colonial revolts in Latin America cost them all their territories on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere. Then, in 1898, almost a century later, Spain also lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in a brief, disastrous war with the United States. Yet a strange vitality, not unlike Russia's, persisted. Spain had ties with Africa as close as Russia's ties with Asia. The Moorish conquest of Spain corresponded to the Mongol conquest of Russia. Both countries had tried to shut themselves off from the rest of Europe by building their railways on a wider gauge. Perhaps the handicaps from which the Slavic peoples had suffered would become advantages in the century that lay ahead. Perhaps the qualities that had once made Spain great would no longer prove defects.

Sweden had chosen "the middle way"; Spain had always gone to extremes. The Swedes glorified calisthenics; Spaniards preferred bull-fights. Spain had given birth to the Inquisition, Ignatius Loyola, the Jesuit order, the Counter Reformation. Nowhere in Europe did the power of the Roman Catholic Church run so strong as in Spain, but no other revolutionaries in Europe could match the violence of the Spanish

Anarchists, who drew their inspiration from the Russian Bakunin. Spain responded to its defeat by the United States with an intellectual revival. A new generation of young writers who called themselves the generation of '98 blamed the loss of the war on an antiquated, corrupt social order. But there all agreement ceased. No people on earth set such store as the Spaniards on the individual; their revolt against the medieval world around them and the modern world beyond their frontiers remained completely disorganized. It was also quite in keeping with their national temperament that many Spanish liberals, at the turn of the century, looked forward to the accession of young King Alfonso XIII to the throne. He did not come of age until 1902, but his courage, energy, and charm seemed to augur a better future. They counted on his youthful spirit to give Spain a new lease on life.

• II •

A RUSSIAN JOURNALIST, Eugene Markov, wrote in 1900: "One fears for the future of mankind. The most ominous sign is not the fact that the cook, the servant girl, the lackey want the same pleasures which not long ago were the monopoly of the rich alone; but the fact that all—all without exception—rich and idle as well as poor and industrious, seek and demand daily excitement, gaiety, and keen impressions—demand it as something without which life is impossible, which may not be denied them."

A few years later Stanley Leathes, who had inherited the editorship of the *Cambridge Modern History*, planned by Lord Acton, noted that "the consolations of religion have for the moment lost their efficacy in large sections of the European population." He found that "young and ardent people" pursued "schemes of social regeneration" in preference to "spiritual rapture." "The belief in the possibility of social reform by conscious effort is the most dominant current in the modern European mind." He continued, "It has superseded the old belief in Liberty as the one panacea; even Bismarck paid homage to it; and no modern statesman can afford to ignore it. Its substantial achievements, and perhaps its disappointments, are in the future; but its currency in the present is as significant and pregnant as the belief in the rights of man about the time of the French Revolution. The coming age will be occupied by the attempts to translate its ideals into the phrases of practical politics."

These two contemporary commentators made three points worth noting. They suggested that religion, which once dominated the life of Europe, had lost some of its hold. They stressed the growing passion for social change. They took Europe, as an entity, for granted. The creative artists in the Europe of 1900 elaborated on these points in

words, music, and pictures. Some chose to deal with the subject of social reform. Others lived out their protests in their private lives. Still others kicked over the traces by flouting conventional techniques. Social workers also appeared, ministering to social unrest, and by their choice of that career protested against the prevailing morals and manners of the time. And even those creative or assertive people who did not cry out against things as they were felt a sense of defeat, nostalgia, and approaching doom in the air.

Many of these currents swirled to the surface in 1892 with the appearance of a book entitled *Degeneration*, by Max Nordau, a young German critic. Nordau had dabbled in the new science of psychiatry and had married the daughter of one of the pioneers in that science, Caesar Lombroso, to whom he dedicated his book. It enjoyed an instantaneous, international success. "Hysteria and degeneration," wrote Nordau, "have always existed, but they formerly showed themselves only sporadically, and had no importance in the life of the whole community. It was only the vast fatigue, experienced by the generation on which the multitude of discoveries and innovations had burst, imposing organic demands that this generation lacked the strength to support, which created favorable conditions for these maladies to gain vast ground and threaten civilization."

Nordau accused most writers and a growing section of the public of succumbing to confused mysticism, erotic egomania, and false realism. He regarded Tolstoy and Wagner as false mystics; Ibsen and Nietzsche as frustrated egotists; Zola as a pornographer disguised as a realist. He cited the degenerate personal lives of Verlaine and Oscar Wilde, the epilepsy of Dostoevsky, the insanity of Nietzsche and van Gogh. He accused Ibsen of stacking the cards against the existing social order. He accused Wagner of unbridled eroticism. Some of Nordau's strictures made more sense than others. Posterity—the court of last appeal—has not endorsed all his rather mechanical judgments.

A whole school of French writers—Verlaine, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud—had made a cult of degeneracy. "A fine book is the end for which the world is made," said Mallarmé. Oscar Wilde took up "art for art's sake." Rossetti asked, "What does it matter to me if the sun revolves around the earth or the earth revolves around the sun?" These men did not depict what Nordau called "the universal normal life." Compared to Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, or Goethe, they were "degenerates" all right. "The style of decadence," wrote Théophile Gautier, "is ingenious, complicated, learned, full of shades of meaning and research, always pushing further the limits of language, borrowing from all the technical vocabularies, taking colors from all palettes, notes from all keyboards, forcing itself to express in thoughts what is most ineffable,



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Oscar Wilde's Salome, Surrounded by Peacocks: drawing by Aubrey Beardsley



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Aubrey Beardsley, One of the Leading British Artists of the Nineties

and in form the vaguest and most fleeting contours; listening, that it may translate them, to the subtle confidences of the neuropath, to the avowals of aging and depraved passion, and to the singular hallucinations of the fixed idea verging upon madness."

The decadents made no pretense of appealing to a mass public, yet they had considerable influence, especially among the educated classes. At best, they had broken with the past. At worst, they wrote pornography in the guise of art. The naturalists who took their lead from Zola scorned literary tricks and flourishes and wrote crudely of life in the raw. But Nordau, a sensation-monger himself, ignored the protest that underlay the best naturalist literature of the time and dwelt only on its coarser features: "The vanguard of civilization holds its nose at the pit of undiluted naturalism, and can be brought to bend over it with sympathy and curiosity only when, by cunning engineering, a drain from the boudoir and the sacristy has been turned into it."

Nordau's vision of the coming century expressed what many of his contemporaries also anticipated: "The end of the twentieth century will therefore probably see a generation to whom it will not be injurious to read a dozen square yards of newspapers daily, to be constantly called to the telephone, to be thinking simultaneously of the five continents of the world, to live half their time in a railway carriage or a flying machine, and to satisfy the demands of a circle of ten thousand associ-

ates, acquaintances, and friends. It will know how to find its ease in the midst of a city inhabited by millions and will be able, with nerves of gigantic vigor, to respond without haste or agitation to the almost innumerable claims of existence."

• III •

THE DECADENT, *fin-de-siècle* spirit possessed Max Nordau so completely that he could not transcend it. He became so obsessed with the contrast between the vigorous culture of an earlier day and the symptoms of decay around him that he could find no saving grace in his contemporaries. How much more clearly Nietzsche saw things when he summed up the decadents in these few words: "They change; they do not *become*." And Nietzsche, who hated Wagner far more bitterly than Nordau did, also saw more clearly than Nordau the depth of Wagner's apostasy. Nietzsche never doubted Wagner's genius. He accused him of putting his great gifts in the service of a false religion and a false patriotism. Nordau concentrated on Wagner's eroticism and thus missed the revolutionary import of his unique "music dramas." Bernard Shaw, on the other hand, saw Wagner—and Ibsen, too—as apostles of revolution.

Wagner may have betrayed and debased the great tradition of German music, but he inspired and liberated musicians in other countries. The great French conductor Jules Étienne Padeloup not only made the Parisian public acquainted with Wagner's music. He popularized French composers, too, especially Hector Berlioz and César Franck, and prepared the way for a general musical renaissance in France. Nobody called César Franck a decadent, but his experiments with "augmented harmonies" became the basis of the new "impressionistic" music with which Claude Debussy startled audiences in the late 1880's and 1890's. While Richard Strauss made some of Wagner's technical innovations the basis of a less romantic musical style, Debussy broke new ground. He not only introduced a new whole-tone scale: he fused his new music with the new literature. Paul Henry Lang, in his massive work *Music in Western Civilization*, has written: "Debussy stands at the end of the long century of romanticism; at the same time he was the first great master of the new music of the twentieth century which we so loosely call 'modern.'" Debussy spent more time with writers than with musicians. In 1892 he began an orchestral prelude to Mallarmé's *L'Après-midi d'un Faune*; much of the next ten years he devoted to writing an opera based on Maeterlinck's *Pelléas and Mélisande*.

Debussy not only gave musical expression to *fin-de-siècle* literature: he became the chief exponent of impressionism in music, as Paul



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How the Public Feels after Listening for an Hour to Wagner's "Music of the Future": lithograph by Honoré Daumier



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Paul Cézanne, Self-Portrait: The father of modern French painting in one of his realistic moods

Cézanne had already become the chief exponent of impressionism in painting. In assailing the decadent spirit of the 1890's, Max Nordau had concentrated his fire on the writers of the period, quoting their own words against them. He devoted much less attention to the musicians and painters, who displayed more vitality and originality than most of their writing contemporaries and who had to fight against heavier odds. Wagner, with all his defects, cleared the way for the new music of the twentieth century. Cézanne performed the same service for painting, twenty years later and with far less public acclaim during his lifetime.

Just as German composers dominated the musical world of the nineteenth century, so French artists dominated nineteenth-century painting. But during most of the nineteenth century, the leading Paris art dealers—taking their cue from the conservative French Academy—favored those painters who carried on the photographic, painstaking workmanship of Ingres. The revolt against this tradition remained almost sterile for decades. Only painters with independent means could survive. They took up the doctrine of "impressionism," based on "the innocence of the eye." They tried to put on canvas just what they saw and felt, thus corresponding, in a sense, to the naturalists of literature.

Cézanne died in 1906 at the age of sixty-seven. When his first pictures were shown at an exhibition of impressionist painting shortly after the Franco-Prussian War, they came in for the most caustic abuse, and even his fellow impressionists held him in low esteem. When dealers exhibited his work independently in the 1880's and 1890's he again failed

to impress either the critics or the public. "I have not tried to reproduce nature," he said of his work. "I have represented it." He went into virtual retirement in 1899 at the age of sixty. Although other painters in the new tradition did better, Vincent van Gogh, the son of a Dutch pastor, enjoyed even less worldly success than Cézanne. He won some recognition from his fellow artists; he was also a latter-day saint who lived out the rebellious convictions that most of his contemporaries merely talked about. Van Gogh first threw away the successful career as an art dealer on which he had embarked, then turned his back on other painters, lived with starving coal miners, befriended tramps and prostitutes, and died insane in 1890 at the age of thirty-seven. "Oh," he had once exclaimed, "for the vision of a child of six!"


While in France van Gogh had met another rebellious artist, Paul Gauguin—as handsome as van Gogh was homely—who succeeded where van Gogh failed in capitalizing on his revolt against society. Gauguin abandoned a wife, five children, and his successful stockbroking business to become a painter. His work received much more praise than Cézanne's, but in the 1890's he left Paris to live and paint in the South Seas. Returning to exhibit some of his pictures in 1895, he asked the Swedish playwright and novelist August Strindberg to write the introduction to the catalogue of his paintings. Strindberg refused and their exchange of letters, which the publicity-wise Gauguin printed, gives expression to some of the ferment of the times.

"You have created a new heaven and earth," wrote Strindberg, "but I find no pleasure in your creation; there is too much blaze of sun for one who loves subdued light. And in your paradise dwells an Eve who does not conform to my ideal—for truly I also have an ideal or two of woman. You, Gauguin, are the wild man who hates a hampering civilization; you have something of the Titan who, jealous of the Creator, knocks together a little creation of his own at odd times; a child who takes playthings to pieces to make different ones out of them; a man who braves opinion, to make out that the sky is red instead of blue, as most of us believe."

Gauguin replied: "Your civilization is your disease, my barbarism my restoration to health. The Eve of your civilized conception makes us all misogynists. The old Eve who shocked you in my studio will perhaps seem less odious to you someday. I have perhaps been unable to do more than suggest my world, which seems unreal to you. . . . Only the Eve I have painted can stand naked before us. Yours would always be shameless in this natural state, and if beautiful, the source of pain and evil." Gauguin returned to Tahiti, where he took the part of the natives against the colonial administration of France, but disease and drugs led to his death in 1903, at the age of fifty-five.



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Vincent van Gogh, Self-Portrait

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Paul Gauguin, Self-Portrait

Impressionist pictures looked as strange as impressionist music sounded. Like the new literature that Max Nordau attacked, the new painting and the new music seemed to have moved into a new dimension. This was more than the recurrent revolt of youth. Nietzsche's phrase, "the transvaluation of values," came closer to describing what was going on. The romantic movement that Rousseau had launched more than a century before had tied itself in with the French Revolution. It marked the rise of new classes, the triumph of new beliefs—in liberty, equality, fraternity. But the new literature, painting, and music of the 1890's had no positive program; it had no connection with any mass movement. Art for art's sake looked suspiciously like revolt for the sake of revolt.

Some of the new writers, painters, and musicians believed in socialism and the proletariat, but their work never reached proletarian audiences. The mass public—proletarian and middle class—found the new, cheap, popular press more to its liking. A minority of well-to-do eccentrics patronized the new intellectual and artistic cults, but the world of wealth and fashion preferred Sargent's paintings to Cézanne's; the music-loving public preferred Puccini to Debussy. Sargent and Puccini delighted the eye and the ear: Sargent did not see the world with new eyes, Puccini did not startle the ear with sounds, rhythms, and melodies never heard before. Perhaps the decadents and impressionists had no program, no ready-made, mass following. But if they seemed to reject



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Mr. Sargent at Work": drawing by Max Beerbohm.

American-born John Singer Sargent painted the aristocracy of prewar Europe with a speed and dash that dazzled the Old World



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Inventor of Dynamite Enjoying All Souls' Day. (In reality, Alfred Nobel, the Swedish inventor of dynamite, devoted much of his fortune to establishing the international prizes that bear his name for contributions to peace, literature, and science); lithograph by Daumier

all accepted forms and values, the general sense of unrest to which they gave expression did strike responsive chords. Their first claim to fame did not lie in the slender following they attracted but in the wide opposition they aroused. When the mass public later accepted the "decadents," it did not mean that society itself had gone into a decline. It meant that a new generation saw things in *fin-de-siècle* art that only the advance guard of the time could recognize.

• IV •

THE CREATIVE POWER of Europe which had expressed itself for centuries in literature, painting, and music had fallen, by 1900, into a condition of almost nihilistic confusion. Yet it was a vigorous confusion, and the scientists added a stabilizing touch. Between 1800 and 1900 European science had evolved from a scattered group of almost unrelated special studies into a method of thought and investigation. Science did not offer a "philosophy of life"; religion took care of that and of more besides—and the more thorough the scientist, the less religion he

brought into his work. It was not that he looked down on religion; he simply believed in keeping everything in its proper place.

Lord Kelvin, who possessed one of the great scientific minds of all time, summed up the nineteenth-century view of science in this classic sentence: "I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science." During the nineteenth century mathematics, "the queen of the sciences," made its most revolutionary advance in two thousand years when it discarded Euclidean geometry and announced that space is curved and that a straight line is not the shortest distance between two points. More than twenty years before the development of non-Euclidean geometry, Charles Darwin expounded his subversive theory of natural selection in these words: "As many more individuals are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form."

Darwin's theory of evolution changed man's conception of himself. It led to greatly increased activity in all the natural sciences. At the same time that Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, Pasteur propounded his germ theory of disease, and Lister in Scotland and Koch in Prussia went on to develop the new science of bacteriology. But as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the physical sciences came into the ascendant. Europe's scientists—like most of the rest of the people of Europe—had become increasingly concerned with mastering man's physical environment. As the British physicist Sir Frederick Soddy put it, "Through metaphysics first; then through alchemy and chemistry, through physical and astronomical spectroscopy, lastly through radioactivity, science has slowly groped its way to the atom."

On the occasion of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee in 1887, Thomas Henry Huxley described the march of science during the previous half century in these words: "The rapid increase of natural knowledge, which is the chief character of our age, is effected in various ways. The main army of science moves to the conquest of new worlds slowly and surely, nor ever cedes an inch of any territory gained. But the advance is covered and facilitated by the ceaseless activity of clouds of light troops provided with a weapon—always efficient, if not always an arm

of precision—the scientific imagination. It is the business of these *enfants perdus* of science to make raids into the realm of ignorance wherever they see, or think they see, a chance; and cheerfully to accept defeat, or it may be annihilation, as the reward of error.”

During the closing months of the nineteenth century Professor Max Planck of the University of Berlin started a revolution in the physical sciences. In the words of Sir James Jeans, he “brought forward a tentative explanation of certain phenomena of radiation which had so far completely defied interpretation. Not only was his explanation non-technical in its nature; it seemed impossible to connect it up with any mechanical line of thought. Largely for this reason, it was criticized, attacked, and even ridiculed. But it proved brilliantly successful, and ultimately developed into the modern ‘quantum theory’ which forms one of the great principles of modern physics. Also, though this was not apparent at the time, it marked the end of the mechanical age in science, and the opening of a new era.”

Lord Kelvin had said he could understand nothing of which he could not make a mechanical model; Helmholtz added, “The final aim of all natural science is to resolve itself into mechanics.” Presently, however, the various specialized branches of science had begun to draw together, to borrow from one another, and to create new productive offshoots—as, for instance, when biology and chemistry combined to beget biochemistry. And though, as Sir James Jeans indicated, science became less mechanical as the end of the century approached, to the general public science meant better health and better conditions of life: anaesthesia and the telegraph, antiseptic surgery and the internal-combustion engine, inoculation and the phonograph, the telephone, the electric light. The researches of the so-called “pure scientists” always precede the inventions of the “applied scientist.” It is therefore revealing that throughout the nineteenth century Europe virtually monopolized the field of scientific research.

The research scientist combined the industry of the scholar, the talent of the artist, and the devotion of the priest. His achievements created a rapid, profound, and universal revolution. But the scientist could no more stand apart from his class or his country than could the scholar or the artist. Nor could the scientists organize themselves—or anyone else—after the fashion of religious leaders. As a result, the men who had done most to give Europe the unique, world pre-eminence it attained during the nineteenth century had no control over their own creation. Priests and politicians, rich men and poor, philosophers and artists, Slavs, Latins, and Teutons recognized the achievements of science, but they did not turn to the scientists for leadership—nor did the scientists have any leadership to provide. The scientists had devised

the most powerful weapons in Europe's arsenal—weapons of peace as well as war. But to possess these weapons was one thing; to use them, something else again.

Although Europe loomed large in the world of 1900, it did not control that world. In spite of all the forms of power that Europe had developed by 1900, it had no monopoly of power. It had not learned how to live at peace with itself or with its overseas possessions. Two other major areas counted for something, too. The United States of America, originally an offshoot of Europe, had in some respects surpassed Europe. Asia, of which Europe had once been an offshoot, was also showing more signs of vitality than of decline.

SUMMING UP

FOR ALL the extent and variety of its power, Europe entered the new century uncertain, fearful, divided against itself. Its small democracies held out the best hopes for the future. They showed the heights that European civilization could achieve. But moral power did not rule the world of 1900. The fate of Spain perhaps foreshadowed Europe's fate, but Spain had tapped new sources of vitality that had little connection with either the nineteenth or the twentieth century. The Europe of 1900 showed plenty of vitality in the arts and sciences, but it was a vitality of fever, not health, and the expression "*fin de siècle*" came to mean not the end of the century but the end of a world.

U. S. A.

How the Republican Party first made the United States safe for capitalism and then prepared to do the same thing for the rest of the world.

PREVIEW

THANKS to the steady flow of immigration, the United States had remained throughout the nineteenth century a permanent member of the European community. But Americans had their own character and history as distinctive as the character and history of any European people. As late as 1900 the country still remembered the effects of the Civil War but had not yet grasped the equally important effects of the much more recent war with Spain. The final, troubled decade of the nineteenth century ended with defeat for the Populists, victory for the trusts, and a new era of expansion abroad.

• I •

THINKING BACK to the time of William the Conqueror, Frenchmen have sometimes described England as a French colony that turned out badly. The United States of 1900 seemed, to many Europeans, like a European colony that had turned out well. During the eighteenth century the North American colonists began to apply ideals of political democracy that originated in Europe but had never taken effective hold there. During the nineteenth century the new nation that these colonists had created developed on a continental scale the new scientific principles that had also originated in Europe. Because the United States derived so much from Europe, the Old World bore a considerable responsibility for the kind of civilization that the United States was creating.

Many ties bound Europe and the United States together in 1900. Throughout the nineteenth century a rising stream of European emigrants had poured across the Atlantic. After 1848, German and Hungarian revolutionaries sought in America a freedom they could not find in their native lands. Victims of the potato famine and of British oppression in Ireland sought opportunity and sanctuary in the United



BROWN BROTHERS

*"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"*

*Emma Lazarus in "The New Colossus": Inscription for the Statue of Liberty,
New York Harbor*

States. Later came Polish and Russian Jews, Scandinavians, Italians, and South Slavs. Most of these new arrivals belonged to the very poorest classes, and in pulling up stakes and setting out for the New World showed more ambition than those who stayed at home. Some of them—perhaps many of them—might have devoted their lives to fighting tyranny in Europe if the United States had not given them a chance to build a democracy overseas.

The American way of life enjoyed an enormous prestige among the common people of nineteenth-century Europe. Europe's Emperors, Kings, and aristocrats, on the other hand, regarded the young American Republic as an affront, even as a threat, to themselves. The outbreak of the Civil War caused rejoicing among European reactionaries. They hoped to see the Union smashed, the United States Balkanized, and the entire New World thrown open to their intervention and influence. Although the British ruling classes made no secret of their hostility to the Union cause, the British people—especially the industrial workers—supported it. Even Gladstone, the outstanding Victorian Liberal, fa-



BROWN BROTHERS

How the Other Half Lived in 1900: Recent immigrants making clothing at home

vored the South, but the government to which he belonged throughout the Civil War period wisely restrained its impulse to come to the open aid of the Confederacy.

In the first place, the New World had become too powerful to accept dictation from the Old—especially in view of the sympathy that the European masses felt for American democracy. In the second place, the opportunities that the New World held out to immigrants from Europe provided an outlet for surplus population

and a safety valve through which European pressures could find release. Far from threatening the monarchies and empires of Europe with destruction, the republics of the New World—especially the United States—stabilized and strengthened the European *status quo* by welcoming manpower of which Europe was only too glad to rid itself. The British, in particular, benefited. As Bismarck pointed out, the most important political fact of the nineteenth century was that the American and British people spoke the same language.

From the point of view of the United States, the most important fact of that century was the Civil War, which accomplished three things: It preserved the Union, abolished Negro slavery, and gave Northern business interests license to industrialize, develop, and exploit the country. Lincoln had successfully maintained in the New World a continental unity that Napoleon had failed to create in the Old.

By 1900 the Constitution of the United States, originally a daring and revolutionary document, had remained in force longer and with fewer changes than the constitution of any other major power. Revolutions and counterrevolutions had shaken most of Europe. The British had avoided violence, but they had not avoided change. American democracy differed from British and French democracy in that it operated on a unique system of checks and balances. The President, or chief executive, had far more power than the President of France or the King of England, but the British House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies had more power than the Congress of the United States. Finally, the United States Supreme Court could check both the executive and the legislature as no similar body could check the executive or the legislative body in either Britain or France. The framers

of the American Constitution had devoted their energies and ingenuities to creating such a perfectly balanced system of executive, legislative, and judicial government that no one department of that government could ever completely dominate the other two.

The checks and balances worked almost too well, but the Constitution in and of itself did not automatically establish democracy in the United States. Most of the Southern states, for instance, denied the Negroes the right to vote, and poll taxes deprived millions of poor whites of the ballot. In 1900, 40 per cent of the seventy-six million inhabitants of the United States were foreign born and only a small proportion of them voted. Most native-born whites, on the other hand, took their politics seriously, and in the Presidential election of 1900 75 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls.

As for the politicians of the time, they had rather less power and no higher morals than the business community. The two major parties—Democratic and Republican—organized both Houses of Congress in Washington and most of the state governments. Through their control of the primaries and the conventions, these two parties picked the presidential candidates between whom the voters finally made their choice. Although the United States, like Great Britain, operated on the two-party system, the American Democrats and Republicans did not represent quite such fixed interests and principles as the British Con-



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Pullman Travel, 1900 Style

servatives and Liberals. The Democrats entirely dominated the South and traditionally stood for low tariffs. Since the Civil War they had also developed powerful and corrupt local machines in most of the larger Eastern cities. But since the end of the Civil War only one Democrat—Grover Cleveland—had reached the White House and only during the first two years of his second term, in 1893 and 1894, did the Democratic Party control both Houses of Congress.

The Union victory in the Civil War put the Republicans in power, and they presently became the political arm of the Northern industrialists and bankers—and, as such, the inveterate champions of high tariffs. Having established the authority of the Federal Government over the individual states, the Republicans handed out free Western lands to settlers and gave further privileges to big business in general and to the railroads in particular. During the first two decades after the Civil War, the railroad construction boom led to the corruption of entire states—their governors, judges, and legislatures. Railroad promoters sold securities far in excess of earning powers. Their bonds and stocks defaulted, ruining thousands of small investors. And these early railroads provided miserable service. By the 1890's, however, two railroad magnates had absorbed and consolidated many of the smaller lines into two extensive empires. Edward H. Harriman controlled the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, the Illinois Central, and the Georgia Central. He dominated the entire Southwest. James J. Hill gained a comparable position in the Northwest. But where Harriman concentrated on the acquisition of railroad properties, Hill pioneered in other directions and encouraged modernized farming and the conservation of natural resources.

By the 1890's the same centralizing tendency that had created a few great railroad empires made itself felt in other directions. Two men, in particular, rode this wave. John D. Rockefeller, the son of poor parents from upper New York State, entered the newly developed oil industry, where he created the first great vertical trust. Controlling every step in the long process of refining and distributing petroleum products, he used price-cutting campaigns to crush all competitors who refused to join the Standard Oil empire on his terms. He claimed that these methods promoted the interest of the ultimate consumer by bringing production costs and prices down.

J. Pierpont Morgan preferred horizontal combinations and did not even feign an interest in the common man. His mother came of an old Brooklyn family. His father founded a banking house in London. The son attended Göttingen University, where his genius for mathematics attracted the admiration of his professors, but he took up banking, first in New York, then in London, then back in New York again. Morgan

used financial manipulation to bring many different types of industry under the control of the private banking house that he founded. He sought power through money; Rockefeller sought power through production. Both men built trusts and combinations. Both came into conflict with the courts and the Federal Government. Morgan lived a more lavish life than the austere, teetotaling Rockefeller. He spent much of his fortune on pictures and a private library. He built a theater for Maxine Elliott, and the Lying-In Hospital for mothers in childbirth. Rockefeller, on the other hand, turned most of his fortune over to a foundation for philanthropic and scientific work. William Jennings Bryan declared, in the 1890's, "No man could make a million dollars honestly." He had the Rockefellers and Morgans in mind, but such men not only inspired Bryan's oratory, they also inspired many ambitious youngsters to follow their example.

• II •

AT THIS TIME the rapid concentration of wealth had begun to restrict the opportunities of ten and twenty years before. The worst American depression of the century threw city workers out of their jobs, small businessmen into bankruptcy, and small farmers off their land. Grover Cleveland, defeated for the Presidency in 1888, came back to defeat Harrison by a wider margin in 1892 than that by which he had defeated Blaine in 1884. Nor was this all. A third party, the Populists, had entered the field and polled over a million votes, as compared with five and a half million for Cleveland and five million for Harrison. Their frankly radical platform depicted the state of the nation this way:

"We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislature, the Congress and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized; most of the states have been compelled to isolate the voters in polling places to prevent universal intimidation or bribery. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrating in the hands of the capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right of organization for self-protection; imported pauperized labor beats down their wages; a hireling, standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down, and they are rapidly degenerating into European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and these, in turn, despise the Republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two



Henry George

CULVER

great classes of tramps and millionaires."

The Populists campaigned for direct election of Senators, a graduated income tax, government operation of railroads, telephones, and telegraphs, and the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the fixed ratio of sixteen to one for gold. (At the time, the Government bought only a limited amount of silver, at erratically declining prices.) Although currency reform furnished only one plank in the Populist platform, the "Silver Question" by 1896 overshadowed all others and became the cardinal issue in one of the great presidential campaigns in American history.

The free-silverites based their economic thinking on the fact that the production of gold had not kept pace with the production of other forms of wealth. This meant that the value of gold, measured in terms of goods, steadily increased, thereby benefiting those who held gold currency at the expense of those who held wealth of other kinds. Even such extreme Conservatives as Arthur J. Balfour in England therefore argued that as a matter of enlightened self-interest, the capitalist system should expand the base of its currency to include the more plentiful metal of silver as well as the scarce metal of gold. American free-silverites used some orthodox economics in pleading their case, but the most zealous of them had virtually imbibed faith in free silver with their mothers' milk until it became part of their bone and tissue. That faith was more than an economic doctrine: it became an emotional symbol, especially during the long period of rising discontent that reached its climax in the 1896 presidential campaign.

Other economic panaceas also came in for wide attention. In 1879 an unknown Californian named Henry George had published a book entitled *Progress and Poverty* in which he traced most of the world's economic troubles back to the private ownership of land. He therefore proposed a radical "single tax" on land values and land values only. His doctrines acquired wide popularity in Europe as well as in the United States. Joseph Chamberlain and Bernard Shaw took up the single tax. It became a kind of cult, and George himself once ran for

Mayor of New York City. His obsession with land values reflected the conditions in which he lived. Real-estate speculation had frequently run riot in the United States. Farmers acquired and developed land—not to produce crops or to build homes, but to sell at a profit. Most of the capital in American banks and insurance companies consisted of mortgages on real estate. In addressing himself to the exploitation of land values, Henry George therefore exposed one of the fundamental weaknesses and injustices of the economic order—or anarchy—in the United States. *Progress and Poverty*, for all its limitations, remains nonetheless a lucid, hard-headed exposition of political economy.

Nine years later another book enjoyed a comparable vogue. Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* anticipated even some of H. G. Wells's presentiments, depicting an imaginary future society in which mankind had at last harnessed the forces of nature to give prosperity and security to all. But Bellamy and George appealed to a relatively small section of the public. The book that really swept the country did not appear until 1894; within a year it had sold two million copies; within another two years it had sold another two or three million—at twenty-five cents a copy.

This book, *Coin's Financial School*, by William Hope Harvey—a former schoolteacher, law clerk, and speculator in mines and real estate—was published by its author in Chicago in the summer of 1894. The book reported a series of completely imaginary lectures delivered by a fictitious character, "Professor Coin," before classes which all of Chicago's leading citizens supposedly attended. Medill McCormick of the *Chicago Tribune*, Lyman Gage, president of the First National Bank, Marshall Field, Phil D. Armour, Levi Z. Leiter, and other men of wealth were all represented as quizzing "Professor Coin," who promptly squelched them with his superior financial wisdom. Many purchasers of *Coin's Financial School* assumed that the book described a real course of lectures attended by real people. Most of them accepted the Professor's bimetallist theories and agreed that currency reform spelled economic salvation.

The economics behind this propaganda require a word of explanation. During the Civil War the United States had gone off the gold standard, and between 1860 and 1865 the number of dollars in circulation had doubled. Under Grant the country went back on the gold standard, with the result that the number of dollars in circulation, per capita, had decreased 50 per cent by 1880. This meant that the banking interests and the creditor classes had profiteered by as much as 100 per cent at the expense of the debtors. Farmers lost their land when the collapse of grain prices made it impossible for them to meet their mortgage payments. The smaller railroads suffered similar fates when they



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

If Bryan Wins: The 16 to 1 bargain counter of the future as seen by the Democratic but anti-Bryan New York World


could not meet the interest payments on their bonds. The banks that held the mortgages thus acquired farm lands at low cost; the big railroads bought up the small ones at bargain prices. A few figures show what had happened. By the turn of the century 35 per cent of America's farmers were tenant farmers; another 15 per cent had lost all their property to the banks. Nine per cent of the people owned 71 per cent of the wealth. This left 90 per cent of the people with less than 30 per cent. Three one-hundredths of 1 per cent owned one-fifth of all the wealth.

The backbone of the Populist movement lay in the country districts and small towns. It was essentially a revolt of the Protestant, white, native-born Anglo-Saxon American against the big money of the big cities. But the Populists also appealed to the newly organized labor movement, which fell into two groupings. In 1869 the garment cutters of Philadelphia secretly began to organize the Noble Order of Knights of Labor until they found they got more support by coming into the open and calling for one big union of all workers. Although their strikes always meant violence, they attracted three-quarters of a million members by 1885. In the meanwhile, however, the better paid workers in the more highly skilled trades had organized the American Federation of Labor on a craft basis. The Knights continued to lead the strikes, but it was the Federation that gradually got the members. Socialistic ideas and revolutionary tactics made a certain appeal to industrial workers

in the larger cities, especially those who had had trade-union and political experience in Europe. But most discontented Americans in the 1890's did not want socialism or revolution. They wanted a full dinner pail and reform—in that order—though in many small towns and country districts “free silver” came first.

In 1892 the Populists began to rally some of the malcontents behind their catch-all reform program. The revolt reached its peak four years later when the bimetallists, under the leadership of thirty-six-year-old William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, seized control of the Democratic Party. Bryan had served two terms in Congress, practiced law, and set himself up as a newspaper publisher. He had also spoken up and down the land in favor of the free and unlimited coinage of silver, which he wanted the Government to purchase at the fixed rate of sixteen ounces for one ounce of gold. This, he argued, would give the people the currency they needed to buy the goods they could produce and break the hold of the Wall Street “gold bugs.” The farmers liked Bryan because the free coinage of silver promised to raise the prices of their products. Many industrial workers rallied to Bryan because he assailed the vested interests. Small businessmen who had gone into debt welcomed the prospect of paying off these debts in cheaper dollars. The bankrupt South saw salvation in free silver. But the Northern commercial interests and the salaried and professional classes feared and hated him.

The climax of the drive for free silver came when Bryan rose to speak before the undecided Democratic convention of 1896. He had delivered the same speech, in substance, hundreds of times before, but this time he had a national audience and a national opportunity. He made the most of it in an historic oration, memorized for the occasion: “We have petitioned and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more. We defy them.” And then, his classic closing words: “Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, the laboring



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Republican Campaign Poster, 1896


interests and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: 'You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns—you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.'"

The speech won Bryan the nomination and delivered the Democratic Party over to militant reformers. The Republicans retaliated by nominating Senator William McKinley of Ohio, chiefly known as the author of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1891, which imposed the highest tariffs in American history. McKinley—sober, devout, honest, friendly—did not stump the country, but his adoring campaign manager, Marcus A. Hanna, who had made a fortune in Cleveland's public utilities, saw to it that other men of wealth also came to the aid of the party. After one of the bitterest campaigns in American history McKinley won the Presidency with a popular plurality of more than six hundred thousand votes. Bryan had failed to break the Republicans' hold on the heavily populated Northeastern and Middle Western states.

Twenty years after the election the poet Vachel Lindsay recaptured the spirit of that campaign in a long poem to Bryan, one stanza of which, reprinted from *The Golden Whales of California*,* goes this way:

*Election night at midnight:
 Boy Bryan's defeat.
 Defeat of western silver.
 Defeat of the wheat.
 Victory of letterfiles
 And plutocrats in miles
 With dollar signs upon their coats,
 Diamond watch-chains on their vests
 And spats on their feet.
 Victory of the custodians,
 Plymouth Rock,
 And all the inbred landlord stock.
 Victory of the neat.
 Defeat of the aspen groves of Colorado valleys,
 The blue bells of the Rockies,
 And blue bonnets of old Texas,
 By the Pittsburg alleys.
 Defeat of alfalfa and the Mariposa lily.
 Defeat of the Pacific and the long Mississippi.
 Defeat of the young by the old and the silly.
 Defeat of the tornadoes by the poison vats supreme.
 Defeat of my boyhood, defeat of my dream.*

*Published by the Macmillan Company, 1920. Reprinted by permission.



BROWN BROTHERS

*Henry Adams:
A late portrait*



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

*President William McKinley Delivers
His First Inaugural Address*

• III •


THE POETRY of Vachel Lindsay recaptures the atmosphere, the prose of Henry Adams explains the significance of Bryan's defeat. Adams's grandfather and great-grandfather had sat in the White House, and when his father went to London as American Minister during the Civil War young Henry went along as his secretary, thus cutting himself off from the great experience that most of his generation shared. Yet, failing to become a complete American, Adams fell still further short of becoming a European. Too sensitive, timid, and conceited to compete against his contemporaries on their terms, Adams spent his life on the side-lines of politics, yet the exercise of power always fascinated him. His family connections opened almost any Washington door he chose to enter; his own wit made him welcome everywhere. Oscillating between frustrated ambition and scholarly detachment, Adams understood, perhaps better than his more active friends, that during the 1890's American history had taken its most decisive turn since the Civil War.

The election of 1896 did not surprise him. He felt that Cleveland had already settled the issue once and for all in 1893 when he committed the United States to the gold standard even before Bryan had forced the Republicans' hand. "For a hundred years between 1783 and 1893," Adams wrote in his *Education*, "the American people had hesitated, vacillated, swayed forward and back, between two forces—one simply industrial, the other capitalistic, centralizing, mechanical. In 1893 the issue came on the single gold standard, and the majority declared itself once and for all in favor of the capitalistic system with all the necessary machinery. All one's friends, all one's best citizens, reformers, churches, colleges, educated classes had joined the banks to force the submission to capitalism, a submission long foreseen by the mere law of mass."

Adams continued, "Nothing could surpass the nonsense of trying to run so complex and concentrated a machine by Southern and Western farmers in grotesque alliance with city laborers, as had been tried in 1800 and 1828, and had failed even under simple conditions."

As for the new dispensation of "McKinleyism," Adams defined it as "the system of combinations, consolidations, trusts—realized at home, realizable abroad." McKinley himself, though far less articulate than Adams, saw things the same way. He did not finally redeem his pledge to keep the United States on gold until he signed the Gold Standard Act on March 14, 1900. On his beloved tariff he took a more forthright position. Within less than a fortnight after he had assumed office in 1897 he called a special session of Congress to write a new tariff act. He got quick action and within four months Congress had passed and he had signed the Dingley Act, which did not, however, raise tariffs quite so high as McKinley's own Act of 1891 that a Democratic Congress had subsequently repealed. The Dingley Act contained two novel features. It gave the President power to lower some tariffs in exchange for reciprocal concessions by other countries. It also established certain duties or rates "for revenue only."

The entire history of the Republican Party made it the consistent champion of high tariffs. Since long before the Civil War the Northern states had always sought high tariffs to shelter their industries from



*Currier and Ives Endorse High Tariffs:
A lithograph of 1888*

BETTMANN ARCHIVE




BETTMANN ARCHIVE

A Puck Cartoonist Assails the McKinley Tariff

foreign competition. The South, on the other hand, lived mainly on the income from its cotton and tobacco crops, which it sold on the world market at world prices. But the Southern states could not purchase manufactured products at world prices. They had to buy their textiles, their farm equipment, and almost everything they needed at the exorbitant prices charged by Northern manufacturers. High tariffs excluded the low-priced products of Europe; free trade would have let these products in.

During the nineteenth century the Northern states pleaded that the country could not develop its own industries without the protection of a high tariff wall. They recalled that the American Colonies had fought for independence from England in order to build up their own manufactures and not remain forever consigned to produce only food and raw materials for an alien factory system. By the end of the nineteenth century American industry had outstripped British industry, and the tariffs, once used to protect America from foreign competition, were subsidizing inefficient industries and guaranteeing the more successful ones extortionate profits. The Republicans, fearful of a revolt among the farmers, therefore put high tariffs on a long list of farm products, but since the United States already produced an export surplus of



BROWN BROTHERS

John Hay in 1902

these products, the farmers received no economic benefits; the Republicans reaped no political rewards.

By the close of the nineteenth century American industrial production led the world. The city population had steadily increased; the farm population had steadily declined. Modern science, which had stepped up the output of America's factories, also stepped up the output of America's farms. Thanks to new machinery, improved irrigation, and chemical fertilizers, the American farmer

fed a growing population and he still produced an export surplus. Foreign competition no longer threatened the existence of American industry—or of American agriculture, either. High tariffs did, however, protect the high profits of American industry; but high profits also meant high prices—higher prices than the mass of Americans could afford to pay. Behind their wall of high tariffs the American people had developed the most productive farms and factories in the world. They had yet to learn how to distribute what they produced.

Nor did lower tariffs break the vicious circle: the Cleveland Democrats had tried them for a few years without results. And though the Bryan Democrats demanded wide social reforms, the voters had turned them down. Many of the Republicans around McKinley therefore felt he must do more than "stand pat" with Hanna. One of these, John Hay, first served as Ambassador to England and then became Secretary of State. Largely under his direction, the Republicans set about trying to achieve on a world scale what they had already achieved inside the United States. Hay, the son of a Midwestern physician, had been graduated from Brown and served as a secretary to President Lincoln during the Civil War. He then married a rich wife, went into business in Cleveland, and turned to writing. Charles and Mary Beard called his novel *The Bread-Winners*, which appeared anonymously in the 1880's, "perhaps the best vindication of raw capitalism" that the period produced. But attacks on the book caused the touchy author to denounce, still anonymously, "the inner circle of petty tyrants who govern the trade unions and expressly forbid the working man to make his own bargain with his employer."

John Hay's thin skin, which made him a sensitive writer, handicapped



Chicago Brick-Layers—1900 Style

BETTMANN ARCHIVE

him in the rough-and-tumble of politics and business alike. His talent, however, did not approach genius, and the diplomatic life appealed to him strongly. He moved to Washington, where he became an intimate friend of Henry Adams, and where he also associated himself—as Adams did not—with the leaders of the Republican Party. McKinley respected Hay and encouraged him to bring together the nations as he had brought together industries during his business career in Cleveland. “Hay,” wrote Adams in his *Education*, “thought England must be brought first into the combine, but at that time Germany, Russia, and France were all combining against England, and the Boer War helped them.” But Hay set out—as he thought—to woo first England, then Germany, and “at the end of the vista, most unmanageable of all, Russia remained to be satisfied and disarmed.” Adams called this instinct “McKinleyism,” and he saw these alternatives: “either Germany must destroy England and France to create the next inevitable unification as a system of continent against continent—or she must pool interests.” McKinley, the high priest of high tariffs, had once favored continental integration; McKinley, the high priest of combinations, consolidations, and trusts, now sought to create a single pool of world power.

If Washington society and the friendship of Henry Adams dazzled John Hay, London society and the consideration of the British aristocracy blinded him. As American Ambassador to London, Hay became the intimate of that select group known as “The Souls” who gravitated around Herbert H. Asquith’s wife, the former Margot Tennant. Here was the spiritual and social refreshment for which Hay had thirsted throughout his drab Midwestern boyhood, his dull years in Cleveland. “I do not see,” Hay plaintively concluded, “how it is possible for an American to be an aristocrat.” But he did see hope for America in close association with England.

The British, during Hay's stay in London, had convinced him that the Anglo-American powers should pursue a common policy in China. At the same time, Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British Minister to Washington, handed President McKinley a secret but formal proposal calling for joint Anglo-American action in China and for the maintenance of free trade throughout the world. But Secretary of State John Sherman—brother of the famous Union General—replied that the situation did not warrant action at the time. There matters stood when war with Spain suddenly plunged the United States into European power politics and empire building in the Far East.

• IV •

THE SAME PROCESS that had caused European influence to spread throughout the world during the nineteenth century finally began to affect the United States. By the 1890's American industry was producing more goods than American markets could absorb at the prices industry had to ask to show a profit. Overseas markets seemed to offer better opportunities. Returns on domestic capital were not what they used to be. Foreign investments promised higher yields. Unlike the British Isles, the United States did not depend on imports of food and raw materials; unlike Europe, the United States had plenty of wide, open spaces. Nevertheless, by the 1890's American pioneers and settlers had reached the last frontier. The Government had no more good farm land to give away. The period of quick, easy expansion within the continental United States had ended. The period of overseas expansion had arrived.

In 1889 units of the American and German fleets almost clashed at Samoa, where the United States subsequently acquired the best harbor and several small islands. Two years later, more than a hundred boisterous American sailors became involved, while on shore leave, in a political demonstration that had broken out in Chile, and two of them lost their lives. The commander of their ship denied that they were drunk. The commander of another ship took a different view: "His men were probably drunk on shore, properly drunk; they went ashore, many of them, for the purpose of getting drunk," he declared, adding this interesting corollary: "When in this condition they were more entitled to protection than if they had been sober." Soon, American naval officers were accusing Chile—a country with three million inhabitants—of trying to control the Pacific Ocean, and young Theodore Roosevelt, one of the Republican members of the President's Civil Service Commission, wanted to lead a cavalry charge against the Chileans.

Within another two years, an American cruiser and some United

States marines helped depose Queen Liliuokalani of Hawaii. John L. Stevens, the American Minister, proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate and advised the State Department that "the Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it." The Hawaiian insurgents set up Sanford B. Dole, the American owner of extensive pineapple plantations, as chief of state. Cleveland, who replaced Harrison in the White House before the Republicans could rush through a treaty of annexation, denounced this attempt to unseat the ruler of a small nation, but the United States finally recognized Dole's Hawaiian Republic after the Queen had refused to amnesty the rebels, and formal annexation

followed in 1898, under McKinley. The United States had not reversed its foreign policy; it had simply continued a trend that began in 1842 with a warning to all foreign powers to keep hands off Hawaii.

In 1895 President Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine and threatened war when the British attempted to impose a unilateral boundary settlement on Venezuela. The incident happened to coincide with the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation to President Kruger of the Boer Republics for repelling the Jameson Raid, and the British nervously accepted the American point of view. According to the *London Times* this meant "that in respect of South American republics the United States may not only intervene in disputes, but may entirely supersede the original disputant and assume exclusive control of the negotiations."

During the 1890's the United States also began expanding its Navy and making plans to build a canal through the Central American isthmus. The French had just failed, at Panama, to duplicate their achievement at Suez, and the Americans did not propose to let any other outside power build and control a waterway cutting the Western Hemisphere in two.

The growing interest of the United States in both Western Hemisphere and Pacific affairs found ample outlet in connection with Cuban



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Don't poke him up, Bizzy—he's a very patient bird, but almighty nasty when he's aroused. I speak from experience."

John Bull warns Bismarck not to press German claims to Samoa: cartoon by Gillam in Judge



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Papa doesn't kill them; he merely skins them and lets them grow more skins, and then he skins them again."

This cartoon by F. Oppen in Hearst's New York Journal shows Hanna encouraging the trusts while McKinley approves



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Yes, Willie, here is a nice little boy Nurse and I have found to play with you. Treat him kindly as he is very timid and retiring."

Another F. Oppen cartoon in Hearst's New York Journal shows Hanna and the trusts introducing Theodore Roosevelt to William McKinley as his running mate in the 1900 election


agitation for independence from Spain. Cuban nationalists had set up quarters in the United States in 1891, and their cause received more and more attention in the American press, especially in William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World*. Hearst, the son of a millionaire Senator from California, had attended Harvard, where he asked one of his professors to recommend a promising career to a young man of wealth and ambition. William James, to whom the question was addressed, suggested that Hearst establish a first-rate newspaper or, better yet, a chain of newspapers. Soon afterward the Harvard authorities expelled Hearst for an obscene undergraduate misdemeanor, whereupon he returned to the Pacific coast and took James's advice. But instead of striving for quality, Hearst went in for big headlines in colored ink and demagogic appeals to popular discontent. His ruthless genius for sensation attracted a mass audience, and in 1895 he extended his operations to the Eastern seaboard by founding the *New York Journal*. This put him in competition with the Hungarian-born Joseph Pulitzer, and the two men tried to outdo each other by featuring Spanish atrocities in Cuba. The cause of Cuban independence proved a sure-fire circulation builder—but why stop there? Spanish oppression not only outraged all decent Americans. Spain threatened the security of the United States in the New World.

The circulation war between Hearst and Pulitzer presently helped to foment military war between the United States and Spain.

Other men than Hearst, animated by other motives, also wanted war. These men included two other Harvard graduates—Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. Roosevelt, whose father belonged to an old New York Dutch family and whose mother came from Georgia, was born a weak and puny child with poor eyesight. Through sheer grit he conquered his physical handicaps, becoming the apostle of what he called "the strenuous life" and entering Republican politics as a young reformer. He had lived in the West, studied abroad, written books on American history and outdoor life. His lifelong friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, came from mixed British and New England stock, and after devoting some years to the academic life and editing the *North American Review* he assumed the role to which he devoted the rest of his life, that of the scholar in politics. Lodge never interested himself in reform. He joined the regular Republican organization and toed the party line, becoming Senator from Massachusetts in 1896 and obtaining for Roosevelt the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt had served in the New York State Assembly, run unsuccessfully for Mayor of New York City, served as police commissioner, and then as a Republican member of the Civil Service Commission in Washington under both Harrison and Cleveland.

Roosevelt and Lodge shared many aims and convictions. They believed in what they called the "Large Policy." "We have a record of conquest, colonization, and expansion unequaled by any people in the nineteenth century," wrote Lodge in 1895. "From the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country." At the same time, Roosevelt wrote to Lodge, "This country needs a war." Two years later Roosevelt pointed out that Cuba offered an excellent opportunity for military adventure because of the "benefit done to our people by giving them something to think about which isn't material gain and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both the Army and Navy in actual practice." The fact was that both Roosevelt and Lodge expected war with Spain to accomplish much more than the liberation of Cuba. In 1897 both of them favored the outright annexation of the Philippines, then under Spanish rule.

President Eliot of Harvard called Roosevelt and Lodge "degenerate sons of Harvard." In return, Roosevelt denounced Eliot and all other milksofs of "the international arbitration type." The man to whom he and Lodge looked for inspiration was not a university president, but a captain in the United States Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Annapolis graduate and son of a graduate of West Point. After spending two decades in the naval service and as lecturer at the Naval War College,



BROWN BROTHERS

Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in Later Life



BROWN BROTHERS

*Senator Albert J. Beveridge,
Progressive Republican of Indiana*

Mahan suddenly became world-famous in 1890 with the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. Drawing chiefly upon British history, Mahan showed that the nation that controlled the seas controlled the world. The British discovered Mahan before his fellow countrymen did, and the Kaiser saw to it that every vessel in his new Navy had a copy of Mahan's tract aboard.

The United States Navy took up Mahan's ideas. More and more Republicans also preached naval expansion and the acquisition of overseas territories to check men like Bryan, who, Roosevelt said, was "plotting a social revolution and the subversion of the American Republic." The Republicans also discovered an oratorical antidote to Bryan in the person of young Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, whose "March of the Flag" speech, delivered in Boston on April 27, 1898, praised expansion as eloquently as Bryan had praised free silver.

"American factories are making more than the American people can use," said Beveridge. "American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours. And we shall get it as our mother, England, has told us how. We will establish trading posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. We will cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies, governing themselves, flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our trade on the wings of our commerce. And American law, American order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant them-

selves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, by those agencies of God henceforth made beautiful and bright."

Just as conservative Democrats like Cleveland feared Bryan's doctrine of free silver, so conservative Republicans like McKinley feared Beveridge's doctrine of expansion. In fact, the night before his inauguration McKinley told Cleveland that he would be the happiest man in the world if he could get through the next four years without a war. Roosevelt, however, thought differently and a year later declared McKinley had "no more backbone than a chocolate éclair" because he had not taken a firm enough stand against Spain in Cuba. Unhappily, McKinley did not take a firm stand against the Republican expansionists either, and after February 15, 1898, when the United States battleship *Maine* blew up in the harbor of Havana with a loss of two hundred and sixty lives, war became inevitable. Who ordered the *Maine* to Havana? What caused the explosion? The answers to both questions remain unknown to this day. In any event, the United States and Spain failed to compose their differences on this and other matters and war finally came in April, 1898, on the sole and single issue of Cuban independence.

All the major European powers—Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy—addressed a note to the United States expressing the hope that for humanity's sake the Cuban issue could be settled peaceably. None of these countries wanted any more trouble at this time, and there is reason to believe that they had consulted the State Department before making their appeal. The unhappy McKinley replied that he, too, hoped for peace, but that if the United States did have to intervene in Cuba, it would be for humanity's sake. Prime Minister Salisbury of Great Britain and his nephew, A. J. Balfour, both wanted to take some further action, but the counsels of the belligerent Joseph Chamberlain prevailed, and the United States went to war with the tacit approbation of Great Britain. The British poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt recorded this comment in his diary: "Between Spain and the United States I am obliged to be on the side of the older and more barbarous country. The Yankees as the coming race of the world would be worse even than ourselves."

• V •

THE WAR against Spain went fantastically well for the United States. Only 379 Americans lost their lives in combat, but 5,462 died of disease and many veterans of the fighting in Cuba and Puerto Rico returned weakened by yellow fever. To them and to many who remained at home, the war seemed grim and real at the time. Some residents of the Eastern seaboard even feared that the Spanish Navy would bombard



ACME

Theodore Roosevelt in His Uniform as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Famous "Rough Riders" Regiment


their summer cottages. The men who enlisted for service responded to the same emotions that had always sent men to fight for home and country. The American people knew so little of war—and so little of Spain—that they expected anything: anything, that is, except what actually happened. Few of those who expected a fight got it. Fewer of those who expected adventure got that. It took a Theodore Roosevelt to turn the war to his own political advantage.

As soon as war was declared, Roosevelt resigned as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and proceeded to organize a select volun-

teer regiment of "Rough Riders" under the command of his friend Colonel Leonard Wood. His indignation that he did not afterward receive the Congressional Medal of Honor cooled a little when he did receive the Republican nomination for the governorship of New York State. He won the election in the fall of 1898 after having broken promises to his reformer friends never to make a deal with Boss Platt, head of the New York State Republican machine.

The United States kept its promises to Cuba, setting up machinery to give the country early independence. The island of Puerto Rico, however, was annexed outright, and after prolonged discussion and negotiation the United States also purchased the Philippine Islands from Spain for sixty million dollars. This constituted a complete departure from the ostensible purpose of the war and an equally sharp break with traditional American foreign policy. Most European statesmen had assumed that the United States, in proclaiming exclusive responsibility for Western Hemisphere affairs under the Monroe Doctrine, thereby renounced any interest in the affairs of Europe or Asia. The British, who had inspired the idea of the Monroe Doctrine, which John Quincy Adams appropriated, made the further assumption that the United States would show at least benevolent neutrality toward British policy in Europe in exchange for Britain's benevolent neutrality toward United States policy in the Western Hemisphere.

The annexation of the Philippines changed all that. In June, 1898, Lodge jubilantly declared, "The drift in favor of an imperial policy seems to be absolutely overwhelming, and the Democrats seem to be



ACME

An Artillery Unit of Rough Riders Swings into Action: drawing by the celebrated Hearst illustrator, Frederick Remington

going to pieces on it." Already, Bryan's followers had shown themselves hotter for war than the older, conservative Republicans; Bryan responded as Roosevelt had, organized a regiment of Nebraska volunteers, and received the rank of Colonel, but never saw action. In August, as the brief war was already drawing to an end, Beveridge delivered another of his flag-waving speeches. "The ocean does not separate us from the lands of our duty and desire," he declared. "The ocean joins us, a river never to be dredged, a canal never to be repaired. Steam joins us, electricity joins us—the very elements are in league with our destiny. Cuba not contiguous? Puerto Rico not contiguous? The Philippines not contiguous? Our Navy will make them contiguous."

The Navy had, indeed, performed brilliantly—more brilliantly than the Army, with the result that the United States found itself holding a bear by the tail, especially in the Philippines. The people of those islands had tried to revolt against Spain in 1896. One of their leaders, Emilio Aguinaldo, fled to China until a United States naval vessel carried him back to his native islands shortly after Admiral Dewey had routed the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay without a single American casualty. Aguinaldo's guerrillas then played an important part in crushing Spanish resistance, but American troops, who took over the garrisons that the Spanish still held when the war ended, soon came into conflict with the natives. Aguinaldo, it seemed, had meant business when he fought for Philippine independence, whereas the purpose of the United States had not been to liberate the Filipinos but to substitute American for Spanish rule. Finally, seventy thousand American troops—four times as many as fought in Cuba—had to be sent to the Philippines to

subdue and pacify the islands. Fighting continued throughout 1902, costing more lives than the war against Spain. At home, people sang, "There'll be a hot time in the old town tonight," while American troops in the Philippines sang to the tune of "Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching":

*"Damn, damn, damn the Filipino
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag."*

Because the terms of the peace treaty between the United States and Spain called for American annexation of the Philippines, the exponents of the "Large Policy" faced a fight in the Senate. Senator Gray, one of the Democratic representatives on the Peace Committee, cabled from Paris his opposition to the annexation. "Policy proposed," he warned, "introduces us into European power politics and entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a Navy equal to largest of powers, a greatly increased military establishment, immense sums for fortifications and harbors, multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap, no area for homes for American citizens."

During the Senate debate about the treaty, Senator Lodge's elderly Republican colleague from Massachusetts, George F. Hoar, made this reply to one of Beveridge's annexationist orations: "I listened in vain for those words which the American people have been wont to take upon their lips in every solemn crisis of history. I have heard much calculated to excite the imagination of youth seeking wealth, or the youth charmed by the dream of empire. But the words Right, Duty, Freedom were absent from that eloquent speech." Mark Twain, William Vaughan Moody, William James, and other writers of the day raised their voices against annexation. Theodore Roosevelt, on the other hand, found it "difficult to speak with moderation of men like Hoar." Senator Chauncey Depew of New York predicted, "The annexation of the Philippines gives a market of ten million of people. It will grow every year as they come into more civilized conditions and their wants increase." But the distraught President remarked to a friend, "If old Dewey had just sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have saved us."

Poor McKinley. After the war as well as before it, he tried to reconcile un-Christian acts with his Christian faith. He had not wanted war with Spain. As a young man he had fought in the Civil War; now, he faced the approach of old age in a serene, kindly frame of mind. At any rate,

the Spanish-American conflict had not lasted long and had cost few casualties. The time had come to get on with the peace, but he was finding it hard to square his country's prewar pledge to fight only for Cuban freedom with the postwar clamor to annex the Philippines. He finally rationalized his decision to annex in this wholly sincere, wholly characteristic confession, made before the General Missionary Committee of the Methodists:

"One night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was but it came: 1. That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; 2. That we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; 3. That we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and, 4, that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could for them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed and went to sleep and slept soundly."

McKinley's simplicity may amuse a later generation; his own contemporaries who had fought and sacrificed for the Union cause in the Civil War knew that righteousness paid. Now, victory over Spain had widened the field in which Americans could serve their own interests and the interests of all mankind at one and the same time. Kipling, Rhodes, and Chamberlain had identified the expansion of the British Empire with the extension of the Christian virtues. Roosevelt, Lodge, and Beveridge saw the United States playing a still more spectacular role. But the older McKinley could not share their enthusiasm until he had convinced himself that the United States had a moral duty to annex the Philippines, and many other Americans of all ages felt the same way.

Lodge described the Senate fight for ratification of the treaty and annexation of the islands as the toughest he had ever experienced. The treaty finally received just one more than the necessary two-thirds majority, and Senator Hoar declared afterward in his memoirs, "I have been told by many Senators who voted for the treaty that they regretted it more than any act of their lives. Enough Senators have said that to me in person, not only to have defeated the treaty, but if they had so voted to defeat it by a majority."

John Hay took the war with Spain and its aftermath in a more cheerful, philosophic spirit. Shortly before returning from London to become Secretary of State he wrote Roosevelt, "It has been a splendid little war; begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent in-



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Uncle Sam Prepares to Hold the "Open Door." An American cartoon of 1900

telligence and spirit, favored by that fortune that loves the brave. It is now concluded, I hope, with that fine good nature which is, after all, the distinguishing trait of our American character." Hay said less—and understood less—about the plans that he and his British friends had hatched in London to extend American commitments from the Philippines to China.

The European powers had just experienced the greatest difficulty, in 1895, preventing the Japanese from establishing themselves on the Asiatic mainland. Japan had overwhelmed China in a short, sharp war and had forced the Chinese to grant concessions simi-

lar to those the Europeans had enjoyed for the past fifty years. The European powers quickly formed a united front that prevented the Japanese from declaring themselves in on a new partition of China. But no sooner had the Japanese been stopped than the Russians and Germans prepared a new partition plan of their own. This alarmed the British, who wanted to preserve the *status quo* under which the weak central Government of China had given them special privileges in the rich Yangtze Valley. The trouble was that neither the British nor the Chinese could stop the Germans and the Russians. The British therefore enlisted the support of John Hay to help them prevent the further partition of China.

Hay liked the idea. McKinley felt more doubtful. But the annexation of the Philippines settled matters. The United States now had a large, advance base in the far Pacific, and the fate of China affected the fate of the Philippines. On July 3, 1899, Hay sent notes to the British, German, and Russian Governments and later to Italy, Japan, and France, asking them for assurances that they would observe existing treaties with China and not discriminate against other foreign interests there. Only the British gave Hay the assurances he sought. All the others, except the Italians, who had no spheres of influence in China, replied that their acceptance hinged upon acceptance by the rest. On January 2, 1900, Hay announced that all the powers with interests in China had accepted his note, but he did not reveal their replies and later in the year he asked them—at British instigation—to pledge themselves to

respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China and thus to support the principle of the "Open Door." Again he expressed satisfaction with the response.

Naturally, the British favored Hay's notes because they tended to freeze the *status quo*. It was equally natural that the Russians, who sought to widen their sphere of influence in the Far East, showed less enthusiasm. Originally the expression "Open Door" meant equal trading opportunities for all, and since the United States hoped to increase its trade with China but had no special concessions or spheres of influence there, the Open Door furthered American interests. But a weak China could not guarantee equal treatment to all comers; the foreign powers had to agree to hold themselves in check, and this was precisely what the foreign powers had never done. Ostensibly, Hay was still trying to promote free trade; actually, he was trying to commit all the powers with interests in China not to molest the *status quo*. Since the United States had no power to enforce this proposed policy, Hay described it as "making bricks without straw." Events soon proved that such bricks crumble fast.

• VI •

DID THE twentieth century begin on January 1, 1900, or on January 1, 1901? To many Americans of the time that question seemed more important than John Hay's questions about the Open Door. Professors pointed out that the Christian era began with the year A.D. 1 and that the first century ended with the year A.D. 100, not with the year 99. Therefore the nineteenth century ended with the year 1900 and the twentieth century began with the year 1901.


In spite of all this, most of the world preferred to believe that the twentieth century began with 1900, and no country anticipated this new century more eagerly than the United States. The nineties had proved a difficult decade. The post-Civil War expansion had run its course. The worst depression in American history had hit the country in 1893. Bryan and the Populists terrified the conservatives. The Republican victory of 1896 embittered the reformers, whereupon the discovery of gold in the Yukon and South Africa and new, more efficient methods of extracting gold from existing fields led to a sharp increase in the currency supply. The money question faded into the background as the output of money increased almost as rapidly as the output of wealth. Moreover, the American economy operated on the boom-and-bust cycle, and though the busts had caused wide distress, bigger and better booms always followed.

Then, too, the war with Spain gave the American people a new sense of unity and a new political leader, Theodore Roosevelt. In 1900 the



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Hanna to McKinley in 1899: "That man Clay was an ass. It's better to be President than right." Mark Hanna, the man behind McKinley, came in for more bitter attacks than the kindly President



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

After Bryan's Second Defeat. Cartoonist Victor Gillam of Judge depicts Bryan unhorsed from the Democratic donkey as Boss Croker and the Tammany tiger register consternation

political bosses thought they had driven him up a blind alley when he agreed to become McKinley's running mate in the presidential election. No Vice-President, since Van Buren in 1836, had ever gone on to the White House except when a President had died in office. Roosevelt at first resisted the pressure. All his friends except Lodge urged him to turn the nomination down. But the convention clamored for the young leader of the Rough Riders and he accepted. Afterward, convinced that his political career had ended, he prepared to take up the study of law.

The Roosevelt name added strength to the Republican ticket, and the Democrats—who again nominated Bryan—suffered a worse defeat than in 1896. The financial magnates who had contributed heavily to McKinley's re-election believed that the outcome gave them a freer hand than ever. The farmers also had returned to the Grand Old Party: their products were finding a market again. Industrial workers were getting jobs. By 1900 the clouds of depression and war had lifted.

The American people had good reason to feel hopeful. They had worked out a new way of life in new surroundings and they had assimilated all comers to their ways. Between 1860 and 1880 three-quarters of the rising generation of Americans came from farms and small towns, and nearly all of them received at least eight grades of

public school education. Many of them also attended Protestant Sunday schools and joined Protestant churches. The Puritan tradition still ran strong in New England, stronger still in the Midwest. Baptists and Methodists predominated in the South. Revivals and camp meetings, Sunday school picnics and church suppers played a big part in the social life of the time. A spirit of religious tolerance generally prevailed, and it was a democratic spirit, too. But the same generation of Americans that had received this small-town, religious education went forth to build cities and industries and to force nature, through applied science, to serve human needs.

In 1900 twelve million of the seventy-six million inhabitants of the United States belonged to the Roman Catholic Church; another million professed the Jewish faith. Many of these Catholics and Jews had arrived in the recent wave of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, and they soon found that the American practice of separating church and state gave them a religious freedom they had never known before. Separation of church and state also made it difficult for Americans to take religion for granted, though it was also true that by 1900 a large and growing minority did not attend or even belong to any church, and in the person of Grover Cleveland the American people had even elected an agnostic President. Because neither church nor state depended on the other, the churchgoing majority of Americans knew that the future of their religion depended upon themselves and themselves alone. The state merely insured their freedom to worship—or not to worship—as they pleased.

New sects flourished in this atmosphere. Spiritualism made great headway among Americans; so did every variety of fanatic, crank, and faker. During the nineteenth century two important new Christian sects came to being in the United States—the Mormons and the Christian Scientists. The Mormons, originally an outlawed persecuted minority who gladly permitted themselves to be swindled by their leaders, had become by 1900 a highly respectable community of some three hundred thousand persons concentrated in Utah and the neighboring states. Their *Book of Mormon*, which they added to the Bible, specifically condemns polygamy and sets forth high ethical principles, even though it was concocted by a fraud and revised and promoted by assorted quacks and idealists. The Christian Scientists, always prosperous and respectable, established their headquarters in Boston and attracted a nation-wide following. They, too, had added to the Bible, embellishing it with the marginal comments of their founding mother, Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy, who had intuitively reached and systematically applied some of the same psychological principles that the new science of psychiatry was also developing. The psychiatrists attributed many



UNDERWOOD

Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy

physical ills to our mental and nervous systems. Mrs. Eddy went further and denied the reality of physical illness, save as the symptom of "malicious animal magnetism." She died in 1908, leaving a fortune of more than two million dollars. The Christian Scientists never revealed the extent of their membership, but in 1906 it was estimated at less than one hundred thousand, 72 per cent of them women.

Distance lends enchantment. Because Mrs. Eddy led an active life in our own century, critical biographers have had no difficulty exposing her as a self-deluded, self-seeking fraud, more interested in financial success and worldly

power than in religious truth or spiritual grace. Nonsense—often illiterate nonsense—streamed from her pen: "Obesity is an adipose belief in yourself as a substance." "We have no evidence of food sustaining life, except false evidence." "Human systems of philosophy and religion are departures from Christian Science." With the passing of time, however, Mrs. Eddy's followers discarded some of the chaff from her teachings, and the grain that she had sown bore fruit. Sufferers from imaginary illnesses found relief at the hands of Christian Science healers. Seekers for new varieties of religious experience found spiritual satisfaction in the Church of Christ, Scientist. In medieval Europe Mrs. Eddy might have been canonized as a saint or burned as a witch. In twentieth-century America she had made religion pay.


The Swiss psychoanalyst, Dr. C. G. Jung—himself a Roman Catholic—once described Christian Science and its appeal to Americans in these words: "Christian Science is an exorcistic ritual; the demons of sickness are denied to be existent, the proper formulas are chanted over the rebellious body and the Christian religion, which represents a high cultural level, is used for magic cures. The poverty of the spiritual content is appalling, but Christian Science is alive; it possesses a thoroughly earth-rooted power and has worked those wonders which we would look for in vain in the official churches. Thus the American presents a curious picture: a European with the manners of a Negro and the soul of an Indian."

The complete separation of church and state not only encouraged new sects: it gave fresh vitality to old ones, leading Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, and other American Catholic prelates to commend the practice to their superiors in Rome. This did not suit Pope Leo XIII, who still hoped to regain the temporal power his predecessors once exercised in parts of Italy; neither did he propose to give up the privileged position the Vatican enjoyed in a number of predominantly Catholic countries. In 1899 he therefore addressed a papal encyclical to Cardinal Gibbons condemning the new heresy—"Americanism."

The Vatican looked back to the Middle Ages, when the temporal and spiritual power of the Roman Catholic Church gave Western Europe a unity it never recaptured after the Protestant Reformation. The Vatican hoped eventually to restore this unity and extend it to the whole world. The American experiment of separating church and state introduced a new principle that had thus far proved dangerously successful. In the American melting pot, the Irish Catholics of Boston became more Puritan than the Puritans. Wisconsin Germans and Minnesota Scandinavians showed themselves equally adaptable to new ways. Catholic Poles went into heavy industry; Catholic Portuguese took over the Gloucester fishing fleet from Yankee Protestants. Jewish shopkeepers and tailors continued, on a larger scale, the occupations they had followed in Russia and Poland. They had less difficulty than the Italian immigrants in adapting themselves to American ways.

The stream of cheap labor that kept pouring into the United States from Europe made it hard for industrial workers to improve their conditions. The slums and sweatshops of New York, the Pittsburgh steel mills, with their twelve-hour day and seven-day week, the second-class status of virtually all Negro citizens made the American dream look more like an American nightmare. Religion became uplift. The old-time American belief in hell just about expired with the last years of the nineteenth century as religious leaders paid more attention to improving man's condition here on earth. As in England, the social worker replaced the evangelist.

Unlike England, the United States had no landed aristocracy to speak of; nor any aristocracy of birth, brains, or wealth. "Three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves" summed up many a family history. Middle-class ideals permeated all social groups. The workingman and the farmer, the country boy and the child of immigrant parents aspired to belong to the great and growing American middle class—or, at any rate, accepted the values that class dictated. John D. Rockefeller's fortune lifted him into the select ranks of the plutocracy, and into that vacuum of all values he brought his middle-class ideals. Those



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Gibson Girl Becomes the Career Woman and Does Business with Men

plutocrats like J. P. Morgan who also fancied themselves as gentlemen had to follow the sophisticates—Henry James and John Singer Sargent—abroad and spend part of every year in England, where they tried to take on the tweedy, protective coloration of the British aristocracy.

The American middle class on which they turned their backs suffered from the universal middle-class sin of hypocrisy. A double standard of morality ran through the public and private life of the time. Church vestrymen signed temperance pledges and contributed funds to political candidates backed by the liquor interests. The businessman, the professional man, and the politician each had his own recognized sphere of influence. The man of the house devoted himself to making a living. The woman's place was in the home or the schoolroom, but she had begun to appear in factories, offices, and even in some of the professions, too. American middle-class men at the turn of the century had been brought up to idealize women; American middle-class women had been brought up to respect men. But as women began to make their own way in a man's world, men ceased to idealize them, and the women ceased to respect the men. The American man thus found it harder to assert his importance; the American woman found it harder to be understood. Both suffered from loneliness.


Many other causes contributed to this sense of loneliness—perhaps the deepest and most widespread of all American traits. The early settlers, having broken with their European past, found themselves in

an almost empty, utterly undeveloped continent. After they had populated the Atlantic seaboard of that continent, they fought a successful war of independence against England—again defying authority, again setting forth on their own. The same process continued, in somewhat different form, throughout the nineteenth century as the tide of transatlantic immigration swelled until by 1900 a million Europeans a year were cutting their ties with the Old World to seek their fortunes in the New. They, too, had repudiated authority and kept alive the defiant tradition established by the first settlers.

Yet behind this defiance lay a certain uneasiness that sometimes expressed itself in extreme boastfulness, sometimes in extreme sociability. The United States had attracted so many different kinds of people, it possessed so many regional peculiarities of its own, it had grown so fast in so short a time that it had few universally accepted national traditions. The American people did not yet feel that they all belonged to one great family—or even that some belonged and some did not. What a contrast with Europe, where a rigid caste system, rooted in the past, gave the individual a sense of continuity that the United States lacked.

Of course, the United States put fewer restraints than Europe upon the individual, but those Americans who made their way into the upper ranks of the middle class found themselves trapped in a competitive squirrel-cage. The energies their forebears had put into pioneering went into the struggle for business success. They skimmed on all the arts, including the art of living. Emerson's rustic philosophy had become as outdated as Jefferson's rustic politics, and ideas imported from Europe did not fit either the New World or the new century. Only a native American could rise to the new occasion.

Such a man emerged, during the last decade of the old century and the first decade of the new one, in the person of William James, speaking for his generation of Americans as clearly and authentically as Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Freud spoke for their generations in Europe. James came of Scotch-Welsh-Irish stock on his father's side and of colonial English stock on his mother's. His immigrant grandfather had made the family fortune in Albany during the first half of the nineteenth century. His father had been a nonconforming Swedenborgian, a friend of Emerson and Carlyle, and a citizen of the world. William, the eldest son, was born in New York's Astor House in 1842 and received an urban upbringing, punctuated by frequent visits to Europe. William James had too many talents and not enough vitality. He switched from art to medicine, from medicine to philosophy, and from philosophy to psychology. He brooded over suicide and did not find himself until after he had passed the age of thirty, when President



CULVER SERVICE

William James

Eliot invited him to teach anatomy and physiology at Harvard. Within ten years he was teaching philosophy and psychology and within another ten he had developed a national and even a world reputation.

William James owed much of his appeal to what the British call "charm" and what Americans call "personality." Other people's emotions and ideas interested him as much as his own. He read rapidly, wrote smoothly, spoke well. *The Three Jameses*, by C. Hartley Grattan, contains this critical, not unjust, appraisal of his work: "The very skill and completeness with which he uttered himself would seem to be indicative of the fact that his thought had no heights and depths toward

which he unavailingly strained. His writing is lacking in that density which we associate with profundity. He conveyed a sense of excitement and bright, electric light, but no sense of deep thought or protracted contemplation." A less sympathetic critic might go further and describe William James as a scientist who undertook no original research, a philosopher unable to deal with abstract ideas, a political reformer who confined himself to moral exhortation, a religious man without a creed, a physician who never practiced medicine. Yet in the judgment of his contemporaries, abroad as well as at home, the range of James's interests made up for his lack of depth; the generosity of his enthusiasm compensated for its lack of originality. Moreover, he addressed his active mind to matters of wide popular interest, and the conclusions he reached met with wide agreement.

During the 1870's he discovered the new science of psychology in Europe, but unlike Freud he attempted no original experiments. In 1886, two years after the foundation of the English Society for Psychical Research, James helped to organize a similar body in the United States, and told a group of clergymen that the end of every philosophy is action. Yet he had no use for the "strenuous life" of Theodore Roosevelt, whom he denounced as "a dangerous and ominous jingo," and "the mere monstrous embodiment of unprecedented, resounding Noise."

James's first major work, *The Principles of Psychology*, appeared in 1890. "Consciousness," according to James, "does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows; a 'river' or 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life." Serious researchers in the field praised its autobiographical frankness and literary distinction. Men of letters found it especially rewarding. Even the extraverted H. G. Wells called James his "second master," and the Universities of Oxford and Edinburgh invited him to deliver lecture courses on religion, philosophy, and psychology. Between 1896 and 1909 four more books added to his fame: *The Will to Believe*, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, *Pragmatism*, and *A Pluralistic Universe*.

In reply to a questionnaire on religious belief James, who called himself a religious man, once wrote, "Religion means primarily a universe of spiritual relations surrounding the earthly practical ones, not merely relations of 'value,' but agencies and their activities. I suppose that the chief premise for my hospitality towards the religious testimony of others is my conviction that 'normal' or 'sane' consciousness is so small a part of actual experience. Whatever be true is not true exclusively, as philistine scientific opinion assumes. The other kinds of consciousness bear witness to a much wider universe of experiences, from which our belief selects and emphasizes such parts as best satisfy our needs."

Ultimately, the name of William James became synonymous with his philosophy of pragmatism, which he once summed up in these few words: "Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain, if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash value in experimental terms?" Crudely put—"Does it work?" Thus pragmatism became the Puritanism of the twentieth century. The Puritan had interpreted worldly success as a mark of divine favor. The pragmatist did not need to have recourse to God: success justified itself. Yet James did not carry his own doctrine to its logical conclusion. He clung to an idealistic faith which he expressed with eloquence and feeling: "If this life be not a real fight in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a fight—as if there were something wildly real in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears. For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted."

Although neither a Christian Scientist nor a psychoanalyst, James had as much in common with Mrs. Eddy as he had with Dr. Freud. "Evil," he wrote in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "is a disease; and worry over disease itself is an additional form of disease, which only adds to the original complaint. Even repentance and remorse, affections which come in the character of ministers of good, may be but sickly and relaxing impulses. The best repentance is to up and act for righteousness and forget that you ever had relations with sin." James brought this same moral fervor—but not much else—into his frequent attacks on American imperialism. When Kipling exhorted Americans to take up the white man's burden and annex the Philippines, James wrote: "If the Anglo-Saxon race would drop its sniveling cant it would have a good deal less of a 'burden' to carry. We're the most loathesomely canting crew that God ever made. Kipling knows perfectly well that our camps in the tropics are not college settlements or our armies bands of philanthropists, slumming it; and I think it a shame that he should represent us to ourselves in that light." James opposed war as well as imperialism and wrote a famous essay on the subject, "The Moral Equivalent of War," that pointed out how comparatively harmless activities could release the same impulses that traditionally expressed themselves in war. But concerning the economic and social causes of war, James said almost nothing.

This attitude accorded with the prevalent optimism of his time. Americans at the turn of the century did not deny that evils existed; they merely counted on moral exhortation to drive these evils away. They lived in a time of transition, and James's confusions and contradictions reflected their own. He remained as deeply religious a man as any churchgoer, yet he belonged to no sect. He talked the language of science, especially the new science of psychology, but in purely literary terms that everybody could understand. His philosophy of pragmatism vindicated the businessman; his opposition to imperialism and war appealed to the reformer. While his younger brother, Henry, spent a lifetime writing novels that gave scope to remarkable powers of observation and expression, William James covered a much wider field. Henry wrote for posterity; William for his own time.

The fact that William James's European contemporaries welcomed him as an equal proved, surely, that America had come of age. But might it not also mean that Europe hoped to recapture from the America of William James its own lost youth, lost faith, and lost optimism? Certainly, the relationship between the United States and Europe was entering a new stage at the turn of the century. Although both belonged to the same civilization, Americans did not regret that they had cut their political ties with the king-ridden, decadent Old World

while Europeans tended to accept the United States as the land of opportunity and democracy. Each region contributed to the other. Europe did not hold out the opportunities to the common man that inspired Thomas A. Edison to invent the electric light. But Edison could never have produced the electric light if Europe had not first produced disciplined researchers. Different systems of education accounted for this contrast. Most young Americans received at least a grammar school education as a matter of right. If they wanted to go further, they or their parents had to provide the necessary funds. Few European countries gave their young people so good an early education as a matter of right, but in most European countries young people of exceptional talent had better educational opportunities than the United States offered.

Yet the United States and Europe aped one another more and more. The Eiffel Tower did not belong in Paris, but in New York. The Philippines did not belong under the American flag, but under European rule. While the Americanization of Europe caused increasing concern in the Old World, America was also becoming Europeanized—not only in its Far Eastern policy, but in other ways. Europe's nationalist fever was spreading to the United States; America's democratic spirit was spreading to Europe. But the world of 1900 included more than Europe and the United States. As Europe and the United States came to resemble each other more and more closely, they also tended to draw together more and more closely against the vast, backward majority of the human race, described by Rudyard Kipling as "lesser breeds without the law." The relations between these two unequal halves of the modern world promised to play a large part in the history of the new century.

SUMMING UP

THE LAST DECADE of the nineteenth century had brought more changes to the United States than any similar period since the Civil War. The star of empire still moved westward as the Republican Party committed the country to a policy of expansion across the Pacific Ocean. With the dawn of the twentieth century the United States became an imperialist power, while in Europe imperialist rivalries were creating new coalitions and weakening old ones. The civilization of the United States had originated in Europe; the civilization of Europe had originated in Asia. Now, at the turn of the century, Europe's most advanced outpost had spread its influence to that part of the world to which Europe traced its own beginnings.

“Lesser Breeds”

The condition of the great majority of the human race in the year 1900 and what it meant to the dominant minority.

PREVIEW

THE LAST three decades of the nineteenth century saw a sudden resurgence of the expansionist spirit bring almost the whole world under the control of Europeans and their descendants overseas. The Latin Americans had won political but not economic independence. India, “brightest jewel in the British crown,” remained for the most part untouched by the new age. China—more independent than India but more backward, too—had only just begun to feel the full impact of the Western world. Japan needed all it could learn from the West to save itself from going the way of India and China. And behind all these struggles between exploiter and exploited, between rival imperialist powers, between East and West lay the makings of new crusades.

• I •

BETWEEN 1870 and 1900 the power of Europe exploded all over the map. The entire continent of Africa, except for little Liberia and the inaccessible kingdom of Abyssinia, fell under European domination. France acquired Tunis, Madagascar, and most of Equatorial Africa. Britain took over control of Egypt, destroyed the independence of the Boer Republics, and gained new territory in the East. Germany established two large colonies in the Southwest and Southeast. Italy took Somaliland. King Leopold of Belgium grabbed the Congo. Portugal retained two colonies as large as those the Germans acquired. In 1876 the British Parliament gave Queen Victoria the title of Empress of India. Ten years later India annexed Burma, and France completed the conquest of Indo-China. All the major European powers and the United States partitioned the islands of the South Seas. Most of them, except the United States, secured exclusive zones of influence and special treaties for themselves with China.

The sudden arrival of the imperialist age marked a new chapter in the long history of European expansion which dated back to the fifteenth century. The early European explorers looted some of the new lands they discovered and colonized others. Then Britain, as the first country to industrialize itself, tried to develop permanent supplies of raw materials and permanent markets for its factory products by keeping its colonies in a permanently backward condition. But the successful American Revolution suggested that the so-called mercantile system could not last forever or work everywhere, and the British gradually adopted the system of free trade and *laissez faire* instead.

The free-traders, taking their cue from Adam Smith's classic *Wealth of Nations*, argued that the greatest good of the greatest number could best be served if all the peoples of the world specialized on what they could do best and traded freely with one another. Backward China and subject India offered no threat to British industry, which continued, during the first half of the nineteenth century, to lead the world as the free-traders rode high. They gained control of the Liberal Party and argued that Britain's colonial possessions were becoming liabilities rather than assets and that enlightened self-interest called for the gradual emancipation of the Empire. In other European countries, too, anti-imperialist sentiment increased for substantially the same reasons.

Nevertheless the final thirty years of the nineteenth century brought changes that led to a sudden imperialist resurgence. America and Germany were getting a larger and larger share of the expanding world market as their industries surpassed British industries. More and more American and German goods poured into the British Isles, but America and Germany did not permit British goods to compete freely in their home markets. To hold their trade, the British therefore had to hold their Empire and try to regain their lost industrial leadership.

This trade for which all the industrial nations were competing loomed larger and larger as the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph brought the whole world closer together. Thanks to new means of transport and exchange, northern peoples bought more and more tropical products—rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar. Investments in remote, backward regions often yielded five times as large returns as investments in the more highly developed parts of the world. But the backward regions could not create their own heavy industries. They could not defend themselves from modern armies and navies. They became the pawns of power politics.

Imperialism wore many faces. Although the people of Latin America enjoyed political independence, Argentina belonged, economically, to the British Empire. Most of the countries on the Caribbean—especially after the Spanish-American War—had to make their foreign policies

conform to the foreign policy of the United States. The upper classes throughout Latin America imported their culture from Europe and encouraged the all-pervasive influence of the Roman Catholic Church. China and India treasured cultural traditions that Latin America lacked, but China had little political or economic independence and India had none at all. Most of the natives of Equatorial and South Africa either lived a savage, jungle existence or toiled for European overlords. The natives of North Africa belonged to the world of Islam.

The races of Europe and their descendants thus controlled most of the world of 1900. More than half the inhabitants of that world lived directly under European rule. Many of the rest lived at the mercy of forces that originated in Europe. But many of these backward, subject peoples had preserved a vitality of their own. All of them had also gained some benefits from the European influences that had come their way. The people of Latin America, India, China, and Japan counted for something in their own right, and a comprehensive survey of the world of that time must include them all.

• II •

SPANISH INFLUENCE carried little weight at the turn of the century largely because earlier generations of Spaniards had spent themselves and their country's substance overseas. Yet they left a distinctive heritage in Latin America, where European and native cultures had blended into the beginnings of a new civilization. If the twenty Latin-American republics occupied a unique place in the world of 1900, they had a unique history. When the Spaniards conquered Central and South America in the sixteenth century, they found two highly developed native cultures—one among the Incas of Peru, the other among the Aztecs of Mexico. Neither Inca nor Aztec culture had ever approached European levels; both had gone into a decline at the time of the Spanish conquest, but they had advanced far beyond the primitive level of the Indians of North America. Thus, the Spanish not only began to settle and conquer Central and South America a century before the British arrived in North America: they found, especially in Peru and Mexico, a more highly developed and numerous native population.

The Spaniards did not flock to the New World in such numbers as the British. They concentrated, at first, on gutting it of its gold and silver. They transported Negro slaves to work their mines and plantations. They forced their Roman Catholic faith upon the native population. If the Spanish were more cruel in some respects than the English, they were more tolerant in others. The British and their descendants, with their intense pride of race, regarded any person with any Negro blood

as inferior. The Spaniards, on the other hand, tended to grant social equality to any person with any white blood.

The revolutions that liquidated Spanish rule on the mainland of the New World in the early 1800's differed from the American Revolution of a few decades before. The North American colonists received help from France. The Latin Americans took advantage of Napoleon's invasion of Spain to cut themselves loose, and they enjoyed the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain. Otherwise, however, they operated on their own. The Latin-American wars of liberation lasted longer and cost more blood and treasure than the American Revolution in the North. The chief dignitaries of the all-powerful Roman Catholic Church and the chief landowners who dominated the whole continent remained faithfully devoted to the Spanish throne. But a rising middle class and some militant Indians and Negroes were prepared to fight and die for freedom.

Latin America had not begun to develop the powerful trading, farming, and manufacturing interests that led the revolt of the thirteen North American colonies against British rule. Impassable jungles and mountains made any unification of all Latin America out of the question. To complicate matters, Brazil—the largest and most populous of the new Latin-American countries—was not Spanish at all, but Portuguese. In fact, King John of Portugal transferred his court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 to escape Napoleon. After King John returned to Portugal his grandson became Emperor Pedro II and made Brazil in many ways the most orderly and enlightened nation in Latin America until a revolution forced his abdication in 1889. But in Brazil, as in the Spanish American republics, the landowners and the Church held on to most of their privileges.

Mexico, the richest of the new Latin-American republics at the time of the break with Spain, also had the richest history. It lost a war to the United States in the 1840's. It executed the brother of Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria when he tried to make himself Emperor Maximilian I during the American Civil War. Following Maximilian came Benito Juárez, the first full-blooded native to lead a popular and successful Latin-American revolution. But following Juárez came Porfirio Díaz, who won the Presidency as a reformer only to usurp it as a tyrant and permanent agent for the Roman Catholic Church, the big native landowners, and the foreign concessionaires. Like Emperor Pedro in Brazil, Díaz could boast that he had given his country peace and order, and his rule lasted until 1911.

By 1900 the Argentine Republic had become the most powerful and progressive though not the most populous of the Latin-American republics. During the early years of the nineteenth century Argentina had

counted for little. Its wealth lay in a square stretch of fertile territory, six hundred miles on each of its four sides, known as the Pampas. British investors had built and owned Argentina's railway system and meat refrigeration plants. In 1900 the population of Argentina was approaching five millions, more than half of them European immigrants and their descendants, hardly any of them native Indians. Economically, Argentina belonged to Europe, serving as a source of meat and grain and as an outlet for investments and surplus population. Along with Chile and Colombia it had come closer than any other Latin-American country to establishing a democratic form of government.


Concerning Latin America as a whole at the turn of the century, these few generalizations can be made. Its northern republics, especially those that touched the Caribbean, were falling more and more into the orbit of the United States. Its southern republics, especially Argentina, maintained closer ties with Europe. The Roman Catholic Church still exercised considerable political power and owned valuable lands and other properties almost everywhere. Parliamentary democracy remained about as primitive as the masses, who took little interest in politics. Most of them lived off the land and could neither read nor write. The men who called themselves Presidents of these republics usually came to power by means of a military *coup d'état* which did not deserve the name of revolution. But the university students provided a certain leaven, and the rising middle class read the latest European books, welcomed visiting European artists, scientists, and intellectuals, and began to sponsor national cultures of their own. Latin America had not come up in the world so rapidly as the United States or even Canada, but the seeds of Spanish culture were beginning to bring forth new fruit from an alien soil.

• III •

SINCE the beginning of history, India and Europe had remained in constant if not close contact. Most European languages originated in India. Most European peoples had come from the same stock as the peoples of India. The influence of ancient Greece reached India by way of Persia. Some fifty or sixty books in the Vatican library report that Jesus, as a young man, visited India and borrowed some of his teachings from Indian sources. Five hundred years before the Christian era Buddha had said, "Let no one do to others what he would not have done to himself." "Hatred ceases by love." "Overcome anger by kindness, evil by good."

Religion had always dominated the life of India as science finally came to dominate the life of Europe and North America. The British

philosopher G. Lowes Dickinson summed up the religion of India in a memorable essay on the civilizations of the East: "In the first place, India has never put man at the center of the universe. In India, and wherever Indian influence has penetrated, it is, on the one hand, the tremendous forces of nature, and what lies behind them, that is the object of worship and speculation; and, on the other, Mind and Spirit; not the mind or the spirit of the individual person, but the universal Mind, or Spirit, which is in him, but to which he can only have access by philosophic meditation and discipline. Indian religion is thus very 'inhuman' compared to Christianity; and very much more in harmony with the spirit of Western science than with that of Western religion."



BROWN BROTHERS

Indians Worship a Statue of Buddha


The Dickinson essay—written in 1913 after its author had visited the Far East—continues: "To an Indian saint or philosopher the whole world of matter is unreal, and the whole of human history illusory. There is no meaning in time or the processes of time; still less is there any goodness in it. In some way, unexplained and inexplicable, the terrible illusion we call life dominates mankind. To be delivered from the illusion—from life, that is, and activity in time—is the object of all effort and religion."

This description fits the Hindu religion in which about two out of every three Indians believe. Gandhi has called Hinduism "the search after truth through nonviolent means." Many foreign visitors have seen it quite differently. The fact is that Hinduism takes innumerable forms. To the high-caste Brahman scholar Hinduism means a lofty way of life and a sweeping philosophy that embraces all other religious faiths. To some priests it means the intense physical discipline of yoga; to others it means unrestricted sexual indulgence. Just as the kindly teachings of Buddha served mainly to mitigate some of the more crass and barbarous Hindu practices, so Hinduism itself has attempted to mitigate the miserable daily lives of the Indian masses.

Hinduism, the distinctive religion of India, differs from all other religions as India differs from all other parts of the world. The equa-

torial regions of Africa and South America have climates as hot as India's. China has as dense a population. Poverty-stricken farmers all over the world have battled for centuries against hostile nature. But India has a hot climate plus a dense population plus hostile natural surroundings. Foreign conquerors have repeatedly subdued India. The first Moslem conquest of India took place in 711, a thousand years before the British drove out the French and began to establish themselves as the country's sole rulers. Not until 1858 did the British Crown take over the administration of India from the East India Company. Disraeli persuaded Queen Victoria to let herself be proclaimed Empress of India in 1876, and ten years later her rule was extended to incorporate Burma as well. No conqueror since Genghis Khan had brought so large an area under a single authority, but even in 1900 the British remained mere newcomers as compared with the Moslems, whose serious conquest of India began shortly after the year 1000 and who dominated most of India for the next six hundred years and more. The arrival of the British and other Europeans happened to coincide with a period of general breakdown inside India itself.


When the Moslems conquered India, hundreds of thousands of foreign invaders moved in permanently and converted millions of Hindus. By 1900 some seventy million Indians accepted the Moslem faith. The cow, which the Hindus held sacred, the Moslems delighted



BROWN BROTHERS

Hindus Bathe in the Holy River Ganges

to slaughter. The Moslems also held the Hindu caste system in contempt, but both religions believed in the segregation and subordination of women. The British found the Moslem religion more acceptable than the Hindu. They also found that by supporting the Moslem minority against the Hindu majority they could make it difficult for the Indians to unite against them. In 1885 the Hindus formed the so-called National Congress Party in the hope of winning ultimate independence, but they made little



BROWN BROTHERS

Indian Moslems Pray before the Great Mosque at Delhi

headway against the British policy of "divide and rule." For the British not only befriended the Moslems: they supported some seven hundred Indian Princes—both Hindu and Moslem—who ruled over approximately one-third of India under British supervision.

India, in 1900, had a population three times as large as that of the United States living on half as much territory. Not one Indian in ten could read or write. A still larger proportion lived on the soil. Once, the great majority of Indians dwelt in village communities, and all members of each family farmed the family plot of land together. But British rule replaced the traditional village and family system of agriculture with the revenue system. A few moneylenders and landowners built up larger and larger estates as the peasants sold their lands and mortgaged their future crops to pay taxes. At the same time the rise of industry, both native-owned and British-owned, attracted more and more peasants to the cities. In the Bombay slums it was not uncommon to find six families of thirty people occupying a single room fifteen feet long and twelve feet wide. Although life expectancy averaged only twenty-six years, although floods and droughts brought periodic famines to the country districts, population increased at the rate of two millions a year.

The kind of rule that the British maintained over this vast population had no parallel in the history of India, or any other country of comparable size. Armed force played almost no part at all. The Indian Army totaled only two hundred thousand men—less than one-third of them British but all of them commanded by British officers. No Indian could possess arms, Britain controlled Indian foreign policy and Indian finance. During the nineteenth century four-fifths of India's trade went



BROWN BROTHERS


Indian Beggars During a Famine

to Great Britain. Twelve thousand British officials held the top administrative posts in the Indian Government; another twenty thousand British businessmen lived in India. In 1900 British investments in India totaled close to four billion dollars; British revenues from Indian sources totaled half a billion dollars a year.

The British made no attempt to Anglicize the Indians or to Indianize themselves. They never intermarried with the natives; they educated their children in Great Britain, passed their vacations at home, retired to their native land after spending most of their active lives administering Indian affairs.

They gave the Indians an honest and efficient system of law and granted the natives more and more opportunities to run their own internal matters, but did forbid Indian widows to cast themselves into the flames that consumed their husbands' dead bodies. The British built a network of railways that remained the property of the British-controlled Indian Government. Well-to-do Indians sent their sons to Eton and Harrow, to Oxford and Cambridge. The sons came back with democratic, Western ideas which gradually percolated down to the Indian masses. More and more educated Indians spoke and wrote English, which became a kind of *lingua franca*. So long as the Indians continued to speak six distinct native languages and more than two hundred dialects they would remain as diverse and divided as the people of Europe. British rule therefore proved a powerful influence for unification. Missionaries, especially American missionaries, brought Western ideas directly to the Indian people. The story of the American Revolution made a deep impression. Educated Indians found inspiration in George Washington; in the cry "Taxation without representation is tyranny."

India furnished Great Britain with a market for factory products and a vast reservoir of cheap labor and raw materials. India also gave opportunities for government service to the younger sons of entrenched British families and business opportunities to ambitious members of the British middle class. India cost the British taxpayer nothing. It paid for its upkeep while yielding profits to British traders, interest payments to



BROWN BROTHERS.

Harnessing India's Sacred Animals

British investors, and outlets for surplus British energies. Although India remained a passive factor in the world of 1900, the active policy that Britain pursued in many other quarters reflected a constant concern for India. British interests in India demanded good relations with the entire Moslem world. To control the "thin red line of empire" through Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, Suez and the Red Sea, the British had to maintain a long string of naval bases and the world's largest Navy.

Britain's stake in India led to constant friction with Russia. Russian intrigues in Persia always worried the British, but they regarded a neutral Afghanistan as some protection against the expanding power of the Tsars. In 1885 the British therefore suddenly feared war when a Russian general attacked and routed an Afghan force on India's troubled northwestern frontier. The British at once strengthened their frontier garrisons, and two years after Lord Curzon became Viceroy of India in 1899 he created a new North-West Frontier Province. Curzon fancied himself as a latter-day proconsul and proved himself a great colonial administrator. Unhappily, his cold, arrogant personality antagonized British and Indians alike and added to the friction between the rulers and the ruled. India in 1900 indeed deserved to be called "the brightest jewel in the British crown," but it amounted to far more than that. It kept Europe in the closest contact with Asia.

The influences between Europe and Asia did not all flow in one

direction. While a small but growing fringe of leading Indians came under the influence of Western ideas, a smaller, lunatic fringe of Westerners responded to the influence of India. Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky led the way. Madame Blavatsky came from a German family that had settled in Russia. In 1848 at the age of seventeen she married a Russian old enough to be her father, left him after a few months, and devoted the rest of her life to traveling all over the world. She twice visited Tibet and in 1875 she arrived in New York, founded the Theosophical Society, and took out American citizenship papers. Although several times exposed as a fraud, Madame Blavatsky set herself up as a spiritualist medium and by the time of her death in 1891 had attracted one hundred thousand followers, most of them in Britain and the United States. Soon afterward the Theosophical Society split, and Mrs. Annie Besant, the former wife of a Church of England clergyman, became the leader of one of the factions, and as a Socialist of long standing became more and more active in behalf of Indian independence. Her free-thinking religious views, her radical political views, her partiality to assorted quacks and cranks made her seem like something of a joke. But there was reason to believe that the joke was on the conventional world of 1900, not on herself.

The Indians themselves saw nothing to laugh at, and the wiser among them saw more trouble ahead for the British—and for other Europeans—than for themselves. The poet Rabindranath Tagore in *Letters To A Friend*, summed up the relations between Europe and the “lesser breeds without the law” this way: “In India, when the upper classes ruled over the lower, they forged their own chains. Europe is closely following Brahman India, when she looks upon Asia and Africa as her legitimate fields for exploitation. The problems would be simpler if she could altogether denude other continents of their population; but so long as there are alien races, it will be difficult for Europe to realize her moral responsibility with regard to them. The gravest danger is when Europe deceives herself into thinking that she is helping the cause of humanity by helping herself; that men are essentially different, and what is good for her people is not good for others who are inferior. Thus Europe, gradually and imperceptibly, is losing faith in her own ideals and weakening her moral supports.”

• IV •

EAST and West may never meet, but an even wider gulf lies between North and South. When G. Lowes Dickinson visited India he felt he had stepped into a new, alien world. When he arrived in China he felt immediately at home. “Over India gleam the stars,” he wrote; “over



BROWN BROTHERS

*Chinese Peasant Plowing with Water
Buffaloes*



BROWN BROTHERS

*Tomb of the
Ming Dynasty Period*

China the sun shines. Mankind is the center of the Chinese universe, as the Absolute is the center of the Indian." India's torrid climate had made its civilization special, unique. But because China and India both lay in Asia, because most Chinese and Indians lived off the soil, many Europeans and Americans lumped the Chinese and Indians together as backward Asiatic peoples. Of course European and American civilization reflected the influence of modern science just as the civilization of India reflected the influence of a hot climate. But as Lin Yutang has said in *My Country and My People*, "The difference between China and the West seems to be that the Westerners have a greater capacity for getting and making more things, while the Chinese have a greater determination and capacity to enjoy the few things they have."

As for the difference between China and India, rival religions, hostile races, innumerable languages, and separate castes divided India—and always had—every which way. The Chinese had lived under one Empire, written one language, preserved one civilization for more than two thousand years. One-fifth of the human race dwelt in China—a country about the same size as Australia or the United States. Half the people of China had crowded themselves into one-quarter of the country, where most of them lived, miserably, off the land. They tilled their farms to a depth of twelve to sixteen inches, lifting all their topsoil at least twice and sometimes a dozen times a year—by hand. But


at the time China became an Empire, more than two hundred years before the birth of Christ, it shook off its feudal aristocracy. Since then the Chinese people had enjoyed a larger measure of democracy over a longer period of time than any other people on earth.

The Emperor of China did not rule; he reigned. As the Son of Heaven he symbolized the people of the Middle Kingdom, as the Chinese called themselves. The immediate centers of authority in China lay in the family and the guild. Religion gradually took the form of ancestor worship. The Emperor appointed a governor or viceroy to head each of China's eighteen provinces, but the men who actually ruled China were the chief magistrates of the local *hsiens*, or districts, corresponding roughly to American counties, and the magistrate worked so near to the people that he had always to take account of the pressure of the local guilds. China's minor officials got their jobs by passing competitive examinations based on the precepts of Confucius and other sages. "What heaven has conferred is called nature," wrote Confucius; "an accordance with nature is called the path of duty; the regulation of this path is called instruction." Addressing one of his disciples, Confucius justified filial piety, which lay at the heart of China's cult of ancestor worship, this way: "Filial piety is the basis of virtue, and the origin of culture. Sit down again and let me tell you. The body and hair and skin are received from the parents and may not be injured: this is the beginning of filial piety. To do the right thing and walk according to the right morals, thus leaving a good name in posterity, in order to glorify one's ancestors: this is the culmination of filial piety. Filial piety begins with serving one's parents, leads to serving one's king, and ends in establishing one's character." This contemporary of Buddha also kept repeating, five hundred years before the birth of Christ: "What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do unto others."

Confucius stressed wisdom and scholarship. Lao-tse, who lived a little earlier, stressed virtue and saintliness. These lines of his sum up the simple paradoxes that underlie all great religions:


*"He who acts destroys: he who grasps loses.
Therefore the saint grasps not nor acts;
He who humbles himself shall be saved;
He who bends shall be made straight;
He who empties himself shall be filled."*

Owen Lattimore, who has divided his life between China and the United States, has drawn this distinction between the American and the Chinese attitude toward life: "We judge the ability of man by his capacity to 'do things' with the forces of nature and to 'make things



BROWN BROTHERS

*The South Gate
Entrance to Peking*



BROWN BROTHERS

*China's Great Wall and Eroded
Countryside*

happen' in the world of men. . . . Chinese method appears in practice to fix responsibility, not in terms of 'who has done something' but in terms of 'what has happened.'" Americans attributed the failure of prohibition to corrupt officials who conspired to break the law. The Chinese, on the other hand, expect their officials to participate in the illegal opium trade and therefore do not go through the formality of making it legal.

Possessing this attitude of mind—as well as the oldest civilization on earth—the Chinese regarded the first European intruders with more complacency than contempt and with more contempt than fear. In the eyes of these visitors, the Chinese suffered from a perverse tendency to do everything backwards. They began their meals with sweets and ended with soup. Women wore trousers; men skirts. The Chinese shook their heads for "yes"; nodded for "no." They opened their books on the last page and read downward, starting with the right-hand column. All of which seemed as strange to the foreigner as he seemed to the Chinese. "Squeeze" is not, therefore, the Chinese equivalent of "graft" in the United States; it is more like the "spread" to which houses that issue new American securities consider themselves legitimately entitled.

The Chinese had never sought to impose their will on others; they absorbed, assimilated, and sometimes ejected foreign invaders who tried to force a foreign way of life upon them. The Manchu dynasty that ruled China in 1900 had led a successful invasion from the north several hundred years before, but the Manchus had left China's ways unchanged and accepted Chinese ways themselves. Chinese did not willingly pioneer. They left home only to escape misery and took their ancient customs with them. They looked upon Manchuria and Mongolia, to the north and northwest, as buffers against outside attack and outlets for surplus population.

One conquest, however, the Chinese could neither entirely repel nor quickly assimilate—the conquest by the Western world. By the mid-nineteenth century the nations of Europe, with the British in the van, had obtained valuable concessions from the Chinese by main force. The British set up a Crown Colony at Hong Kong. The Chinese granted extraterritorial privileges to other foreigners in other parts. Foreign governments acquired ninety-nine-year leases to areas in which their citizens could settle and buy property. First the foreigners built railways. Then, as the nineteenth century ran its course, they established banks to finance the further development of the region that the railway served. The Chinese Government participated only to plunge itself deeper into debt. Private individuals—most of them foreign, some Chinese—amassed large fortunes based on low labor costs, high prices, small volume, and big profits. Chinese factories earned annual dividends of 100 per cent a year on their invested capital, but Chinese workers, whose wages ranged from three to thirteen cents a day, could not afford to buy back the products of their toil. Transportation in China cost twelve times as much as in the United States.

Most of the new millionaires in Western Europe and the United States had profited from the increasing efficiency of industry. And as the rich had grown richer, so had the poor. Perhaps the rich received more than their share; certainly the workers in European and American factories did not enjoy many of the good things of life. China—and India, too—presented a different picture. There, the greatest fortunes rested on commerce, not industry; on buying cheap and selling dear, not on turnover and sheer volume of production. Although industries did make fabulous profits, they added little to the buying power of the Chinese or the Indian masses. They merely improved the trading position of a handful of well-to-do natives and foreigners. The great majority of the Chinese and Indian people still lived on the edge of starvation. In 1900 the Industrial Revolution which had transformed Europe had barely touched most of the peoples of Asia.


China possessed far less natural wealth than India. It had meager reserves of coal, iron, and oil. Erosion had washed away much of its topsoil. But China did possess one priceless asset: the character of its people. They not only survived and multiplied, they clung to some of their independence and preserved a unity that India had never attained. Materially, the West had enslaved India. Spiritually, the Indians remained largely unchanged. Materially, the West had not completely subdued China. Spiritually, however, Western ideas made measurable headway among the Chinese.

Foreign missions played an incomparably greater role in China than



BROWN BROTHERS

Summer Palace, Peking



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Chinese Cleaning and Sorting Tea

in India. The Chinese, having few religious dogmas of their own, had little prejudice against Christianity as such. The younger generation also welcomed the schools, the hospitals, and the new ideas that the Christian missionaries brought them. Although the proportion of Chinese converts to Christianity remained small—not more than 1 per cent of the entire population—the mere existence of these Christian missions opened a breach in the intellectual wall behind which China had lived for two thousand years. The missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, interested themselves in the daily lives of the Chinese, and the younger Chinese, in particular, opened their minds and hearts to these ambassadors from a strange world that had made such inroads upon their own.

Young China, as the rising generation of 1900 called itself, had begun to turn away from a literal application of the doctrines of Confucius and Lao-tse. It had by no means embraced Christianity, but it had accepted many Western ideas. The first impact of these ideas naturally had a shattering effect, but the Chinese people possessed such powers of resistance and adaptation that they kept their character. More and more of them had emigrated, but they had always remained Chinese in every climate and every level of civilization. As Nathaniel Pfeffer has written in *China: The Collapse of a Civilization*: "There are few places on the planet where there are not some Chinese, fewer still where they do not do well, and none at all where they do not move with ease and naturalness in the situation in which they find themselves." The Chinese could not, perhaps, pursue an aggressive policy, but their reactions to the actions of others had wide repercussions. During most of the nineteenth century these actions and reactions had remained confined to China and the Western powers. But as the nine-

teenth century drew to a close a new, purely Asiatic conflict broke out that soon changed the face of Europe and the world.

• V •

"I CONCEIVE the dominant note of India to be religion; of China humanity; of Japan chivalry." So wrote G. Lowes Dickinson after visiting all three countries in 1912. Many Europeans and Americans shared his respect for Japan. Some admired Japan's rapid assimilation of Western ways. Others admired Japan for its past. The crippled American author Lafcadio Hearn, who spent most of his life in Japan because the people treated his affliction with consideration, admired their art, their philosophy, their character. But toward the end of his life—after writing a great deal in praise of Japan—he changed his mind. It took him many years to reach the conclusion that the Japanese were not what they appeared—a simple, artistic, childlike people who had tried to accept the civilization of the West as they had once accepted the civilization of China. Rather did he finally see them as the dupes and slaves of a rigid, ruthless oligarchy that borrowed from abroad only what it needed to promote its own secret, aggressive designs.

The Constitution under which the Japanese lived in 1900 dated back to 1889. The revolution from which this Constitution had emerged took place in 1868 when fifty-five leaders of the feudal clans and of the court nobility put through the so-called Meiji Restoration, establishing the hitherto obscure Mikado, or Emperor, as the symbol of the Japanese state and the central figure of the national Japanese religion. Taking the real power into their own hands, they modeled their Constitution on Prussia's and set up a Parliament of two chambers, one of them elected by the people, but both of them subject to an invisible government of army and navy commanders. The Choshu clan controlled the Army; the Satsuma clan controlled the Navy. The Emperor, who alone could make war and peace, took all his orders from the families that had made him the puppet ruler of a slave kingdom.

The subjects of this slave kingdom led such busy lives that they had little chance to develop individuality. Most Japanese bathed every day. Most Japanese could read and write some of their ideograms—enough, at any rate, to follow their rather primitive daily papers. Those Japanese who had money and leisure for study took to extremist doctrines and highly charged literature. Karl Marx's ideas made a considerable appeal to young students, who also absorbed the novels of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Turgenev. Japan had the highest suicide rate in the world. Both the Moslem and the Christian religions frown on suicide. Among the desert Arabs the practice is unknown in spite of their miserable

living standards. The Japanese lived better than the Chinese, the Indians, or the Arabs; nevertheless, they had always considered suicide an honorable death. Disappointed lovers flung themselves from mountaintops. Dishonored statesmen and soldiers plunged knives into their stomachs. The nervous and physical pressure under which the Japanese lived often drove them to make an end of it all.

As the Indian people expressed their character in their religion and the Chinese in their humanity, the Japanese people proclaimed themselves in sheer action rather than in the appearance of chivalry that caught the eye of G. Lowes Dickinson. The warrior embodied the highest Japanese ideals. “Japanese feudalism,” wrote Dickinson, “converted Buddha’s doctrine of renunciation into the Stoicism of the warrior. The Japanese Samurai renounced desire, not that he might enter Nirvana, but that he might acquire the contempt of life which would make him the perfect warrior.” Nietzsche had built a characteristically German philosophy on the will to power. William James had built a characteristically American philosophy on the ideal of pragmatism: that whatever works is right. Nietzsche rejected and James rationalized the crass materialism of the new century. The synthetic Shinto religion, based on Emperor worship, represented the closest approximation that the Japanese could formulate to a national philosophy.

After the Meiji Restoration the Japanese devoted all their energies to reorganizing their own country. Agriculture remained the chief occupation. Less than 20 per cent of the land in Japan would grow crops, but the Japanese managed to double their population in fifty years while feeding themselves and building industries too. They had almost no coal, almost no iron ore, almost no oil. Nevertheless, they created a modern Army and Navy, a merchant marine, a railway system, and the beginnings of a textile industry. They produced their own raw silk, but they had to import all their cotton and wool from abroad. Their flimsy fishing fleet—the largest in the world—added to their food supply and provided something extra for export. Some of the old landowning families went into industry. New industrial and banking dynasties also established themselves. Control remained centralized. The state provided direct and indirect subsidies.

Nothing resembling Japan’s ruling oligarchy existed anywhere else in the world of 1900. No individual personality stood out. No single faction dominated the rest. It was not a landowning oligarchy, a banking oligarchy, an industrial oligarchy. It was more a military and naval oligarchy than anything else, although the new Japan did not show its military power until 1894, when it routed China in short order. From the West the Japanese had learned that God is on the side of the strongest battalions and that the weak do not inherit the earth. Just as

the Europeans had extended their power all over the world by military conquest, so the Japanese first used their newly developed power to make war upon their Chinese neighbors. The quick defeat of China stunned the Chinese and staggered the rest of the world. The Japanese, however, suffered an even sharper shock when France and Germany joined Russia in preventing them from taking over the positions in Korea and Manchuria that the Chinese had agreed to yield. And having excluded Japan from the Asiatic mainland, the British, French, Germans, and Russians proceeded to enlarge their own Asiatic spheres of influence at China's expense.

The Russians benefited the most. They lent the Chinese the money needed to indemnify Japan and received in exchange the right to build a branch line—the Chinese Eastern—across Manchuria and to send troops into that zone. In 1897 the Germans took advantage of the murder of one of their missionaries in Shantung Province to get a long lease on the Kiaochow Bay area and its hinterland. The Russians countered this move by securing a twenty-five-year lease on Port Arthur, which they promptly fortified. The British had prospered in China by concentrating on trade, although they held military and strategic bases, too, at Hong Kong and Kowloon. Now, however, they demanded a lease on the port of Weihaiwei, which lay between the German-controlled Kiaochow Bay concession and the Russian-controlled Port Arthur.

The new turn of events irked the British, who had their hands full administering India and feared that a further partition of China would work against their interests. They had done a profitable business with the weak, compliant, nominally independent Chinese Government. They wanted to forestall trouble from Russia, Germany, or any other aggressive power, whereas the Kaiser welcomed the prospect of conflict in China for the same reasons that the British dreaded it. He hoped to pick up some new territories for himself. He also hoped to keep the Russians turned eastward, toward Asia and away from Europe; toward friction with Britain, away from closer relations with France.

The American annexation of the Philippines introduced a new factor. The United States had always traded with China and, at the turn of the century, furnished North China with more than half its imports. But the United States had no exclusive spheres of influence. A partitioning of China among the European powers would freeze out the United States. On the other hand, with free and equal opportunity to all, the United States could more than hold its own. From the European point of view, John Hay's Open Door policy meant that the United States was demanding an equal share of China's trade with other foreign powers that had assumed responsibilities and made sacrifices



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

*The Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi of China
Receives a Foreign Diplomat*



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

*Li Hung-chang: China's foremost states-
man; from a colored lithograph, 1896*

to build up their privileged positions there. From the Chinese point of view, the Open Door meant that all the foreign powers had agreed to observe certain rules among themselves for continuing and intensifying the exploitation of China. The British favored and even inspired Hay's Open Door policy. It meant less risk; it meant American support of British interests. To many Chinese, however, the choice between partition and the Open Door seemed a Chinaman's choice indeed.

In 1900 one of the most remarkable women rulers in history had dominated China and its Imperial Court for almost forty years. The Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi, came of a noble Manchu family. At the age of sixteen, in 1840, she had become one of the Emperor's concubines. Before he died, in 1861, she had borne him a son and gained herself the title of Imperial Consort because the legitimate Empress had no children. Tzu Hsi had everything—brains, beauty, charm, ambition—everything except compassion, a quality rarely found in great rulers, whether men or women, Chinese or European. She had ingratiated herself with the Empress, and they ruled China together as joint Dowager Empresses until 1881, when the legitimate Dowager Empress died a natural death. Other rivals to Tzu Hsi passed away more mysteriously.

Her own son had died suddenly in 1875. So did his young widow, who was about to bear a child. Li Hung-chang, the leading statesman of the time, then conspired with Tzu Hsi to put her infant nephew on the throne, thus extending her own regency.

Even when the nephew, Kwang Hsu, came of age, his aunt remained the real head of the Chinese court at Peking. Kwang Hsu had no children and little force of character. His dynamic aunt allied herself with Li Hung-chang until he negotiated the Peace of Shimoneseki with Japan in 1895, when she turned to the younger Yuan Shih-kai, who had distinguished himself as a military organizer and provincial governor. The Chinese as well as the Japanese had learned new lessons from their brief war and its outcome. The performance of the Europeans did not convince the Japanese of the folly of military aggression. It convinced them only of the need for adequate preparation. They had made no mistake in attacking China. Their mistake had been to try to grab more than they could hold. They drew the logical conclusions and redoubled their program of military preparedness. As for the restive younger generation of Chinese, events had convinced them that they must modernize their country along European and American lines. They studied abroad and planned to replace their ancient classical system of education with a Western curriculum.

The Dowager Empress and the conservatives skilfully turned this anti-Manchu attack into a wider anti-foreign movement. Their conduct of the war against Japan had caused them to lose face. Yet they gathered support because the idea of welcoming foreigners and foreign ideas antagonized many Chinese who banded into secret and anti-foreign societies. By the summer of 1900 the strongest of these, the Fists of Righteous Union—generally known as the Boxers—acquired a wide enough following to cut off and besiege all the foreign Embassies at Peking. On June 20 the Boxers, supported by government troops, killed the German Ambassador as he was going to protest against the Chinese Government's tolerance and support of anti-foreign agitation.

The Germans demanded strong joint action by all the foreign powers. At first the United States Government held off, and American naval vessels declined to join the Europeans in a shelling of the Chinese coast. Yet even the United States sent a detachment of troops on the international relief expedition to Peking, commanded by Germany's Field Marshal von Waldersee. It was at this time that the Kaiser startled the world by telling the German troops under Waldersee to act like the Huns of old. And the unhappy John Hay justified this multilateral violation of his own Open Door policy by announcing that the United States now stood for "the principle of equal and impartial trade in all parts of the Chinese Empire." Already, the "territorial and administrative integrity of China" had gone up in smoke.




BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Nations of Europe, Defend Your Holiest Possessions"

The Kaiser composed the above caption and personally supervised the execution of the painting, which shows the Archangel Michael addressing the nations of Europe. From right to left the figures represent France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, England, and Spain

The international army made its way without trouble to Peking, where it found that the Chinese had not slaughtered the European colony. But that did not prevent the international army—especially the Germans—from looting the ancient city nor did it prevent the European governments from forcing the Chinese to pay an indemnity of 333 million gold dollars for the whole Boxer affair. John Hay had kept insisting that the United States was not at war with China, that American troops were simply protecting American interests. The United States therefore took the lead in getting the foreign troops withdrawn from Peking and tried to scale down the indemnity. The Russians, however, reached a separate agreement with the Chinese about Manchuria, which they did not regard as part of China. The British and Germans also reached a bilateral agreement to respect each other's interests in China.

John Hay's Far Eastern policy had perhaps slowed down but it had certainly not arrested the forward march of foreign influence in China. His Open Door had let more American troops than American trade into the country. It had also failed to safeguard China's territorial and administrative integrity and had not lessened the friction among the



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

United States Officers Entering Peking with the Boxer Relief Expedition

foreign powers. Whether it prevented the partitioning of China remains a matter of speculation. The fault did not, however, lie with either Hay or his policy. The same revolution of applied science that had transformed Europe and the Western Hemisphere had reached China too. An irresistible force had met an immovable body.

SUMMING UP

WITH THE TURN of the century the expansionist fever had spread from Europe to the United States, while the spirit of nationalism had spread from the United States—and from Europe, too—to Asia. Would the spirit of religion again spread from Asia to Europe as it had done before? Since the French Revolution, Western man had been turning from religion to worldly causes. What distinguished the twentieth century from earlier times was not that it had discovered a substitute for the old religions; it had merely widened their scope. Man is a gregarious creature who delights in group effort and assumes a different personality when he takes part in mass actions. The consolidation of many small states into a few large ones, the drift of country folk to the cities, the growth of big business at the expense of small had brought more and more people together into larger and larger communities. Here they followed standardized routines, lived in standardized houses, wore standardized clothes, read a standardized press. The raw material for mighty mass movements lay ready to hand.

A few nations and a few leaders had risen to such prominence that

the individual became lost in the anonymous mass. Yet this individual remained the essential, irreplaceable unit to whom the twentieth century offered its ideals of comfort and progress—ideals that did not always come or stay true. Human beings in the twentieth century, as in all other centuries, required more than hope for a good life here on earth. They required a faith for which they could make sacrifices, together. Never before in history had mankind massed itself into such huge, compact, and mighty groupings. The nature of the new century would reveal itself in the nature of the faiths for which these masses would act.

Part Two

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PREWAR

1

The Queen Is Dead: Long Live the King

How Edward's England liquidated the Victorian age and changed the world balance of power through new alliances with France and Japan.

PREVIEW

IN EDWARD VII, twentieth-century England found a twentieth-century King whose love of life and feeling for world affairs served his country well. During the first three years of his reign England concluded peace with the Boers and alliances with Japan and France. After the Kaiser and Bülow had rejected a limited Anglo-German alliance, the division of Europe into two separate camps continued. Arthur J. Balfour succeeded his uncle, Lord Salisbury, as British Prime Minister and Joseph Chamberlain split the Conservative Party with his program to build a tariff wall around the British Empire. Balfour, however, refused to resign and call for a general election. Instead, he proceeded to reorganize the British Army while across the Channel, in France, the anti-clericals came to power.


• I •

QUEEN VICTORIA survived the nineteenth century by a bare three weeks. She died on January 22, 1901. The counselors of her youth could remember the French Revolution. Napoleon did not die until after her birth; Hitler was born before she died. Far more remarkable than the length of the Queen's life were the changes that it witnessed: the unification of Germany and Italy, the American Civil War, the emergence of Japan; the development of the railway, the telegraph, and electric power; the invention of the automobile, the phonograph, and the motion picture. All these things transformed the lives of the British people, who looked to their Queen as the symbol of stability in a world of change. To the people of Europe she personified the royal as well as the British cause. She had relatives—usually close relatives—at every court. Her funeral was at once an unprecedented pageant of Emperors and Kings and at the same time a purely family affair.



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"The Rare and Rather Awful Visits of Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, to Windsor Castle." Caption and drawing by Max Beerbohm



BROWN BROTHERS

King Edward VII with the Prince of Wales (left) and Prince Edward (right), All Wearing the Popular Royal Navy Uniforms

The accession of Victoria's sixty-year-old eldest son, Prince Albert Edward, to the throne marked the beginning of a new century and a new era. During forty years of widowhood Queen Victoria had adored the memory of her beloved Prince Consort, "Albert the Good." No one ever applied that adjective to his popeyed, stout, and genial namesake, the Prince of Wales, who had responded as many other healthy men of normal appetites responded to Victorian education in the raw. The Prince of Wales, who learned all the required languages, spoke English with the accent of his father's Germany but preferred the tastes and morals of the French to those of his two parents. To the end of her long life, Queen Victoria forbade her son and heir ever to see any confidential government papers that her Ministers submitted for her perusal, especially those relating to foreign affairs. She felt that his many ceremonial duties as Prince of Wales kept him sufficiently busy and she saw to it that he had a heavy schedule by ordering him to represent her at most state occasions.

Prince Albert Edward found the endless pageantry of princely life endlessly boring. He therefore sought at gambling casinos, race tracks,

and the theater some of the excitement from which the routine prescribed by his mother had excluded him. Like other closely supervised children, who often remain children as long as their parents live to order them about, the Prince of Wales rebelled against some of his mother's pet prejudices. She could see virtue only in the Tory leaders. The Prince sought out the society of Liberals. The Queen, for all her motherly interest in her royal European relations, remained unaffected by foreign influences, although the devotion of Kaiser William II of Germany always touched her. Albert Edward, on the other hand, detested his neurotic nephew and believed that a good Englishman might also become a good European.

Queen Victoria's elderly eldest son began his reign with a characteristic gesture of defiance. Immediately after his mother's death he pledged himself in a graceful, impromptu speech to his Ministers to walk in the late Queen's footsteps and "to be a constitutional monarch in the strictest sense of the word." He saved his surprise for the end, when he suavely declared that he wished "to be known by the name of Edward, which has been borne by six of my ancestors." He knew his mother's reverence for his father's name of Albert, but he also knew he wanted to stand on his own feet and not in another man's shoes. He therefore wound up his remarks with this declaration of independence: "I do not undervalue the name of Albert, which I inherit from my ever-lamented, great, and wise father, who by universal consent is, I think, deservedly known by the name of Albert the Good, and I desire that his name should stand alone."

British diplomats soon found King Edward VII's tact and determination a priceless asset. During his long period of preparation for the throne, friends at the British Foreign Office had quietly schooled him in world affairs, and his public duties and extensive travels made him aware of the possibilities as well as the limitations that went with his new position. Queen Victoria had possessed an instinctive understanding of the great and growing British middle class that had prospered during her reign; King Edward gravitated just as naturally to the society of bankers, shipping magnates, and industrialists who had become fused with the older British aristocracy. His pleasure-loving temperament also accorded with the expansive spirit of the times. His paunchy, jaunty figure had dignity and authority, and radiated a sense of well-being that the British people relished after forty years of the diminutive, widowed Queen. Of course, the entire British populace did not enjoy all the comforts of the Edwardian age, but British society never appeared more stable than during the opening years of the new century, and the ruling class found it easy enough to make the best of this best of all possible worlds.

The policy-making fraction of this small ruling class saw clearly enough that the new century had brought new problems. Just before the outbreak of the Boer War, Prime Minister Salisbury had permitted his Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, to propose an Anglo-German agreement to the Kaiser and Bülow, who turned him down. But in the "Khaki Election" of November, 1900, the Conservatives had won the right to remain in power for another seven years, and Lord Salisbury—exponent of "splendid isolation"—made Lord Lansdowne his Foreign Secretary. Lansdowne, like Chamberlain, was a refugee from the Liberal Party, but more tractable and far better born than "Brummagem Joe." Salisbury, like other strong Prime Ministers before him, had held the post of Foreign Secretary, too, but he could no longer carry two such heavy responsibilities alone.

Early in 1901, soon after assuming his new office, Lansdowne began to sound out the German Embassy in London on the prospects of a limited Anglo-German alliance. Several participants in these discussions have given conflicting reports about what went on, but they all follow the same general pattern. Count Bülow had recently become German Chancellor as well as Foreign Secretary. Confident of his ability to hold both positions, he urged Count Paul von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, to go slow, predicting that time would convince the British that they could not trust Russia and must come to terms with Germany. At the same time, Salisbury, still half convinced of the virtues of "splendid isolation," urged Lansdowne not to offer too much. Baron Eckardstein, the first secretary in the German Embassy, complicated matters still further by failing to report fully to Hatzfeldt on certain conversations he had held with Lansdowne during Hatzfeldt's absence on sick leave. In July, 1901, after four months of backing and filling on both sides, the British Government closed the door on further negotiation. Joseph Chamberlain promptly abused Germany for refusing "to see the rise of a new constellation in the world"—the potential Anglo-American-German-Japanese combine on which he set such store.

These futile Anglo-German negotiations left the two governments further apart than ever. The Boer War opened the eyes of the British leaders to their unpopularity abroad—and to their vulnerability. That was why they offered a generous peace settlement to the Boers and a limited alliance to Germany. Whereupon the Kaiser and Bülow overplayed their hand. It hardly occurred to the Kaiser that his flamboyant personality and war preparations made the British people uneasy and suspicious. It hardly occurred to Bülow that no responsible British leader would think of bringing his country into the Triple Alliance, thus, in effect, underwriting Austria's shaky position in the Balkans.


Britain and Germany could come together, if at all, only by stages, and the first stage required the German leaders to change their whole behavior, which expressed and reflected the dominant mood of the German people at that time. And the hesitation of the British leaders to meet the Germans even one-quarter of the way expressed and reflected the dominant mood of their people, who distrusted alliances in general and the Kaiser in particular.

• II •

WHAT THE British leaders failed to achieve with Germany they accomplished with Japan. When foreign troops crushed the Boxer Rebellion and occupied the Chinese capital of Peking in the summer of 1900 a new chapter in Asiatic history began. The Chinese had already turned their best ports over to foreign control; foreigners operated and exploited the Chinese customs service; almost the entire country had been divided into spheres of influence. Not content with crushing the Boxer uprising, the foreign powers then forced the Chinese to indemnify them for the expenses of the punitive expedition to Peking. Negotiations dragged on until the summer of 1901, when the Chinese Empress re-established her court at Peking and the foreign troops agreed on a schedule of withdrawal and the Chinese on a schedule of payments.

Of all the powers that had moved further in on China at the time of the Boxer uprising none benefited more than Russia, and none showed more consideration for the Chinese. John Hay, who coined the phrase "Open Door," had proclaimed a doctrine that recognized, in words, the "territorial and administrative integrity of China." Whereupon, the European powers with interests in China used the Open Door doctrine to extend their privileges while asserting that the special measures they took for their own protection also promoted China's interests. Only the Russians gave China tangible evidence of value received, using the loans they were already receiving from the French to help the Chinese pay the Boxer indemnity. The United States also made the friendly gesture of using the Boxer indemnity payments to finance Chinese students in American colleges.

The British met this extension of Russian influence in Asia as they had tried to meet the extension of German influence in other quarters. First, they proposed a deal with the Russians and, when the Russians refused to come to terms, reached an understanding with the Japanese, who had reason to trust London and fear St. Petersburg. In 1894 the British had taken a lead that other powers had to follow when they dropped all their extraterritorial privileges in Japan. The next year,



UNDERWOOD AND UNDERWOOD

Symbol of Anglo-Japanese Friendship: A Japanese cruiser takes on coal from a British tramp steamer

after Japan's victory over China, the Russians led off in the opposite direction, followed by the French and the Germans, and forced the Japanese to withdraw from Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula. And no sooner did the Japanese move out than the Russians moved in.

It was against this background of events that the British, during the closing months of 1901, proposed a limited alliance to Japan. The original overtures had come from Japan, but rumors reached London during the summer of 1901 that the Japanese were making overtures to Russia, too. The British did the same, and only after the Russians rebuffed them did they come to an understanding with Japan. On January 30, 1902, the British and Japanese Governments announced that they had agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China and Korea and that they had no aggressive designs on either country. However, the alliance went on to declare that the British were free to safeguard their special interests in China and that the Japanese were free to take similar action in China—and in Korea, too. If either Britain or Japan became involved in war with a third power, the other signatory would remain neutral and try to prevent other powers from making war on its ally. If two or more powers made war on Britain because of British interests in China, Japan would enter the war on Britain's side; and if two or more powers made war on Japan because

of Japanese interests in either China or Korea, Britain would enter the war on Japan's side.


The Anglo-Japanese Alliance opened with the usual endorsement of John Hay's phrase respecting China's "territorial integrity" and then went on to use more of Hay's phrases to violate the very principles they set forth. It was also a limited agreement. It did not apply to any part of Europe nor did Japan offer Britain any aid in the defense of India. The essence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 lay in Britain's recognition of Japan's special position in Korea. It was there that Japanese and Russian interests collided. And the terms of alliance suggested that the Japanese believed they could defeat the Russians single-handed but could not stand off a hostile coalition.

The man who became Prime Minister of Great Britain six months after the conclusion of the Japanese alliance frankly interpreted it as a British go-ahead signal to Japan to fight Russia. On July 11, 1902, the superannuated Lord Salisbury turned over the leadership of his government to his stoop-shouldered nephew, Arthur James Balfour. "A war between Japan and Russia in which we were not actively concerned," commented the new Prime Minister, a master of double-negative understatement, "would not be an unmixed curse."

On December 29, 1903, Balfour pointed out in a memorandum that even a Russian victory over Britain's Japanese ally would have its compensations: "Even if we assume Russia to get the best of it, we can by no means assume that she will come out of the fighting stronger than she went in. Stronger in the Far East for many purposes she may perhaps be. But we have to fear her chiefly as (a) the ally of France; (b) the invader of India; (c) the dominating influence in Persia; and (d) the possible disturber of European peace. For these purposes she will not be stronger but weaker after overrunning Korea—bound to the East by the necessity of watching Japan, she will be unable freely to take part in strategical combinations against Britain in the West. Though her value to France in a war with Germany might thereby be little affected, her value to France in a war with us would be greatly reduced and her whole diplomacy, from the Black Sea to the Oxus, might be weakened into something distantly resembling sweet reasonableness." All of which tended to confirm the suspicions of the Kaiser, Bülow, and Holstein, who saw Japan falling into the same kind of trap that they believed British leaders had set for them in Europe.

• III •

NOBODY PERSONIFIED the Tory brand of this leadership at the turn of the century so elegantly as the new Prime Minister. As a member of the



CULVER

*Arthur James Balfour as Prime Minister
of England*

ancient Cecil family, Balfour had been born to the political purple, but the blood ran thin in his veins. He dabbled in philosophy as well as in politics and made himself the exponent of what he called the doctrine of "philosophic doubt." Margot Asquith, who knew him well, said that Balfour regarded our present life on this earth as having little importance. It seemed to him the antechamber to another world. Balfour, she continued, "has no profound convictions about politics. They attract him only as a game he plays well. He does not

really care for the things at stake, does not think the happiness of mankind depends on things going this way or that." Balfour regarded himself as an exponent of "Tory democracy," by which he meant, "the more you extend responsibility to the whole community, the more Tory the result is likely to be. By Tory I mean averse to change—inclined to continuity." And toward the end of his life he said, "When I look back, I think my opinions have hardly ever changed at all about anything."

Balfour never read a daily paper. He did not hear of the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 until five days after it had happened and, several years later, three weeks elapsed before he learned of the great eruption of Mount Vesuvius. Yet no member of the House of Commons—where he had led the Conservative party for eight years—excelled him in the art of debate. One evening Herbert Asquith, the outstanding Liberal debater in the House, invited Balfour to dinner and afterward during a night session challenged Balfour to defend the Government's policy. "I felt a mild awkwardness," Balfour commented afterward, "in replying to a man in the strength of his own champagne. I did it all the same with considerable vigor."

Balfour, who never married, concentrated his limited energies on intellectual and social activities. He first made his mark in the late 1880's as chief secretary for Ireland, where his cool suppression of the local nationalists earned him the name of "Bloody Balfour." This effete British aristocrat showed, on occasion, the ruthlessness of a Turkish eunuch-vizier, yet he never lost his cynical humor or his taste for political heresy. During the 1890's he subscribed to the free-silver doctrines of William Jennings Bryan and ten years later he joined the early converts to Zionism.

Balfour became Prime Minister six weeks after the Boer War had officially ended. Peace, which seemed so near as 1900 drew to a close, did not come until another eighteen months had passed. Although Boer President Kruger had fled to Europe on board a Dutch cruiser and Lord Roberts, the supreme British commander, had returned to England, the Boers fought on, adopting guerrilla tactics. They cut British-held railway lines, penetrated the Cape Colony, and almost set off an uprising among the South African Dutch. General Botha, the Boer leader, held his own in the north, then drove eastward into Natal. Kitchener, who had inherited the Roberts command, countered these tactics by rounding up civilians in concentration camps and establishing blockhouses from which British troops raided the countryside and defended the railways. Humanitarians in England and elsewhere called Kitchener's methods barbaric, since women and children died of disease in the concentration camps while British troops burned Boer crops and farmhouses. But as soon as these methods crushed the Boers' will and power to fight, Kitchener, unlike some of the stay-at-home fire-eaters, urged a moderate, negotiated peace, not a punitive, dictated one—and his counsels prevailed.

Although the British showed some unpleasant traits during the early stages of the Boer War, the best elements in their national character came through in the end. Hypocrisy turned to magnanimity; enlightened self-interest replaced blind rapacity. Strong and victorious, the British showed more consideration for the beaten Boers in 1902 than they had displayed in 1899 when they overrated themselves and underrated their enemies. In the final peace treaty the British promised that all Boers who surrendered and acknowledged themselves the subjects of King Edward VII would regain their liberty and their property. The schools would still teach Dutch. Boer farmers would receive three million pounds to compensate for the damage British troops had inflicted. A civil administration with votes for native whites was promised at the earliest possible moment.

When General Botha visited England a few months after the war ended, he was greeted with placards that read, "Good Old Botha," and "Our Friend, the Enemy." The Boer guerrilla leaders who had fought to the end also proved more reasonable than broken old Kruger, who had run away. One of these leaders, Jan Christiaan Smuts, had made an outstanding record at Cambridge University before the war in which he fought the British to a finish. But the generous settlement that the British finally offered made him a devoted servant of the Empire. Far from believing that he had fought in vain, Smuts became convinced that the resistance of the Boers taught the British the most valuable lesson they had learned since the American Revolution.

Not all British leaders learned this lesson at once. Germany's rejection of the proffered British alliance and the generous settlement with the Boers made Joseph Chamberlain and his fellow imperialists look a little silly. The new century was not following the pattern they had foreseen. As soon, therefore, as the Boer War had ended, the impatient Chamberlain sought a new issue to keep the Conservatives on the attack, the Liberals on the defensive, and the Empire on the move. In July, 1902, an Imperial Conference of the Prime Ministers of the British Colonies, held under the auspices of Chamberlain's Colonial Office, passed a resolution urging the mother country to abandon its historic policy of free trade for all comers and adopt instead a system of preferential tariffs with a view to imposing tariffs on all imports from outside the British Empire if the British Isles would reciprocate. They wanted to make the Empire a closed economic system in which the Dominions, Commonwealths, and Colonies would exchange their raw materials for the products of British factories. They also wanted British investors to put money into the development of Empire countries instead of spreading their capital, indiscriminately, all over the world.

"At the present moment," said Chamberlain in 1902, "the Empire is being attacked from all sides and in our isolation we must look to ourselves." He spent the next year traveling all over the Empire promoting his new panacea, "Imperial Preference." Chamberlain's crusade united the Liberals and divided the Conservatives. All Liberals—imperialists and anti-imperialists alike—acknowledged that the prosperity and security of the British Isles depended on the freest and fullest world trade and that one-third of the population of Great Britain was underfed and on the verge of starvation. The Liberals blamed this condition on the high cost of food and predicted that Chamberlain's tariff proposals would send food prices still higher and reduce living standards still further. Many Conservatives agreed with them.

Prime Minister Balfour met this threatened split in his own Party first with diversion and then with delay. First he created a Committee of Imperial Defense, including both army and navy leaders, to apply the lessons of recent experience to all the forces. He then appointed Lord Kitchener commander of the British troops in India. Both Balfour and Lord Curzon, the Viceroy to India, feared Russian encroachment, but Balfour—who had backed the Japanese Alliance—favored meeting the threat openly by the appointment of Kitchener whereas Curzon would have proceeded more quietly.

Meanwhile, Chamberlain's agitation for tariff reform had become so insistent that he quit the Cabinet on September 17, 1903. In the opinion of most Liberals and some Conservatives, Balfour should at least have sought a vote of confidence in the House of Commons on

the tariff question. But he did not dare to risk the possibility of defeat, resignation, and a general election; he preferred to procrastinate, announcing that he, too, favored higher tariffs, but that he must first consult the experts. The Conservative London *Spectator* commented at the time, "Whatever else may happen, Mr. Balfour's day as a great British statesman is over. No turn in the political kaleidoscope can restore to him the confidence of the country." The *Spectator* was wrong. The Balfour Government remained in office two more years. The rage and the ridicule of the Liberals proved equally unavailing. Balfour, they howled, had violated the spirit of the British Constitution; he had shattered sacred precedent; it "wasn't done." Balfour, however, had done it. With serene assurance, he made his own precedents and pursued his own way.

• IV •

RAPID CHANGES in British foreign policy during the opening years of King Edward's reign went a long way toward justifying Balfour's decision to remain in office. Lord Salisbury had resisted the pressure of the Tory die-hards to impose a hard peace on the Boers. Even Chamberlain admitted that his projected alliance with Germany had failed. If Balfour had yielded to the agitation for a general election in 1903, his reorganization of the armed services and his additional precautions for the defense of India might have come to nothing, especially since the British public knew little about the dangerous new currents gathering force in Germany, Russia, and Japan, nothing about the proposed alliance with Germany. Generations of British schoolboys had learned to think of France as the "hereditary enemy"; the tradition dated back to the Norman Conquest of 1066 and had continued through the Napoleonic Wars. But the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War and the consolidation of the German Empire since 1871 had changed the European balance of power. The hereditary French enemy seemed, in the twentieth century, less and less of a menace. Rather did France appear the most dependable check on German expansion in Europe, and perhaps beyond.

Here King Edward VII played a crucial part. He had followed with more concern than surprise the efforts of his diplomats to come to an understanding with Germany. When these efforts failed, he prepared himself to help them see what could be done with the French. In the spring of 1903 he paid some leisurely visits to the royal families of Portugal and Italy and called on Pope Leo XIII. From Rome he journeyed to Paris to present his official respects to President Loubet of the Third Republic. A member of his party, recalling the obscene at-

enlarged the Russian alliance. Delcassé had always assumed that Britain, Russia, and France would have to draw together against Germany, and things were moving his way. The most serious differences between the British and French Governments had to do with spheres of influence in North Africa, and here the British proved accommodating. They offered to recognize the predominant position of France in Morocco in exchange for French recognition of British predominance in Egypt. This represented a greater concession from the British side than from the French, and the French grabbed it. On April 8, 1904, the two Governments announced that

they had reached a firm agreement, which came to be known as the Entente Cordiale, covering these and other limited but specific matters. They did not, however, reveal that they had also signed secret agreements permitting further extensions of British influence in Egypt and of French and Spanish influence in Morocco. Delcassé gave advance notice of the nonsecret clauses to Bülow, who assumed an air of cold indifference. As a result, Delcassé never did ask for German recognition of the special position that France presently claimed in Morocco—an oversight that he lived to regret.

Bülow had to make light of the Entente Cordiale or else admit that he had blundered fatally in rebuffing the British three years before. The Kaiser, on the other hand, rightly and publicly interpreted the Anglo-French Entente as a major diplomatic victory for France. To this the disgruntled Bülow replied that Germany had no direct interest in Morocco and that the British and French had merely gone through the formalities of acknowledging Moroccan independence.

Both Morocco and Egypt, two pawns in the international chess game, enjoyed only the most nominal kind of independence. Balfour, in 1903, described Egypt as "a province of the Ottoman Empire in the military occupation of England." However, Egypt had gone deeply into debt to England, and France controlled 60 per cent of the public obligations of the Imperial Turkish Treasury. The British no longer got much economic benefit from Egypt. Both Balfour and Lansdowne hoped to



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The Entente Cordiale. Germany: "Damned. I thought it was paper; now I see it is really stone." A British cartoon from Punch

pull out entirely by 1907. British plans for imperial defense in time of war did not contemplate holding the Suez Canal or the eastern Mediterranean. The British expected to fall back on the longer but less vulnerable sea route to India and the Far East by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Although they did not need Egypt for themselves, they dared not let it fall into the hands of any other major European power.

The Germans had no designs on Egypt or the Suez Canal. What the Germans wanted was to build a Berlin-Bagdad railway across Turkey. Back in 1888 the Turks had granted them some concessions. In 1903 they granted more. The Germans were now in position—if they could find the money, skill, and equipment—to build a railway as far as the shore of the Persian Gulf. The French saw this projected railway ruining their shipping lines that carried silk from Marseilles to India. The Russians feared that the opening up of Mesopotamia would lose them some of their markets for wheat. The British saw the Berlin-Bagdad Railway competing with the Suez Canal and their own shipping interests. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy to India, and author of a masterly book on Persia, commented at the time that he “would not hesitate to indict as a traitor to his country any British Minister who would consent to a foreign power establishing a station on the Persian Gulf.”

Bülow therefore displayed almost criminal levity in trying to laugh off any tightening of Anglo-French relations, especially in a region close to the Middle East. Germany's projected Berlin-Bagdad Railway had already alarmed the British, the French, and the Russians. By the same token, French policy in Morocco should have alarmed the Germans. The local Sultan, who maintained his capital at Fez, had little real power over his four million subjects. The French, having made the neighboring country of Algeria an integral part of the Third Republic, were looking westward. They had quietly worked out an elaborate program of peaceful penetration of Morocco—including administrative, economic, and military reforms—that the Moorish court opposed. In Bismarck's time the Germans had welcomed French activity in North Africa because it distracted French attention from the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. But in Bülow's time the Germans had begun to acquire overseas possessions themselves. They were placing more and more emphasis on world trade, and their naval building program had become a matter of growing concern to the British. In these circumstances the new agreement between the two largest colonial empires on earth could not fail to affect, vitally and adversely, the interests of Germany's expansionist leaders.

The attitude of King Edward VII toward his imperial German nephew added to the international tension. Osbert Sitwell, in the second volume of the autobiography, *The Scarlet Tree*, quotes an exchange of


toasts between the British and German monarchs, as related to him by one of the British guests at a dinner given in King Edward's honor by the Kaiser at Kiel two months after the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. "Your Majesty," said the Kaiser, "has been greeted by the thunder of the guns of the German fleet, delighted to see its Honorary Admiral. The fleet is the youngest in point of creation among the Navies of the world, and is an expression of the renewal in strength of the sea power of the German Empire." To which the imperturbable Edward replied, "I am especially glad that it was possible for me to pay Your Majesty a visit at this time of the year when I am ordinarily occupied at home. The interest, however, which I have for many years taken in—*yachting*—exercised too great an attraction to allow me to miss the opportunity of convincing myself how successful Your Majesty has been in inducing so many to become interested in this sport in Germany."

Edward's wit may have deflated his nephew's ego for the moment. It had the opposite effect on the Kaiser's sense of inferiority, against which his ego fought a constant and losing battle.

• V •


THE ENTENTE CORDIALE received a better press in London than in Paris. Under Tory leadership, Britain had crushed the Boers in South Africa and had partitioned North Africa with France. The Balfour Government never felt more sure of itself than when it came to terms with the anticlerical coalition of Radical Republicans who governed France. This coalition included Alexandre Millerand, the first French Socialist to accept a cabinet position. For this defection, Millerand suffered expulsion from his Party, which did not, however, vote against the Government which he had joined. In 1902 a new and strongly anticlerical Premier took office—Émile Combes. And Émile François Loubet, President of the Republic, had pardoned Dreyfus in 1899.

One of Loubet's colleagues wrote this typically French description of this typically French statesman at the time he became president of the Senate: "This man, incapable of keeping silent, is a little, frisky, grayish Senator of modest mien, whom modesty does not misbecome, with brushed-up hair, pointed beard, clear eyes, a drawling, monotonous, uneven voice in which the southern grasshopper's note sings and all the pots and kettles of Montélimar grate—a voice that gives emphasis to the most surprising phrases, such for instance as 'The great unanimity of the country'; 'The dynamite that strikes not only magistrates but also the innocent.' The unlucky word comes naturally, and escapes from his mouth with clarion distinctness. He emphasizes it with a swaying of his body, a to-and-fro of his legs, a bent attitude that makes him look



CULVER SERVICE

President Émile François Loubet of France



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Pope Pius X, Supreme Pontiff from 1903 until after Outbreak of War in 1914

like a floor-polisher at work. He always, when speaking, seems to be waxing the tribune. For the rest, he is a very decent fellow."

Émile Combes, the new Premier, had a less sympathetic nature. Originally he had studied for the Roman Catholic priesthood, but he abandoned the Church for literature, literature for medicine, and medicine for politics. He fought clerical prejudice with anticlerical prejudice and took the lead in the successful campaign to scrap the Concordat that had governed relations between France and the Vatican since the time of the first Napoleon. Under this arrangement the French state paid the salaries of all Roman Catholic priests and bishops, subsidized Roman Catholic instruction in its own schools, and permitted certain Roman Catholic orders to own considerable properties, tax-free. But a number of new religious orders had sprung up and the Concordat did not govern their actions. They opened their own schools, agitated against the Republic, led the fight against Dreyfus. Most of the regular Roman Catholic priests in France and the majority of Roman Catholic laymen supported the Republic. It was a minority of anti-Republican Catholics who made all the trouble during the Dreyfus affair, turning many of their coreligionists into anticlericals.

The showdown came, unexpectedly, in April, 1904, when the new Pope, Pius X, protested to President Loubet against the measures that the French Government had begun to take against some of the Roman Catholic schools and orders. The French Government retorted by withdrawing its Ambassador to the Vatican. The Pope then violated the Concordat by summoning two French bishops to Rome without making

his request through the usual civil authorities. The French Government ordered the bishops to ignore the Pope's summons. One did; the other didn't. Whereupon the French Government dismissed the Papal Nuncio from Paris, making the break complete. The Combes Government strengthened its hold on the French people by speeding up its program to separate church and state. The Roman Catholic authorities themselves estimated that at this time barely one-quarter of the population of France formally belonged to the Church, and only a minority of that minority attended mass and made confession with any regularity. Anticlericalism was in the saddle, and it was with this comparatively radical French Government that the Conservative British Government of A. J. Balfour had come to terms.

SUMMING UP

THE OPENING of the new century saw Britain's Conservative statesmen seizing the initiative everywhere. They faced two tasks: first, to organize a new balance of world power; second, to reorganize their own country, and they made more headway in the first direction than in the second. Hoping to bring all the major nations of Europe into a single, harmonious community, the British leaders first offered a rather loose alliance to the Germans, who wanted a much firmer commitment and believed they could get it by waiting. The British had other ideas and quickly made up their minds to resort to balance-of-power politics and create an anti-German coalition, beginning with France. Because Russia seemed to be playing the same expansionist game in Asia that Germany was playing in other parts of the world, the British also entered into a limited alliance with Japan. Britain and France came together at the expense of Egypt and Morocco; Britain and Japan came together at the expense of China and Korea.

Difficulties at home did not settle themselves quite so easily. Germany and the United States were coming up fast in the world; Britain had stood still for thirty years. Some Conservatives argued that England had always "muddled through"; others crusaded for the abolition of free trade, the establishment of a self-sufficient Empire, and more emphasis on social reform. This crisis within the dominant Conservative Party reflected a deeper internal crisis which the Liberal Party prepared to meet by stressing the need for reform at home. The same kind of social ferment also disturbed France. On the surface, the new century did not yet appear very different from the old. Beneath the surface new forces were striving to create a new world.

“Now Look, That Damned Cowboy Is President of the United States.”

How the assassination of McKinley made Roosevelt the youngest President in American history and why he won re-election by a record majority three years later.

PREVIEW

THE BULLET of an assassin prevented President McKinley from living to reap the rewards of victory over Spain and the return of prosperity. But Theodore Roosevelt's personality was better suited to the spirit of the times. Like most of his contemporaries, he talked bigger—and better—than he acted; he restrained some of the more ruthless monopolists, wielded the “big stick” in Latin America, made his own arrangements for the construction of the Panama Canal, and announced his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. His arrival in the White House coincided with a cultural renaissance in the United States, while the greatest event of his first term went almost unnoticed as the Wright brothers' heavier-than-air flying machine took off at Kittyhawk.

• I •

WHILE NEW ALLIANCES were forming in Europe and Asia, the American people were discovering that their victory over Spain had brought them new problems abroad without solving the domestic problems from which war and expansion once seemed to offer an escape, if not a solution. For more than two years, beginning in February, 1899, seventy thousand frantic American soldiers chased Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader, up and down his native islands, through jungle valleys and up steep mountainsides, under the sporadic fire of a ghost army of guerrillas. Often it took the bullet of a .45-caliber automatic pistol, fired at point-blank range, to stop these fanatical fighters who knew how to use knives in ways that drove white troops to a frenzy. Finally, however, the Americans captured Aguinaldo, and President McKinley abolished


the office of Military Governor, appointing Judge William Howard Taft Governor General and granting a general amnesty to all rebels and political prisoners willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States.

William Howard Taft came from one of the leading families of Cincinnati, Ohio. Upon graduation from Yale he practiced law until 1889, when President Harrison appointed him Solicitor General. In 1892 he became a federal judge and during the next ten years no judge in the country enforced more labor injunctions. In the Pullman strike of 1894 he expressed regret that more strikers had not been killed. But nearly all right-minded Americans felt the same way at the time, and the fat, jovial Taft was the least bloodthirsty of men. His liberal religious convictions proved a political liability: in a predominantly Christian land he denied the divinity of Jesus. "I am a Unitarian," he proclaimed on one occasion; "I believe in God. I do not believe in the divinity of Christ, and there are many other postulates of the orthodox creed to which I cannot subscribe." Unlike many Republicans, Taft had opposed the annexation of the Philippines as "a burden, contrary to our traditions," and because "we had quite enough to do at home." But he did not agree with Senator Hoar that the Filipinos could govern themselves. Having assumed the responsibility of taking their islands over, the United States had, in Taft's view, "a sacred duty to give them a good form of government."

At first Taft had resisted his appointment as Governor General, fearing that it might frustrate his lifelong ambition to become a Supreme Court Justice. But when he got out to the islands he threw himself into his work and joked that his horseback trips took more weight off the horse than off his own corpulent frame. As Governor General, Taft opposed the Krag and bayonet methods of General Arthur MacArthur, the supreme American commander. He saw to it that the Filipinos enjoyed all the protections of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution except the right of trial by jury and the right to bear arms. He shocked many American civilians by refusing to draw any color line and by entertaining prominent natives. He called the Filipino "our little brown brother," to which the hard-bitten American soldiers serving in the islands replied,

*"He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine."*

Opinion in the United States, however, was turning against the annexation of the Philippines, and all that it implied, just as opinion in the British Isles was turning against the Boer War and its consequences. Americans were as eager to do right by the Filipinos as the British were



ACME

President Theodore Roosevelt

to do right by the Boers. The poet William Vaughan Moody spoke for millions of his fellow countrymen in his poem "On a Soldier Fallen in the Philippines," which ended with the words:

*"Let him never dream that his
bullet's scream went wide of
its island mark,*

*Home to the heart of his darling
land where she stumbled and
sinned in the dark."*

While Governor General Taft was setting up the machinery of civil government in the Philippines, one of the chief instigators of American expansion was preparing to resign himself to the end of what had once seemed a political career of infinite promise. Theodore Roosevelt, side-tracked into the Vice-Presidency by the political bosses of the Republican Party, found his new duties so trivial that he was preparing, at the age of forty-three, to study law. On September 5, 1901, President McKinley attended a Pan-American celebration at Buffalo, New York. There, the high priest of high tariffs, who had also prayed he might keep his country out of war with Spain, declared that the era of American isolation had ended and that America's new position in the world would require a downward revision of tariff rates. The next day, at a public reception, Leon Czolgosz, a Polish-born anarchist, fired a revolver, point-blank, at the President's heart. Two of the bullets went wild; one lodged in McKinley's stomach. For a few days he appeared to be recovering, but a relapse set in and he died on September 14. Theodore Roosevelt had become the youngest President in American history.

He assumed his new responsibilities with dignity and tact. When he rushed to Buffalo to take the oath of office, he insisted, against the advice of lawyers in the Cabinet, on paying his respects to Mrs. McKinley before doing anything else. "I will call on Mrs. McKinley first," he said. "I do not wish to see her as the President when I am giving my condolences on her husband's death." In his first public statement he pledged himself "to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley." He asked all members of the Cabinet "to retain their positions, at least for some months to come." He told the press, "Everybody must be my friend, now," and tried to be everybody's friend himself. He even tried to console the heartbroken Marcus A. Hanna, who

had opposed him for the Vice-Presidency: "I hope you will be to me all that you have been to him." But Hanna knew how to discount this outburst and told H. H. Kohlsaas, the Chicago newspaperman, as they rode from Buffalo together on the McKinley funeral train, "I told William McKinley it was a mistake to nominate that wild man at Philadelphia. I asked him if he realized what would happen if he should die. Now look, that damned cowboy is President of the United States."

• II •

THE NEW PRESIDENT went from Buffalo to his sister's house in Washington, giving Mrs. McKinley the better part of a week to remove her effects from the White House. He also held two cabinet meetings, attended McKinley's funeral in Canton, Ohio, and conferred with a group of Senators. He toyed with the idea of dropping the ailing John Hay as Secretary of State and the conservative Lyman Gage as Secretary of the Treasury, but heeded those who warned of a possible "Roosevelt panic." During his first months in office Roosevelt spent most of his time seeing people. "I have received," he said, "more advice than any man living—mostly bad." He was probably the first President to play tennis—a game imported from England in the '70's—and his closest advisers became known as the "Tennis Cabinet." Roosevelt learned jiu-jitsu, rode horseback, read quantities of books and invited their authors to the White House. "The White House is a bully pulpit," he declared. With his American sense of moral superiority he also announced, "When I do a thing, I do it so as to achieve substantial justice."

Two major injustices cried out for treatment when Roosevelt entered the White House. Fewer and fewer businesses were controlling more and more of the American economy, while workingmen, farmers, and small businessmen were receiving a diminishing share of America's increasing production. For during these years the politicians, the supposed representatives of the people, all too often supported the growing power of the monopolists. Roosevelt had not identified himself with the trust busters—much less with the defenders of the oppressed. But neither did he belong to that section of the Republican Party that followed Hanna's terse advice during the 1900 campaign to "stand pat."


Roosevelt therefore addressed himself to reforming the bad trusts, always drawing distinctions between the great mass of honest businessmen, large and small, and the minority of evildoers. He announced, in his first message to Congress, "There have been abuses connected with the accumulation of great fortunes," but went on to add that these fortunes also conferred "immense incidental benefits upon others." "It is not true that as the rich have grown richer, the poor have grown

poorer." Finley Peter Dunne put in the mouth of "Mr. Dooley" this summary of the Roosevelt message: "Th' trusts,' says he, 'are heejous monstheres built up be th' enlightened intherprise iv th' men that have done so much to advance progress in our beloved country,' he says. 'On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other hand not so fast.'"

Two important decisions in the field of trust busting and labor legislation confronted Roosevelt during his first year in office. On February 18, 1902, his Attorney General, Philander C. Knox of Pittsburgh, informed the President that in his opinion J. P. Morgan and Company's latest merger of railroad lines into the Northern Securities Company violated the anti-trust laws. Morgan himself at once hurried to the White House, where he told Roosevelt, "If we have done anything wrong, send your man to my man, and they can fix it up." "That can't be done," said Roosevelt. "We don't want to fix it up," Knox explained; "we want to stop it." Morgan asked, "Are you going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust, and the others?" "Certainly not," said Roosevelt, "unless we find out that in any case they have done something we regard as wrong." After Morgan left, Roosevelt summed up their conversation this way: "That is a most illuminating illustration of the Wall Street point of view. Mr. Morgan could not help regarding me as a rival big operator, who either intended to ruin all his interests or else could be induced to come to an agreement to ruin none." The Supreme Court sustained the Government, and the Northern Securities deal did not go through.


Later during the same year, shortly before the November elections, the anthracite coal miners of Pennsylvania went out on strike. They sought a 20 per cent wage increase, a reduction of the working day from ten to eight hours, and recognition of their union. The coal operators refused to negotiate, and the price of anthracite rose from five dollars to thirty dollars a ton. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, fearful of a Democratic victory in November, denounced the insolence and stupidity of the coal operators. "I firmly believe Morgan is behind them," he said at the time. "It is playing with fire. The socialistic feeling is growing apace, and the demand that the Government take the mines—one of the greatest disasters that could befall us." The truth was that Morgan backed Roosevelt against the mine owners and won the President's thanks for this support.

Yet Lodge had good reason to feel concerned. During the two and a half years prior to the end of 1904, industrial warfare in the United States had cost one hundred and eighty lives. Slason Thompson, editor of *The Outlook*, wrote this account of the Pennsylvania coal strike in the December 17, 1904, issue of that magazine: "From beginning to end it was attended by every conceivable description and degree of human



BROWN BROTHERS

*J. Pierpont Morgan
in 1904*



BROWN BROTHERS

*The Gentleman from Massachusetts:
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge*

fiendishness. Malicious and criminal mischief held carnival in many districts. Outbreaks of minor deviltry did not spare the mother bearing her infant in her arms, or innocent children on their way to school. Clergymen were notified not to bury dead nonunionists, and union men refused to worship at the same altar with the industrious 'scab' who preferred to work rather than see his family starve."

The coal operators proved their own worst enemies. When Roosevelt intervened personally in the strike he found the union leaders sensible, the operators impossible. After protracted haggling, Roosevelt discovered that the operators refused to accept any representative of organized labor on the three-man arbitration board he had proposed. But when the President appointed the Grand Chief of the Order of Railway Conductors as an "eminent sociologist," the coal operators made no objection and finally granted almost half of the union's demands. The publication of a letter written by George F. Baer, spokesman for the coal operators and president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railway Company, provided one of the high points of the whole dispute.

In reply to an unknown correspondent who appealed to Mr. Baer to consider the miners' claims on religious grounds, Mr. Baer wrote: "I do not know who you are. I see that you are a religious man; but you are evidently in favor of the right of the workingman to control a business in which he has no other interest than to secure fair wages for the work


he does. I beg of you not to be discouraged. The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for—not by labor agitators but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of the country, and upon the successful management of which so much depends. Do not be discouraged. Pray earnestly that the right may triumph, always remembering that the Lord God Omnipotent still reigns, and that His reign is one of law and order, and not of violence and crime.”

The letter, which breathed the religious and political spirit of Mr. Baer's class and period, became a sensation. The *New York Times* and the Hearst papers denounced it as blasphemous. So did the religious press. Some people questioned its authenticity, but Mr. Baer had spoken in the same vein for the record on other occasions. What shocked his contemporaries more than his arrogant attitude toward labor was his proprietary attitude toward God. Yet in this respect Mr. Baer differed little from his critics. Religious faith ran strong in all classes. Capital invoked God in behalf of its right to bigger dividends. Labor invoked God in behalf of its right to fatter pay envelopes. And each seemed equally hypocritical to the other.

Roosevelt sometimes seemed hypocritical to both. He regarded himself as the incarnation of “righteousness”—one of his favorite words—and consigned all those who called attention to his own untruthfulness to membership in the “Ananias Club.” But throughout his Presidency Roosevelt steered a middle course, alarming the conservatives with his daring talk and disappointing the progressives with his cautious action. He fought hard and consistently for conservation of natural resources, preservation of wild life, and civil service reform, but he called Bryan's utterances “criminal” and declared, “All the ugly forces that seethe beneath the social crust are behind him.” It was also revealing that Roosevelt had no closer friend than the reactionary Henry Cabot Lodge. As Henry Adams, who knew both men well, once commented, “Roosevelts are born and can never be taught, but Lodge was a creature of teaching—Boston incarnate—the child of his local parentage.” Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who served as best man when Roosevelt was married in England, said of him later: “If you took an impetuous small boy to a beach strewn with a great many exciting pebbles, you would not expect him to remain interested for long in one pebble. You must always remember that the President is about six.”

• III •

THE PEBBLE of political reform never interested Roosevelt so much as the pebble of overseas expansion. Having promoted the war with Spain



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Panama Canal: Work in progress

and the acquisition of the Philippines, Roosevelt saw that the United States had to build and control a canal somewhere in Central America connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In ousting Spain from the New World, the United States had assumed responsibility for former Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. The islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico commanded the approaches to Central America; they also lay on the route between North and South America. With the Anglo-German naval race already under way, the big-navy party in the United States could make a strong case for building new bases and ships to protect the Western Hemisphere. The big-navy party could also point to the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii and to the rise of Japan to justify still greater expansion across the wider reaches of the Pacific. During the early 1890's Admiral Mahan, the one-man brain-trust of the big-navy school, had begun to urge the United States to build a canal across Central America at Panama or Nicaragua. By the early 1900's he had an unanswerable case and, in President Roosevelt, an indomitable disciple.

In 1900 an American commission to investigate and report on the best location for such a canal recommended Panama rather than Nicaragua. The next year Secretary of State Hay negotiated a new treaty with Great Britain to supplant the fifty-year-old Clayton-Bulwer agreement whereby the two nations were to build any canal together. But the

Senate rejected Hay's treaty because he had not made sufficient provision for the defense of the canal zone. This rebuff led the thin-skinned Anglophile Secretary to comment, "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say just when or how the blow will fall, but one thing is certain, it will never leave the arena alive." Even so, Hay renegotiated the treaty and in 1901 persuaded the British to concede the right to the United States to fortify the canal. In this form the treaty passed the Senate.

However, Roosevelt and Hay needed more than the consent of Great Britain before work could start. The Isthmus of Panama belonged to the independent sovereign Republic of Colombia, which could not build the canal itself but wanted to get the best possible terms for permitting the United States to do so. José Vicente Concha, Colombian Minister to the United States, became so disgusted with the sacrifices of national sovereignty demanded by Secretary Hay that he refused to negotiate any treaty at all. The *chargé d'affaires*, Herrán, took over and on January 22, 1903, signed a treaty—under protest—after Hay had gone over his head to his home Government and warned that the United States would build the canal across Nicaragua unless Colombia accepted the American terms. The Senate of the United States promptly approved the Hay-Herrán Treaty, but the Colombian Senate, which had been led to expect something better and quite different, refused to ratify.

A weird assortment of European adventurers, Wall Street plungers, and local revolutionaries went into action and on November 4, 1903, with United States marines and warships standing by, Panama proclaimed its independence from Colombia. Roosevelt called it "a most just and proper revolution," justifying his own high-handed policy: "The position of the United States is altogether different from that of private capitalists who, unless expressly exempted, are altogether subject to the local jurisdiction, and who, before invoking their government's protection, may be required to tread the path of ordinary litigation and establish their rights before the tribunals of the governments against which they assert them. Under such circumstances, the private capitalist must have everything beforehand nominated in the bond. The United States is not subject to such disabilities and can take care of the future."


The immediate future took care of itself. Within thirty days President Roosevelt recognized the independent, sovereign Republic of Panama, whose leaders at once ceded to the United States a canal zone ten miles wide, instead of the six-mile strip called for in the treaty with Colombia. For these concessions they at once received the ten million dollars originally offered to Colombia. "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress

debate," Roosevelt declared afterward. Elihu Root, his Secretary of War, put it more humorously in a letter to the President: "You have shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you were guilty of rape."

In his December, 1904, message to Congress, Roosevelt waved the same big stick at all of Latin America and at Europe too. In 1823 President Monroe had declared to the European powers that "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." President Roosevelt went

further, adding what became known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Doctrine of President Monroe. He asserted that the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade Europe to extend its system into the Western Hemisphere, also required the United States to maintain law and order and to safeguard foreign properties and claims throughout Latin America. "Chronic wrongdoing," he declared, "or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

Although the anti-imperialists attacked him, Roosevelt had merely carried over into the twentieth century the same principles that Monroe had first applied in the nineteenth. For more than eighty years the Monroe Doctrine had shielded Latin America from European intervention. Under its protection the New World had made itself largely independent of the Old. Meanwhile, however, a new danger had arisen: the danger that certain Latin-American republics might use this independence, which the Monroe Doctrine had helped them to gain, to defy the United States. It was to forestall this danger that President Roosevelt devised the corollary that bore his name.



BROWN BROTHERS


Elihu Root in 1903, as Secretary of War in Roosevelt's Cabinet

• IV •

BY THE TIME Roosevelt had proclaimed this corollary he had defeated the Democratic candidate for the Presidency—conservative Judge Alton B. Parker of New York—by an even larger majority than that by which McKinley had defeated the demagogue Bryan four years before. All the big financial interests backed Roosevelt against Parker. Elihu Root, one of the ablest New York corporation lawyers of his time, who had replaced Taft as Secretary of War, told New York City's crusty Union League Club that Roosevelt was "the greatest conservative for the protection of property in the city of Washington." Root added this warning: "Never forget that the men who labor cast the votes, set up and pull down governments, and that our Government is possible, the perpetuity of our institutions is possible, the continued opportunity for enterprise, for the enjoyment of wealth, for individual liberty, is possible only so long as the men who labor with their hands believe in American liberty and American laws."

Roosevelt, who combined the tolerance of the born aristocrat with the confidence of the self-made man, had little use for the Union League mentality. "These fools in Wall Street think they can go on forever," he wrote his friend Lodge in 1904. "They can't." He also enjoyed talking big in public and loved to denounce the "malefactors of great wealth," as he called the economic royalists of his time. Roosevelt's mother had come from Georgia and two of her brothers had fought in the Confederate Army; with this background, the new President hoped to improve relations between North and South and to better the lot of the American Negro. Less than a month after he succeeded McKinley he outraged the professional Republican politicians by appointing Thomas Goode Jones, an Alabama Democrat, a United States District Judge. Roosevelt regarded Jones as the best man for the job and wanted to give the solidly Democratic South a demonstration of nonpartisan politics.

But the same Southern newspapers that praised Roosevelt's appointment of Jones sang a different song when the new President invited the Negro educator Booker T. Washington to lunch at the White House. "White men of the South, how do you like it?" cried the New Orleans *Times-Democrat*. "White women of the South, how do YOU like it?" The Memphis *Scimitar* said Roosevelt had committed "the most damnable outrage ever perpetrated by any citizen of the United States when he invited a nigger to dine with him at the White House." The Richmond *Times* declared, "It means the President is willing that Negroes shall mingle freely with whites in the social circle—that white women



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Floradora Girls Out for a Spin in a 1905 Packard

may receive attentions from Negro men; it means there is no reason in his opinion why whites and blacks may not marry and intermarry, why the Anglo-Saxon may not mix Negro blood with his blood."

Roosevelt took all the abuse without comment. He wrote Lodge, privately, that he had invited Washington to dinner "as a matter of course," but he made no public reply to any of the attacks against him, and he never invited a Negro to dine at the White House again. By 1904 the incident had been forgotten, and Roosevelt received a larger popular vote in the South than any Republican candidate since the Civil War. Perhaps the Southern newspapers had not reflected the real feelings of the mass of the Southern people. Perhaps Roosevelt's tolerance expressed something deeper in the American character than the Southern newspapers had touched.

The great strength of the United States had always resided in the variety of its people. Its great weakness had always resided in its lack of homogeneity. In a sense, the American people consisted of nothing but minorities: a Negro minority, a Roman Catholic minority, a Jewish minority, a Southern minority, a minority of farmers, a white-collar minority, a minority of labor-union members, and so on. Roosevelt took pride in the fact that he was the first President of the United States whose Cabinet included both a Jew and a Roman Catholic. "I believe that this Republic will endure for many centuries," wrote Roosevelt in a letter that his Secretary of Commerce, Oscar Straus, preserved. "If so, there will doubtless be among its Presidents Protestants and Catho-

lics, and very probably at some time Jews. I have consistently tried while President to act to my fellow Americans of Catholic faith as I hope any future President of the United States who happens to be a Catholic will act towards his fellow Americans of Protestant faith. Had I followed any other course, I should have felt that I was unfit to represent the American people."

Roosevelt's victory over Judge Parker in 1904 surprised nobody but himself. The Democrats suffered the worst beating that either party had received since the Civil War, whereupon Roosevelt, in a spasm of relief, composed this written promise that he lived to regret and to break: "The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form; and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination."

• V •

ROOSEVELT won re-election because his own personality went with the temper of his time. The "strenuous life" that he preached appealed to the optimistic vigor of a young people. His love of the West and the outdoors struck a responsive, even a nostalgic chord in the hearts of many young Americans who had left the small towns and farms of their childhood to seek careers in the cities, where they gave vent to their homesickness in such popular songs as "The Moon Shones Bright Tonight Along the Wabash," "In the Shade of the Old Apple Tree," and "In the Good Old Summer Time." They had no more real desire to go back to their farms than Roosevelt had to quit the White House for life on the range, but they enjoyed an occasional sentimental wallow. The humorous weekly, *Judge*, summed up the prevalent mood as the year 1904 ended in a glow of prosperity and good will:

*Good old year of 1904.
Everyone had goods in store.
What galore—a dollar up,
Lots to eat and lots to sup.
None abroad is mad at us,
Naught at home to raise a fuss.
May the year ahead give more
Of the branā of 1904.*

The depression of the early 1890's and the Populist revolt that followed had marked the end of the Gilded Age and cleared the way for a cultural renaissance in the United States. With the turn of the century, American readers abruptly turned from British novelists to novels about America by Americans. The historical romances of Winston

Churchill—not to be confused with a rising young British journalist-politician of the same name—headed the best-seller lists year after year. *The Crossing* outsold all other works of fiction in 1904. Next came two sentimental tales: *The Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come* by John Fox, Jr., and *Mrs. Wiggs of the Cabbage-Patch* by Kate Douglas Wiggin. A more realistic group of younger writers were also attracting attention. Frank Norris had begun his trilogy on the epic of wheat, living to complete only *The Octopus* and *The Pitt*. Jack London, who called himself a Socialist and presently became the highest-paid writer on earth, was describing outcasts and adventurers who could find no place in a ruthless industrial society. Mark Twain, the one outstanding writer of the period, could not hold out against the commercial trend; he devoted himself to unhappy business ventures, lecturing, and sardonic humor. Edith Wharton, influenced by her master, Henry James, was probing the morals of the same moneyed classes against which Jack London rebelled.

As for Henry James himself, he belonged to no American school and had only a meager following in the United States. James came of an old New York family. He had received the conventional upper-class, Eastern-seaboard education and had inherited enough money to pursue a literary career in foreign parts. He had left his native country in the 1880's and spent the next quarter of a century abroad—chiefly in England, France, and Italy. Although he found Europe more congenial than the United States, he could not escape his American past, and in 1906 he returned to his native land, where he spent the better part of a year traveling about, in his self-styled role of "restless analyst," recording his impressions in *The American Scene*.

"Certain of the manifestations of wealth in New York," as he called them, led to this outburst: "Nowhere else does pecuniary power so beat its wings in the void, and so look round it for the charity of some hint as to the possible awkwardness or possible grace of its motion, some sign of whether it be flying, for good taste, too high or too low. In the



BROWN BROTHERS

Jack London



UNDERWOOD

Mrs. Edith Wharton,
at the Height of Her Fame



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Henry James, "*The Old Pilgrim Returning Home*": A drawing by Max Beerbohm

other American cities, on the one hand, the flights are as yet less numerous—though already promising no small diversion; and amid the old congregations of men, in the proportionately rich cities of Europe, on the other hand, good taste is present, for reference and comparison, in a hundred embodied and consecrated forms. Which is why, to repeat, I found myself recognizing in the New York predicament a particular character and a particular pathos.”*

Henry James hazarded but one final judgment about the America of 1906; it was that no final judgment could be reached concerning a society in such a fluid state. Two types, however, impressed him: the businessman and the woman. “No impression,” he wrote, “so promptly assails the arriving visitor of the United States as that of the overwhelming preponderance, wherever he turns and twists, of the unmitigated ‘businessman’ face, ranging through its various possibilities, its extraordinary actualities, of intensity. And I speak here of facial cast and expression alone, leaving out of account the questions of voice, tone, utterance, and attitude, the chorus of which would vastly swell the testimony and in which I seem to discern, for these remarks at large, a treasure of illustration to come. Nothing, meanwhile, is more concomitantly striking than the fact that the women, over the land—allowing for every element of exception—appear to be of a markedly finer

*Reprinted from *The American Scene*, by Henry James; copyright, 1907, by Harper and Brothers, 1935, by Henry James; used by permission of the publishers Charles Scribner's Sons.

texture than the men, and that one of the liveliest signs of this difference is precisely in their less narrowly specialized, their less commercialized, distinctly more generalized physiognomic character."


To James it seemed that the American man lacked "the right kind of woman" and the American woman "the right kind of man." Which led him to this train of thought: "The right kind of woman for the American man may really be, of course, as things are turning out with him, the woman as to whom his most workable relation is to support her and bear with her—just as the right kind of man for the American woman may really be the man who intervenes in her life only by occult, by barely divined, by practically disavowed courses. But the ascertainment and illustration of these truths would be, exactly, very conceivably high sport for the ironic poet—who has surely hitherto neglected one of his greatest current opportunities. In any case, it remains vivid that American life may, as regards much of its manifestation, fall upon the earnest view as a society of women 'located' in a world of men, which is so different a matter from a collection of men of the world; the men supplying, as it were, all the canvas, and the women all the embroidery."

What impressed James most about the city of Washington was that there and there alone "nobody was in 'business'—that was the sum and substance of it; and for the one large human assemblage on the continent of which this was true the difference made was huge." Because the businessman could "never hope to be anything *but* a businessman," the American woman took over everything unrelated to business. "The world he lives in accepts its doom and becomes, by his default, subject and plastic to his mate; his default having made, all around him, the unexampled opportunity of the woman—which she would have been an incredible fool not to pounce upon. It needs little contact with American life to perceive how she *has* pounced, and how, outside business, she has made it over in her image."

"The sentence written largest in the American sky," according to Henry James, was this: "The woman is two-thirds of the apparent life—which means that she is absolutely all of the social; and, as



"Dangerous": The Gibson Girl



BROWN BROTHERS

S. S. McClure, the Man behind the
Muck-Rakers

this is nowhere else the case, the occasion is unique for seeing what such a situation may make of her." Rarely in *The American Scene* did Henry James pontificate or prophesy, but the swank buildings of the new-rich on upper Fifth Avenue in his native city of New York did wring from him this admonition: "It's all very well for you to look as if, since you've had no past, you're going in, as the next best thing, for a magnificent compensatory future. What are you going to make your future of, for all your airs, we want to know?—what elements of a future, as futures have gone in the great world, are at all assured to you? Do what you

will, you sit here only in the lurid light of 'business' and you know, without our reminding you, what guarantees, what majestic continuity and heredity, that represents. Where are not only your eldest son and *his* eldest son, those prime indispensables for any real projection of your estate, unable as they would be to get rid of you even if they should wish; but where even is the old family stocking; properly stuffed and hanging so heavy as not to stir, some dreadful day in the cold breath of Wall Street? No, what you are reduced to for importance is the present, pure and simple, squaring itself between an absent future and an absent past as solidly as it can."

Although James saw only the upper crust of the Eastern seaboard, his eyes penetrated beneath its surface. And his observations in 1906 applied to the whole first decade of the new century. He also saw—but did not describe with such detail—the strange new forces in American life that had already produced a new type of journalism and that might produce a new type of literature, too, someday. During the 1890's, the so-called "yellow press" of Hearst and Pulitzer promoted the Spanish-American War and pilloried the trusts. During the early 1900's a new figure appeared. S. S. McClure, the child of poor Irish peasants, had come to the United States with a Napoleonic belief in his destiny as a journalist, and just as Hearst and Pulitzer had created a new type of newspaper, so McClure created a new type of magazine to which he gave his own name. Here he surrounded himself with a group of young journalists turned reformers or young reformers turned journalists—it


was sometimes hard to say which. "You say other magazines have told that story," McClure would shout as one of his staff writers set out on a new assignment. "You are wrong. A story is never told until *McClure's* tells it."

Ida Tarbell's *History of the Standard Oil Company* first appeared serially in *McClure's*; so did Lincoln Steffens's *The Shame of the Cities* and Ray Stannard Baker's *The Railroads on Trial*. Writers for *McClure's* offered no solution for the problems they investigated. They crusaded for facts, facts that stirred the readers' indignation. President Roosevelt, quoting from *Pilgrim's Progress*, called this new type of journalist "the man with the muck-rake," but it was a name that the muck-rakers themselves bore proudly. They had become a power in the land.

• VI •

ALTHOUGH the American journalist counted for more than the American man of letters during the early 1900's, the inventor counted for more than both of them put together. Europe's great research scientists had challenged some of man's most cherished beliefs about himself and the universe, but who understood the meaning of these challenges? Even the award of the 1903 Nobel Prize in Physics to Professor H. Becquerel, Pierre Curie, and his Polish wife for their researches with radium seemed unimportant beside the achievements of America's Thomas Alva Edison, whose inventions had received more than eight hundred patents in the United States and more than two thousand abroad. Edison had invented the electric light and the phonograph. He had become a national institution in his own country and a symbol of America in other lands.

Edison's career had followed the approved American pattern. His mother, a former schoolteacher, had given him an appetite for knowledge and skill in acquiring it, but he had made his own way in the world without benefit of a college education. He came from the little Ohio town of Milan, and though he never knew poverty he had to hustle for his living before he had reached the age of twenty. He sold papers on the local train, then printed and sold a paper of his own. He became an expert telegraph operator and made up his mind to turn to invention as his lifework. Neither money, power, nor abstract ideas interested the young Edison, who applied himself to more practical efforts and lived only for practical results. He used the proceeds from one invention to finance his work on the next one and gradually built a laboratory at Menlo Park, New Jersey, where he surrounded himself



BROWN BROTHERS

Thomas A. Edison and His Electric Dynamo

with a staff of assistants whom he drove as ruthlessly as himself.

Before the turn of the century, Edison's great achievements lay behind him. In 1897 he had reached his fiftieth year, and his gentle smile, his direct gaze, his stooping frame, his unruly head of hair had become as familiar as the silhouette of the Statue of Liberty. Edison continued the tradition of Benjamin Franklin; his words of practical wisdom made the same kind of appeal. "Everything comes to him who hustles while he waits." "The first thing is to find out what everyone else knows and begin where they leave off." "I don't live with the past. I am living for today and tomorrow." "There is no expedient to which a man will not go to avoid the real labor of thinking." And, of course, his famous definition of genius as "1 per cent inspiration and 99 per cent perspira-



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
Sarah Bernhardt Records Her Voice in an 1892 Model Graphophone

tion." Edison said he averaged twenty hours of work a day for fifteen years. "Lack of sleep never hurt anybody," he declared. "Nearly every man who develops a new idea works it up to a point where it looks impossible, and then gets discouraged. That's not the place to get discouraged, that's the place to get interested."


Nobody praised or promoted Edison until after he had made his own way. Yet he did not feel that he had overcome insuperable handicaps or that America had not given him a chance. Just the opposite. And the same kind of opportunity still awaited the same kind of talent after the turn of the century, although Edison's success had not made the way of the inventor any easier. While the American press glorified American progress, it scoffed at many of the newer inventions. Even in

THERE'S NO TELLING WHERE IT WILL STOP


COPYRIGHT, 1897, BY KEEPLER & SCHWARTZMAN



Why should n't business-men enjoy a little spin while dictating to their typewriters?



Bicycle hair-cutting establishments ought to do a rushing business with wheeling enthusiasts.



The old style of sprinkling-carts will soon be superseded by something more popular.



What the President's hand-shaking receptions will soon develop into, at the rate the bicycle craze is growing.



Cooks could, as well as not, get a little wheeling exercise while chopping hash.



The next thing that train-boys will offer to railroad travelers.

BETTMANN ARCHIVE


The Bicycle Craze at the Turn of the Century: Cartoons by F. Oppen

1904 the driver of the newfangled "horseless buggy" had to face the ridicule of his fellow citizens as well as the hazards of dusty, rough roads, temperamental motors, and uncertain tires. Clad in long duster coat, cap, goggles, and gauntlet gloves, he had to put up with the mocking cry of "Get a horse," and sometimes came in for physical abuse as well if—as often happened—he killed a chicken or caused a nervous horse to break its traces and run away. Obviously, the future did not belong to the automobile but to the bicycle and the electric streetcar.

While the reality of the automobile aroused the public to alternating fits of merriment and rage, the possibility that men could fly excited still wilder emotions. Nevertheless, Congress had appropriated one hundred thousand dollars—a large sum in those days—to experiment with "flying machines," the money going to the solvent Smithsonian Institution and its learned Professor Samuel Langley. During the fall of 1903 Langley made two attempts to catapult the model of an "aerodrome" that he had designed off the deck of a ship and across the Potomac River. Twice his model plummeted to the river bottom as the press and public jeered. After the second futile attempt on December 8, 1903, Ambrose Bierce—one of the leading journalists of the day—commented, "I don't know how much larger Professor Langley's machine is than his flying model was—about large enough, I think, to require an atmosphere a little denser than the intelligence of one scientist and not quite so dense as that of two."

Eight days after the second Langley fiasco, a couple of bicycle mechanics quietly succeeded where the orthodox scientist had spectacularly failed. Wilbur and Orville Wright, the sons of a Dayton, Ohio, minister, put a gasoline engine and two propellers into a glider with which they had experimented for five years and made it fly one hundred and twenty feet in twelve seconds. Only three newspapers in the country carried the news the next day, and another five years passed before the Wrights received official recognition and substantial support.

The Wright brothers' story was as American as Edison's. Their father had awakened in them the same intellectual interests that Edison's mother had awakened in him. They had set themselves up in their own little bicycle shop, where they tinkered with gasoline engines and read everything they could get their hands on dealing with the possibilities of heavier-than-air flight. In 1900 they began experimenting with home-made gliders above the windy, open sands of Kittyhawk, North Carolina. After spending three years and a few thousand dollars, they at last put together a homemade glider and a homemade engine. The companies that made engines for automobiles would not build an engine to the Wrights' specifications for fear their customers would consider them crazy. The Wrights' first experimental wind tunnel measured eighteen




BETTMANN ARCHIVE

One of the Many Early Flying Machines That Never Got off the Ground. The designer: Hiram Maxim. The year: 1895

inches long and looked like a cornstarch box. The one they finally used measured six feet long and an electric fan provided the wind.

Like Edison, the Wrights wanted practical results; they had no more interest than Edison in making money. Like him, they obtained these results after years of patient effort. But even though they succeeded while still in their middle thirties, the public ignored them. When the first demonstration for newspapermen failed in May, 1904, most of the correspondents left, although during that year the Wrights flew a total of forty-five minutes, including two flights of five minutes each. The brothers had to wait another two years before either the Aero Club or the *Scientific American* gave them official credit. It seemed that the country that had far surpassed the rest of the world in the field of applied science failed to recognize its own revolutionary contribution to the new century, even going so far as to deny the national faith in material progress.

Here is a possible explanation. During the third of a century between the Civil War and the war with Spain, the American people had tamed the Wild West, built a continental network of railways, and developed scores of new industries and thousands of new inventions and mechanical processes. They had no time, no energy, to develop new attitudes toward life as well. Just the opposite, in fact. The press of new



AL ME

The Only Photograph of the Wright Brothers' First Flight. Orville Wright lies at the controls; Wilbur Wright has just released the end of one wing

problems caused them to draw what comfort and understanding they could from their traditional beliefs. Thus, pioneer families of old Yankee or Southern stock clung to the practices of their ancestors; many European immigrants also clung to the old ways of the Old World.

Hence the contrast between belief and behavior, the time lag between twentieth-century practice and eighteenth-century theory. Hence the blatant hypocrisy of the new-rich who found the force of inertia highly profitable, as they quoted Scripture to justify their depredations. Moreover, this minority found a formidable ally in the older generation which also tended to cherish traditional ways, though from quite different motives. Whereas the older generation feared change, the privileged few did not want their position challenged. Both groups wanted to preserve the *status quo*: the well-to-do because they liked things exactly as they were, the older generation because it had already adapted itself to more than enough change for one lifetime. In these circumstances how could those Americans who did not yet know in 1903 that the automobile age had already begun possibly see that the new age of flight had just arrived?

SUMMING UP

THE UNITED STATES showed signs of both maturity and strength during Theodore Roosevelt's first three years in the White House. Humane sentiment came to the fore in the popular revulsion against repression in the Philippines. Moderate Republicans prepared to make amends for the actions of their extremist colleagues. But when it came to safeguarding the Western Hemisphere by building a canal at Panama, the extremists—with President Roosevelt in the lead—carried the day. Perhaps the vital interests of the United States did not extend clear across the Pacific Ocean; they certainly reached beyond the Rio Grande. With this expansion of American power came an expansion of the American mind. American writers and American readers showed a new interest in American themes. Historical romances and sentimental tales still won the widest audiences, but a new school of realism had begun to develop, too. Journalists challenged things as they were, and President Roosevelt soon denounced them for going too far. But the country as a whole still had a long way to go. It still ignored its scientific pioneers until they had come to the top through their own efforts, often against heavy odds. It had not yet begun to learn its own strength or to know what that strength could mean.

War Between Russia and Japan

Some of the biggest battles in history usher in the twentieth century as an Asiatic nation, for the first time, challenges and defeats one of the major European powers.

PREVIEW

WITH THE backing of their British allies, the Japanese made their bid to become a world power by challenging Russian predominance in East Asia. Although the fighting did not go quite so well as Japan's leaders had hoped, they proved themselves superior to the Russians on land and sea. By the summer of 1905, after the war had lasted eighteen months, everybody wanted it to end, and President Roosevelt took credit for summoning the Portsmouth Peace Conference, although financial pressure from Britain played an equally important role. The peace terms proved surprisingly easy on the Russians and some Japanese began to wonder if war really paid.

• I •

DURING the early 1900's the implications of empire were causing more concern in the United States than the implications of the automobile and the airplane. The same drive for export markets and outlets for surplus capital that made the war with Spain so appealing to American expansionists now attracted attention to North China and Manchuria. These regions had come to depend on the United States for kerosene, flour, and textiles. The Massachusetts cotton mills were expanding their exports to Manchuria, and in 1903 Senator Lodge wrote President Roosevelt: "I have been thinking a great deal about Manchuria. Our trade there is assuming very large proportions, and it seems to me we ought to take very strong grounds." Lodge was alluding to the refusal of the Russians to withdraw their troops from certain Manchurian cities under the terms of the Boxer indemnity agreement with China. He therefore suggested to Roosevelt that the United States "unite with England and Japan in protest." Secretary Hay, however, wrote the

President: "I am sure you will think it is out of the question that we should adopt any scheme of concerted action with England and Japan. Public opinion in this country would not support such a course, nor do I think it would be to our permanent advantage." This time Roosevelt did not take Lodge's advice.

Korea seemed important, too. America's stake in North China and Manchuria took the form of trade. America's stake in Korea took the form of investments, which surpassed those of any European country. American capital and American equipment had built Korea's first railroad, its streetcar lines, public-utility plants, and telephone installations. Americans owned the most productive mines in the country. But the whole expanse of the Pacific Ocean separated Korea and the United States; only three hundred miles of water separated Korea and Japan. Moreover, the extension of Russian power into Manchuria convinced the leaders of Japan that they must establish themselves in Korea or find themselves confined to their own overcrowded, barren island home.

In January, 1904, the American Minister at the Korean capital of Seoul—who, incidentally, had no liking for the Japanese—advised the State Department: "Korea should belong to Japan by right of ancient conquest and tradition. I think our Government will make a mistake if it tries to have Japan simply continue this fiction of independence." In other words, he was suggesting that the State Department give tacit support to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which already recognized Japan's special position in Korea.

The Russians, against whom the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was originally directed, remained aggressive as ever. After the suppression of the Boxer uprising in 1900 they tightened their hold on Manchuria, strengthened their bonds with China, and extended their influence into Korea. In 1901 they organized the Yalu Lumber Company to exploit the forests on the farther side of the Yalu River, which divides South Manchuria from Korea. The Japanese regarded this as a threat to Korean independence and pressed the Koreans to force the Russians out. But the Russians had already bribed Korea's Emperor.

In 1903 Russia's pacific Count Witte and Prince Ito, the leader of the Japanese moderates, tried to reach a peaceful settlement. Witte opposed any further Russian expansion, especially by force of arms. Ito hoped to avoid war. But the Kaiser kept pressing the all-too-willing Tsar to give the expansionists their heads while the British backed Baron Katsura, leader of the war party in Japan. In August, 1903, the Tsar created a new post, Viceroy of the Far East, to which he appointed Admiral Alexeiev, a leading expansionist, making him responsible only to the throne. Yet the Tsar informed the Kaiser at the same time that

there could be no war with Japan—for what seemed to him the sufficient reason that he did not want war at that time.

The fatuous Tsar and his exuberant Viceroy decided on a "forward" policy in both Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese, posing as the friends of Chinese and Korean independence, then reopened negotiations with the Russians during the closing weeks of 1903. But Baron Katsura had already taken charge in Japan. At the end of January, 1904, with negotiations still in progress, the Japanese prepared to land troops in Korea. On February 3 the Russians resorted to bluff and ordered their squadron in Port Arthur to put to sea. When this news reached Tokyo the next day, the Japanese broke off negotiations and ordered their fleet to sail from its home base of Sasebo to the Korean coast.

Meanwhile, the Russian squadron had returned to Port Arthur, where it was discovered by the Japanese, who began shelling the Russians at long range on the night of February 8 without warning or any declaration of war. The attack did little damage but threw the Russians into a panic. The Japanese failed to follow up their advantage and withdrew. The next day, still without a declaration of war, the Japanese landed an additional fifteen hundred men on the Korean mainland, twenty-six miles south of Seoul. At the same time Japanese naval vessels sank two small Russian warships in the Korean port of Chemulpo. On February 10 both Governments declared war.

At the moment the war broke out, Japan enjoyed every advantage. The Russians had less than one hundred thousand soldiers in the Far East—half of them in the Port Arthur garrison, the other half guarding sixteen hundred miles of railway, four hundred miles of seacoast, and the one-hundred-mile boundary between Korea and Manchuria on the Yalu River. Russian naval strength in the Far East consisted of two squadrons, one at Port Arthur, the other at Vladivostok. But the Port Arthur squadron had made itself the laughing stock of the Far East during the summer of 1903, when its vessels could not get up steam simultaneously and maneuver as a unit.

Against these forces the Japanese pitted their entire British-trained Navy and a Prussian-trained Army of three hundred and fifty thousand men equipped to fight on the Asiatic mainland. The Japanese could not hope to break the full power of Russia. They could, however, hope to break Russia's hold on Manchuria and Korea by striking swiftly, suddenly, and overwhelmingly at those two regions. This they lacked the daring to do. Their Navy did not follow up its surprise attack of February 8 on Port Arthur, but waited a week and then sent a few torpedo boats that inflicted only minor damage. Two weeks later the Japanese tried to block the harbor entrance by sinking several concrete-laden



Japan and Russia Fought Here: The area in which all the land and sea battles of the Russo-Japanese War occurred

vessels there, but they could not get in close enough to do a thorough job.

In Korea the Japanese Army moved slowly, and against Manchuria it did not move at all. Japanese troops did not begin landing in force in Korea until February 15, and it took them another three months to bring the country under control, although the Koreans at first welcomed their arrival. The cold February weather ruled out any landing on Manchuria's unguarded coastline. The Japanese had thus given the Russians three months to pour troops into Manchuria, across the Chinese Eastern Railway.


Overprudence does not, perhaps, win wars, but insufficient preparation loses them. The Japanese declared war on Russia convinced that they could not be too prudent or too well prepared. Russia had cheated

them of the spoils of their victory over China ten years before, and their leaders felt they must settle that score by gambling everything on quick victory. A long-drawn-out war would exhaust their limited resources and might even bring most of Europe into the fight against them.

Yet the Japanese could not have chosen a weaker adversary. The centers of Russian power lay far from Manchuria and Korea. A war with Japan would stir no popular enthusiasm among the Tsar's sullen subjects. The Russians could count on little support from the native Koreans, Manchurians, or near-by Chinese, all of whom regarded them as alien intruders, and not fellow Asiatics, like the Japanese. Finally, the Japanese had their alliance with the British, whereas the Russians stood alone.

In Russia, only the Government and the armed forces concerned themselves seriously with the war. "It is not our war," the people said. "It is the Government's affair." The Russian Army had some brave and able officers, but most of their commanders—especially those in the lower ranks—stood apart from their men. They delegated authority to the noncommissioned officers and looked upon the war as a kind of glorified maneuver that would exterminate the presumptuous little Japanese monkeys. But as soon as the Russian and Japanese troops faced one another, it became apparent that the Japanese had the more modern military machine. The lumbering, illiterate Russian soldier wore clumsy boots, too big for comfort. His long coat and trousers tripped him when he walked. He fought and died stoically, but without the patriotic fervor of the Japanese, who believed he was fighting for a national glory that transcended his personal fate. This Japanese soldier wore carefully fitted shoes, tight leggings, a snug, warm, dark-blue uniform, and a neat little visored cap. He carried his water in a light aluminum canteen, and his pack weighed forty pounds. The bigger Russian used an unsanitary iron-bound wooden water bottle and carried a sixty-pound pack. The Japanese Army advanced only twelve miles a day, but all its supplies and artillery moved at the same rate of speed. The Japanese lived on fish and rice, of which he always had enough. The Russian, accustomed to a heavier diet, often got nothing at all.

The rulers of Japan attached as much importance to securing the good will of the outside world as they did to sustaining the morale of their own people and their own troops. They made it possible, therefore, for American, British, and European war correspondents to accompany their armies in the field. No Japanese investment ever paid such rich dividends. The world press carried vivid, sympathetic accounts of the war from behind the Japanese lines, written by leading journalists. The American, Frederick Palmer, who had seen and ad-



ACME

Japanese Artillery outside Port Arthur

mired the correct deportment of the Japanese troops at Peking in 1900, wrote this description of the Japanese in Korea, four years later, for the benefit of the readers of *Collier's Weekly*:

"Wherever you see a blue figure on the landscape, it is Japanese, wherever you see a white figure, it is Korean. The Korean never washes his body and only washes his clothes occasionally. You are in a land of coolies and corrupt officials. All spend most of the time in the street. The race itself is characterless, listless, without color. Through the mass rides one little Japanese artilleryman or walks one little Japanese infantryman, and the natives look at him with a kind of stupid, pre-occupied curiosity. The smart visitor in uniform came only yesterday, clearing the seas first of a European enemy. He could almost walk under the arm of one of the big Koreans who erectly, patronizingly, saunter the street's length and back again, pipe in hand. Yet he could clear the town by lifting his finger. Giving way to the masterful race, the native, not making even the feint of resistance, still retains that stupidly impassive dignity: 'Let the Japanese come! We still wear white and do our hair up in knots on top of our heads, and thus you see we will lose nothing.'"

Late in February, 1904, a week after their troops began to arrive in force, the Japanese Government ordered the Korean Government to conclude an alliance whereby Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and Korea subordinated its foreign policy to Japan's. Meanwhile, the battered Russian squadron at Port Arthur had begun to pull itself together under its vigorous new commander, Admiral Makarov, who

might have taken the offensive had he not lost his life when his flagship hit a floating mine in April. Before his death, however, he made Port Arthur a formidable fortress once again, and the Russian and Japanese armies had yet to meet.

• II •

THEY CLASHED on April 29, when fifty thousand Japanese troops in northern Korea broke through the Russian defenses along the Yalu River and penetrated Manchuria. It took the Japanese two days to cross the river. On the third, they met their first serious Russian resistance. The Japanese had learned well from their German teachers. First came the well-aimed fire of the Japanese artillery directed against the Russian-held hills above the Yalu.

Frederick Palmer, who witnessed the action, described the effect of shrapnel fire: "There is nothing in our everyday life comparable with shrapnel fire except lightning; it is the nearest thing to it that a human being can produce, and it has the same awful theatricalism. As few men are killed by shellfire, so few are killed by lightning. The souging of the fragments of a shrapnel are those of the wind through a telegraph wire multiplied a thousand times and raised to a high key. It sometimes seems to a recruit like a file-tined fork scooping out his stomach and scraping the vertebrae of his backbone. Such are his feelings then that his legs will not lift him out of his trench or, if they will, they carry him to the rear."

But neither the Russians nor the Japanese gave ground before the shrapnel. The Russians who survived the shellfire remained in their trenches, and the Japanese charged in mass formation, Prussian-style, with an added refinement of their own. The first men to reach the Russian trenches would toss aside their guns and impale themselves on the bayonets of the Russian defenders so firmly that the Russians could not get their bayonets loose in time to fight off the next wave of Japanese, who proceeded to butcher the Russians as systematically as those who had gone before sacrificed themselves. The Japanese had fused Western military science with Eastern fatalism—a combination that proved too much for the Russians, who slowly and steadily fell back.

President Theodore Roosevelt and King Edward VII gloated over the early Japanese successes—perhaps because Anglo-American money helped to sustain the Japanese war effort. "I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory," Roosevelt wrote Hay in February, 1904, "for Japan is playing our game." Two months later, shortly before the Battle of the Yalu, he predicted, "The Japanese will whip them handsomely." King Edward wrote to Chancellor Bülow: "The Japanese are

a brave, chivalrous, and intelligent people—every bit as intelligent as Europeans from whom nothing except the color of their skin distinguishes them. It would be regrettable if fear of the Yellow Peril which does not even exist were to influence German policy in any anti-Japanese direction.”

The other land battles followed roughly the same pattern as the Battle of the Yalu, with the Russian foot soldier proving himself once again the most stubborn defensive fighter in the world. By early May the Japanese found themselves in position to take their two chief objectives, Port Arthur and Mukden. As long as the Russians maintained a naval squadron and a military garrison at Port Arthur, they controlled the Liaotung Peninsula. And as long as they held the South Manchurian city of Mukden they possessed a railroad center through which they poured men and supplies across Siberia to fight the Japanese. The Port Arthur squadron finally disintegrated after a futile sortie in August, 1904, although Port Arthur itself remained in Russian hands. At the same time, the Japanese forced the Korean Government to sign a second treaty putting its finances, its armed forces, and its diplomatic representatives under Japanese control. At this point, President Roosevelt



UNDERWOOD

Two Russian Soldiers Survey Their Dead Comrades outside Port Arthur



UNDERWOOD

Port Arthur Surrenders. Japanese soldiers take over an outdoor fort from the Russians

issued his first, vain appeal to the Russians and Japanese to make peace.

The Russian squadron at Vladivostok had made a little trouble for Japanese shipping during the summer months, and in October the Russians decided to send their Baltic Fleet to challenge Japan's control of Far Eastern waters. The Japanese had no trouble sending men and supplies to the mainland, but they paid a stiff price for their victories in the land fighting, and it was not until January 1, 1905, that General Stoessel, the commander of the Russian garrison at Port Arthur, surrendered. This marked the turning point of the war, even more in the psychological than in the military sense.

Japanese losses at Port Arthur totaled ninety-two thousand—killed, wounded, and sick. The Russians had not run out of food or ammunition, and half their original garrison of nearly fifty thousand men could still fight. General Stoessel, however, violated his own country's Articles of War when he overrode almost his entire staff and insisted on giving up. The siege of Port Arthur had become a running sore to the Japanese, and if the fortress had held out even a few weeks longer the war might

have ended quite differently. As it was, the fall of Port Arthur gave the Japanese the entire Liaotung Peninsula and enabled them to throw their expeditionary force of more than six hundred thousand men against Mukden.


Late in February the series of battles that finally led to the fall of Mukden began. Almost a million men took part: Russian losses totaled nearly one hundred thousand men; Japanese losses came to about half that number. The scale of the fighting in Manchuria far surpassed the scale of the fighting around Port Arthur. It made the Boer War look like a boy-scout operation. This was large-scale warfare—Napoleonic in scope, but with weapons far more deadly than those used by the soldiers of Napoleon's time or even by the men who fought at Gettysburg in 1863 or at Sedan in 1870. Moreover, the Japanese in the Battle of Mukden left no doubt about their superiority over the Russians.

The last major battle of the Russo-Japanese War took place at sea. On May 27, 1905, Russia's Baltic Fleet arrived at the Tsushima Straits, leading into the Sea of Japan, after an unlucky journey. In the North Sea the nervous Russians had mistaken a group of British fishing smacks for Japanese men-of-war and had opened fire on them, sinking one vessel and killing several British fishermen. For a few days war with England almost threatened, but the dispute went to an arbitration court as the Russian Baltic Fleet slowly made its way to the Far East,



UNDERWOOD

Japanese Infantrymen Await a Russian Cavalry Attack in Manchuria



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Japanese Officers Question Russian Prisoners in Manchuria. From a popular Japanese lithograph

stopping at French ports for fuel and supplies. At Madagascar it learned of the fall of Port Arthur and almost turned back in despair, but finally decided to wait for reinforcements. When the Russian fleet finally arrived at the Tsushima Straits, almost six months later, Admiral Togo, the wily Japanese commander, had concentrated his vessels in home waters. Admiral Rozhdestvenski, the bold but unlucky Russian commander, then accepted battle on Togo's terms. It took the Japanese an afternoon and a night to sink or capture almost the entire Russian fleet, and with that fleet went the Russians' last chance of cutting the shipping lanes on which some three-quarters of a million Japanese soldiers depended for their supplies.

From this point on, Russian naval power ceased to exist in the Pacific Ocean and could not revive again for an indefinite period. The Japanese had also driven the Russians from Korea and from the Liaotung Peninsula as completely as they had driven them from the Pacific. Although the Japanese had won temporary control over South Manchuria as well, Russian troops still poured across the Trans-Siberian, and even after the fall of Mukden the Russians had an army of nine hundred thousand men willing and able to continue the war against three-quarters of a million Japanese. European Russia was another story. There the military and naval disasters and generations of corruption and



ACME

Admiral Togo, the Victor at Tsushima Straits. A photograph taken in later life

oppression had led to revolutionary outbreaks that seemed to threaten the whole Tsarist regime.

The Japanese Army, according to its Surgeon General, had suffered 632,690 casualties of all kinds, but he never did reveal how many of these had lost their lives. The war had also cost the Japanese Government a round billion dollars, 90 per cent of which it had borrowed from Britain and the United States at interest rates ranging from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 per cent. More than half of all the taxes collected in Japan went to pay for the cost of the war. Before the Japanese attacked they had calculated that three hundred and fifty thousand of their troops could drive the

Russians from Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and South Manchuria within the space of a year. It had taken more than twice as many men half again as long—and they still had not finished the job. In July, 1905, the Japanese had to move troops from their garrisons on Formosa to occupy the southern half of Sakhalin Island. At this point, outside forces intervened. Within another month Russia and Japan had made peace.

• III •

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR disclosed several new aspects of the new century. A new major power had arisen in Asia and had defeated one of the major powers of Europe in a series of large-scale land and sea battles. But in spite of Japan's unbroken record of victories, in spite of the terrible losses the Russians suffered, the war went on so long that the victorious Japanese almost wore themselves out winning. Was it all worth while? Further, if the more advanced nations of Europe ever went to war, they would inflict far greater damage on one another.

The course of the Russo-Japanese War revealed the final logic of imperialism. Both the Japanese and Russian Empires had long since committed themselves to expand, and nearly all the fighting, except the final, almost bloodless Japanese conquest of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, took place hundreds of miles from either Japanese or

Russian soil. The Japanese sought markets for their factory products, raw materials for their industries, outlets for surplus population, cheap labor to exploit, and—above all else—security from attack. The Russians also wanted more prosperity and more security, in the form of warm-water ports, railroad connections with the principal oceans, and adjoining real estate. The spirit of imperialism inspired the leaders of both Russia and Japan, a spirit that has been described as “the love of another man’s country and the determination to grab it.” Or, as Mr. Dooley put it: “Hands across the sea and into someone else’s pocket.”

Neither the Russian nor the Japanese leaders could have let themselves go so far without support from abroad. Prime Minister Balfour had no philosophic doubts about the benefits of a Russo-Japanese War to the British Empire. Neither had the British and American bankers who helped to finance the Japanese war effort. In like manner, Russia could not have remained in the fighting without loans from France. Briefly, the bankers had everything under control, and by the summer of 1905 they and the political leaders of Britain and France concluded that enough was enough and that the war should end. The British moved first. Their alliance with Japan still had two years to run, but on August 12, 1905, British and Japanese diplomats in London announced that it had been extended for ten years on a wider basis. Japan agreed to help defend British interests in India as well as in China. Britain agreed to recognize “Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea.”

The original Anglo-Japanese Alliance made it politically possible for Japan to fight Russia. Anglo-American loans then made the war financially possible. The new Anglo-Japanese Alliance recognized Japan’s conquest of Korea, but at the same time the British stopped lending the Japanese money and warned them to make peace. Japan’s military and naval leaders welcomed the proposal. During the spring and summer of 1905 they had visited the fighting zones and on their return to Tokyo urged the Cabinet to make peace. The condition of Russia caused still greater concern among French leaders, who regarded Russia, primarily, as a make-weight against Germany and feared that continued warfare in Asia would dangerously weaken Russian power in Europe. The French therefore warned the Russians that unless they, too, made peace they could expect no more loans.

Although the British and French pulled the strings behind the scenes, Theodore Roosevelt and the Kaiser enjoyed the illusion that they had arranged everything. Neither man wanted his own country involved, but neither man could resist the urge to play a dramatic personal role. It was unthinkable that Germany’s supreme War Lord and America’s Colonel of the Rough Riders should have to sit out this great conflict.



UNDERWOOD

Japanese Soldiers and Civilians Gather in Manchuria to Celebrate the Peace

From the day the fighting began, their conduct provided a welcome spectacle of comic relief. Like two small boys who had managed to sneak behind the scenes of a serious dramatic performance, they kept rushing from the wings, making faces, gestures, and noises at each other, at members of the cast, and—whenever possible—at the audience. But the cream of the jest was reserved for the finale, when they convinced themselves that they had rung down the curtain and imposed their own solution on the drama.

As soon as the Russo-Japanese War began, Roosevelt and Hay had sent a circular to the two belligerents, reasserting the Open Door doctrine and inviting them both to respect “the neutrality of China and in all practicable ways her administrative entity.” They then informed the other powers that the Russians had sent a “responsive” reply and that the Japanese had promised “adherence” to their proposal. Six days after Roosevelt had sent out this circular he boasted to his friend Elihu Root, “Yes, it was on the suggestion of ‘Bill the Kaiser’ that we sent out the note on the neutrality of China. But the insertion of the word ‘entity’ was ours.”

A year later Roosevelt had convinced himself—and tried to convince

his British friend Spring-Rice—that he had played a bolder, more belligerent role. “I notified Germany and France,” Roosevelt wrote Spring-Rice on July 24, 1905, “in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a combination against Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany, and France did to her in 1894 [he meant 1895], I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf. I, of course, knew that your Government would act in the same way, and thought it best that I should have no consultation with your people before announcing my own purpose.”

Once again Roosevelt qualified for membership in his own Ananias Club. The truth was that he sent no such message to the Germans or the French. The truth was that “Bill the Kaiser” wanted to partition all of Manchuria and part of North China with the Tsar, at the same time gaining concessions from Russia in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and along the route of the projected Berlin-Bagdad Railway. But the Kaiser could not openly advocate this, or any other policy. His motives were too suspect. He therefore played upon Roosevelt’s vanity by suggesting that the President call for the neutralization of China and the separation of Manchuria from the rest of the country.

The Kaiser approached Roosevelt through his Ambassador to Washington, Baron Speck von Sternburg, whom Roosevelt had nicknamed “Specky” and admitted to the select company of his “Tennis Cabinet.” But Secretary of State Hay, although ignorant of the Kaiser’s real motives, jumped at the opportunity to invoke his own Open Door doctrine and persuaded Roosevelt to emphasize that China remained an “entity”—including Manchuria. At the time, Roosevelt credited the Kaiser with taking the initiative and described him as “the only man I understand and who understands me.”

As the war continued, however, both the Kaiser and Roosevelt became increasingly concerned. At first, the Kaiser and Bülow and Holstein congratulated themselves that Britain had not lured them into fighting Russia in Europe as Japan had obviously been lured into fighting Russia in Asia. But the Japanese victories and the Russian defeats sent the Kaiser off on several tangents. His fears of the Yellow Peril revived. He also recognized—gradually, reluctantly, but clearly—that the Tsar had overreached himself. By the time Port Arthur had fallen, the Kaiser saw the war leading to the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty and to the eventual collapse of other imperial houses, including, perhaps, his own. The Kaiser had originally egged the Tsar on. Now he wondered how to call him off.

Early in 1905 the Tsar’s brother, Grand Duke Michael, told the Kaiser in Berlin, “It ought to stop. The condition of the country is so disturbed that my brother should be able to give it his entire attention. But the

difficulty is how to bring it about." The Kaiser replied, "England cannot do it because she is the ally of Japan. France can't because Japan will not have it, as she is your ally. There remains the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt. He is a man of his word, active, of high ideals, and will have the confidence of the Japanese, who also fear America and your brother."

Only a few months before this, Roosevelt had suggested to the Kaiser that they jointly sponsor, after the war, a Japanese protectorate over Korea and the appointment—"by Germany, *not* England"—of a Chinese viceroy over Manchuria. "The noble gentleman," commented the Kaiser, "seems to intend to horn in on world politics." At the same time Bülow informed the Kaiser, "The President is a great admirer of Your Majesty and would like to rule the world hand in hand with Your Majesty, regarding himself as something in the nature of an American counterpart of Your Majesty." The Kaiser had once pointed out that "Teddy is quite a dilettante in his opinions and conclusions"—a judgment that applied no less accurately to the Kaiser himself. In like manner Roosevelt found the Kaiser "jumpy and nervous" and could not understand why so many people described him in the same way. "They say the Emperor and I are alike," said Roosevelt, "and have a great admiration for each other on that account. I do admire him, very much as I would a grizzly bear."

Roosevelt did, however, possess two priceless assets the Kaiser lacked: courage and a sense of humor. Roosevelt had disciplined and built up his weak constitution. Although born to wealth and social position, he had made his own way through his own efforts. His grin had become his trade-mark. He enjoyed life. The Kaiser, on the other hand, never rose above the infirmity of his withered arm, and in spite of his royal blood showed all the uneasiness of the *nouveau riche*. He rarely laughed—least of all at himself.

Life never seemed better to Roosevelt than in 1905. During the evening of March 3, as he waited impatiently for his Inauguration Day to dawn, Roosevelt told a few of his old friends, "Tomorrow I shall come into office in my own right. Then watch out for me." Three months later—just after the Japanese naval victory at Tsushima—Roosevelt proposed to the Japanese and Russian Governments that they send emissaries to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to make peace and offered his services as chairman. The Japanese welcomed the prospect, and the peace proposals they submitted seemed reasonable to the Russians to whom the President passed them on.


Roosevelt still admired Japanese efficiency, but he was beginning to see that the Russians had their virtues, too. At the time he made his arbitration offer he wrote Lodge, "As for Japan, she has risen with

simply marvelous rapidity and she is a formidable power from the industrial as from the military standpoint. She is a great civilized nation, though her civilization is in some respects not like ours." But Roosevelt had his misgivings, which he expressed at the same time in the same letter: "While for the rest of us Russia's triumph would have been a blow to civilization, her destruction as an Asiatic power would also in my opinion be unfortunate. It is best that she should be left face to face with Japan so that each may have a moderating influence on the other."

As he was unburdening himself in these terms to his old friend, Roosevelt dispatched his newer friend, Secretary of War Taft, on a special mission to Japan. Ostensibly Taft was revisiting his old stamping grounds in the Philippines, which he had recently left to join Roosevelt's Cabinet. The real purpose of his visit, however, was to drop in on Prime Minister Katsura, leader of the Japanese war party, and sign a secret "agreed memorandum" whereby the United States approved Japan's "suzerainty over" Korea in exchange for a Japanese promise to keep hands off the Philippines. The United States thus became a silent, limited partner to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and although Taft brought back no formal treaty, the Roosevelt administration had put itself on record to work with the Japanese "for the maintenance of peace in the Far East."

The Portsmouth Conference opened on August 9, three days before the British and Japanese announced their new alliance. It took the delegates only two weeks to come to terms. The Russians gave up the southern half of Sakhalin Island and surrendered all their privileges on China's Liaotung Peninsula to the Japanese. They agreed to withdraw entirely from the rest of Manchuria—which also belonged, technically, to China—and they recognized Japanese predominance in Korea. Japan had won, but at the expense of China and Korea, not at the expense of Russia, for the treaty did not require the Russians to pay a single yen in reparations. The treaty also included the customary acknowledgment of China's independence.

The outcome of the Portsmouth Conference looked, at the moment, like a diplomatic victory for Russia as sweeping as any of the military and naval victories of the Japanese. The Russians still controlled twelve hundred miles of Manchurian railways as compared with four hundred and fifty miles in Japanese hands. Russian troops still occupied three hundred thousand square miles of Manchuria; the Japanese only sixty thousand. In some ways the Russians held stronger positions in East Asia when the war ended than when it began. They had stopped over-extending themselves. The war had hit Russia hardest at home—but that is another chapter.



UNDERWOOD

*President Roosevelt and the Russian and Japanese Peace Envoys at Portsmouth.
Count Witte stands at the far left*

The announcement of the peace terms produced such a stunning effect inside Japan that for several days the press withheld comment. Within a week, however, the storm broke. The war had hit every family in Japan. Many had lost their only breadwinners. All felt the pinch of higher prices, heavier taxes, lower living standards. Because the Japanese people had been led to believe that they would all benefit from the glorious, costly victories of their armies, riots broke out everywhere. The Japanese vented most of their rage not on their Russian enemies nor on their British allies, whose financial pressure had ended the war, but on the Americans who had undertaken the thankless task of arbitration at Portsmouth. On September 6, 1905, Japanese mobs burned four American churches in Tokyo, and the United States Legation had to be placed under guard. To Roosevelt these riots appeared "ominous" and reconciled him to the fact that the Japanese had received no reparations.

The rulers of Japan, however, had their people under control and knew they had not done too badly. They had their alliance with England and their agreement with the United States. They had gained

their first substantial foothold on the Asiatic mainland. They had defeated a major European power and had thereby gained unique prestige among some Asiatic peoples and had fired others with similar nationalist ambitions. They had won precious experience, too—difficult to measure, perhaps, but difficult also to underestimate. What they had lost was best expressed by a Japanese diplomat in London who told one of his British colleagues: “We used to be a nation of artists; our art was really very good. You called us barbarians then. Now our art is not so good as it was, but we have learned to kill, and you call us civilized.”

SUMMING UP

THROUGHOUT the Russo-Japanese War, the eyes of the world were concentrated on Japan. Most of the best reporting came from the Japanese side of the lines. So did all the victories. The Japanese had entered the war in the position of underdog; before peace came, the admiration they aroused had begun to turn to misgiving and even to fear—fear of this new major power that had suddenly emerged in Asia, fear that Asia itself might challenge or destroy Europe’s world leadership. The unexpected, not the inevitable, had happened. Little Japan had defeated enormous Russia; Asia had routed Europe; the new century had opened with war, not peace, and the war had ended with threats of revolution. The rulers of Japan had no difficulty quelling the riots that followed the Peace of Portsmouth. The rulers of Russia faced the much more difficult task of quelling the outbreaks of revolution that had begun even before the war itself had ended.

The Russian Revolution of 1905

*The first major war of the new century gives rise
to the first major attempt at revolution. This time
the old order survives.*

PREVIEW

LESS THAN A YEAR after the Russo-Japanese War began, the Russian people were demonstrating for democracy. They had to resort to violence to get any concessions from the Tsar, and even then he practiced deceit and delay. As the war against Japan went from bad to worse, the Tsar made more and more concessions—on paper. Finally, after he announced the terms of the Peace of Portsmouth, a general strike tied up his Empire. He at once guaranteed the civil rights of all citizens and summoned the Duma, or Parliament, to draw up a new Constitution. His apparent willingness to compromise split the revolutionaries, and his aggressive soldiers and police finished the job. The St. Petersburg and Moscow Soviets of Workers failed to seize power, and most of their leaders were killed or exiled. Before the Duma finally met in May, 1906, Premier Witte, hero of the Peace of Portsmouth, got the credits he needed from France and England. Two months later the Tsar sent its members about their business and ordered new elections. He appointed a strong and loyal Premier in the person of P. A. Stolypin and appeared to have ridden out the storm.

• I •

VICTORY exposed Japan to new dangers abroad. The riots that followed the Peace of Portsmouth soon subsided, but the imperialist appetite came with the eating. A bloodless revolution at the top had committed Japan to a program of expansion. The rulers had little difficulty keeping the masses in line: having established themselves in Korea and South Manchuria, the Japanese closed ranks at home in order to continue the perilous but profitable course to which they found themselves committed abroad. Their conquests in Asia had opened new opportunities and imposed new burdens. They had routed the Russians, but their

success had stirred up suspicion and fear as well as praise and admiration abroad.

Defeat exposed Russia to new dangers at home. The riots that preceded the Peace of Portsmouth gathered strength, and presently Tsarist oppression gave rise to bloody revolution. The Tsar had put General Kuropatkin, his War Minister and ablest military leader, in charge of the Russian armies in the Far East, but had subordinated him to the much less competent Admiral Alexeiev. This division of command doomed the Russian war effort in advance. With the people apathetic and the commanders divided against themselves, disaster had to follow.

Less than six months after the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, an assassin killed General Bobrikov, the Russian Governor of Finland; a few weeks later another assassin killed Vyacheslav Plehve, the blood-stained, all-powerful Minister of the Interior. In late November, 1904, representatives of the *zemstvos*, or county councils, poured into St. Petersburg from all parts of the Empire and held a three-day meeting at which they adopted an eleven-point program calling for a democratic Constitution and local self-government for national minorities. Because the moderate men from the *zemstvos* threatened no violence, the Tsar ignored their pleas for a peaceful revolution.

Two months later riots broke out in the capital. On January 19 a cannon ball fired by mutinous soldiers in the Fortress of Peter and Paul ripped a hole in the wall of the Tsar's Winter Palace just across the Neva River. Nicholas at once quit St. Petersburg, not to return for more than a year. At the same time, one hundred thousand workers in the great Putilov arms factory went out on strike. Three days later Father Gapon, a bewildered Orthodox priest with a flair for organization, led a popular demonstration to the very palace the Tsar had already abandoned. Not knowing that the Tsar had fled, Father Gapon carried with him a pathetic petition. "We workmen come to you for truth and protection," it began. "We have reached the extreme limits of endurance." The petition asked the Tsar to "direct that elections for a constituent assembly be held by a general secret ballot." It called upon him to "throw down the wall that separates you from your people." And one prophetic sentence read, "If you do not reply to our prayer, we will die in this square before your palace." Perhaps the fact that Father Gapon had been in the pay of the Tsar's secret police accounted for this prescience.

Some two hundred thousand men, women, and children dressed in their Sunday best marched behind Father Gapon, singing "God Save the Tsar." As they entered the square before the palace, soldiers opened fire, killing hundreds and wounding thousands of the demonstrators. The next morning Father Gapon, who was among the wounded, an-



SOVfoto

Cossacks Attack a Workers' Demonstration before the Tsar's Winter Palace in January, 1905. From a contemporary painting

nounced, "There is no Tsar now. Innocent blood has flowed between him and the people." Sporadic revolts broke out all over the Empire. Peasants, crazed with vodka, burned the barns and houses of their landlords. Revolutionists in the cities built flimsy barricades, piled snow and poured water over them, and stuck red flags into the frozen forts they had thus made. When soldiers tore them down the revolutionaries opened fire from the adjoining houses, which the soldiers then attacked, often killing innocent people after the revolutionaries had escaped. National minorities demonstrated for autonomy. Schoolboys went on strike against compulsory courses in Greek, while the nobility continued to divide its time between bear hunts and court balls.

On February 17, 1905, the Tsar's cruel and degenerate uncle, Grand Duke Serge, Governor General of Moscow, was blown to bits by an assassin's bomb. Even the moderate reformers who had avoided violence expressed no regret or disapproval, and on March 3 the Tsar issued a frightened imperial rescript from his country estate at Tsarskoe Selo, promising to summon a constitutional convention. At once the reformers got busy, drafting model constitutions and organizing the convention that the Tsar had promised.

Councils, or soviets, of all kinds sprung up and they, too, elected representatives. Professor Milyukov, one of the most respected liberal leaders, worked for a Union of Councils, or Supreme Soviet, of professional and industrial workers who had little representation in the zemstvos. But the reformers were not moving fast enough. In July

mutiny broke out in the Black Sea Fleet after officers had shot down a sailor on the cruiser *Potemkin* for presuming to present a list of grievances. The sailors took over the vessel, killed their officers, and ravaged the Black Sea coast for several days before permitting themselves to be interned in Rumania.

Meanwhile, on June 19, a delegation headed by the respected, aristocratic Prince Trubetzkoj presented a list of moderate demands to the Tsar. At first the Tsar appeared irritated. Trubetzkoj then talked to him, like a kindly uncle to a flighty child. The Tsar's face suddenly cleared. "Throw aside your doubts," the Tsar declared, "my will, the will of the Tsar, to call together the representatives from the people is unchangeable." The Tsar agreed to permit a Duma of four hundred and twelve members, drawn from all parts of the Empire, to meet before the first of the year and submit its proposals to the Council of State, which might, if it approved, then lay them before the Tsar. It was at this juncture that the Tsar also ordered his diplomats to make peace with Japan at once.

Count Witte, who headed the Russian delegation to Portsmouth, returned a national hero. This self-made opportunist had put himself over with the American press as a great liberal. The fact that he came of mixed German and Armenian descent and that his wife had some Jewish ancestors perhaps made it easier for him to convince many Americans that the Tsarist regime would stop encouraging pogroms. Witte also had a good reputation with foreigners generally, and since Russia needed money, the Tsar needed Witte to convince these foreigners—especially the French and their British allies—that his country remained a good financial risk. Thus although Witte could not win over the reformers or restrain the reactionaries, he found himself promoted to the Premiership when he returned from the United States.

The Russian masses had already traveled so far along the road to revolution that they paid little attention to the Tsar's announcement of the final peace terms with Japan on October 14. No foreign armies had invaded Russian soil. Professional soldiers and sailors had done most of the fighting. Living costs, however, had increased, and the more radical labor leaders even welcomed Japan's victory because it weakened the Tsar and revealed his incompetence. The Tsar, in turn, had summoned Count Witte, who had not identified himself with the war party, and Count Witte did not let his sovereign down.

On October 21, when the railway workers throughout the country went on strike and demanded an immediate constitutional convention and universal suffrage, Witte told one of their delegations, "A Constituent Assembly is for the present impossible. Universal suffrage

would, in fact, only give pre-eminence to the richest classes because they could influence all the voting by their money." He concluded: "There is not in the entire world a single cultivated man who is in favor of universal suffrage." On October 26 the Council of Labor Delegates in St. Petersburg issued a general-strike call throughout Russia, and about one million workers responded. Rail transportation had already stopped. All city life now came to a standstill. Meanwhile, the peasants, unable to move their products to the cities, regarded the strikers as their enemies.

It took just four days for the general strike to bring the Tsar around. On October 30 he issued a manifesto calling upon his Government "to grant to our people the immutable foundations of civil liberty, based on real inviolability of person, and freedom of conscience, speech, and association." He promised the election of a Parliament, or Duma, by all the people, and declared that all laws must receive its approval. The manifesto produced the desired results. At home, it split the reformers and revolutionaries. Abroad, it confirmed Count Witte's reassurances and prestige. On November 8 the Central Strike Committee in St. Petersburg reluctantly ordered all workers back to their jobs. Too many Russians had taken the Tsar at his word to justify continuation of the strike. The next day some of the sailors at Kronstadt mutinied—unsuccessfully. This gave the Government courage to violate the Tsar's manifesto by proclaiming martial law in Poland. On November 14 the Central Strike Committee ordered a resumption of the general strike, but had to call it off a week later. The revolutionaries had failed. Tsarism had survived.

• II •

THE TSAR'S MANIFESTO marked the turning point in the Russian Revolution of 1905. The Liberal British journalist Henry W. Nevinson, who arrived in Moscow at the end of November, 1905, and described his experiences in *Dawn in Russia*, said that the Tsar's advisers outlined their strategy in some such words as these: "The first thing is to secure the Army, by promises of better food and pay. Having secured the Army, you may goad the people to open resistance by attacking them without warning. When they rise up, it will be easy to stamp them down, and under the excuse of their violent revolution, you can silence the press, you can close the meetings, you can shoot or imprison the leaders, you can choke the voice of freedom in troublesome districts like Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and the Caucasus. By controlling the elections, you can secure exactly the kind of Duma you want. You may then appeal to Europe to admire both your power and

your progress, and all Europe will join in applause. The chorus of journalists which used to sing 'The Dawn of Freedom' will chant warnings of rebellion and the triumph of order over chaos. Your object will then be gained, for you can obtain the money that is the one thing needful for your existence. England will again recognize your credit. France will contribute the interest on her own loans, and Germany will recognize a government endued with just about as much liberty as William likes."

Soon after Nevinson arrived in Russia he visited Tolstoy and quoted him as follows: "The present movement in Russia is not a riot; it is not even a revolution. It is the end of an age. And the age that is ending is the age of Empires—the collection of smaller states under one large state. There is no true community of heart or thought between Russia, Finland, Poland, the Caucasus, and all our other states and races. Or what have Hungary, Bohemia, and Styria, or the Tyrol to do with Austria? No more than Canada, Australia, India, or Ireland have to do with England. People are beginning to see the absurdity of these things, and in the end people are reasonable. That is why the age of Empires is passing away."

Tolstoy, then in his seventy-seventh year, did not speak for any of the political parties that had done so much to organize the 1905 Revolution. Most of the original impetus had come from the middle classes—professional people, businessmen, and students. They knew little about the problems of the industrial workers or the peasants. They did know that the nobility and the bureaucracy held a virtual monopoly of power and privilege and had thus kept Russia weak and backward. The middle-class reformers, supporting the same kind of program that the Liberal Party supported in Great Britain, organized the Constitutional Democrats—or Kadets—and hoped to dominate the Duma.

Other parties appealed to rank-and-file peasants and workers. The Social Revolutionaries had the largest potential following because they appealed to the peasants, who had more and longer grievances than any other class in Russia. The growing minority of increasingly militant industrial workers belonged to the Social Democratic Party, which split into two factions after the turn of the century. Kadets, Social Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats had all suffered exile in Siberia because of their political beliefs. Nearly all these men and women belonged to the educated classes. In the 1905 uprisings, however, hundreds of thousands of rank-and-file workers took direct political action for the first time in Russian history. Most of their leaders still came from the intelligentsia, but at last these leaders had begun to attract a mass following. Maxim Gorky, whose plays and novels about the common people of Russia had already won him international fame, financed one of the



BROWN BROTHERS

After the 1905 Revolution. Count Leo Tolstoy (center) with William Jennings Bryan, at his right, in 1906 at Tolstoy's estate


most influential Social Democratic newspapers in St. Petersburg and frequently contributed to its columns. The woman who later became his wife served as its editor.

The Social Democrats led the most effective and violent opposition to the Tsar. They had no faith in his promises or in his projected Duma. In mid-November they felt the tide had turned against them and that they must make a last, desperate effort to seize power. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities they established local workers' councils or soviets that formed provisional governments over limited areas. The Moscow Soviet made a stronger bid for power and suffered more than the St. Petersburg Soviet at the hands of the soldiers and the police. The revolutionaries put light barricades across the streets, about thirty yards apart, not as defenses but as obstacles to the advancing soldiers, who cautiously proceeded down a street until revolutionaries fired revolvers at them from either side at close range. As the revolutionaries escaped from back doors and down alleys, the soldiers shot in all directions, killing innocent people, and then demolished the buildings with light artillery. In Moscow alone some ten thousand persons lost their lives in the course of several weeks' fighting, and damage to houses was estimated at fifty million dollars. But the Government finally brought St. Petersburg, Moscow, and all the other cities under control. It also

eliminated most of the outstanding Social Democratic leaders by exiling them to Siberia.

Two younger revolutionaries did, however, live to fight another day. The St. Petersburg Soviet of workmen had chosen as one of its vice-presidents a twenty-six-year-old orator of unusual eloquence, born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, later known as Leon Trotsky. He had a handsome head, a great shock of black hair; he dressed almost as well as he spoke. The young man's father owned and worked a farm in the Ukraine; the boy had received a good education in Odessa and Nikolaev on the Black Sea, where he lived with relatives. He led his classes, excelled in mathematics, but interested himself more and more in history. Tsarist Russia offered few opportunities, even to the most brilliant young men of Jewish origin, and young Bronstein decided to make a career of revolution. He assimilated and accepted Marxism and tried, without much success, to bring the rival factions of the Social Democratic Party together. He knew the history, languages, and peoples of Europe—Odessa was a cosmopolitan city—and he enjoyed the dangerous life. But his intellectual pride made him seem to some of his comrades like a one-man revolution.

After the defeat of the St. Petersburg Soviet, Witte sentenced Trotsky to solitary confinement for a year and to Siberia for life. Although Siberia sounded grim, the political prisoners sent there did not have too



SOV FOTO

Street Fighting in the Russian Revolution of 1905. From a painting by I. Vladimirov

hard a time of it. They got a small cash allowance from the Government, boarded with peasants, visited one another freely, and received literature from the outside world. Many devoted themselves to reading and writing as they served out their terms. The impatient Trotsky, however, soon escaped and presently turned up in London.

Here he was made welcome by a still obscure but already legendary figure who had taken the name of Lenin after the River Lena near which he had spent three years of Siberian exile. Although nine years older than Trotsky, Lenin played a less conspicuous and important part in the 1905 Revolution. He worked behind the scenes of the St. Petersburg Soviet and the subsequent uprising in Moscow. He had few of Trotsky's gifts as a popular journalist or orator, but in power of mind and personality he stood alone. His opinions, expressed in letters or articles, carried weight among other revolutionaries. Nobody else gave such violent, extreme expression to the fears and hopes of the rising generation of Marxists.

The fall of Port Arthur, for instance, stimulated him to this outburst: "Progressive, advanced Asia has dealt backward, reactionary Europe an irreparable blow. Ten years ago, this reactionary Europe, with Russia at the head, was made uneasy by the crushing of China by Japan, and it united to deprive Japan of the fruits of its victory. Europe defended its prior and primal right, sanctified by the centuries, to the exploitation of the Asiatic peoples. The blow against Port Arthur by Japan is a blow against the whole of reactionary Europe. Not the Russian people but absolutism has suffered a shameful defeat. The Russian people have won by the defeat of absolutism. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of Tsarism."

Six months later a young Social Democrat from Lenin's native province asked him what he thought the Russian masses should do. "What is to be done?" Lenin replied, "One thing—an armed uprising, an immediate armed uprising." The young Socialist asked what Lenin thought of the chance of victory. "Victory?" Lenin turned on his visitor, "What do we care about victory?" And then he elaborated:

"We do not live by illusions. Tell that to the comrades in my name. We are sober realists. Let no one believe we shall necessarily win. We are still very weak, but this is by no means a question of victory alone. We want the uprising to shake the foundations of the autocracy and set the broad masses into motion. Our task will then be to attract the broad masses to our cause. That is the main point. The uprising is what matters. Talk that 'we can't win' and therefore don't need the uprising is the talk of cowards with whom we must have no relations."

Lenin and Trotsky regarded the Duma as worse than a waste of time. Its real purpose, they believed, was to delude the masses and strengthen

reaction. At the same time they did recognize that the Duma represented a concession, on the part of the Tsar, to the forces of revolution. The Social Democrats therefore prepared to send delegates to the Duma for the purpose of embarrassing the Tsar and spreading their own propaganda. Witte supported the Duma for the same reasons that Lenin and Trotsky opposed it. He hoped that the moderate Octobrist Party, which had split off from the Kadets in October, 1905, would give the Duma a conservative character.

In April, 1906, Witte had achieved his greatest triumph. Knowing that the Kadets outnumbered the Octobrists and might make trouble, he succeeded, a month before the Duma opened, in floating the biggest foreign loan that any nation had ever raised up to that time. The Tsar's promises of moderate constitutional reform and the fear of still further trouble if this program failed persuaded a group of French and English bankers to lend the Russian Government two and a quarter billion francs—or close to half a billion dollars—at 6 per cent interest. The Tsar had liquidated the Japanese war. He had restored order at home. Witte's loan gave him the wherewithal to pull his country through a difficult period. Georges Clemenceau, editor of the radical Paris newspaper *L'Aurore*, spoke for a substantial section of French opinion when he wrote at the time: "After having furnished the Tsar with the financial resources which were destined to lead to his defeat abroad, it now remains for us to supply him with the financial resources to assure his victory over his own people."

Once Witte had arranged for the loan, his usefulness ended. He had proved an able administrator and an accomplished diplomat, with many excellent personal qualities, but little popular support and no political flair. The Tsar therefore replaced him with the more conservative Goremykin, a lazy aristocrat of the old school "with a sleepy face and Piccadilly whiskers"—Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador, recorded—who spent most of his time "reclining on a sofa reading French novels." He said of the Duma, "Let them babble. The Government alone knows the country."

• III •

THE DUMA met in the Tsar's Winter Palace in the afternoon of May 10, 1906. The Tsar himself greeted the elected representatives of the Russian people in the presence of the court and the foreign diplomatic corps, reading an opening address from a canopy-covered stage at the end of a long ballroom, with triple-decked chandeliers hanging overhead. George von L. Meyer, the United States Ambassador to Russia, wrote this eye-witness description of the affair in his diary: "The entire

left side of the hall was occupied by members of the Duma and they were peasants, shopkeepers, priests, merchants, lawyers, even a dentist and a Catholic bishop. Perhaps a third were in dress suits, half a dozen in uniform, and many in simple peasant costume and rough clothes. All this made a strange contrast with the officers in their silver or gold-lace uniforms, members of the Council with decorations, and members of the court. On one side were the representatives of the people and on the other those of the bureaucracy, past and present. Those on the right had shown themselves unequal to the task of satisfactorily governing the nation. Would the left be equal to the occasion? Judging simply from appearances, it was not encouraging. It would have been interesting to compare them with the Assembly of Louis XVI."

The members of the Duma did not applaud the Tsar's perfunctory address. Few of them showed any outward sign of respect. The Kadets, who dominated the Duma, at once sounded off with utopian slogans and impossible demands, calling for universal suffrage, suppression of the Imperial Council, establishment of parliamentary government, and expropriation of landlords. The Octobrists suggested only that the Duma become the lower house of a new Parliament and that the upper house consist of the members of the Imperial Council, half of whom the people would elect and half of whom the Tsar would appoint. The Duma had brought together all kinds of people, who mingled freely, jostling one another at the long tables where they wrote letters home or in the near-by courtyard where they shared meals. When some young women, agitating for the vote, approached one of the peasants he said, "We'll fix that for you, but let us get on our feet first and then we'll get you some rights." And another peasant exclaimed, with plaintive good nature, "Even without rights, the Jews are on top of us."

Neither the Tsarist Government which had created the Duma nor the Kadets who dominated it knew what to do next. Premier Goremykin paid the Duma as little attention as possible, and the Duma returned the compliment. P. A. Stolypin, the forty-three-year-old Minister of the Interior, soon asserted himself as the strong man in the Goremykin Government. Sir Arthur Nicolson judged him "a great man . . . the most notable figure in Europe." Tall, erect, impeccably dressed, firm of manner and loud of voice, he alone of all the Tsar's Ministers silenced the Duma by force of will. Believing that the recent revolutionary outbreaks threatened to ruin the country, he favored gradual reform. "His own ideal," wrote Nicolson, "was the British Constitution, but it was impossible to cast Russia at once into that mold."

Both the Kadets and the Social Revolutionaries made things as hard as they could for Stolypin. The Kadets spent all their time talking and passing generous resolutions, but they came forward with no clear,

agreed-upon program. The Social Revolutionaries systematically made trouble inside the Duma and out. The assassination rate for Tsarist officials rose sharply during the month of June. "For the moment," declared Stolypin, as he prepared to take stronger action, "the Government must govern." He anticipated a peasant uprising by autumn, and in the meanwhile one of the Black Hundred bands massacred more Jews at Bialystok. Foreign governments and Jewish organizations abroad protested. On July 22 the Tsar ordered the Duma dissolved and appointed Stolypin Premier. The members of the Duma, finding the doors of the Winter Palace in which they had met locked against them, assembled in the near-by Finnish city of Viborg and issued a manifesto urging passive resistance. More mutinies broke out and a general strike call followed on August 3, but within two days the Government had restored order and the different groups within the Duma had fallen out among themselves. Moreover, the Tsar had ordered elections for a new Duma which would assemble the following March. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, England's newly installed Liberal Prime Minister, summed up the feelings of the democratic world when he wound up a speech before the House of Commons with the words, "*La Douma est morte; vive la Douma!*"

SUMMING UP

JAPAN could not have defeated Russia if the Japanese masses had not supported their leaders to the death. The Russian masses did not support the war, and only a few thousand revolutionaries were prepared to fight their own Tsar to the death. As for the Tsar, because he feared his own people more than he feared the Japanese, he lost the war and crushed the revolution. His regime had survived military defeat and social upheaval. He had made some surface concessions to the democratic spirit of the time without, however, weakening the foundations of his own rule. Yet the events of 1905 did mark a turning point in Russian history. For the first time organized, industrial workers had acted together against the regime in large numbers. They depended on middle-class intellectuals to lead them, and these middle-class intellectuals no longer stood alone. If the peasant majority had made common cause with the workers and middle classes, the Tsar might well have lost his throne.

The Triple Entente Is Born

How German blunders led, first, to a strengthening of the Anglo-French Entente and then to closer Anglo-Russian ties as well.

PREVIEW

THE EFFECTS of the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution in Russia soon made themselves felt in Europe. The rulers of Germany took advantage of Russia's momentary weakness to try to break up the Anglo-French Entente. The Kaiser played an unwilling part in helping Bülow force Foreign Minister Delcassé of France from office and then overplayed his hand by letting himself in for a general European conference on the future of Morocco. The Kaiser's abortive effort to make a personal alliance with the Tsar misfired just before German diplomacy fumbled the Morocco crisis. The net result of these maneuvers was to tighten the bonds between England and France and to put the anti-German Clemenceau at the head of the French Government. The Liberals had just defeated the Conservatives in Britain's general election, and the new Government began to work out secret military arrangements with the French and signed a new treaty with Russia.

• I •

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY had opened with a bang. Within five years it had witnessed some of the greatest battles in history and the most serious revolutionary outbreaks since 1848. Once again the masses had gone into action. By mobilizing all their people, the rulers of Japan had created a new major power in the Far East. Three-quarters of a million Japanese soldiers had landed on the Asiatic mainland, prepared to die for their Emperor. Japan had no elite troops like Germany's Death's-Head Hussars, Britain's Coldstream Guards, or Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. Every Japanese outfit was a crack outfit. All fought with the same fanatical devotion. And the workers, peasants, and women at home supported the war with equal enthusiasm.

The Japanese had shown that strong leadership plus wide mass support could work miracles. The Russians proved the opposite proposition. They showed that without mass support no government can ever maintain order at home, much less win victories abroad. It was perfectly true that the Russian delegation had come back from the Portsmouth Conference with surprisingly easy terms. It was perfectly true that the Tsarist regime crushed the 1905 uprisings and made meager concessions. Yet the loss of the war to Japan, which had weakened Russia at home and abroad, gave rise to a series of violent diplomatic shocks in Europe. The rulers of Europe, unlike the rulers of Japan and Russia, did not fear their popular masses. They saw no immediate danger of revolution. They did not contemplate war in the near future. They continued to play the old game according to the old rules, but they recognized that mass action in other countries had changed the European balance of power—for the moment, at any rate—to Germany's advantage.

Russia's diplomats had made more advance preparations than Russia's military and naval leaders had made for warfare with Japan. Back in 1897 the Russian and Austrian Governments had agreed to work together to preserve the *status quo* in Southeast Europe. In 1902 Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria signed a military agreement with the Tsar putting himself under Russian protection against the Triple Alliance. The next year the Kingdom of Serbia also swung into the Russian orbit when a group of young officers broke into the palace at Belgrade, hacked King Alexander and Queen Draga to pieces with their swords, and put the pro-Russian Peter Karageorgevich on the throne. Neither the Austrians nor the Russians showed any interest in Alexander's fate. Both congratulated Peter on his succession.

Austria's Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski—a hearty and realistic Pole—had no ambitions in the Balkans. Taking the impending collapse of the Turkish Empire for granted, he hoped only to delay the inevitable. In October, 1903, when the Tsar visited Francis Joseph in Vienna, they renewed their pledges to work together in the Balkans and asked the Sultan of Turkey to grant reforms to his Christian subjects in Macedonia. The Russians, anticipating trouble in the Far East, wanted to insure themselves against trouble elsewhere.

They had already straightened out their affairs with Germany. Count Lamsdorf, the Russian Foreign Minister, saw at once what Bülow did not: that the German rejection of an understanding with England had weakened Germany's position in the world and had sent Anglo-German relations into a decline. The sly Lamsdorf then tried to make more trouble for the Germans by inviting Bülow to join him in an offer to mediate the Boer War and to join Russia and France in a common front

against Britain and Japan in the Far East. For once, Bülow's and Holstein's suspicions served them well. They turned both Russian proposals down. Whereupon the Kaiser gratified the Russians by giving the Tsar his personal assurance that Germany would protect Russia's Western frontier if war broke out in Asia. The Kaiser had visions of Russia drawing France into a defensive alliance and thus led the infatuated Bülow to praise him as "the soundest pillar of peace in the world and the best card in our political game."

In February, 1902, Bülow had welcomed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as "the one gleam of light" in the darkness that was settling over Germany. He hoped that closer relations between England and Japan would cause strained relations between England and Russia and enable Germany to hold the balance of power between them. But he had his worries. The Triple Alliance expired during the summer of 1902, and Italy's young King Victor Emmanuel wanted closer ties with France and England. The Italians therefore proposed three changes in the Triple Alliance. They wanted to add a clause stating that "Italy had undertaken no engagements that could prove dangerous to France." They wanted the Austrians to renounce any further claims upon the Balkans. They wanted recognition of their right—a recognition the French had already secretly granted—to take over Tripoli from Turkey. Since the Germans and Austrians stood firm, the Italians finally gave in only to reassure the French secretly that the renewal of the Triple Alliance did not imply any threat against them.

Two years later, shortly after the outbreak of war in the Far East, Count von Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff, informed Bülow that Russia could not possibly fight two wars, one in Europe and one in Asia, at the same time. "If the necessity of war with France should present itself," said Schlieffen, "the present moment would undoubtedly be favorable." But the Kaiser still banked on a Russian victory over Japan and Bülow did not want war with anybody. He hoped to take advantage of Russia's difficulties in Asia to humiliate France and weaken the Entente with England.

He had an issue. In 1904 Foreign Minister Delcassé of France had neglected to ask Germany to approve the new order his country was establishing in Morocco. Delcassé had thus violated the Madrid Convention of 1880 whereby all the major European powers, and the United States, had recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and guaranteed equal privileges to all foreign interests there. Until the spring of 1905, however, Bülow had shown no concern for the fate of Morocco, and the Kaiser had told both Edward VII of England and Alfonso XIII of Spain that Germany had no interest whatsoever in Morocco. Nevertheless, Bülow and Holstein tried to use the Moroccan

question to weaken the Anglo-French Entente and to force Delcassé either to make commercial concessions to Germany in Morocco or to resign.


Early in 1905 Bülow urged the Kaiser to take time out during his springtime cruise through Mediterranean waters to stop at the Moroccan port of Tangier and assure the Sultan that he considered him an independent sovereign and did not recognize any special French privileges. The Kaiser pointed out that he had repeatedly given assurances that Germany had no interest in Morocco and that the gesture Bülow proposed would serve only to drive the French and British closer together. The egregious Holstein, still dazed by the Anglo-French Entente, refused to recognize his own miscalculations. "We can," he coolly declared, "take it for granted that British diplomatic support as provided by Article 9 of the Agreement will remain purely platonic." The Kaiser, who had fewer illusions than Holstein about the importance of the Anglo-French Entente, was more impressed by Bülow's assurance that Delcassé was sweating blood and could be driven from the French Foreign Office by this one simple gesture. That vain, irresolute monarch, dazzled by Bülow's picture of himself at the center of the world stage, consented to go through with the plan. Bülow, taking no chances with the Kaiser's mercurial temperament, at once informed the press of the impending imperial visit to Tangier, adding that Germany sought no selfish aims but was merely upholding the economic equality of all nations in Morocco.

As the imperial yacht approached Tangier, the imperial feet turned cold. The Kaiser tried to wriggle out of the visit, pointing out that he had no suitable horse to ride and that Tangier had no suitable landing facilities. When Bülow telegraphed back that any change of plans would look like retreat under French pressure, the Kaiser carried out his assignment and was, in fact, nearly thrown from his horse in the narrow streets of the town, after making a difficult landing in rough water. Diplomatically, the visit proved a success. The French chargé d'affaires at Tangier made an unexpected speech of welcome at the public reception in the Kaiser's honor and announced that France had no intention of infringing upon other nations' rights. The Kaiser coldly replied that he would deal with the Sultan directly, as one independent sovereign with another. This encouraged the Sultan to ask the German Foreign Office whether Germany would support him if he rejected any demands the French might make upon him, provided these demands were not also supported by a general European conference. Bülow replied in the affirmative and told members of the Foreign Service to answer no questions foreign diplomats might ask but to "emulate the Sphinx, who, surrounded by inquisitive tourists, gives nothing away."



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Good Neighbor—a German View. "Morocco is my neighbor; Morocco shall be mine."—Foreign Minister Delcassé of France



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

"Whom shall I call on next?" A cartoon of the Kaiser from Puck, 1905. A typical cartoon portraying the Kaiser as a war lord

Again, Bülow and Holstein misjudged foreign opinion. Bülow knew, Holstein knew, the Kaiser knew, the General Staff knew that Germany had no intention of launching an aggressive, preventive war on France. But large sections of the British and French publics did not know it and would not believe it. Although Germany may have sympathized with Russia during the early stages of the war against Japan, it had now become clear to the other powers that the Russian cause in Asia was hopeless and that Japan's victories made it impossible for the Russians to fulfill their treaty obligations to France and strike at Germany from the East if Germany struck at France from the West. The long silence of the German Foreign Office, after the announcement of the Anglo-French Entente, and now this sudden appearance of the Kaiser in Morocco—again followed by silence—led the British and French Governments to suspect the worst. The British did not believe war was imminent, but they did regard the Kaiser's visit to Tangier as a demonstration against their alliance with France and as the prelude to a demand for a German port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. And instead of weakening in their support of France, as Holstein had anticipated, they reacted as the Kaiser feared they would and assured Delcassé of "all the support in their power" to resist German claims for a Moroccan seaport.

By the time the report of this British assurance to France got back to the German Foreign Office it sounded like a British offer to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with France against Germany. But the

Germans also heard, through the unreliable channels of secret diplomacy, that Foreign Minister Delcassé had rejected the British offer. This looked like weakness on the French side, and Bülow followed up his imaginary advantage by demanding an international conference, which Delcassé had rejected, and informing Premier Rouvier of France "that so long as M. Delcassé remains in office there is no possibility of an improvement in Franco-German relations." Actually, Delcassé wanted to defy the Germans. He believed that Great Britain would aid France if Germany attacked and he favored running the risk of war. Rouvier then proposed a compromise: that France and Germany come to a bilateral agreement on the Moroccan question. But Bülow, having cast Germany in the role of defender of Moroccan independence, felt he could not sell out the Sultan of Morocco to France, even in exchange for the "compensations" he kept demanding. He therefore proposed a conference of all the powers that had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880. Rouvier capitulated and Delcassé resigned on June 5, 1905. Bülow then proposed that the conference discuss other matters, including the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. Rouvier had him there. Germany had demanded an international conference on the future of Morocco and that was what Germany would get—no more and no less. The time and place of the meeting remained to be set.

• II •

FOR THE SERVICES Bülow rendered at this time, the grateful Kaiser made him a Prince. But Bülow never told his sovereign about Rouvier's offer of a direct Franco-German agreement, and when the Kaiser first heard about it several years later he wrote, "If I had been told about this, I should have gone into it thoroughly and that idiotic conference would never have taken place." At the time, however, the Kaiser had an idiotic conference of his own on his hands. During the closing months of 1904 the Tsar had suggested to the Kaiser that their two countries sign a treaty. The Kaiser at once agreed, assuring him that he had kept the proposal a secret from everybody except Bülow. The Tsar then declared he would have to consult France first, whereupon the Kaiser warned him against "that Republic of miserable civilians."

Nothing came of the negotiations until the eve of the Portsmouth Peace Conference, the following year. In June, 1905, the Tsar and the Kaiser met, "as simple tourists" at the Finnish port of Bjorko. Here the Kaiser again raised the question of an alliance, saying that the agreement his Government had reached with France on Morocco would remove previous French objections to a Russo-German pact. In fact, he continued, he just happened to have in his pocket the draft of the agree-

ment they had discussed the year before. The two Emperors hustled into the private cabin of the Tsar's yacht, where the Tsar read the text of the proposed treaty several times. The heart of the document lay in the promise to "assist each other" against the attack of any third party, but the Tsar insisted on adding after "assist each other" the two words "in Europe," and the excited Kaiser agreed. But these two extra words compelled Germany to defend Russia's land and sea frontiers against a British attack in Europe while freeing Russia from any obligation to attack the British, where they were most vulnerable, in Asia. Only two men witnessed the signatures of the two Emperors: the German diplomatic envoy, von Tschirschky, who had not read it, and deaf old Admiral Birilev of the Tsar's personal suite, who did not understand it.

In asking the Tsar to put his name to the agreement, the Kaiser said, "It would be a very nice souvenir of our interview." Bülow took a far less sanguine view of the whole affair. When he read the text of the treaty he threatened to resign—partly because of genuine concern, partly in order to establish his own supremacy in the Government. His threat produced the desired effect upon the volatile Kaiser, who at once wrote: "The morning after the arrival of your letter of resignation would no longer find your Emperor alive. Think of my poor wife and children!" Bülow did not resign. The Kaiser did not commit suicide.

Russia's Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorf also exploded. He told the Tsar that the French would regard the treaty as a betrayal of their alliance. Consequently, the Tsar wrote the Kaiser that he would have to consult the French before the treaty could go into effect. The Kaiser replied, in a rage, "We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows." But both the German and the Russian Foreign Offices ignored the treaty and regarded each other with more suspicion than ever.

German negotiations with France concerning Morocco had gone much better. On September 28, 1905, the German Government recognized the right of the French and the Spaniards to begin organizing the Moroccan police, and the French agreed to submit the question of who should ultimately control Morocco to a conference of all the nations that had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880—this one to be held early in 1906 at the Spanish city of Algeciras.

The Kaiser's conference at Bjorko had led nowhere. The conference that Bülow then sponsored at Algeciras led to more harm than good—not only for Germany but for the rest of Europe. Ostensibly, the Algeciras Conference had two purposes: to set up an international bank to finance the development of Morocco and to reorganize the Moroccan police. Actually Bülow and Holstein planned to use the Algeciras Conference to test out the Anglo-French Entente. But Bülow recognized



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Algeiras Conference—a German View

the risk they ran. "Our main object," he wrote on November 23, 1905, "must of course be to see that we are not placed in a position of isolation. If in any question on which we have taken a stand we find all the others, or a majority of them, against us, then neither forcefulness nor threats will be of any use, as our position after all that has passed would be rather ridiculous."

Barely six weeks after the conference opened, on January 16, 1906, the German delegation found itself maneuvered into precisely the position that Bülow had hoped to avoid. There had been little trouble about agreement on the international bank, although the details took time. The Germans, however, decided to challenge the French demand for a police force under French and Spanish control and to insist on a police force under international control. Acting under orders from Holstein, Count Tattenbach—the less important and more offensive of the two German delegates—tried to convince Sir Arthur Nicolson, the chief British delegate, that French designs on Morocco endangered both Britain and Germany and that he should force the French to drop some of their demands for control of the police or assume responsibility for the failure of the conference. This infuriated Nicolson, who described Tattenbach as "really a horrid fellow, blustering, rude, and mendacious. The worst type of German I have ever met." Tattenbach's threatening attitude served only to drive Nicolson still closer to the French delega-

tion, whereupon the official German news agency printed a false account of the first few weeks' proceedings that the official French news agency denounced as "a lie."


Foreign opinion had not favored France when the conference opened, and Bülow and Holstein had counted on American, Russian, and Italian support in any case. But Nicolson had no difficulty persuading the kindly, bumbling Henry White who represented the United States that the French proposals to control the Moroccan police were more practical than the German because only the French and Spanish had North African possessions from which they could recruit loyal Moslems acceptable to the Moroccans. The Germans, knowing nothing of the American Constitution, had assumed that President Roosevelt would take a strong stand for the Open Door and oppose the French. But Roosevelt had no stomach for new foreign commitments that might require Senate approval. He wanted only to strike attitudes that yielded the maximum moral advantage at minimum cost. The Germans found the Italians even more disappointing. The secret Franco-Italian treaty that gave the French a free hand in Morocco and Italy a free hand in Tripoli put Italy in the French camp. And the Russians, still irritated by the Bjorko fiasco and eager to borrow money from London and Paris, resented German efforts to make trouble for the two countries best able to save them from bankruptcy.

Rebuffed at every turn, the Germans tried stalling for time. Sir Arthur Nicolson, heartened by the appearance of the combined Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets of the Royal Navy at Gibraltar, adroitly brought the conference to a showdown on March 3. On a matter of procedure, the Germans found themselves outvoted ten to three. Only the reluctant Austrians and the helpless Moroccans joined them in opposing Nicolson's motion to bring the question of the police to an early vote.

The Germans, seeing themselves isolated, prepared to retreat. Bülow turned against Holstein, took over the Algeciras negotiations, gagged the aggressive Tattenbach, and restored the more conciliatory Herr von Radowitz to command of the German delegation. Radowitz offered sweeping concessions to Nicolson, who was dejected when the French did not accept them. But the French knew—though they had concealed it from the British—that the vote of March 3 had reduced the German Government to panic.

On March 7 the French Cabinet of Premier Rouvier fell on a domestic issue, whereupon Bülow made a last-minute effort to take advantage of the sudden confusion. He informed all his Ambassadors that all the delegates at Algeciras, including Nicolson, opposed the French and that the Russians were coming over into the German camp. Again German diplomacy backfired. A new strong man emerged in France—

Georges Clemenceau, old-time radical, friend of England, defender of Dreyfus, opponent of Germany. As a result of purely domestic developments, Clemenceau took over the key Ministry of the Interior under the new figure-head Premier, Sarrien. Again the British and French Governments closed ranks, and a few days later Radowitz told Nicolson that a "conciliatory mood" had come over his chiefs in Berlin, who would yield to the French point of view on the Moroccan police in exchange for "compensations" elsewhere.



BROWN BROTHERS

Prince Bernhard von Bülow in His Court Uniform

The Act of Algeciras, signed on April 7, 1906, "In the name of God Almighty," gave the Sultan nominal control over a native police force, staffed by French and Spanish officers and noncommissioned officers and commanded by a Swiss Inspector General. A new State Bank of Morocco was also established under foreign control, with the Banks of England, France, Spain, and Germany occupying privileged positions. "Signatory Powers," the Act of Algeciras declared, "reserve to themselves the right to see that any concessions granted to foreign capital are not of a nature to weaken the control of the Moorish Government over important public services."

This account of the Algeciras Conference has served its purpose if it has shown how the classic diplomacy of Europe coped with the first major crisis of the new century. The German policy-makers on the spot and at Berlin displayed something worse than technical incompetence. Their personalities, their assumptions, their methods revealed an appalling misunderstanding of the kind of world in which they lived. It was only by comparison with the Germans that the British and French appeared either intelligent or humane. No less than the Germans, they underrated—if they did not ignore—the mass movements which the twentieth century had released. Everybody at Algeciras recognized that the Russo-Japanese War had changed the world balance of power. What everybody missed was the part that both the Japanese and the Russian masses had played, during and after the fighting.

In one respect the British and French statesmen displayed greater hypocrisy and more arrogance than the Germans. The Kaiser claimed

that he ruled by divine right and his officials therefore considered themselves accountable to him alone. The British and French statesmen, on the other hand, claimed that they represented their people. Nevertheless, before, during, and after the Algeciras Conference certain British and French military leaders and statesmen began to confer secretly and informally about possible joint action against Germany, including but not confining themselves to the defense of Belgium. King Edward expressed his version of what became the official British view when he told Ambassador Cambon of France: "Tell us what you wish on each point, and we will support you without restriction or reserve." The conversations started in 1905 while the Conservatives still held office in England and became more detailed after the Liberals came to power a few months later. And still only a handful of officials in the War, Admiralty, and Foreign Offices knew about them. Parliament and most members of both the Conservative and Liberal Cabinets remained quite in the dark. The general public, of course, heard nothing at all.

Not that the general public, even in the democracies, expected anything different. All their statesmen regarded their national sovereignty as absolute, and their people accepted secret diplomacy as they accepted their armies and navies. The Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath had revealed some of the dangers of secret diplomacy, of armies and navies, even of national sovereignty itself, but most of Europe's leaders either looked the other way or preferred to ignore the record that the new century had already written, in characters of blood and fire.

• III •

CERTAIN POLITICAL LEADERS in France and Britain—unlike the captains, the Kings, and the professional diplomats—gave some heed to the popular masses, and thus furthered the national interests of their countries, both at home and abroad. Chancellor Bülow, on the other hand, paid less attention to the popular masses in Germany or anywhere else, and lived to regret it. Soon after the Kaiser made him a Prince because he had driven Delcassé from the French Foreign Office, he found himself confronted with a far more formidable adversary. The sixty-five-year-old Clemenceau dominated the Cabinet as Delcassé had never dominated any Cabinet to which he ever belonged. Both men regarded Germany as their country's hereditary enemy; both men supported the Third Republic. But Delcassé had specialized in foreign affairs; his views became more and more militaristic; his zeal for democratic institutions flagged. Clemenceau, on the other hand, had devoted his whole life to fighting for the principles of the Third Republic; he

had supported Dreyfus; he had opposed lending money to Tsarist Russia. Not since Bismarck's time had Europe produced a statesman of Clemenceau's stature. None of his compatriots rivaled him. None of his contemporaries surpassed him. His white walrus mustache, his Mongolian brows and cheekbones, his short figure and massive, jutting head endeared him to cartoonists. All the anti-German, pro-Republican traditions of France achieved synthesis and fusion in the person of Clemenceau, who prepared to draw closer to England at a time of rising Franco-German tension.



UNDERWOOD

Georges Clemenceau

Even by 1906 Clemenceau had become a legendary figure. Back in 1858, when police jailed his father—a country doctor in the western province of Vendée—for alleged participation in an attempt on the life of Napoleon III the seventeen-year-old Clemenceau cried out, "I shall avenge you." His father uttered only one word, "Work," and Georges Clemenceau did just that. In 1860 he went to Paris to study medicine, and before he had taken his degree a pamphlet he had written against the Second Empire landed him in jail for a few weeks. In 1865 he left France for England, where he translated John Stuart Mill's study of August Comte into French. He then spent several years in the United States, teaching in a girls' school at Stamford, Connecticut, marrying a French wife, writing a book on the Civil War. In 1869 he returned to the Montmartre quarter of Paris, where he resumed the practice of medicine.

But Clemenceau could not stay out of politics for long. During the uprisings of 1870 he tried to bring the leaders of the Paris Commune and the leaders of the French Government together—without success—but he gained the respect and confidence of them all. For the next five years he played a leading part in the municipal affairs of Paris and from 1876 to 1893 sat in the Chamber of Deputies, talking Government after Government to death but never accepting a Cabinet post himself. In 1880 he founded his own newspaper, *La Justice*, and his enemies tried to identify him with some of the corrupt Republicans at the time of the Panama scandals and accused him likewise of acting as a British agent. From 1893 to 1902 Clemenceau devoted himself to political journalism,

writing for *L'Aurore* and coming forward as the first eminent *Dreyfusard*. Although he had demanded the abolition of the Senate, he accepted a seat in that body in 1902 and supported the Combes Ministry, still refusing to accept any Cabinet post until the fall of Rouvier in 1906.

As Minister of the Interior and guiding spirit of the new Government, Clemenceau showed himself as indomitable in office as in opposition. In the May, 1906, elections, the pro-Republican parties won more than four hundred seats in the new Chamber as compared with one hundred thirty for the Royalists, Bonapartists, and Nationalists. But since most of this overwhelming Republican majority feared organized labor and even opposed social legislation, Clemenceau did not hesitate to defy the Socialist minority and call out the Army, in his capacity as Minister of the Interior, to break a miners' strike. By October he had replaced Sarrien as Premier.

Another strong personality, in many ways the antithesis of Clemenceau, also accepted his first Cabinet post in the Sarrien Government. Conviction, temperament, and expediency had made Clemenceau, at sixty-five, a lifelong, one-man oppositionist. Aristide Briand, at forty-four, had always belonged to the Socialist Party, which forbade its members to hold office in bourgeois Cabinets. However, from the time he won his first election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1902 Briand had made himself an expert on ways and means of separating church and state. Sarrien therefore begged him to take a Cabinet post and write the text of the Separation Bill that all the parties of the left had advocated for years. When Briand accepted, the Socialists expelled him from their ranks—as they had expelled Millerand in 1899—and some anticlericals criticized the bill he finally prepared for its leniency toward the Church.

Under the Third Republic many other so-called "men of the left" followed Briand's course, but none had traveled so fast or so far. His parents had kept a small hotel in the Breton port of Saint-Nazaire. As a boy their son made the acquaintance of Jules Verne, who put him into one of his lesser-known books, *Two Years' Holiday*, under the name Briant, who "often finds himself at the foot of the class, though, when he wants to, with his great memory, he lifts himself to the first rank." The story concerns the shipwreck of a group of Australian students, of whom Briant becomes the leader because of his diplomatic skill, audacity, enterprise, and quickness at repartee.

Briand fulfilled the early promise that Jules Verne detected. Before he reached the age of twenty he went to Paris to study law, supporting himself by copying briefs for lawyers at night and finding time to attach himself to a group of writers and actors—Maupassant and Huysmans, Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt—who met once a week at a Latin

Quarter café. Returning to Saint-Nazaire, Briand organized a pro-labor weekly newspaper, *La Démocratie de l'Ouest*, and turned it into a daily. One of his diatribes against capitalism involved him in a lawsuit, but his legal training and native skill won his case and made his reputation. He became active as a labor organizer and got himself elected Town Councilor at the age of twenty-six on the Socialist ticket. Four years later, at the tenth annual Socialist Congress in Marseilles, Briand attracted national attention by arguing that the day of street fighting and barricades had passed and that the workers should rely on the general strike rather than on revolution.

He moved to Paris, where he supported himself as a journalist and joined the *Dreyfusards*. He continued to stress the importance of the general strike and on one occasion he told a Socialist Congress, "Go and fight with spears, weapons, swords, pistols, muskets—not only will I not disapprove but I will consider it my duty to be among you."

In 1902, at the age of forty, Briand won his first election to the Chamber of Deputies, still as a member of the Socialist Party. Yet it took his expulsion from the Socialist Party and the passage of his law separating church and state to bring Briand into his own. When Clemenceau succeeded Sarrien as Prime Minister he retained Briand as Minister of Public Instruction and then promoted him to the Ministry of Justice. Briand's Law of Separation, commented Clemenceau, "took care of all eventualities except those that arose." Many a devout French soldier, with gun and fixed bayonet, found himself being ordered by his commanding officer to take inventory of church properties while the priest, in full vestments, stood at the door of the church forbidding him to enter. "No list of chandeliers is worth a soldier's life," declared Clemenceau, and all church properties were turned over to so-called Cultural Associations. Nevertheless, the Vatican objected and in 1908 a compromise was arranged assuring the Catholic Church continued ownership of its properties.

Unlike Clemenceau, who had never committed himself to the doc-



UNDERWOOD

Aristide Briand

trine or party of Socialism, Briand was regarded by many of his early comrades as a turncoat. Like Clemenceau, however, Briand kept the common touch and possessed the temperament of an artist, too. His deep, musical voice caused him to become known as "The Violincello" and cartoonists portrayed him as an animated musical instrument. Briand used to say he wanted to follow the sea, and he did indeed appear to have inherited from one of his seafaring ancestors a lifelong aversion to bathing. But his cultivated sloppiness made him look more like an actor than a sailor. He let his hair grow down over his elongated ears to his hunched, curving shoulders. His deep, blue eyes suggested a Celtic rather than a Latin temperament. He went in for sweeping mustaches, baggy, tweedy suits, battered hats, shapeless overcoats. A cigarette almost always adhered to his lower lip. "No progress can be achieved through violence," he now declared. But just as Clemenceau had used troops to crush a miners' strike shortly before he became Premier in 1906, so Briand, after he in his turn became Premier, also used force to break a still bigger railway strike in 1910.

Although strength of character made Clemenceau a man apart and artistic temperament characterized Briand, both men shared, in common with their contemporaries, an instinctive attachment to their country's culture. Not until after the turn of the new century did the Third Republic finally come of age, and Clemenceau and Briand moved with the chief intellectual and artistic currents of their time. The Dreyfus case had brought the leading writers and scholars of France out of their ivory towers and into the blood and sand of politics, while at the same time most of the politicians of the Third Republic also belonged to the republic of letters and the arts.

The *fin-de-siècle* French decadents who seemed, to Max Nordau, to herald the doom of Europe gave way to a more vigorous generation. Was it only an accident that Maurice Barrès, the most talented young disciple of the decadents, turned from self-conscious, experimental prose and verse to rabid nationalism and anti-Semitism? Did these new political cults hold out the same kind of appeal to the same kind of young men who formerly took to alcohol, drugs, and unnatural vice? The wider, growing middle-class public preferred Romain Rolland's *Jean Christophe*, that vigorous epic of an artist's development which enjoyed a vogue comparable to that of Goethe's *Sorrows of the Young Werther* more than a century before. Rolland, like Goethe, wrote as a European—he even chose a German as his hero—and the story of this hero seemed to thousands of young readers the allegory of their generation. The psychological novels of Paul Bourget won a wide public, and in Henri Bergson, a naturalized Frenchman born in Paris in 1859 of Anglo-Jewish parents, France produced a philosopher as vital and



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Romain Rolland



UNDERWOOD

Henri Bergson

positive as William James. Descartes had said, "I think; therefore I am." Bergson said, "I endure; therefore I am." He tried to bring scientific methods to the study of philosophy and devoted himself especially to the problem of time. Like James, however, he regarded intuition as a better guide than intelligence to the real nature of the universe. He wrote his masterpiece, *Creative Evolution*, in 1907, and originated the expression *élan vital*, or vital principle, which lay at the heart of his positive, optimistic view of the world. As a creative writer, however, Anatole France remained the master of them all as he turned from light satire to more serious, social themes.

French literature had not become complacent at the turn of the century; rather, it had become more vigorous and less rational. The same trend appeared in French painting. Cézanne and Gauguin had struck out in new directions. Matisse, Modigliani, and Picasso followed, and the public which had ignored Cézanne sat up and took notice of his disciples. Matisse made a more brilliant and original use of color. Whereas Gauguin had found inspiration in the South Seas, Modigliani found inspiration in the Negro art of Africa. And just as the Dutch-born van Gogh came to France to paint, so the Spanish-born Picasso made Paris his home. Cézanne and his followers became known as impressionists and postimpressionists, and presently still more schools developed—cubism, futurism, expressionism.

This signified two things. First, the accepted forms and conventional schools had suddenly fallen to pieces. New forms and new schools replaced them. Second, the public—at any rate the French public—responded. In Paris, if nowhere else, painters from all countries found a

community in which they could live and work. It was the same story with foreign composers and even foreign writers. The Paris of the Third Republic became, during the opening years of the twentieth century, the intellectual capital of the world. The French public welcomed even non-French writers—in translation, of course—and the works of Kipling, Tolstoy, and Ibsen sold widely. Paris had welcomed the operas of Wagner. It was soon to give Scriabin, Stravinsky, and the Russian ballet as cordial a reception. Architects, especially from the United States, studied at the Paris École des Beaux Arts. Indeed, Paris seemed more important than France and reflected not a single country but the civilization of Europe as a whole.

In 1909 the futurist movement, which included writers as well as artists and foreigners as well as Frenchmen, issued a manifesto from Paris: "The simultaneousness of states of mind in the work of art: that is the nature of our art," they proclaimed. "In painting a person on a balcony, seen from inside a room, we do not limit the scene to what the square frame of the window renders visible, but we try to render the sum total of visual sensations which the person on the balcony has experienced: the sun-bathed throng in the street, the double row of houses which stretch to right and left, the beflowered balconies, and so forth. This implies the simultaneousness of the ambient and therefore the dislocation and dismemberment of objects, the scattering and fusion of details, freed from accepted logic and independent of one another. In order to make the spectator live in the center of the picture, as we express it in our manifesto, the picture must be the synthesis of what one remembers and what one tells."

At the same time F. T. Marinetti, a leading Italian futurist, wrote: "We will sing the love of danger, the habit of energy and boldness. The essential elements of our poetry shall be courage, audacity, and rebellion. Literature has hitherto glorified thoughtful immobility, ecstasy, and sleep; we will extol aggressive movement, feverish insomnia, the double-quick step, the somersault, the box on the ear, fisticuffs. We declare that the splendor of the world has been enriched by a new beauty—speed."

The sciences, which had done so much to create the kind of world Marinetti celebrated, also bourgeoned on French soil. A Frenchman, Gottlieb Daimler, had developed an early internal-combustion engine in 1895. Fifteen years later the French automobile industry led the world. The Wright brothers found the first markets for their new flying machine in France. Santos-Dumont of Brazil, and Farnham, Britain's pioneer airman, had French mechanics build their planes in France. The Frenchman Blériot, flying a French plane, made the first flight across the English Channel.

The French owed their intellectual pre-eminence to their vigorous middle-class civilization. Although France had its cartels and its proletariat, its peasants and some few surviving aristocrats, the great middle class gave French civilization its special character during the early 1900's. This middle class still believed in the purposes of the French Revolution. It cultivated the bourgeois virtues of thrift, independence, and enterprise. It made education and culture accessible to all persons of talent. It displayed tolerance toward its enemies abroad and toward its critics at home—not so much for idealistic as for practical reasons. It encouraged variety and shunned extremes. It tended toward anticlericalism, and though it worshiped the Goddess of Instinct rather than the Goddess of Reason, cultivation of the good life here in man's earthly garden seemed a more and more attainable ideal.

• IV •

THE RULE of King Edward VII produced equally happy results in England. Queen Victoria, during the closing decades of her life, had become more and more of an anachronism. Her grandmotherly concern for her own people strengthened the existing social order in Great Britain while her grandmotherly concern for her royal relatives in Europe strengthened the institution of monarchy abroad. But stability does not always mean progress, in Britain or anywhere else; and progress was in the air. Victoria's death and the accession of King Edward therefore had a cathartic effect throughout Europe. Edward threw the considerable authority of his royal person behind the alliances with Japan and France. He also encouraged the new trend toward closer relations with Russia and the isolation of Germany. At home, his Liberal friends finally routed the Conservatives whom his mother had always favored.

Prime Minister Balfour's Government resigned in November, 1905. It still commanded a majority in the House of Commons, but Balfour knew that the Liberal Government which at once replaced it would be voted down and he calculated that the Conservatives would win the general election that would automatically follow. In spite of the split that Chamberlain's demand for empire tariffs had created among the Conservatives, Balfour believed that the Liberals suffered from even more serious internal divisions on anti-imperialism abroad and social reform at home. Many Liberals feared that Balfour had diagnosed their condition all too accurately, but Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took a different view. He came out strong for free trade abroad, with the support of the entire Party, and the imperialist faction did not dare attack his generous attitude toward the defeated Boers or his program of social reform.

The results of the general election of January, 1906, amazed almost everybody. The Liberals won three hundred and seventy-nine seats; the Conservatives, one hundred and fifty-seven. Even Balfour failed to carry the supposedly "safe" constituency assigned to him. Fortunately, one of the victorious Conservatives obligingly died a few weeks later and Balfour won his seat in the by-election that followed. Urbane as ever, he tried to divert attention from his own chagrin by stressing the fact that the fledgling Labor Party had won twenty-nine seats in the new House of Commons and that other supporters of the labor cause had won twenty-four more. "What is going on here," he observed, "is the faintest echo of the same movement that has produced massacres in St. Petersburg, riots in Vienna, and Socialist processions in Berlin. We always catch Continental maladies, though we usually take them mildly."

Balfour could not, however, take mildly the man who succeeded him as Prime Minister. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had a dour, smug purposefulness that made even an apostle of philosophic doubt uneasy—and Balfour's cultivated charm exercised no fascination over Sir Henry. The new seventy-year-old Prime Minister had waited long and endured much before heading his own Government. He belonged to a respectable but undistinguished Scottish family that had amassed an immense fortune in the drapery business. His elder brother, like their father, had remained a lifelong Conservative and had sat twice in Parliament. The rebellious Sir Henry had gone over to the Liberals, serving as Secretary of War in the Gladstone Cabinet of 1886, and then had lined up with the anti-imperialist wing of the Party during the Boer War.


Whereas Balfour's suppleness had failed to hold the rival Conservative factions together, Campbell-Bannerman's uprightness won the respect even of the Liberal imperialists who had denounced him during the Boer War. A clergyman wrote to him in 1901: "Sir, you are a cad, a coward, and a murderer, and I hope you meet a traitor's or a murderer's doom." The next year Lord Rosebery, a former Liberal Prime Minister, founded the Liberal League and tried to drive all Boer sympathizers and supporters of home rule for Ireland from the party. Herbert H. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and some of the other young Liberal imperialists joined the movement. But Sir William Harcourt, another Liberal ex-Prime Minister, John Morley, James Bryce, and young David Lloyd George backed Campbell-Bannerman. The peace treaty that the Conservative Government negotiated with the Boers in 1902 brought the Liberals somewhat closer together, as most of them sympathized with Campbell-Bannerman's magnanimous approach. But it was Joseph Chamberlain and his empire tariff policy that brought real unity to the

Liberal Party, just as it was Campbell-Bannerman's emphasis on social reform that brought them victory. The Liberals also closed ranks in their attack upon the Conservatives' Education Bill as "privileged-class" legislation because it gave state aid to private religious schools while offering no further help to the state-supported board schools.

Campbell-Bannerman had always worked for social reform at home. He regarded the British victory over the Boers as a mandate to give them self-government and to bring their territories into the Union of South Africa. Campbell-Bannerman also knew and loved France. Although he differed with the Tories on empire policy, he supported the Entente Cordiale. During the summer of 1905, at King Edward's request, the two men had discussed foreign affairs together—sympathetically and at length.

The Campbell-Bannerman Cabinet included several outstanding personalities. Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary, went on with the French from where his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne, had left off. Within a fortnight of his arrival in office, Grey had agreed with Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that British and French Army and Navy leaders should at once open "solely provisional and noncommittal" discussions of joint operations in the event of war with Germany. Sir Edward had inherited his title from his grandfather. He attended Winchester, one of the oldest English public schools, which has as its motto "Manners Makyth Man," and after that Balliol College, Oxford. He knew barely a word of any of the other living languages of Europe. He never visited the Continent. He loved fishing, ornithology, Wordsworth, and the life of an English country gentleman. The brief biographical sketch of Sir Edward Grey in the 1911 edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* refers to his prowess on the tennis court and describes his "interest in politics" as "rather languid." He had served as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1892 to 1895 but thoroughly enjoyed the ten years of Conservative rule that followed because they gave him freedom from responsibility.

Grey was a gentleman with a conscience. As a gentleman he accepted without question the privileges and obligations that his conscience compelled him to justify. British Foreign Secretaries rarely originate policy. They carry out—each in his own way—the decisions of the permanent Foreign Office staff, after consultation with the Prime Minister and with some, at least, of their Cabinet colleagues. Grey's utter loyalty made him a dependable instrument of official Foreign Office policy, which the outcome of the election left unchanged. But it was his conscience that made him invaluable and unique. His ignorance inoculated him against doubt. His simplicity caused him to attribute his own high motives to others.



BROWN BROTHERS

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman

BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Winston Spencer Churchill

Although the Liberal election sweep did not disturb the aristocracy in the Foreign Office, something new had been added to the Board of Trade. What Georges Clemenceau brought to the Sarrien Cabinet in France, David Lloyd George brought to the Campbell-Bannerman Cabinet in Great Britain. Lloyd George also came from humble surroundings. His father, a Welsh schoolteacher, had died in 1865, two years after young David's birth. At the age of fourteen the boy had already begun to study law and earn a living. In 1892, at the age of twenty-eight, he defeated the Conservative candidate for the House of Commons in a Welsh district that the Tories had usually controlled, and he kept right on winning—in 1895, 1900, and 1906. His constituents liked his advocacy of Welsh nationalism and his opposition to the right of the Church of England to collect tithes. He had opposed the Boer War and made himself the outstanding advocate of radical domestic reform in the House of Commons. Like Clemenceau, Lloyd George excelled as an orator. Like Clemenceau, he had fought his way up from poverty and had remained the friend of the poor. His toothbrush mustache, his flowing mane of hair, his noble head, massive chest, and dwindling torso and legs made him a cartoonist's favorite too. And responsibility in office had the same sobering effect on Lloyd George that it had on Clemenceau.

Neither the aristocratic Grey nor the humbly born Lloyd George expected to succeed the ailing Campbell-Bannerman. When he resigned after barely two years in office, leadership of the Government and the

Party went to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Herbert H. Asquith, who, like Grey, had attended Balliol College in Oxford, winning the highest honors there. He fulfilled his early signs of promise by making a phenomenal success at the bar. After the death of his first wife, Asquith married Margot Tennant, the widely courted daughter of a wealthy ironmaster. With her he became one of the leading self-chosen spirits in that little group who called themselves "The Souls," to which Balfour also belonged. Winston Churchill spoke of Balfour at that time as "wicked and moral," but "the most courageous man alive." He added, "I look on him as my enemy," and described his nature as hard and cruel. Asquith, on the other hand, Churchill regarded as "good and immoral." Asquith could drink and play cards all night, then work with a clear head throughout the next day. Balfour summed Asquith up as follows: "Asquith is an arbitrator, an eminently fair-minded judge—the best-tempered man I ever knew—a splendid chairman of a committee, and after all a Cabinet is only a committee; but I have never heard him originate or suggest. If he were in this room now and heard us talk, he would still be incapable of understanding that more is required of him than the admirable balance he is able to give." But all that was required of Asquith in 1906 was to fill the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer—wait.

If Lloyd George was the bad boy of the Liberals, Winston Churchill was their problem child. Too young and erratic to receive full cabinet rank, but too promising and well-connected to be ignored, the thirty-one-year-old Churchill received the important post of Under-Secretary for the Colonies. His father, Lord Randolph Churchill—a descendant, through his mother, of the Duke of Marlborough—entered politics as a Conservative and in his early thirties became Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. But he could not get along with his colleagues and within a few months suddenly resigned from the Cabinet. Twelve years later, before reaching the age of forty-six, he was dead.

The father's brief, troubled, and meteoric career greatly influenced his eldest son, Winston, who felt that he must make his mark early in life. After an indifferent record at Harrow, he decided to become a professional soldier and went to Sandhurst. But in 1895, at the age of twenty-one, the redheaded, impetuous youngster lit out for Cuba to report the campaigns of the Spaniards against the native insurrectionists. Rejoining the British Army, Churchill again turned war correspondent in South Africa, where he was at once captured by the Boers, and almost at once escaped. In 1900, at the age of twenty-six, he was elected to the House of Commons as a Conservative.

The Boers had held Churchill for less than a month; the Conserva-

tives held him for more than three years before he broke loose and joined the Liberals because he believed in free trade, domestic reform, and home rule for Ireland. In 1908 Churchill married Miss Clementine Hozier, whose father had created the British War Office's legendary Intelligence Service—a connection that served Churchill well. Of the poor people of England he said, "I would give my life to see them placed on a right footing in regard to their lives and means of living." He admired the bold unscrupulousness of Joseph Chamberlain and shared his enthusiasm for the Empire. But he also won the friendship of the anti-imperialist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, who respected Churchill's realistic candor and quoted him as saying of the Indians, "If they ever unite against us and put us in Coventry, the game would be up. If they could agree to have nothing at all to do with us, the whole thing would collapse."

Thanks to the magnanimous spirit of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the game continued and nothing did collapse, in India or anywhere else. The new Prime Minister addressed himself first of all to repairing the injustices that he had always associated with the Boer War. Working through Jan Christiaan Smuts as interpreter, Campbell-Bannerman dealt with General Botha as representative of all the Boers. Botha had tried to fulfill the moderate peace terms, believing that the British would meet good faith with good faith. Campbell-Bannerman responded in the same spirit. The Conservatives predicted that further concessions to the Boers would encourage revolt. The Liberals replied that failure to make concessions would start the vicious circle of suspicion all over again. Events justified the Liberals. Botha, Smuts, and their countrymen accepted the British offer of self-government within the Empire. The offer did not, however, include the five million Negro inhabitants of South Africa, who outnumbered the whites about five to one and provided a cheap, docile, and efficient labor force. Most of these South African blacks could neither read nor write, and the white minority saw to it that they remained subservient.

The British Liberals, under Campbell-Bannerman's leadership, showed true magnanimity in their generous settlement with the Boers. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that Campbell-Bannerman's consistent opposition to the Boer War finally made South Africa safe for the British Empire. But the confidence that the Boers felt in Britain's new Liberal Prime Minister was not the only consideration that made it easy for Boer and Briton to reach agreement. South Africa's white minority had to form a common front or the whole game would be up.

Because the South African Negro lived an even more backward existence than the native Moslems at the northern end of the same continent, the cause of colonial emancipation stirred far less enthusiasm,

even among British reformers, than reform of the House of Lords. No sooner had the House of Commons passed the Liberals' domestic program than the House of Lords used its veto power to block educational reform and abolition of dual voting. To those who praised the House of Lords as "the watchdog of the Constitution" Lloyd George replied that it had become "Mr. Balfour's poodle." He went still further and brought down upon himself the personal remonstrance of King Edward by declaring that the Lords' opposition to the Liberals' education bill had raised the question of "whether the country was to be governed by the King and the Peers or the King and the People."

King Edward did not remonstrate against any of the writers who won new popularity during his reign, but he can hardly have liked them much better than he liked Lloyd George's attacks on the House of Lords. It was not until the early 1900's that Bernard Shaw, who had come to London in 1876, made his mark as a successful playwright. The younger H. G. Wells did not have to wait so long for fame. He wrote his first serious novel, *Kipps*, in 1905, and followed it with *Tono-Bungay* and *Ann Veronica*. Both men made Socialism popular, if not respectable. Both had learned how to appeal to the new mass public that put a premium on readability. At the dawn of the mass-production age, Wells in particular became a one-man mass-production literary factory. As a member of the lower middle class, he set about breaking down the class barriers that had made so much literature the property of the privileged few. Part journalist and part preacher, Wells rediscovered on a vastly expanded scale the same mass public that Dickens used to reach, but with a message of revolt against established religion, traditional education, conventional sex morality, and the prevalent spirit of nationalism. Wells reacted to the Edwardian era and the twentieth century as Dickens had reacted to the Victorian era and the nineteenth century. More—far more—than any other writer of his time, Wells also stressed the revolution that applied science had wrought on human life.

Like Shaw, Wells, and the internal-combustion gasoline engine, Arnold Bennett was also a typical product of the new century. In the early 1890's he quit the law for journalism; shortly after the turn of the century he quit journalism to become a novelist. Bennett first made his mark with his realistic stories about the "Five Towns" in his native Midlands district of England. He did not preach social reform. He showed the influence of the French realists, whom he greatly admired. But Bennett saw British middle-class life with a new, fresh eye and by persistent application became a skillful craftsman and a prodigious money-maker. The new-rich who amused or disgusted Wells fascinated the self-made Bennett, whose own success story duplicated many of theirs. He, too, depicted a new kind of England and attracted a new



BROWN BROTHERS

Arnold Bennett.
One of the first mass producers
of mass literature



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Three Edwardian Beauties, the Ladies
Alexandra, Mary, and Theo Acheson as
Painted by John Singer Sargent

kind of audience. Moreover, Bennett applied himself to his literary task as the businessmen of the time applied themselves to theirs. While turning literature into money he also transformed business success into a literature—of sorts. To him belongs the added distinction of having written one of the first of those “how to” books that have made so many twentieth-century publishers and authors rich—*How to Live on Twenty-four Hours a Day*.

John Galsworthy's *Man of Property*, which appeared in 1906, portrayed an older England, in a new way. Galsworthy had received the conventional upper-class education at Harrow and New College, Oxford, breaking with his environment when he abandoned the practice of law for the writing of novels and then plays. He did not attack the upper middle class that he knew so well, but he did show some of its weaknesses and hypocrisies. Compared to most members of his caste he seemed, almost, a revolutionary. Although the realities of English life, from top to bottom, presented a somewhat more disturbing picture than Galsworthy chose to give, the surface of life, especially among the favored few, never appeared more charming. Osbert Sitwell in his autobiography, *The Scarlet Tree*, gives this description of London in 1906:

“The hats were gigantic now and covered with ostrich feathers. The colors were those of grass and young leaves, the checkerings of branches

against a gray sky, or rose-pink or azure-blue—they had about them a peculiar ephemerality, a butterfly-like character that was the essence of modishness. Paris had again asserted her leadership, and marched behind the smiling mask of the Entente Cordiale, to take London captive, yet London was now becoming in her place the pleasure center of the world.”

Morals had changed along with fashions. The hypocrisy of the Victorian era had gone out with the bustle. King Edward himself had set standards of hedonism that the aristocracy, by and large, accepted. The only sin, as Oscar Wilde had said, was to be found out, for even the oldest families could not put up with open scandal. The pursuit of pleasure became, however, an end in itself. Even the busiest government officials made a practice of taking extended country weekends and prolonged vacations. Many of them played and drank harder than they worked. The British upper classes during the Edwardian decade gave themselves over to a round of extended house parties at great country estates. The guests all brought their personal servants with them, and these servants observed the same rules of etiquette toward each other in their quarters that their masters and mistresses followed at their formal dinners and other social affairs.

Some forty years after the Edwardian age had ended, the nephew and namesake of one of Edward's closest friends, Sir Christopher Sykes, gave a half-humorous, half-grisly picture of the King and his inner circle, in *Four Studies in Loyalty*. Here Edward is depicted as a cruel boor who delighted in practical jokes and sponged without shame upon his fawning cronies. Sir Christopher quietly bankrupted himself entertaining his sovereign, who used to pour glasses of brandy over his head at formal dinners, while the victim reverently murmured, “As your Majesty pleases.” Victoria Sackville-West's novel *The Edwardians* does not introduce the King himself, but it shows the profligate society of which he set the tone and which afforded such a complete contrast with the period that took its name from his mother. Even to read about this world is to question Talleyrand's remark that anyone who had not known the ancient regime before the French Revolution had never tasted the sweetness of life.

The more numerous, lower social orders also occupied their fixed places in a hierarchy that required neither force nor censorship but merely its own sanction to endure. Yet close to a third of the people of Edwardian Britain lived close to the hunger line in the dingy slums of half a dozen ugly cities. Speaking almost a different language, looking almost like a race apart, the British working class had built strong trade unions and forced some concessions from their employers. Most of them still voted Liberal rather than Labor; they doped themselves with

Alfred Harmsworth's sensational "penny press"; they attended professional soccer matches by the hundreds of thousands while their betters watched or played cricket, a gentleman's game. The middle-class folk—or "black coats"—looked down on the workers as much as the aristocrats looked down on them. They almost alone tried to preserve the Victorian virtues while the more enterprising or desperate among them emigrated to the United States and the colonial Dominions.


• V •

UNDER EDWARD, as under Victoria, the condition of all the British people gradually improved. They saw far more to disturb them abroad than at home. Shortly after the announcement of their country's alliance with Japan came the Russo-Japanese War. That, in turn, led to bloody revolution in Russia. Germany then challenged the new entente with France at Algeciras. Secret diplomacy, of course, kept many details from the public eye; and besides, that impeccable Christian gentleman, Sir Edward Grey, had taken over the Foreign Office. Surely he knew best.

Sir Edward Grey had already enlisted the aid of another impeccable Christian gentleman who knew even better. Sir Arthur Nicolson had devoted his life to his country's diplomatic service and therefore belonged to no political party, though his personal sympathies went out to the Liberals. This shy, bent, delicate little man of infinite charm and sharp intelligence had held diplomatic posts in Persia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In 1905 the Conservatives made him Ambassador to Russia, and when the Liberals took power at the end of the year their new Government invited him to head the British delegation at Algeciras. Nicolson feared and suspected Germany. He did not regard Anglo-German conflict as inevitable, but he believed that only firm alliances and strong actions could deter the Germans from starting a general European war. Nicolson worked well under Grey at Algeciras, and on his return they sat down to a confidential dinner with other Foreign Office officials to map new plans.

They quickly reached a decision that changed the whole direction of British foreign policy. For almost a century the seafaring British had regarded the vast land empire of Russia as their chief potential enemy. Russian ambitions at the Dardanelles, in Persia, on India's northwest frontier, and in the Far East all threatened vital parts of the British Empire. Kipling, with characteristic flair, had coined the popular phrase "the bear that walks like a man." Now, in view of German ambitions in Europe and on the high seas, the makers of British policy decided to have Sir Arthur Nicolson, as British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, seek

agreement with the Russians on three disputed regions: Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. The assignment required patience, tact, and time. Most Russian leaders blamed their recent troubles on the British,¹ whose support of Japan had helped bring them defeat abroad and revolution at home. Yet these same Russian leaders could not but welcome the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France and hope it might be extended to include them. The British, with all their faults, at least appeared more reliable than the excitable Kaiser and the devious Bülow.



CULVER

Sir Arthur Nicolson

Nicolson faced one major difficulty in his negotiations with the Russians. He could not offer them anything in exchange for the settlements he wanted in Asia and the Middle East. When the British had signed the entente with France, they had surrendered certain claims they once made in Morocco. The British were not, however, prepared to concede anything they already held in Tibet, Afghanistan, or Persia to the Russians. The best they could do was to propose a settlement at Persia's expense, dividing the country into spheres of influence while agreeing to maintain the *status quo* in Tibet and Afghanistan. And their best was precisely what they did.

Neither Tibet nor Afghanistan raised any great difficulties. The Russians agreed to permit British troops to continue their occupation of Tibet and their control of Tibet's external relations. The Russians also recognized that Afghanistan lay outside their sphere of influence. Persia was another story. The Russians had no ambition to dominate Tibet or Afghanistan and no intention of attacking India from the north. But they did have ambitions on the Persian Gulf, and the British feared that if the Russians once established themselves on the Persian Gulf they might move toward India next. To continue the pretense that Persia was an independent, sovereign state could lead only to the complete absorption of Persia by Russia. Therefore Nicolson proposed, and the Russians eventually agreed, to partition Persia into an exclusive Russian zone in the north, including the capital city of Teheran, an exclusive British zone in the south, including the shore of the Persian Gulf, and a third central zone where neither could act without the con-

sent of the other. The treaty began with the usual pledge "to respect the integrity and independence of Persia."

Nicolson brought the Russians around to the partition of Persia—for that was the real heart of the Anglo-Russian Convention—by holding out hope of a wider, eventual agreement, to include both the Near and the Far East. The moment Nicolson kindled this hope in the Russians, they accepted his proposals. In Britain the treaty came under attack from two quarters. Lord Curzon, former Conservative Viceroy to India, called it wholesale appeasement of Russia and abandonment of all the advantages Britain had gained in Asia during the course of the previous century. Some Liberals and Laborites objected to the partition of Persia and the establishment of closer relations with the weak and corrupt Tsarist autocracy. However, the House of Commons lost little time ratifying the treaty, which had been signed on August 31, 1907, in St. Petersburg. Only the Emir of Afghanistan refused to recognize its validity.

Of course the Anglo-Russian Convention came down hard on the Government and the people of Persia, but what was the alternative? The Persians could no more develop their own oil wells than the Panamanians could dig a canal across the isthmus on which they lived. The peaceful partitioning of Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence at least spared the natives the fate that the people of Korea and Manchuria had just suffered when their countries became battlefields. The Anglo-Russian Convention also had more to do with Europe than with Asia; more to do with Germany than with Persia. The Triple Alliance, once the arbiter of Europe, had to reckon on a rival combination in the making—the Triple Entente. The encirclement of Germany was becoming complete.

Sir Edward Grey felt that Britain got all the benefits from the new arrangements. The Russians, far from gaining fresh concessions, had pledged themselves not to move into Southern Persia, which the British could not have defended in any case. The Russians, also, feared the British as much as the British feared the Russians, and both of them liked the idea of clipping the wings of the Shah, who had tried—as all heads of all small states do try from time to time—to play off larger rivals against each other. Later, however, Grey warned the Russians that they had failed to co-operate loyally and threatened to resign as Foreign Secretary if they did not mend their ways. He had staked his reputation and his honor on their pledged word and he dared take no chances.

The Tory opposition to the Anglo-Russian Convention worried more about the Empire and Russia than about Europe and Germany. The Liberal and Labor opposition to the Anglo-Russian Convention opposed

imperialism in all its forms and believed that nothing justified a British alliance with the tyrannical Government of Russia. But a majority of both Tories and Liberals supported the Anglo-Russian Convention because they believed that the rise of Germany threatened British security and that Britain, in sheer self-protection, had to establish closer ties with Russia as well as with France. This did not mean that the British Foreign Office planned to encircle Germany or go to war. Just as the Germans believed that their naval building program would frighten the British into accepting their dominant position in Europe, so the British believed that a Triple Entente among themselves, the French, and the Russians would frighten the Germans into a more accommodating frame of mind. The British had failed in their first attempt to create a new concert of the major European powers, beginning with Germany. Therefore they set out on a new tack and tried to establish a new equilibrium by creating a Triple Entente to counterbalance the Triple Alliance.

SUMMING UP

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY had opened with seven lean years for the Kaiser's Germany. The Algeciras Conference, at which Bülow had hoped to weaken the Anglo-French Entente, soon led instead to an agreement between Britain and Russia. The nightmare of encirclement which haunted the dying Bismarck had become a reality that every German could now see. The German masses did not, however, know that the Kaiser and Bülow and Holstein had rejected a limited alliance with England. Neither did the British and French masses know that their generals were already planning joint action against Germany. As for the subjects of the Tsar and Francis Joseph, they knew hardly more than the oppressed colonial world which had no power over its own fate. Yet the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905 had just given striking demonstrations of the power of the masses. By 1907 Europe's rulers had not only split into two increasingly hostile camps: they had become—no less than their own deluded masses—the victims of forces that they had released but could neither understand nor control.

The End of the Bülow Era

The illusions on which Chancellor Bülow and his country had lived for almost ten years fell apart too suddenly and too late for Bülow to save either his country or himself.

PREVIEW

THE FIASCO at Algeciras caused the Kaiser to look to his Navy for the security that his diplomats had jeopardized in their vain seeking of "concessions." Unhappily, the plans for naval expansion that Admiral von Tirpitz worked out for him aroused further British fears and suspicions, which he at once reciprocated. As a result the two countries found themselves unable to reach any kind of agreement at all. Meanwhile, Baron Aehrenthal, the new Austrian Foreign Minister, took advantage of Russia's weakness to annex the two Balkan provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bülow followed through with a virtual ultimatum demanding that the Russians approve Austria's action. Germany's triumph did not last long. The Kaiser gave an indiscreet interview to a British journalist; one of his close friends became involved in a public scandal. Bülow saw that the naval program would require higher taxes; he also awoke to the need for a drastic revision of his whole external policy. But he awoke too late. The conservative majority in the Reichstag voted down his tax bill and the Kaiser dismissed him from office.

• I •

IN 1907, German industry commanded more respect than German diplomacy. Germany was producing more pig iron than Great Britain and half as much as the United States. German exports exceeded American exports and lagged only 20 per cent behind those of Britain. Between 1900 and 1909 the Germans added a million tons to their merchant fleet. The capital of German shipping companies doubled between 1899 and 1908. More than eight million of Germany's sixty million people depended on foreign trade.

Because the diplomatic blunderings of Bülow and Holstein had con-

tributed to the encirclement and isolation of Germany, the Kaiser felt he had to rely more and more upon sea power for protection. In 1898 he had appointed the forty-eight-year-old Admiral von Tirpitz to the post of Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy. Whereas the British based their security at sea on the so-called "two-power standard" and always kept their Navy larger than the combined fleets of any other two powers, Tirpitz laid down the principle that German security required a "risk navy." By this he meant a fleet large enough to make the British refuse to run the risk of battle against it. This did not require Germany to seek anything like naval equality with England, especially in respect to smaller vessels. It did, however, require Germany to build enough capital ships to threaten that part of the British fleet that remained in home waters.

The Kaiser accepted the views of Tirpitz, who devoted nineteen years of his life and all his immense energies and capacity for intrigue to building up the German Navy. Recognizing that a modern navy required modern heavy industries, he enlisted the backing of German industrialists, who saw sure and steady profits for themselves in making warships for the Government. But a navy costs money; the naval construction bills required approval by the Reichstag; Tirpitz therefore saw to it that the same industrialists who would profit from a naval construction program financed newspapers and other publications devoted to big-navy propaganda. While Bülow basked in the spotlight, while Holstein worked behind the scenes, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz proved himself the most tenacious if not the most powerful of the Kaiser's servants. His corpulent frame, his beady eyes, his bald pate, his seaweed beard suggested that he belonged to the seal or walrus family, and like a seal or a walrus he proved amphibious, functioning as efficiently with members of the Reichstag and with the leaders of heavy industry as he had on the bridges of the battleships he had commanded in the Baltic and in the Far East.

In 1907 the British Navy completed an entirely new type of warship: H.M.S. *Dreadnought*. Because it had heavier armor and bigger and longer-range guns than any other ship afloat, British naval experts assumed they had only to build a few more of these vessels to increase still further their lead over all rivals. It did not take them long to discover that they had, in effect, invited the Germans to start a new armament race—from scratch. Because the dreadnought had made many other war vessels obsolete, the Germans had only to concentrate their efforts in this one direction to whittle down Britain's naval supremacy and threaten the security of the British Isles. And this was just what the Germans did. A year later Tirpitz had no difficulty persuading the Reichstag to vote additional funds to build more new ships and to

PREWAR



CULVER

Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz



BROWN BROTHERS

Admiral Sir John Fisher

widen the Kiel Canal to accommodate them. Meanwhile, Campbell-Bannerman, in July, 1906, had enraged the Tories by ordering a reduction in British naval construction for the following year. He felt bound by ancient Liberal tradition and by recent Liberal election promises to cut down expenses on war preparations. He also hoped that the Second Hague Peace Conference, scheduled to meet in 1907, would result in a practical program of general disarmament. He declared that Britain would reduce its naval building program if other nations would do the same and recognize Britain's right to pre-eminence at sea. The Germans, however, rejected the British proposal and declined even to discuss disarmament at The Hague. They feared the plans the British were making to dispatch a reorganized Expeditionary Force to fight on the Continent.

Both the First Hague Conference of 1899 and the Second Hague Conference of 1907 ruled that any matter that any nation regarded as vital to its independence or its national honor need not be submitted to arbitration. Nevertheless, a preliminary attempt was made, before the 1907 meeting, to link arbitration with disarmament. The German and Austrian Governments ignored the advice of their more experienced diplomats, bowed to the judgment of their soldiers, and flatly refused to consider any disarmament proposals. The Russians, French, and Italians—more worldly-wise—felt that the conference should consider disarmament if only, in the words of Count Izvolski, the Russian For-

eign Minister, "to give it a first-class funeral." The Central powers thus incurred universal odium but could not prevent the British from bringing up the topic of disarmament only to have it passed by, almost without discussion.

In November, 1907, the Kaiser went to London for a visit of more than a month and turned down two British proposals to improve relations between the two countries. First, he and his advisers held long discussions concerning the joint development of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. The Germans, in 1902, had obtained the consent of the Turks to extend the railway from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. The British, French, and Russian Governments combined to thwart and delay the plan, which the Kaiser now raised again in a new form. He and his advisers suggested that Germany and England finance the construction together and that England control the part of the railway near the Persian Gulf. Grey replied that his treaty commitments to the French and the Russians required that he consult them first. He also proposed bringing French capital into the project. The Germans, fearing that they would be outvoted, said "No."

Attempts to reach a naval agreement proved equally unavailing. The Kaiser kept assuring the British that he did not contest their right to naval superiority and that he had no intention of fighting them. Yet he stubbornly argued that German security required the construction of a fixed *number* of new vessels and never seemed able to understand Britain's insistence on the two-power standard which required them to maintain a fixed *ratio*. Nor could the Germans grasp the psychological value of a bilateral Anglo-German gesture in the direction of naval reduction.

The Anglo-German naval race poisoned the relations between the two countries. The British Liberals, in order to justify their big new naval building program, had to stress the "German peril." Bülow—at last awake to the dangers to which his careless conduct of affairs had exposed Germany—had to follow in the wake of Tirpitz, who kept arguing that the larger a navy Germany built, the riskier would it be for England to attack. What Tirpitz failed to take into account was the possibility that his naval building program might force the British into a full-fledged military alliance with France and Russia. He thought only in terms of sea power, just as the leaders of the German Army thought only in terms of land power. In fact, Tirpitz predicted that Germany would be completely out of danger by 1915 because by then reconstruction of the Kiel Canal and the fortification of Helgoland would be complete. Meanwhile Admiral Sir John Fisher, Britain's First Sea Lord, urged a surprise attack on the German fleet in 1908 in much the same way that Count von Schlieffen had urged a German attack upon

France during the Russo-Japanese War. Fisher, however, went on to predict that if his advice were ignored, Germany and England would go to war in August, 1914, when he expected the Germans to have completed the Kiel Canal.

• II •

THE FEARS and suspicions of Germany's leaders gave rise to similar fears and suspicions abroad. Because Germany's leaders acted as if the world were conspiring against them, the rest of the world distrusted Germany. At Algeciras in 1906, German diplomats forced the French and British into closer agreement. At London in 1907, German diplomats vetoed any slackening of the naval construction race with England. From Berlin in 1909, German diplomats forced Russia into closer association with France and England by giving Austria a free hand in the Balkans.

The 1909 crisis dated back to May, 1906, when the Tsar promoted Alexander Izvolski from Ambassador to Denmark to Foreign Minister. During his youth Izvolski had absorbed from Pan-Slavic friends a mystical belief in Russia's divine mission to occupy the Dardanelles, acquire Constantinople, and restore the Byzantine Empire. Having spent most of the intervening years in the diplomatic service representing his country in Tokyo, Belgrade, and Munich, he had lost touch with the Pan-Slavs of Russia, whose interest had shifted from the Dardanelles to the Balkans. When Izvolski returned to St. Petersburg he carried with him the resolve to perform brilliant services for Mother Russia in a part of the world that he had dreamed of as a young man although he never understood precisely what Russia could achieve there. His former Pan-Slavic friends, on the other hand, knew just what they wanted in the Balkans, and because he did know that region at first hand he did not quite share all their hopes.

In October, 1906, five months after Izvolski replaced Count Lamsdorf as Russian Foreign Minister, Baron von Aehrenthal replaced Count Goluchowski as Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Goluchowski, a Slav, had maintained tolerably good relations with Russia, where his successor had served as Austrian Ambassador for many years. Aehrenthal, an aristocrat of German-Jewish ancestry, knew from personal observation how seriously the war with Japan and the disturbances that followed had weakened Russia. He also knew—better than Izvolski—that the Russians hoped to regain in the Balkans some of the prestige they had lost in the Far East.

Aehrenthal understood Russia's weaknesses better than he understood his own. He, too, wished to distinguish himself and made up his mind to move fast. In 1907 he and Izvolski clashed for the first time when

Izvolski revealed to the British a plan that Aehrenthal had proposed to exclude them from the Balkans. Aehrenthal promptly denied the Russian charges, at the same time making up his mind to revenge himself at Izvolski's expense. On January 27, 1908, Aehrenthal suddenly announced that Austria planned to build a railway across the Balkan peninsula from Sarajevo to Salonika. This not only antagonized other European statesmen who were trying to get the Sultan to make concessions to his Christian subjects in Macedonia: Aehrenthal had also violated the spirit if not the letter of a series of Austrian agreements with Russia calling for joint consultation on Balkan problems.

A third party suddenly liquidated the Macedonian reforms and the Austrian railway. In late July, 1908, revolt broke out in Turkey. A group of army officers and politicians who called themselves the Young Turks forced Sultan Abdul Hamid to restore the Constitution of 1876, which he had suspended and which gave equal rights to all subject nationalities. The Young Turks felt no special love for subject nationalities. They acted to rid their country of one-man rule and to gain more power themselves, whereupon Baron Aehrenthal and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria took advantage of the confusion to press their separate ambitions. Both men conferred with Emperor Francis Joseph early in August—Ferdinand arranging to cut all ties with Turkey and to proclaim himself King of an independent Bulgaria, and Aehrenthal arranging to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria had administered since 1878 although both belonged, nominally, to the Turkish Empire.

Austria had acquired its special position in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Berlin Congress of 1878, and any change in the status of those two provinces which lay between the land-locked Kingdom of Serbia and the Adriatic coast required the approval of the major European powers, all of which had participated in the Berlin decisions. Aehrenthal, however, circumvented the Treaty of Berlin in September by coming to a loose understanding with Izvolski. Shrewdly appealing to Izvolski's obsession about the Dardanelles, Aehrenthal offered to support Russian ambitions in that quarter in exchange for Russian approval of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The impressionable Izvolski let himself become convinced that he was getting something for nothing. Austria already administered Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annexation amounted to nothing more than a formality that the Treaty of Berlin had already anticipated. But no other European statesman had ever matched Aehrenthal's offer of support for Russian ambitions at the Dardanelles.

On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand proclaimed himself King of an independent Bulgaria. Two days later Aehrenthal announced the

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—without consulting or informing Izvolski in advance. It did not occur to Izvolski, until others angrily and fearfully called it to his attention, that he had made it possible for Austria to gain immediate, material advantage in the Balkans in exchange for hypothetical support of undefined Russian ambitions at the Dardanelles. When the truth at last flooded in on him, Izvolski raged to Bülow: "The dirty Jew has deceived me."

Izvolski became the principal target of attack in his own country, where he was accused of having sold out the Serbs on whose good will more and more Russians were depending. The Serbian Government regarded the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as another act of Austrian aggression against the Slavic people and ordered more armaments from the Creusot works in France. Serbian Foreign Minister Milanovich toured the capitals of Europe demanding autonomy for the two provinces, a Serbian port on the Adriatic, and war against Austria. The Slavic subjects of the Hapsburgs did not share his belligerent spirit. They welcomed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina because it added to the Slavic majority inside the Austrian Empire. Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff, finally became so annoyed at Serbia that in December he began a partial mobilization and urged immediate war.

The British Government expressed "extreme astonishment and regret" at Austria's violation of the Treaty of Berlin. The news of the annexation also enraged the Kaiser. The German Foreign Office told the British Ambassador to Berlin that "Austria's action has placed Germany in a position of great embarrassment as she is forced to choose between her ally, Austria, and her friends, the Turks." Bülow found himself in his element. By supporting Austria, he could compensate for the humiliation of Algeciras. By saving face for Izvolski, he could improve relations with Russia and regain Germany's lost position as mediator between the two other great Empires of Europe. In the end, however, he found himself playing the Austrian rather than the Russian game.


Izvolski first proposed an international conference at which he promised to support the Serbs. Paris and London gave him little encouragement; Berlin gave him still less. Aehrenthal, delighted by Izvolski's difficulties, hinted that he could reveal embarrassing secret agreements that Izvolski had entered into with him concerning the Balkans. The terrified Izvolski begged Bülow to call Aehrenthal off, but a loyal ally could hardly intervene against his own partner, especially in behalf of so dubious a character as the Russian Foreign Minister. On February 26, 1909, Turkey—only too eager to embarrass Russia—recognized the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aehrenthal announced

that this closed the whole incident and demanded Serbia's unconditional acceptance of all that had been done. He threatened to order a general mobilization and to send an ultimatum to Belgrade. He also resumed his blackmailing of Izvolski, who could only advise the Serbs to come to terms with the Austrians, direct.

It was not in the Kaiser's nature to keep hands off. On March 17 he learned that the Russian Crown Council had decided to avoid war at all costs. Instantly, the German Government proposed that all the nations that had signed the Berlin Treaty recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a simple exchange of notes. Izvolski stalled. Four days later the German Government demanded unconditional acceptance of its proposal by the Russians. "You should," the German Ambassador's instructions informed him, "at the same time make it quite clear that we expect a precise answer—Yes or No. Any evasive, complicated, or ambiguous reply will be regarded as a refusal. In such an event we should withdraw and allow matters to take their course. The responsibility for all that follows must rest exclusively on M. Izvolski."

Two days later Izvolski surrendered unconditionally. At no point, however, had any of the principal powers contemplated or planned a major war. Some Austrian military men had favored crushing Serbia in a war that they believed could be localized. Neither the British nor the French cared to make commitments in the Balkans that might lead to war with Germany. The Russians, still weakened from the effect of the war with Japan, wanted peace at any price. And the German Foreign Office informed the French Ambassador at the time it presented its demand to Izvolski that it had no intention of going to war—partly because the Kaiser feared war would mean revolution in Russia but "especially as we are not yet ready for one ourselves."

Two further items, by way of postscript, complete the story of the Bosnia-Herzegovina affair. The Pan-Slavs and their friends have represented Bülow as the villain of the piece and have stressed the violence of Germany's attitude toward Russia. Certainly, Bülow and the Kaiser displayed their usual want of tact, but Aehrenthal had pushed matters too far and Izvolski had made too many advance concessions for them to be able to call Austria off without losing their one, sure ally. Both Bülow and the Kaiser wanted to ease Izvolski's embarrassment and make a friendly gesture toward Russia, but their chief aim was not to save Izvolski from his own folly. Then, in the second place, the story still persists that Izvolski actually accepted a bribe from Aehrenthal and that his real position was even weaker than appeared at the time. True or false, the story was widely believed and therefore influenced the course of events. One conclusion at any rate appears inescapable:



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Germany's Corps of Engineers Build a Railway Bridge during Military Maneuvers

Tension among the major powers of Europe had become so great that the leading statesmen of Europe were fast losing all freedom of decision and action.

• III •

FROM TOP to bottom, imperial Germany suffered from growing pains. The Kaiser and many of his subjects displayed the usual symptoms of the newly rich, covering inner uncertainties with boastful, bad manners. During the first twenty years of his reign William had managed to keep out of trouble, but his luck suddenly ran out in the fall of 1908. First, he made himself the laughing-stock of Europe as the result of an indiscreet interview in the London *Daily Telegraph*. Then one of his closest friends, Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg, became involved in a revolting scandal. Finally, he dismissed Chancellor von Bülow.

At the height of the Bosnian crisis the *Daily Telegraph* of London carried an interview with the Kaiser by Colonel Stuart-Wortley, a private British citizen, who had entertained the Kaiser in England in 1907. In the course of this interview the Kaiser declared that he had always favored good relations with England but that most Germans did not share his friendly feelings. He also claimed credit for having originated the strategy that the British adopted in winning the Boer War. He said he had rejected a Franco-Russian offer to back the Boers

against the British. He declared that the German Navy was not being built for use against England but for eventualities in the Pacific.

Needless to say, the Kaiser had nothing to do with British military strategy in South Africa and the roars of laughter with which the House of Commons greeted his boast did his tender ego no good. His attempt to pose as the friend of England and to sow suspicion among the British and the French and the Russians also backfired. And his assertion that he planned to use the German Navy in the Pacific seemed to the British an even clumsier attempt to drive a wedge between them and the Japanese.

The publication of the *Daily Telegraph* interview set off a campaign in the German newspapers against the Kaiser's personal direction of German affairs. He crumpled under the attack, plaintively—and correctly—insisting that the Foreign Office had seen and approved the text in advance. What actually happened was that the Kaiser submitted the text to Bülow, who passed it on, unread, to the Foreign Office officials. They, in turn, assumed that Bülow had given his approval and at once added theirs as a routine matter. Characteristically, Bülow took no blame upon himself. Eager as ever to strengthen his own position, he went through the formality of presenting his resignation and agreed to stay only after the Kaiser promised to seek his advice before taking any such step again. Nor could he resist the temptation to preen himself and add to the Kaiser's humiliation by reporting the whole affair to the Reichstag.

"Revenge," said Bismarck, "is a delicacy that should be served cold." Baron Holstein had not always admired Bismarck, but he took Bismarck's advice in getting even with all those, from the Kaiser down, who had cast him aside after the Algeciras fiasco in 1906. Holstein attributed his fall mainly to the continuing influence that Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg, former German Ambassador to Vienna, exerted upon the Kaiser. Eulenburg committed two unforgivable crimes. First, he had always spoken frankly to the Kaiser, repeatedly warning him, as Bülow never had had the courage to warn him, against Holstein, Tirpitz, and various lesser fry. Second, Eulenburg openly associated with degenerates, dressed as a woman at revels which the Kaiser attended as his guest, and thus laid himself open to the charges of homosexual practices that Holstein quietly brought against him.

The Kaiser knew nothing of Holstein's charges early in 1907 when he awarded Eulenburg the highest of all Prussian orders, the Black Eagle. A few months later, however, he learned that Maximilian Harden was repeating in his sensational paper *Zukunft* the same charges that Holstein had made privately. The Kaiser therefore issued an imperial rescript that closed with these words: "If this accusation against him


[Eulenburg] of unnatural vice be unfounded, let him give me a plain declaration to that effect and take immediate steps against Harden. If not, then I expect him to return the Black Eagle and avoid a scandal by forthwith leaving the country and going to reside abroad."

When Eulenburg did nothing his enemies took the offensive. Bülow stood by him until the case came to court, where the testimony of an ignorant fisherman caused the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty. Eulenburg's wife and a few friends continued to insist that Holstein had framed him. Guilty or innocent, Eulenburg had compromised not only himself but the Kaiser and the whole imperial hierarchy. More than once Bülow had to answer embarrassing questions from Reichstag deputies who demanded why no one had warned the Kaiser against the vices of his friends.

Much of the power the Reichstag enjoyed in Germany at this time lay in its nuisance value, and the Socialist members made more of a nuisance of themselves than the members of any other party. The German historian Mommsen said the Social Democrats had created "the only party in Germany which has any claim to political respect." The Kaiser, on the other hand, regarded all Socialists as traitors, and Bülow used the other parties' fear of Socialism to further his own conservative aims. In 1903 the Socialists polled one-third of all votes cast, but the Catholic Center Party elected more Reichstag deputies because the "rotten borough" system denied fair representation to the big cities, where the Socialists predominated. In 1907 the Socialists increased their popular vote from three to three and a quarter millions, but lost almost half their seats because the other parties combined and ran a single candidate against the Socialist in many districts. Again, the Center won the largest bloc of Reichstag seats, and its members worked closely with the Conservative Agrarians.

By this time the naval building program was increasing the national debt at an alarming rate, and Bülow saw but one solution: an inheritance tax. Most of the Conservatives and all the Centrists turned against him. The Socialists came to his support because they did not hate the naval program so much as they loved higher taxes on the rich. Financial questions bored the Kaiser; he could not understand that a big navy cost big money and that governments raise money by raising taxes. Also, anything the Socialists wanted must be bad for Germany. Bülow's enemies whispered to the Kaiser that his Chancellor was scheming to become the real ruler of Germany.

The showdown came on June 24, 1909, when the Reichstag rejected by a vote of one hundred and ninety-five to one hundred and eighty-seven the bill that Bülow had approved, calling for an inheritance tax. The Socialists, Independents, and National Liberals supported Bülow as



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

A British Dreadnought Fires a Broadside

a bloc. The Center Party and the Poles voted solidly against him. What turned the tide was the division among the Conservatives, most of whom opposed the new tax. The Kaiser had two alternatives: He could dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections, or he could accept Bülow's resignation and appoint a new Chancellor who would not insist upon the inheritance tax. He chose the second course.

Because the Kaiser lived in a world of his own he had little understanding of the loss he suffered in Bülow's departure. It was not that Bülow's policies had succeeded or would have succeeded. It was that the Kaiser had created Bülow, who came to symbolize a certain continuity and stability in the conduct of German affairs. Having directed German foreign policy for twelve years and having served as Chancellor for nine, Bülow had made it impossible for the Kaiser to train a successor. And the German system of government gave no scope to a responsible opposition.

Moreover, Bülow, with all his shortcomings, had shown a growing awareness of the dangers into which Germany was drifting. His decision to wage a finish fight on the inheritance tax displayed a breadth of vision unusual in a man of his background. But Professor Sidney B. Fay, a close student of the period, once surmised that the real explanation of Bülow's departure lay in his determination to reach some sort of naval agreement with England. If that was indeed the case, Bülow deserves more credit than most historians have given him.

Bülow gave more than his name to the era in which he held high

office. The German people responded to Bülow's self-assurance as they responded to the Kaiser's energy. The German people did not share the vanity and fear that lay behind the Kaiser's energy; they did not share the laziness and conceit that lay behind Bülow's self-assurance. But just as the Kaiser and Bülow failed, somehow, to come off as human beings, so the German people somehow seemed inadequate to their position in the world. The Kaiser masqueraded as a great Emperor; Bülow masqueraded as a great statesman; the German people, assured by their leaders of their own greatness, found it easy to think well of themselves. Had any of their leaders transcended their own limitations, the German people might have done the same, but it was hardly surprising, in the circumstances, that neither of those two miracles occurred.

Most of the weaknesses of the German Empire lay close to the top. During the first twenty years of the Kaiser's reign, Berlin society lost more in character than it gained in prestige. The Kaiser surrounded himself with the newly rich, but he had no taste for pleasure, no interest in culture. Berlin society, during the Bülow era, therefore lacked the glitter of London, the brilliance of Paris. The old aristocracy considered the Kaiser a boor; the new-rich considered him a bore. Berlin society led a life of lavishness without luxury, of ostentation without style.

The Eulenburg scandal brought all the frustration and decadence of the Bülow era into the open. Berlin had no equivalent of the swank Jockey Clubs of London and Paris until the Kaiser attended the opening of the new Union Club, which threatened to put the old, stuffy Casino, on the Pariser Platz, out of business. All the best people joined the Union, which soon became such a center of gambling that the commander of the Berlin garrison had to insist that all officers who belonged to it resign either from the club or from the Army. But dissipation of every kind continued, and though the Kaiser himself led an exemplary moral life, many of his closest cronies—including Chancellor Bülow himself—did not. So little did the Kaiser know of the world that when he learned of the charges against Eulenburg, he insisted on having the whole case exposed. As his more sophisticated advisers warned him, this did not cast him in the role he had expected to play as relentless moral avenger. Instead, it revealed him as the friend, if not the protector, of degenerates.

The Eulenburg scandal suggested that those who attacked the whole imperial system had understated the case against it. Meanwhile, the Socialists continued to draw their growing mass following from the trade unions by demanding social reforms. A few writers of talent also expressed sympathy for the common people—notably the playwright Gerhart Hauptmann and the novelist Hermann Sudermann. Two pub-

lishing houses, Scherl and Ullstein, were issuing low-priced magazines and newspapers for the same mass public to which Alfred Harmsworth was appealing in Great Britain and which Hearst and Pulitzer were reaching in the United States. Maximilian Harden was becoming a small-size, German version of S. S. McClure, but neither the German public nor their public officials approved of muckraking. German authors and German musicians could count on large, serious, and appreciative audiences, but popular taste followed rather conventional lines.



BROWN BROTHERS

Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg

The middle class prospered during the Bülow era in Germany, just as it prospered in the France of Clemenceau and Briand, in the Britain of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, in the United States of Roosevelt and Taft. Its virtues and values became national virtues and values. The rich preached and practiced hard work; all but the industrial workers tried to improve their individual conditions rather than their conditions as a class. In spite of the Kaiser's imperial posturing, regional feeling persisted. The Bavarians still had their own King and their own Ambassador at Berlin. The Saxons and the Rhinelanders still resented the domination of Prussia. Germany still lacked the established national traditions that gave the Western democracies a sense of unity. Germany also remained a halfway house between the tyranny of the East and the liberty of the West. It did not entirely belong to either world and had not yet created a valid world of its own.

The departure of Bülow snapped the strongest link between the Kaiser and his people. And it was typical of Bülow and his time that he did not belong either to the Kaiser or to the people, but represented only himself. He had always assumed that everything would continue of its own accord and that he could survive any storm, but something had gone wrong. Had he miscalculated or did the whole shaky structure which he had always taken for granted suffer from some hidden, vital weakness?

As Bülow's successor, the Kaiser chose Dr. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, a gawky, honorable, absent-minded civil servant of a distinguished Frankfurt family. Bethmann had headed the Ministry of

the Interior under Bülow, who reminded the Kaiser that his successor had had no experience in foreign affairs. The Kaiser cheerfully agreed but declared he had become such an expert himself that he would take over the personal direction of German foreign policy. Bethmann had the temperament of a professor, not of a politician. His wife said that his inability to make up his mind had become a standing family joke. After Bethmann had received his appointment as Imperial Chancellor, Bülow quoted him as having spoken these last words of parting: "On the whole, perhaps it would be better not to. . . . Unless . . . Let me put it this way." Into Bethmann's fumbling hands the Kaiser consigned the responsibilities that Bülow had already betrayed.

SUMMING UP

BÜLOW had triumphed on the wrong issues and met defeat on the right ones. He played up the Kaiser's suspicions of England and thus encouraged the naval expansion program which made agreement with England impossible. He backed Austrian expansion in the Balkans and thus found himself rubbing the salt of defeat into Russia's wounds after Austria had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. German relations with France had always been bad enough. Now German relations with Britain and Russia deteriorated, too. Europe avoided war at the time of the Bosnian crisis largely because none of the great powers wanted to fight. But the Bosnian crisis revealed anarchy in high places and increased suspicion and fear. It also encouraged the Western powers to believe that the choice between war and peace lay in their hands and that the backward, turbulent Balkans need not cause too much concern. The Tsar and his advisers, on the other hand, made up their minds to settle accounts with the perfidious Austrians at some more favorable, future time.

The Square Deal in the White House


How Theodore Roosevelt spent the four happiest years of his life and why the American people enjoyed them almost as much as he did.

PREVIEW

THE FULL four-year term that Theodore Roosevelt served as President from 1905 to 1909 saw him at the top of his form. He kept his head in foreign affairs and started backing away from some of the riskier commitments he had once supported in the Far East. At home he called for the "Square Deal" and rounded off his domestic reform program by subjecting the railroads to tighter federal control. As the election of 1908 drew near he picked Taft to succeed him. The choice did not go down too well with the voters, who elected Taft, but by a much smaller majority than they had elected Roosevelt in 1904. Except for a setback in 1907, times remained good. Roosevelt had given the American people what they wanted. It was up to Taft to carry on.

• I •

A FEW MONTHS before Prince Bülow resigned as Imperial German Chancellor another world figure quit high office. Theodore Roosevelt had spent seven and a half ecstatic years as President of the United States. The first three and a half years that he lived in the White House, completing McKinley's unfinished term, sometimes seemed as if they would never end. He could hardly wait for his chance to serve four years in his own right—to cease being "a political accident"—and when that chance came how those years flew by. Flushed with his own victory in 1904, Roosevelt had pledged himself not to seek another term. Two consolations remained to him. When 1908 came around he picked his Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, to succeed him. And when Taft moved into the White House in 1909 Roosevelt got away from it all by dashing off to darkest Africa on a hunting expedition which slaughtered more than three thousand wild animals in less than a year. The boys in the back rooms of many a saloon drank, "Health to the lions!"



"And Now?"


During his second term in the White House Roosevelt presided over the Portsmouth Peace Conference between Russia and Japan in 1905 and backed the British and French Governments at Algeciras a year later. But the United States played no part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina affair, and during Roosevelt's last two years in the White House the only foreign issue that seriously engaged his attention had to do with the state of California's exclusion of Japanese immigrants from its schools. By 1900 some seventy-five thousand Japanese had settled in the United States, most of them in California. Men in their twenties, eager to learn English, demanded admission to the primary grades of public schools, and in October, 1906, the San Francisco School Board ordered them to attend special Oriental schools with Chinese and Koreans. The measure affected only ninety-three Japanese of all ages, and Roosevelt denounced it as "discreditable to us as a nation," pointing out that under the Treaty of 1894 the Japanese enjoyed all rights except the right to become naturalized citizens. That right, too, the President urged Congress to grant the Japanese, giving this characteristic reason: "Japanese soldiers and sailors have shown themselves equal in combat to any of whom history makes note." He even went so far in his annual message to Congress as to recommend the use of "all of the forces, military and civil, of the United States" to safeguard the rights of the West Coast Japanese. Congress did not declare war upon California, but Mayor Smitz of San Francisco, a former bassoon player then under indictment for graft, visited the White House and agreed to make no more trouble when Roosevelt promised to check the influx of Japanese. The Tokyo Government signed a "gentleman's agreement" in

accord with that promise but did not entirely live up to its terms, and on July 13, 1907, Roosevelt wrote his Secretary of State, Elihu Root, "I am more concerned over the Japanese situation than any other. Thank Heaven we have our Navy in good shape."

What had happened to make the President so alarmed? Only a few years before, most Americans had applauded and admired Japan's victory over Russia. Now, everybody was discussing the "Yellow Peril." To begin with, many Japanese resented the Portsmouth peace settlement, with which Roosevelt had associated himself, and their nationalist newspapers and politicians therefore abused the United States. In the second place, it was one thing for the United States to patronize Japan as long as it looked like the cocky underdog, fighting against enormous odds; it was something else again to welcome the sudden emergence of this new, aggressive power in the Far East. During and after the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt had crusaded for the annexation of the Philippines. In the summer of 1907 he wrote to Secretary Taft: "The Philippine Islands form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that in some way and with some phraseology that you think wise you should state to them that if they handle themselves wisely in their legislative assembly we shall at the earliest possible moment give them a nearly complete independence." And although Roosevelt showed admirable courage in championing the rights of Japanese settlers in California, he did not perhaps make sufficient allowance for the fears and prejudices that cheap Japanese labor, low Japanese living standards, and painstaking Japanese farming methods aroused among descendants of the forty-niners.

In December, 1907, Roosevelt performed what he described afterward in his autobiography as "the most important service that I rendered to peace." He inspired and sanctioned the round-the-world cruise of sixteen battleships of the United States Navy—the "White Fleet"—with twelve thousand officers and men aboard. As in the seizure of the Panama Canal Zone, the President planned the whole affair without consulting his Cabinet, and once again his initiative got the results he wanted. The appearance of American war vessels in Tokyo Bay both sobered and flattered the Japanese, whose schoolchildren greeted the visiting bluejackets by singing "The Star-Spangled Banner" in English. News of this welcome also built up good will for Japan in the United States as well as among the officers and men of the White Fleet itself. Finally, the publicity that accompanied the fleet all the way around the world ensured generous naval appropriations from Congress for years to come.

Only Roosevelt himself and a few of his closest advisers—notably,



BROWN BROTHERS

The White Fleet Returns

Secretary of State Root—knew all the pressures and frictions that might have led to war at this time. The British Naval Intelligence took good care to let the President hear the British Admiralty's opinion that its Japanese ally could defeat the United States Navy in the Pacific. American officers in Russia informed the President that the Japanese planned to seize the entire Pacific coast, including Alaska, and to make California a Japanese colony. From the Kaiser came the most ominous reports of all. He asked the United States Ambassador at Berlin to inform Roosevelt personally, and Roosevelt alone, that "one of my men who has just come back from Mexico . . . tells me that Mexico is filled with Japanese. They have gone there in large numbers of late, and are distributing themselves throughout the country as laborers and farm hands. . . . There is no doubt that they are soldiers. . . . Tell the President that we estimate that there are in Mexico at present ten thousand regular Japanese soldiers. And the Ministers in Peru and Chile report the same thing from those countries."

Sobered by the responsibility of office, Roosevelt kept his information to himself. Had he chosen to foment a war scare and even, perhaps, promote a war, he had all the necessary ingredients. But he had completely changed his mind about the Philippines. In the nineties he had sought war with Spain in order to acquire them; now he was prepared to give them up rather than court war with Japan. The Hearst papers added to his anxiety. In 1898 they had thundered with him against Spain; now they enraged him by thundering as loudly against Japan. Nevertheless, he kept his head.

Balfour in Britain and the Kaiser in Germany had both welcomed the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia. Might not a localized

war between the United States and Japan have similar advantages to Europe? Roosevelt had shown himself both excitable and naive. It was only natural for the British, Germans, and Russians to exploit his known weaknesses for their own ends. That Roosevelt did not succumb must be counted among his major triumphs. He had subdued a formidable adversary—himself.

• II •

ROOSEVELT also found time during his second term to devote considerable energy to domestic matters. From the moment he entered the White House he had promoted the conservation of natural resources. Thanks to his speeches, his appointments, and his messages to Congress, the Federal Government financed irrigation and soil-conservation projects, reforestation, and the development of national parks. Even Senator La Follette of Wisconsin—the most militant of the Progressives—extolled Roosevelt for having started a world-wide movement to check territorial waste and save for the human race those things “on which alone a peaceful, progressive, and happy life can be founded.” Nor could the Old Guard attack Roosevelt’s conservation program as a betrayal of his promise of 1901 “to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley.”

Roosevelt kept this promise for the same reason that he broke others: it served his interest to do so. But during his second term his Progressive supporters demanded action. Lincoln Steffens described in his autobiography his efforts to persuade Roosevelt to “fight the whole system.” But Roosevelt could not see beyond the corrupt political machine. “T. R. saw the machine,” wrote Steffens in his *Autobiography*, “he did not see the system. He saw the party organizations of the politicians; he saw some ‘bad’ trusts back of the bad politics, but he did not see the good trusts back of the bad trusts that were back of the bad machines.”

Steffens suggested that Roosevelt capitalize on his reputation as a reformer and “not play the crooked game of buying votes in Congress with federal appointments.” So long as Congressmen believed he would not play that game, they would ask less, prize more what they got, and serve him better for his few, reluctant concessions.

“No, no,” Roosevelt replied, “I’m going at it in my own way. I want service out of the men I appoint, too. So I’m going to pass the word that I’ll play the game, appoint their men for their support of my bills, but their men that I appoint have got to take my orders and obey them up to the hilt.” And Steffens, concluding that Roosevelt was much more a politician than a reformer, chided him by saying, “You don’t


stand for anything fundamental. All you represent is the square deal."

"That's it," Roosevelt shouted. "That's my slogan: the square deal. I'll throw it out in my next statement. The square deal."

The slogan always came first, the action afterward, if at all. On one of the relatively few occasions when Roosevelt did act, he attacked the preferential freight rates that the railroads granted to certain large corporations. In 1905 the House of Representatives voted almost unanimously to pass the so-called "Hepburn Act" giving the Interstate Commerce Commission much wider authority to fix all railroad freight rates. But the Senate Republicans balked. Roosevelt had to establish indirect contact with Senator "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, a picturesque South Carolina Democrat who took the Hepburn Bill in charge. The two men distrusted each other from the start, and when Roosevelt accepted a Republican compromise giving the courts some power to review the decisions of the I.C.C., Tillman felt that the man in the White House had betrayed him. But the amended Hepburn Act passed the Senate with only three dissenting votes, and most members of both Houses agreed that without Roosevelt's leadership at the start and his final willingness to compromise, no legislation could have gone through.

With the Hepburn Act on the statute books, Roosevelt's zeal for reform relaxed. The muck-rakers, whom he began to denounce, caused him increasing distress. In 1905 he regarded the growth of Socialism as "far more ominous than any Populist or similar movement in the past." A year later he wrote Taft, "I do not like the social conditions at present. The dull, purblind folly of the very rich men; their greed and arrogance . . . and the corruption in business and politics have tended to produce a very unhealthy condition of excitement and irritation in the popular mind which shows itself in the great increase of the socialistic propaganda."

The publication of *The Jungle* by Upton Sinclair, an avowed Socialist, showed which way the wind was blowing in 1906. Sinclair had planned *The Jungle* as a socialistic tract, but his reporting skill and his zeal to tell a story ran away with him and he found that he had written a novel. The picture he gave of the Chicago stockyards made the book an international sensation. "Really, Mr. Sinclair, you *must* keep your head," Roosevelt wrote the author, who had demanded instant action. From England, Winston Churchill sent this tribute to *The Jungle*: "This terrible book pierces the thickest skull and the most leathery heart. It enables those who sometimes think to understand. It is possible that this far-reaching book may be a factor in far-reaching events. The issue between capital and labor is far more clearly cut today [in the United States] than in any other communities or any other age."



Socialist Campaign Poster, 1904

BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Nor had the implications of *The Jungle* escaped Roosevelt, who, as it happened, felt an instinctive antipathy to Churchill—born, perhaps, of the many traits they shared. Writing to Lodge in 1906 about Churchill's life of his father, Roosevelt said, "I dislike the father and I dislike the son, so I may be prejudiced. Still, I feel that while the biographer and his subject possess some real far-sightedness, especially in their appreciation of that 'Society' which had so long been dominant in English politics and which produces in this country the missionary and the mugwump; they both possess or possessed such levity, such lack of sobriety, lack of permanent principle and inordinate thirst for the cheap form of admiration which is given to notoriety as to make them poor public servants."

Lodge agreed with Roosevelt. He had just met Churchill in England and found him "undoubtedly clever, but conceited to a degree which it is hard to express in words or figures and he was not at all sympathetic to me." And four years later, when Roosevelt visited England, he wrote Lodge, "I have refused to meet Winston Churchill, being able to avoid scandal by doing so."


By this time Roosevelt had come to like most Englishmen—after all, they liked him—and had revised the opinion he expressed in December, 1904: "The average Englishman is not a being whom I find congenial or with whom I care to associate. I wish him well, but I wish him

well at a distance. England has been friendly with us ever since we have grown so strong as to make her friendship of more moment to her than to us. If we quit building our fleet, England's friendship would immediately cool."

Although Roosevelt's opinion of the British changed, his essential conservatism did not. His progressive talk did not mean that he wished to overthrow the existing order. It meant that he wished to thrive, within that order, by substituting words for actions. Just as he believed in conserving natural resources, so he believed in conserving the "system" into which he had been born. He saw that the system needed reform, but only to make it more efficient and less corrupt. Hence his zeal for improving the civil service. And because he enjoyed a fight and loved popular acclaim, everything he did became a crusade.

Although Steffens wrote a lot about and against the "system," he did not himself coin the word. It first appeared in *Frenzied Finance*, by Thomas W. Lawson, a Wall Street plunger who won a large amount of fame and a rather smaller fortune exposing the methods of the world in which he had tried to operate. Lawson went the muck-rakers one better: he did not write an outsider's exposé but an insider's confession. The appearance of his book also benefited from the stock market panic of 1907 and the money panic of the following October when Roosevelt, who cared little about economics and knew less, lent himself to a big-business maneuver that he seems never to have fully understood. What happened was this. J. P. Morgan, Judge Elbert Gary, and Henry C. Frick decided to increase the holdings of United States Steel by playing upon the President's excitable temperament. One evening, after a quiet dinner in Morgan's home, Gary and Frick took the night train to Washington, hurried over to the White House, and informed Roosevelt before breakfast that unless he approved the sale of the Tennessee Steel and Iron interests to United States Steel at less than one-fifth of their real value, the banking crisis would get worse. The man who scourged the "malefactors of great wealth" swallowed the bait and the biggest of all the trusts came out of the 1907 panic bigger than ever. Nevertheless, the conservative New York *Sun* had apostrophized Roosevelt: "Hail Caesar! We who are about to bust salute thee!" And Frick, dissatisfied with the limited services the President rendered, declared afterward, "He got down on his knees before us. We bought the son of a bitch, and then he did not stay bought."

For Wall Street in general went right on fearing and hating Roosevelt. His immense energy encouraged the rumor that he drank to excess. The truth was that he suffered only from autointoxication—and from overeating. The law's delay also aroused in Roosevelt an insolence of office that angered his opponents. When the Circuit Court of Appeals in



ACME

Labor Conference, 1905. Left to right, Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, James J. Hill, and John Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers of America

Illinois invalidated the twenty-nine-million-dollar fine that District Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis had imposed on the Standard Oil Company for alleged acceptance of railroad rebates, Roosevelt declared: "There is altogether too much power on the bench." It was this kind of statement that gave him a radical reputation in conservative circles.

In radical circles, on the other hand, Roosevelt earned a better-deserved reputation as a conservative. His personal associations showed where his heart lay. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had guided him to the White House, and the two men remained on terms of the closest intimacy throughout the next seven and a half years. But Roosevelt came to admire Elihu Root, his senior by thirteen years, even more. "The brutal friend," said Roosevelt of Root, "to whom I pay the most attention." He also called Root "the greatest man who has arisen on either side of the Atlantic in my lifetime." Elihu Root had come from upstate New York, where his father taught mathematics at Hamilton College. The son was graduated from Hamilton, taught for a year, then took his law degree in New York City. Like the sons of many other underpaid ministers and professors, Root devoted his trained mind to making the money that his family had always lacked. He succeeded brilliantly and by the early 1880's had become one of the most highly



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

William Howard Taft with His Sons, Charles P. (left) and Robert A. (right)

paid corporation lawyers of the day. At this point Root's sense of obligation to the community asserted itself. He entered politics as a reform Republican and became United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, from 1883 to 1885. Returning to his private law practice, he made more money than ever until he joined the McKinley Cabinet in 1899 as Secretary of War. Here he reorganized the Army and created the General Staff, retaining his post until 1904, when Taft replaced him. In 1905 he returned to Washington to become Secretary of State.

As Secretary of State Root signed arbitration treaties with more than a dozen foreign countries. He was chosen honorary president of the Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. He made a goodwill tour of Latin America, returning in time to speak against William Randolph Hearst, who ran for governor of New York on the Democratic ticket. Root recalled that Roosevelt's first message to Congress had described McKinley's assassin as inflamed "by the reckless utterances of those who . . . in the public press appealed to the dark and evil spirits of malice and greed, envy and sullen hatred." And Root added: "I say by the President's authority that in penning these words, with the horror of President McKinley's murder fresh before him, he had Mr. Hearst specifically in mind. And I say by his authority that what he thought of Mr. Hearst then, he thinks of Mr. Hearst now."

As 1908 drew near Roosevelt finally picked Taft as his successor. Two years before he had said, "I would rather see Elihu Root in the White House than any other man now possible. I would walk on my hands and

knees from the White House to the Capitol to see Root made President. But I know it cannot be done. He couldn't be elected. There is too much opposition to him on account of his corporation connections." Root, of course, had little in common with those Republicans who called themselves progressives. Neither did Taft, whom Roosevelt came to admire as the very antithesis of himself.


"You know," Roosevelt once said to his military aide, Captain Archie Butt, "I think Taft has the most lovable personality I have ever come in contact with. I almost envy a man possessed of a personality like Taft's. People are always prepossessed by it. One loves him at first sight. He has nothing to overcome when he meets people. I realize that I always have got to overcome a little something before I get to the heart of people. No one could accuse *me* of having a charming personality."

Once when Roosevelt left Washington he remarked, "Oh, things will be all right. I have left Taft sitting on the lid." And when Roosevelt had difficult assignments he usually turned them over to Taft. A newspaper poet paid this tribute:

*Pattern for all beneath the sun
To Taft award the palm and bun!
They told him what they wanted done—
He done it.*

Roosevelt and Taft made an effective team, and Mark Sullivan in *Our Times* summed up Taft's qualities this way: "Wherever a tension needed the solvent of good will, or friction the oil of benevolence; wherever suspicion needed the antidote of frankness or wounded pride the disinfectant of a hearty laugh—there Taft was sent." Taft himself had little enthusiasm for the role to which Roosevelt had assigned him. Twice, in deference to Roosevelt's wishes, he had passed up opportunities to accept an appointment to the Supreme Court, which he could have had for the asking. His mother—untrue to national type—never wanted to see her son in the White House. She, too, preferred the Supreme Court. His brothers, however, wanted him elected President and his wife's ambitions also moved in that direction, although she always feared ultimate betrayal at Roosevelt's hands. She seemed to have no immediate cause for concern as the Republican National Convention of 1908, acting on virtual orders from the President, overwhelmingly nominated Taft on the first ballot. A few weeks later Roosevelt wrote Taft, "You blessed old trump. I have always said you would be the greatest President, bar only Washington and Lincoln, and I feel mighty inclined to strike out the exceptions."

In 1904 Roosevelt, running as a progressive Republican, defeated Alton B. Parker, who ran as a conservative Democrat by almost three-



BROWN BROTHERS

Bryan Wired for Sound

million votes. In 1908 Taft, running as a moderate Republican, defeated Bryan, who ran as a radical Democrat, by slightly more than a million and a quarter votes. Although Taft's total vote exceeded Roosevelt's, the Republicans had lost in four years more than half their lead over the Democrats. Taft also lost five states that Roosevelt had carried and in five more states Democratic candidates for governor defeated Republicans. Charles Evans Hughes had barely nosed out William Randolph Hearst in New York—thanks largely to the personal intervention of Roosevelt and Root. Bryan had made a strong campaign; Taft a weak one. Both men wound up claiming the Roosevelt mantle, but Roosevelt's active championship of Taft probably turned the tide. Bryan had also done himself some harm by advocating the nationalization of railways. That was rather more than most Americans were prepared to accept in 1908.

• III •

AS LONG as Roosevelt remained in the White House he gave the American people a grand show. He took up the cause of simplified spelling. He attacked "nature fakers." He discovered new ways to exploit the



BROWN BROTHERS

Hearst Supporters during 1908 Campaign for Governor of New York

press. Recognizing that the news columns and the front page commanded far more attention than the editorial columns, he timed many of his announcements for Monday morning release when other news ran short. He also originated the "trial-balloon" technique and gave favored correspondents "off-the-record" statements that they attributed to "authoritative sources." If the statement caught on, Roosevelt would make it his own. If it fell flat, he would drop it.

The President's physical feats often provided newspaper copy. On January 13, 1909, two months before he quit the White House, Roosevelt made up his mind to dramatize the need for a stiff horseback test for all naval officers. To show that he was not demanding more of a young man of twenty than he could do himself at the age of forty-nine, overweight, and blind in one eye, he set out on a hundred-mile ride, accompanied by his military aide, Captain Archie Butt, and two naval officers. They left the White House at half-past three in the morning and returned at eight-thirty that night, having completed their ride in the teeth of a blizzard. Roosevelt's sons had a private nickname for him—"the old lion"—and one of them is said to have remarked of him: "Father hates to go to weddings and funerals because he cannot be the groom or the corpse." Archie Butt, in his *Letters*, quoted something that Roose-

velt once said about Taft that threw light on the character of both men: "If I were Taft, I would not attempt to take much exercise. I would content myself with the record I was able to make in the next four years or the next eight and then be content to die. The life in the White House will be sufficiently strenuous for him without fretting about exercise, and I do not think exercise does Taft any good. It does not do to try to live too long. Many people are urging me not to go to Africa, as I may get killed or catch sleeping sickness or die in a thousand and one ways. I am ready to die any time. Certainly the fear of dying would not deter me from doing what I want to do."

Although Roosevelt's personality hung together, his policies did not. Lincoln Steffens mocked him for not attacking "the system." But how many Americans would have supported the kind of attack Steffens demanded and how clearly did Steffens—or any American of the time—understand the nature of the system? As Senator La Follette remarked: "T. R. is the ablest living interpreter of what I would call the superficial public sentiment of a given time and he is spontaneous in his reaction to it." Roosevelt concentrated his fire on bad trusts and bad politicians. The muck-rakers and reformers opposed all trusts and all political machines. Louis D. Brandeis of Boston, the outstanding crusading lawyer of his day, argued that the United States suffered from what he called "the curse of bigness" and regarded almost any small enterprise as intrinsically superior to almost any big one.

Roosevelt saw and attacked the corruption in both business and politics, but he saw no connection between the two. The reformers saw the connection between business and politics, but few of them saw what applied science was doing to business, politics, and everything else. Neither Roosevelt nor the reformers did anything to help the Wright brothers develop the heavier-than-air flying machine that they had invented in 1903. The bankers failed to exploit the possibilities of the automobile. It took the vision of a former mechanic named Henry Ford to create the first low-cost, mass-produced car for a mass public—and he got no help from the banks. A Philadelphia engineer named Frederick W. Taylor installed what he called "scientific management" in many large industries, cutting production costs in two, doubling and tripling the output of labor. But most of organized labor fought "Taylorism" because it reduced the worker to a speeded-up cog in the machine; the older established industries hesitated to take up such a revolutionary method; the politicians did not know what it was all about.

Life in the United States did not stand still during the Roosevelt years. So many changes were going on at so many different levels that nobody could co-ordinate them. By and large, however, the abused "system" delivered the goods and offered enough opportunity to pre-

serve the American public's faith in its own institutions. The new-rich displayed a growing sense of *noblesse oblige*, if not of social conscience. Having become the outstanding figure in the American steel industry, Andrew Carnegie proclaimed that to die rich was to die disgraced. During his lifetime he gave away more than \$350,000,000, most of which went into the construction of libraries all over the world and into the establishment of the Carnegie Corporation, with an endowment of \$125,000,000 for the promotion of education, learning, and scientific research.



BROWN BROTHERS

John D. Rockefeller

John D. Rockefeller also turned over most of his still larger fortune to humanitarian and educational projects. In November, 1908, his Rockefeller Foundation donated one million dollars to fight hookworm disease, a debilitating ailment of the digestive tract which afflicted some seven million poverty-stricken persons in the Southern states. Dr. Charles Wardell Stiles of the United States Public Health Service got on the track of the cure, but he received little aid from the Government and much mockery from the press, which ridiculed the "germ of laziness" as it had ridiculed the Wright brothers. But the Rockefeller Foundation believed in Dr. Stiles, and together they worked out what Dr. Charles W. Eliot of Harvard called "the most effective campaign against a wide-spreading disease which medical science and philanthropy have ever combined to combat."

J. Pierpont Morgan had less money than Carnegie or Rockefeller, but more power. Carnegie and Rockefeller each dominated a single industry. Morgan's domination of American finance led Lincoln Steffens to call him "the boss of all the bosses." Perhaps because Morgan had inherited a fortune from his father he did not feel so close to the people as the self-made Rockefeller or Carnegie and therefore took less interest in philanthropy. On the other hand, Morgan performed a unique service in his capacity as banker. McKinley had put the dollar on a gold basis, but neither under McKinley, Roosevelt, nor Taft did the country have a central banking system. Each bank stood alone and had to rely on its own resources to meet any sudden run that might occur. Morgan had not created this state of affairs, but he took advantage of it, and

both Cleveland and Roosevelt had to turn to him to pull the country through two serious financial panics.

Morgan became the symbol of Wall Street and the money power, and when Morgan spoke the country listened. On December 11, 1908, he was quoted in the newspapers as having recited to a group of friends in Chicago these words that his father had preached to him: "Remember, my son, that any man who is a bear upon the future of this country will go broke. There may be times when things are dark and cloudy in America, when uncertainty will cause some to distrust, and others to think there is too much production, too much building of railroads, and too much other enterprise. In such times, and at all times, remember that the growth of this vast country will take care of us all."

Other fathers repeated the same words to other sons long after Morgan recalled them to the generation of 1908. They breathed the assurance of the men who had developed and exploited the United States since the Civil War. During this period only a tiny minority had reached the summits of wealth and power. But a substantial proportion of Americans had died better off than they were born, and still more hoped for better things for their children. More young people were going to colleges than had gone to high schools a generation before. The farmers had their troubles, but their farms produced sturdy sons and daughters, many of whom deserted the soil but carried on into city life the vigor that so many children of the soil possess. At the same time, more than a million immigrants were pouring across the Atlantic Ocean every year, and though they included some misfits and ne'er-do-wells, the great majority of them had the enterprise to pull up stakes and set out in the footsteps of earlier pioneers.

A leader with Roosevelt's vigor could not fail to appeal to so vigorous a people. A country growing so rapidly as the United States could not fail to suffer from the usual growing pains. The insurgent spirit spread during the Roosevelt years, but it never became a revolutionary spirit. Moreover, two unseen revolutions were already well under way. During the nineteenth century the railroads, shipping lines, and factories that had made the world-wide industrial revolution possible used coal as fuel and steam as power. But in the United States the gasoline-driven internal-combustion engine was already beginning to revolutionize transportation and farming, while the hydroelectric generator was beginning to rival the steam engine as a source of industrial power.

Theodore Roosevelt's America observed these changes, but few people understood them and nobody related them to a comprehensive national program. And no wonder. As Roosevelt's contemporary, Henry Adams, pointed out, he and all his generation had not been educated to live in the twentieth century. All of Adams's reading and study in



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Harry K. Thaw in Court during His Trial

Evelyn Nesbit, in Private Life Mrs. Harry K. Thaw

Europe availed him little more than the education that other Americans of his time received from their *McGuffey Readers*. Moreover, "things were in the saddle and rode mankind." After seven and a half years of Roosevelt, the trusts and Wall Street were still going strong. The Republican Old Guard had made some concessions, but "sound as a dollar" meant just what it said—and a dollar was what an unskilled laborer got for a day's toil. "Another day, another dollar," the saying went.

When times were good this workingman could buy a large glass of beer for a nickel and satisfy his hunger at the free lunch counter of the bar. When times were bad he stood in the bread line. In summer he and his family might enjoy an occasional trip on an excursion steamer, but the best that most of them could hope for was a cooling ride on an open trolley car. Bleacher seats at the ball game cost a quarter. Five cents bought a ticket to a nickelodeon, where the kinetoscope showed moving pictures of *Romeo and Juliet*, *Rip van Winkle*, and *The Great Train Robbery* as well as real-life views of politicians, prize fights, and events of the day. Some of these nickelodeons—long, low-ceilinged, unventilated rooms with a single upright piano furnishing all the music—carried warnings: "Do not stamp your feet. The floor may cave in." But in 1908 the movies were already becoming big business. More than two hundred thousand New Yorkers—three-quarters of them women and children—attended every day, and the theatrical trade papers recognized that a new and lucrative art form had appeared, while clergymen, social workers, and fire inspectors denounced them as menaces to public morals, health, and safety. On Christmas Eve, 1908, Mayor Gaynor of



BROWN BROTHERS

William Randolph Hearst in His Office

New York therefore revoked the licenses of all the five hundred and fifty nickelodeons in the city. The infant movie industry at once promised to clean its own house, and within a few days the nickelodeons opened for business again.

The sensational press caused increasing concern too. When the Hearst papers were not beating the drums for war with Japan, they devoted more space to personal scandals than to political muck-raking. The murder of Stanford White by Harry K. Thaw on June 25, 1906, attracted as much attention as the Dreyfus case in France and dragged on even longer. It also gave rise to more and bigger head-

lines than any single action taken by the President. Thaw, a degenerate young Pittsburgh millionaire, shot White, one of the outstanding architects of the time, because of White's supposed attentions to Thaw's show-girl wife, Evelyn Nesbit. The murder took place in full public view on the roof of New York's Madison Square Garden, one of the many buildings that White had designed. The sob sisters and ghost writers of the Hearst press took up the cudgels—for Thaw, whose attorney, Delphin Delmas of San Francisco, put on a show as dramatic as his name. He invoked the unwritten law; he coined the phrase "brain storm" to describe Thaw's crime; he invented a new affliction, *dementia americana*, from which he said Thaw suffered. The jury in the first trial deadlocked. Not until the spring of 1908 did the second trial end with a verdict of "not guilty because insane"—and this after a commission during the first trial had pronounced Thaw sane. The legal delays continued, one of Thaw's appeals finally reaching the Supreme Court of the United States, which refused at the end of December, 1909, to release him from a hospital for the criminally insane.

The Thaw case eventually became an American phenomenon. The play given it by the sensational press forced the more conservative papers to cover it too, thus debasing the standards of taste and journalism all along the line. But if the sensational newspapers set a pace that the others felt they had to follow, the immense popular interest that they aroused reflected upon their readers as well as upon their publishers, editors, and reporters. More and more Americans craved ex-

citement for the sake of excitement, and they found this excitement not in their own lives and problems but in the violent experiences of a world to which very few of them would ever gain access.

Theodore Roosevelt had satisfied some of this hunger for excitement in the American soul, but by 1908 he had come to a temporary dead end. He had left a vast accumulation of unfinished business, and when the time came to pick a successor he did not so much as consider supporting anyone with a personality more spectacular or a program more radical than his own. The victory of the stolid Taft over the volatile Bryan vindicated Roosevelt's judgment. Apparently the mass of the people were still prepared, or resigned, to take their chances with the law of supply and demand and to make the best of a dog-eat-dog, devil-take-the-hindmost society. Yet the nineteenth century, with its unrestricted competition and uncontrolled prices, was as dead as McKinley. In this period of uncertain transition, William Howard Taft entered the White House.

SUMMING UP

THEODORE ROOSEVELT shared the defects as well as the qualities of his people and his time. He had courage, curiosity, optimism, energy. He loved laughter and he loved even more to hear himself talk, frequently mistaking words for actions and self-righteousness for virtue. Although he often gave way to the emotional impulses of a small child, something more than bluster kept him going. With responsibility came maturity. During his final four years in the White House he showed an unsuspected capacity for growth as his native shrewdness asserted itself more and more. But Roosevelt had risen to the very top so early in life that he found himself at the peak of his powers after his greatest opportunities had already passed. He was not yet fifty when he turned over the Presidency to Taft, and already the progressive wave that he had ridden for eight years had swept ahead of him.

The Man Who Was Too Big to Be President

How Taft failed as President because he did the right things the wrong way at home and the wrong things the wrong way abroad.


PREVIEW

THE COOLING-OFF PERIOD between Roosevelt and his successor began even before Taft became President and never warmed up during four unhappy White House years. Yet Taft's record of accomplishment dwarfed Roosevelt's; it was as a showman that he failed. The break between the two men came when Taft inadvertently showed that Roosevelt had permitted United States Steel to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Roosevelt ended up seeking the Presidency on a third-party ticket, thus ensuring the victory of the Democrats and Woodrow Wilson. Abroad, Taft had taken up dollar diplomacy, with mixed success in Latin America and with total failure in the Far East. Revolutions in Mexico and China suggested that the old order was in for violent change.

• I •

IN DECEMBER, 1908, Taft wrote to a friend: "I pinch myself every little while to make myself realize that it is all true. If I were now presiding in the Supreme Court of the United States as chief justice, I should feel entirely at home, but with the troubles of selecting a Cabinet and the difficulties in respect to the revisions of the tariff, I feel just a bit like a fish out of water. However, as my wife is the politician and she will be able to meet all these issues, perhaps we can keep a stiff upper lip and overcome the obstacles that just at present seem so formidable." Two months later, in another personal letter, Taft summed up his intentions: "Mr. Roosevelt's function has been to preach a crusade against certain evils. He has aroused the people to demand reform. It becomes my business to put that reform into legal execution by the suggestion of certain amendments of the statute in the government machinery."

Those statements give the quintessence of Taft. In one way, he felt that his judicial temperament unfitted him for political office. In another



ACME

President Taft Opens the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, 1909. His military aide, Captain Archie Butt, stands at his left in uniform

way, he felt that this same judicial temperament made him well suited to put into effect the program that Roosevelt had put into words. "What I am anxious to do," he wrote between his election and his inauguration, "is to do something, and not to make a pronunciamiento, and then, at the end of my administration, have nothing to point to." And with the figure of Roosevelt perhaps already preying on his subconscious mind, he added that he wanted to "point back to things done and not to a record of wind and hypocritical demagoguery."

Taft ran into his first troubles before Inauguration Day. Immediately after receiving the Republican nomination in the summer of 1908 he had indicated, in a moment of excitement, that he might keep all of Roosevelt's Cabinet intact. He not only changed his mind. He delayed so long in making his new selections known that Roosevelt began to prod him. Jimmy Sloan, who served as personal bodyguard to Roosevelt for seven years and stayed on with Taft, reported to Archie Butt that Roosevelt "got sore on" Taft at this time and said one night, "Jimmy, I may have to come back in four years to carry out my policies." Butt could never quite believe the story, but events bore out Sloan.

For example, Taft's delay in picking a new Cabinet antagonized most of Roosevelt's close friends in the old one. And when Taft finally did make up his mind, he selected no less than six corporation lawyers. This

confirmed the suspicions of the Progressives and at the same time gave further support to Lodge's charge that Taft knew nothing about politics. The night before Taft's inauguration the families of the incoming and outgoing Presidents dined together at the White House. Everyone felt uncomfortable; the old atmosphere of trust and friendship had already evaporated. And the next day Roosevelt set a new precedent by going direct from the inauguration ceremonies at the Capitol to the Union Station instead of riding back to the White House with his successor.

More misunderstandings followed. Taft received no reply to the farewell letter he sent to the ship on which Roosevelt sailed for Africa, and the two men did not correspond during Roosevelt's subsequent absence of more than a year. Nevertheless, Taft appointed Roosevelt special ambassador to represent the United States at the funeral of Edward VII of England in May, 1910. Europe had never seen anything quite like the rough-riding ex-President of the United States. Kings and Prime Ministers jostled themselves black and blue trying to get next to him, and the high point of his triumphant grand tour of the Continent came when he met the Kaiser. From this visit Roosevelt brought back and cherished a photograph of them both on which the Kaiser had written: "When we shake hands, we shake the world."

But when Roosevelt returned to the United States in June, 1910, he showed rather less consideration for his successor in the White House than he had for the German Emperor. Taft had written him: "It is now a year and three months since I assumed office and I have had a hard time. I do not know that I have had harder luck than other Presidents, but I do know that thus far I have succeeded far less than have others. I have been conscientiously trying to carry out your policies, but my method of doing so has not worked smoothly." Roosevelt, however, refused Taft's invitation to visit the White House, offering the hollow excuse that ex-Presidents do not frequent Washington. Although he pledged himself to keep his mouth shut for at least two months after his return, he waited only four days before throwing himself into New York State politics. He also conferred with Gifford Pinchot, whom Taft had dismissed as Chief Forester after Pinchot had attacked Secretary of the Interior Ballinger, his immediate superior. Root had reviewed the whole case for Taft and had advised him to fire Pinchot at once, but Roosevelt had ears only for the insurgents, all of whom conferred with him at Oyster Bay within a month after his return. Senator La Follette, the most militant of them all, declared afterward, "I am very much pleased with my visit to Colonel Roosevelt, very much pleased. I want to tell you that Colonel Roosevelt is the greatest living American and he is in fighting trim." Everyone who saw Roosevelt at this time agreed that he had "returned from Elba," as the expression went, a bigger man.

Whether he had also returned a better man seemed more open to question.

Taft had only one dubious achievement to show for his first fifteen months in the White House. Having pledged himself to lower tariffs, he summoned a special session of Congress and the House did pass a bill reducing many duties. The Senate, however, made more than eight hundred changes in the House bill, and more than six hundred of them increased the duties set by the House. Taft not only felt he had to sign the bill with the changes added by the Senate: he pronounced it "the best tariff bill the Republican Party ever passed." Whether this bill led, on the whole, to a reduction or an increase in tariff rates remains a disputed matter to this very day. Certainly it did not lead to any drop in the cost of living. It should be added, however, in fairness to Taft that he had the courage to defy Uncle Joe Cannon, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Nelson Aldrich, the chief Republican protectionist in the Senate. Roosevelt, on the other hand, had never dared to tackle the tariff question at all.

Taft also went on to put through more reforms in four years than Roosevelt had put through in seven. Roosevelt had confined his reform program to conservation of natural resources, tighter control over railroad freight rates, and passage of a Pure Food and Drugs Act; Taft put through the parcel post system, the system of postal savings banks, an extension of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, an eight-hour law for all government employees, expansion of the civil service, the popular election of Senators, and the graduated income tax. It wasn't only what Taft did or did not do. It was the way he did or didn't do it. In 1910 he appointed Associate Justice White—a Democrat, a Roman Catholic, and a former officer in the Confederate Army—to the position of Chief Justice of the United States. "If Taft were Pope," Cannon complained, "he'd want to appoint Protestants to the College of Cardinals." With that kind of leadership in the White House, no wonder the Democrats won control of the House of Representatives in the 1910 elections. Roosevelt did some speaking for Republican candidates, and the outcome of the voting convinced him that he had no political future. Indeed, as late as October 27, 1911, he wrote to Senator Hiram Johnson, the progressive young Republican from California, "I have no cause to think at the moment that there is any real or widely extended liking or trust in me among the masses of the people."

• II •

TAFT also had his misgivings about his own popularity. "I am a constant disappointment to my Party," he remarked to his wife in 1911. "The fact

of the matter is, the longer I am President the less of a Party man I seem to become." He showed himself as independent of Roosevelt as he did of the Old Guard. In fact, it was more than Taft's alleged desertion of the progressive cause that turned Roosevelt so completely against him: it was also his decision to bring anti-trust proceedings against United States Steel, which, with Roosevelt's approval, had acquired the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company for forty-five million dollars during the 1907 panic. A year later Judge Gary testified that the properties were worth at least two hundred million dollars and perhaps even two or three times more. In June, 1911, Taft instructed his Attorney General, George Wickersham, to investigate the monopoly practices of United States Steel and encouraged an investigation of its labor policies by the Department of Commerce and Labor. The investigation revealed that more than twenty thousand of the ninety thousand workers in the iron and steel industry worked twelve hours a day, seven days a week, and that ten thousand of them earned less than eighteen cents an hour.

In September Taft approved Wickersham's plan to sue the United States Steel Corporation for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. But Taft did not read the exact charges. He did not know that the suit rested on the acquisition of Tennessee Coal and Iron by United States Steel—a deal that Roosevelt had approved. When the newspaper headlines announced "Roosevelt Fooled," the crusader for righteousness hit the roof. It was bad enough that Taft's Attorney General had made him out a violator of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; what Roosevelt found hardest to forgive was that Taft had not even looked into the case. Although Roosevelt had not yet made any friendly gesture toward Taft and had surrounded himself with insurgents, he had not committed himself to breaking with Taft, much less to seeking the 1912 Republican nomination for himself. It was the suit against United States Steel that finally made Roosevelt the leader of the insurgent progressives.

Taft—no less human than Roosevelt—suffered from his share of delusions. He read only the newspapers that supported his policies and ignored the rising opposition. He also took pleasure in the company of men who sniped at Roosevelt. Word of course got right back to the Colonel, who found it easy to believe that the man he had put in the White House was betraying him. Most of Taft's troubles arose from his innocence and carelessness. Jimmy Sloan, after serving as personal bodyguard to both men, summed them up to Captain Butt: "In many way, Captain, I like this man [Taft] better than the other. He's finer in some points, but he doesn't see things as the other saw things." Butt also recalled these words of Taft's: "I could not ask his [Roosevelt's] advice on all questions. I could not subordinate my administration to him and retain my self-respect."

Roosevelt's more and more open support of the insurgents led Taft to concentrate his efforts on getting the 1912 Republican nomination. He came to care more about vindication at the hands of his Party than vindication at the hands of the country. "Sooner or later," he had predicted in 1910, "the country will demand its dose of Bryanism or its equivalent, and I am in favor of never again using such efforts as we did in the past to stay it. Educate the people if we can, but whatever the country thinks is right, whether it is right or wrong, it is right for it to have. Something has been radically wrong with our legislation in the past that such combinations have been formed under our laws and that we have to resort to all sorts of special legislation to counteract it. It may be that after all the opposition may have some remedy which we are unwilling or unable to try."

With the presidential election still two years off, Roosevelt could afford to express generous sentiments, too. He had taken up a doctrine that he called the New Nationalism, drawn from a new book by Herbert Croly—*The Promise of American Life*. Four years later Croly was to found *The New Republic* and endorse Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, but in 1910 he had made no more influential convert than Theodore Roosevelt, who said, "We are face to face with new conceptions of the relation of property to human welfare, chiefly because certain advocates of the rights of property against the rights of men have been pushing their claims too far. The man who wrongly holds that every human right is secondary to his profit must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man holds his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it."

The doctrine of the New Nationalism rubbed Taft the wrong way. He distrusted slogans as much as Roosevelt reveled in them; he concentrated on action as consistently as Roosevelt avoided it. Taft called the apostles of the New Nationalism "destructive radicals," "political emotionalists," and just plain "neurotics." A week later, in February, 1912, Roosevelt announced his decision to seek the Republican nomination for the Presidency with characteristic flair. "My hat," he proclaimed, "is in the ring." Taft still had one laugh left in his system. When his wife said, "I told you four years ago and you would not believe me," he replied, "I know you did, my dear, and I think you are perfectly happy now. I think you would rather have the Colonel come out against me than to have been wrong yourself." For the next several months, Taft and Roosevelt devoted most of their time to rounding up delegates to the Republican National Convention that met in Chicago on June 18. Taft had appointed many of the delegates to their political jobs and thus controlled the committees that controlled the convention. Roose-

vult, on the other hand, had the support of the Republican rank and file and denounced Taft as the creature of the bosses—those same bosses with whom Roosevelt had worked in 1904 and 1908 and with whom he was only too eager to work again. At first Taft refused to meet Roosevelt's personal attacks with personal counterattacks of his own, but in April his patience gave way. Roosevelt had said that Taft "has not only been disloyal to our past friendship but he has been disloyal to every canon of decency and fair play." Taft still refused to resort to personal abuse, preferring to make long speeches setting the record straight. Once, in a moment of weariness, he had blurted out, "Even a rat in a corner will fight," and at the end of another hard day he told Louis Seibold of the *New York World*, "Roosevelt was my closest friend," and burst into tears.

Both men showed complete yet natural disregard of the electorate. Roosevelt said, "It's a bad trait to bite the hand that feeds you," and Taft, some time earlier, had written to Roosevelt, "I can never forget that the power I now exercise was voluntarily transferred from you to me." Taft, in particular, may not have understood politics, but Roosevelt did not understand himself. Elihu Root, whom Roosevelt had once admired so much, said of him, "I have no doubt he thinks he believes what he says, but he doesn't. He has merely picked up certain ideas which were at hand as one might pick up a poker or chair with which to strike." Dr. Morton Prince, one of the American pioneers in the new science of psychology, predicted that Roosevelt would "go down in history as one of the most illustrious psychological examples of the distortion of mental processes through the forces of subconscious wishes." Wearing a large, new, black Rough Rider's hat, Roosevelt set out for the Chicago convention, three days before it met, trumpeting the battle cry that became the symbol and emblem of his party: "I am feeling like a bull moose." The night before the convention opened he made one of his great speeches to a crowd of twenty thousand persons. Its closing words stand with the peroration of Bryan's Cross of Gold speech:

"What happens to me is not of the slightest consequence; I am to be used as in a doubtful battle any man is used, to his hurt or not, so long as he is useful, and is then cast aside or left to die. I wish you to feel this. I mean it; and I shall need no sympathy when you are through with me, for this fight is far too great to permit us to concern ourselves about one man's welfare. If we are true to ourselves by putting far above our own interests the triumph of the high cause for which we battle we shall not lose. It would be far better for us to fail honorably for the cause we champion than it would be to win by foul methods the foul victory for which our opponents hope. But victory shall be ours,

and it shall be won as we have already won so many victories, by clean and honest fighting for the loftiest of causes. We fight in honorable fashion for the good of mankind; fearless of the future; unheeding of our individual fates; with unflinching hearts and undimmed eyes; we stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."

The Roosevelt supporters carried all their enthusiasm into the regular convention hall the next day, and Elihu Root, the temporary chairman, could not control the mob. But the Old Guard had



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The Fighting Colonel Returns from Elba

less difficulty controlling the admissions committee, with the result that Taft received the nomination on the first ballot, getting twenty-one votes more than a majority. Roosevelt had not even then threatened to form a third party, but he quickly succumbed to the enthusiasm of some of his supporters and agreed to attend a meeting of his delegates that same night. Senator Borah promptly walked out, but those who remained had no difficulty persuading Roosevelt to head a new Progressive Party, especially when they told him that if he did not assume the leadership, Senator La Follette would. La Follette at that time had no such popular following as Roosevelt commanded; neither did he have access to the financial backing that Frank A. Munsey, the newspaper magnate, and George W. Perkins, a Morgan partner, had promised Roosevelt. Munsey, a large stockholder in United States Steel, said of the declaration of principles Roosevelt subsequently announced: "While splendidly progressive, it is at the same time amply conservative and sound," and Perkins, a director of International Harvester, had not forgotten that when Taft had ordered the company investigated for alleged violation of the anti-trust laws, Roosevelt kept silent.

Nobody kept silent when the Progressives held their own convention in the same city of Chicago six weeks later. Delegates paraded around the hall shouting:

*"Follow! Follow!
We will follow Roosevelt!
Anywhere, everywhere,
We will follow on!"*

And Oscar Straus of New York led the crowd around the hall as it sang "Onward, Christian Soldiers."

The Republicans had already adopted a platform "opposed to special privilege and monopoly" and dedicated to "a government of laws, not of men." It paid some lip service to progressive principles but stood pat on the protective tariff. Roosevelt's Progressive Party also supported the protective tariff and the convention adopted an anti-trust plank that Perkins persuaded Roosevelt to whittle away. Otherwise, the Progressives called for many more specific domestic reforms.

The Democrats held their convention at Baltimore after the Republican convention and before the Progressives met. At one point Champ Clark, of Missouri, the Speaker of the House and the candidate of the conservatives, had a small majority but not the necessary two-thirds. Bryan, still the leader of the progressive Democrats, finally broke the deadlock by throwing his support to Woodrow Wilson, the reform Governor of New Jersey, whom the Republicans and Progressives regarded as their most dangerous opponent. The Democrats nominated Wilson and adopted a progressive platform, including a low-tariff plank.

The Republicans nominated an honest man on a dishonest platform; the Progressives nominated a dishonest man on an honest platform; the Democrats nominated an honest man on an honest platform. Chauncey Depew, former Republican Senator from New York, said of Taft and Roosevelt, "The only question now is which corpse gets most flowers." His implied prediction came true. In November the Democrats won handily. Wilson received more than six and a quarter million votes; Roosevelt just over four million; Taft less than three and a half million. Wilson received a plurality, but far from a majority, of the popular vote. Roosevelt had split the Republicans but had not created a new party strong enough to become a national force in its own right. When one of his friends predicted a Progressive victory in 1916 the Colonel replied, "I thought you were a better politician. The fight is over. We are beaten. There is only one thing to do and that is to go back to the Republican Party."

• III •

MOST AMERICANS during Taft's four years in the White House paid little attention to politics until the campaign of 1912. In 1909 Commander Robert E. Peary's discovery of the North Pole overshadowed any news that came from Washington. Three years later the sinking of the *Titanic*—the largest ship afloat, with a loss of 1,513 lives—overshadowed any news from anywhere. Peary's achievement ended an era

that began with the discoveries of da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan. He was the last of the great explorers, and when he reached the North Pole he won the last, greatest remaining prize of exploration. (Although the South Pole and the Antarctic continent still remained to be conquered, the North Pole and its surrounding frozen seas presented a far more difficult challenge.) On the other hand, the loss of the *Titanic* reminded man that even in the twentieth century he could not defy nature with impunity. Yet the *Titanic* disaster taught one priceless lesson. Thanks to wireless telegraphy, about one-third of the passengers and crew came through alive. Full utilization of this new device might have brought the death toll down almost to nothing.

The career of Robert E. Peary reads like a typical American success story. He came from the small town of Cresson, Pennsylvania; was graduated from little Bowdoin College in Maine; entered the United States Navy as a civil engineer with the rank of Lieutenant; helped survey the projected ship canal across Nicaragua. In 1886, at the age of thirty, he obtained a leave of absence to study the possibilities of polar exploration from a Greenland base and devoted the next twenty-three years of his life to organizing and leading expeditions under the auspices of the privately financed Peary Arctic Club. His thorough explorations of Greenland won him the rank of Commander in the United States Navy and the presidency of the American Geographic Society. President Roosevelt gave him loud support, which Peary acknowledged by naming a specially constructed exploration vessel the *Roosevelt*.

Peary made his first attempt to reach the North Pole in 1902, his second in 1906, and his third—which succeeded—in 1909. The secret of his success lay in the fact that he adapted himself to the life of the Eskimos: built igloos as they did of snow and ice, wore their kind of clothes, traveled by dog sled, ate their kind of food—usually the meat of musk oxen, killed on the spot, though he also carried his own concentrated pemmican. Peary left nothing to chance and permitted no division of authority. The party that accompanied him on his 1909 expedition included three Eskimos and his Negro servant, Matthew Henson. The proud, stiff, reserved Peary, whose walrus mustache blended perfectly with his head-to-foot bearskin outfit, would permit no other white man to share his glory. He drove himself and those around him to the limits of human endurance—and beyond. Professor Ross G. Marvin, who, by agreement, accompanied him only part of the way on the 1909 expedition, lost his life when he fell through some thin ice. The picturesque charlatan Dr. F. A. Cook—nine years Peary's junior—announced that he reached the Pole in 1908, but his claims did not stand up. Peary had more convincing proof, in the form of pictures and astronomical observations, and Theodore Roosevelt himself wrote a short introduction



Robert E. Peary

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to Peary's book about the expedition, *The North Pole*, although some skeptics doubted Peary's story as well as Cook's.

The final so-called "dash" to the Pole consisted of forty-three slow, short, painful marches over the frozen sea and lasted fifty-three days. Peary's personality and the importance of his achievement, as he saw it, lay in this diary entry which he wrote on April 23, 1909, when he returned to land, seventeen days after reaching the Pole:

"My lifework is accomplished. The thing which it was intended from the beginning that I should do, the thing which I believed could be done, and that I could

do, I have done. I have got the North Pole out of my system after twenty-three years of effort, hard work, disappointments, hardships, privations, more or less sufferings, and some risks. I have won the last great geographical prize, the North Pole, for the credit of the United States. This work is the finish, the cap and climax of nearly four hundred years of effort, loss of life, and expenditure of fortunes by the civilized nations of the world, and it has been accomplished in a way that is thoroughly American. I am content."


The *Titanic* disaster, three years later, hurt British prestige far more than Peary's discovery of the North Pole added to the prestige of the United States. Germany's naval building program made the British people fearful of their physical security; the expansion of the German merchant marine threatened their economic welfare. The British had kept ahead of the Germans in the dreadnought-building race; they also kept ahead in the race to build bigger, faster transatlantic liners. On April 10, 1912, the White Star Line's *Titanic*—the largest, fastest, and safest passenger vessel afloat—set out on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York with 2,224 persons, both passengers and crew, aboard, including many members of the Anglo-American aristocracy of wealth and fashion. Three days out, with a speed record in sight, the *Titanic* began to receive wireless warnings from near-by ships telling of icebergs ahead. The messages made little impression: the *Titanic* had double bottoms, sixteen watertight compartments; her builders called her "unsinkable." By ten o'clock in the evening—it was a Sunday

—five warnings had arrived; the *Titanic*, still intent on that speed record, continued full speed ahead at twenty-two knots. At eleven-thirty, the little liner *Californian*, less than ten miles away, sent this message: "Say, old man, we are stuck here, surrounded by ice." The *Titanic's* wireless replied, "Shut up, shut up; keep out. I am talking to Cape Race; you are jamming my signals." Whereupon the only wireless operator aboard the *Californian* turned in for the night.

Ten minutes later a huge iceberg appeared dead ahead of the *Titanic*. First the big vessel swerved sharply; then the quartermaster on the bridge ordered full speed astern. The iceberg had torn a gash three hundred feet long in the *Titanic's* bottom, but few passengers felt the shock. Forty minutes passed before Captain E. J. Smith, a veteran of thirty-eight years' service, sent out the first wireless appeal for help. The *Titanic* had now stopped; she was listing to port and going down by the head; but the first lifeboat did not put off until more than an hour after the accident. Neither the crew nor the passengers had gone through any boat drill. Many still could not believe that anything serious had happened. No other vessels had yet appeared to stand by. One lifeboat with a capacity for sixty-five people carried only twenty-eight; another with a capacity of forty carried only twelve. As one of the first boats went over the side, a man on deck shouted, "We'll see you again at breakfast."

Not until one-thirty in the morning—two hours after the *Titanic* had hit the iceberg—did everyone understand what had happened. Most of the third-class passengers could not reach the lifeboats. Most of the first-class passengers behaved with heroic dignity. The crew lived up to the finest traditions of the British merchant service. The stokers kept shoveling coal until the swirling waters drove them back. In the Grand Saloon, the ship's band played ragtime; then, as the water lapped about their feet, "Nearer, My God, to Thee," while passengers joined in the singing. Soon after two in the morning Captain Smith announced, "Men, you have done your full duty. You can do no more. Now it's every man for himself." Twenty minutes later the *Titanic* plunged, bow first, to the bottom of the sea—two miles below—with the Captain at his post on the bridge. Fifteen hundred and twelve persons perished with him. Other vessels, finally hearing the wireless S O S, arrived in time to pick up more than seven hundred survivors from scattered lifeboats in the area of the disaster.

A Senate Committee in the United States and a Royal Commission in England could not place the blame on any single scapegoat. For weeks and months the public read newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books based on firsthand experiences. Major Archie Butt, former aide to Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, had helped women and children to life-



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The Sinking of the Titanic: A German artist's impression

boats, and then leapt into the sea. Colonel John Jacob Astor put his young wife in a lifeboat and lit a cigarette with the words, "Good-by, dearie, I'll join you later." Mrs. Isidor Straus refused to leave her husband. "We have been through many years," she said when he tried to persuade her to take her place in a lifeboat full of women and children; "where you go I will go." These and scores of similar stories went the rounds as the dazed, incredulous public tried to grasp what had happened. Thomas Hardy composed a short poem, tracing the course of the inevitable collision. Clergymen preached sermons reminding their congregations that "in the midst of life we are in death" and pointing out that even in the effete, pleasure-loving twentieth century men and women of all classes had not forgotten how to die nobly.

The *Titanic* disaster taught two lessons. First, there was no such thing as an unsinkable ship. Second, that recent invention of Signor Guglielmo Marconi—the wireless telegraph—could have saved hundreds of lives if all the vessels near the scene of the disaster had maintained at least one wireless man on duty at all times. Of course, Marconi and his wireless had come into the news long before the loss of the *Titanic*, but never quite so impressively. Marconi had already earned the popular title of "wizard" and enjoyed the widest kind of fame and publicity. Marconi was born in 1874, the second son of a well-to-do Italian father and an Irish mother. He spoke Italian and English with equal fluency

and had left his native country at the age of twenty-two for England, where he at once took out his first patent for sending electrical signals through the air for a distance of several hundred yards. Four years later, in 1898, the *Dublin Daily Express* used one of his transmitters to report the progress of a yacht race off the Irish coast. The next year he sent his first message across the English Channel; in 1901, Marconi's wireless spanned the Atlantic.

Marconi devoted himself chiefly to perfecting the technique of sending telegraphic messages through the air. Two Americans, Lee De Forest and Reginald A. Fessenden, adapted the principles he had worked out to carry the human voice as well. A new word, "marconigram," went into the language of every country, and the English Marconi Company made such profits that some British Conservatives tried to discredit two outstanding Liberals, Lloyd George and Rufus Isaacs, by accusing them of using privileged information to speculate in Marconi shares. The accusations did not stand up, but the fact that they had been made suggested that the kind of business ethics that had long permeated politics in the United States were beginning to appear in British politics, too. As for Marconi himself, he belonged in the company of such inventors as Edison and the Wright brothers. He had hardly more in common with such original researchers as Newton and Kelvin than he had with such men of business as Carnegie and Morgan.

Speaking before an American audience shortly after the first wireless message had spanned the Atlantic, Marconi acknowledged his debt to the researches of Dr. Heinrich Hertz of Germany, who had discovered that electric waves pass through space in accordance with the laws of optics. "Many others," Marconi continued, "have made experiments in the same direction as I, but so far no one had obtained such results at anything approaching the distances I have done with these Hertzian waves. Fog has no effect upon the signals, nor has even the most solid substance. The waves can penetrate walls and rocks without being materially affected. It is possible to send many messages in different directions at the same time but care must be taken to tune the transmitters and receivers to the same frequency or 'note.' I mean they must be in sympathy."

At approximately the same time that the Wright brothers were making it possible for men to fly at unprecedented speeds, Marconi was making it possible for men to transmit ideas through space, instantaneously. The airplane and the wireless, each in its own way, carried the scientific revolution of the nineteenth century into new dimensions. The Wrights had brought the people of the world closer together by reducing the barrier of distance. Marconi had reduced the barriers that separate the minds of men by speeding the transmission of ideas. As



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Guglielmo Marconi: From a colored lithograph by "Spy"

inventors, neither the Wright brothers nor Marconi dictated how the airplane or the wireless should be employed. That was not their function. They had given man new tools to change both himself and the world around him.

No people followed the progress of aviation and the wireless so passionately as the people of the United States. Ten- and twelve-year-old boys constructed home-made gliders and built their own wireless receiving sets on which they picked up messages in Morse code. Concerning the future, they knew no more than their elders; they shared, however, their elders' faith that with such wonders it could not be anything but bright. And to the inventors who had created these new wonders went out an admiration such as

no Taft—not even a Roosevelt—could hope to enjoy. Let Europe concern itself with diplomatic intrigue. The new century was the century of applied science, and in that field the American people proposed to lead the world. Unhappily, the diplomacy of President Taft had no place in the same century with the inventions of Marconi and the Wrights.

• IV •

TAFT ROSE and fell on domestic issues. In 1908 he let the same progressive tide that Roosevelt had ridden for eight years sweep him into the White House. In 1912 he bucked that tide and out he went. Taft had also departed from the Roosevelt line abroad, with equally disastrous results. He tried and failed to get tariff reciprocity with Canada. He tried and failed to sign unlimited treaties of arbitration with Britain and France. He tried and failed to promote dollar diplomacy in Latin America and the Far East.

Reciprocity and arbitration lay closer than dollar diplomacy to Taft's heart, but he was ahead of his times and his Party. Taft scored no greater success with Congress than in 1911 when he persuaded both Houses to approve a bill that would have lowered some tariffs and

eliminated others between Canada and the United States. But Champ Clark, Democratic Speaker of the House, killed reciprocity when he shouted, "I hope to see the day when the American flag will fly over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole." Taft, too, made some references to Canada as being at "the parting of the ways." Rudyard Kipling at once cabled from England: "It is her own soul that Canada risks today." The Canadians heeded Kipling's warning and voted out of office the Liberal Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier that had favored reciprocity.

When it came to arbitration treaties, Taft found the British more co-operative than Congress. In March, 1910, he made the revolutionary admission that he favored arbitrating matters of national honor. "You have reached the summit of human glory," Andrew Carnegie wrote to Taft; "countless ages are to honor and bless your name." The general public also responded favorably, and in June, 1910, both houses of Congress passed a joint resolution empowering the President to appoint a five-man peace commission to promote general disarmament and an international police force. Roosevelt not only refused to head the commission; when Taft endorsed unlimited arbitration treaties with Britain and France, Roosevelt denounced them as "peculiarly contemptible hypocrisy." By the end of 1910 the American, British, and French Governments signed draft treaties agreeing to submit all "justiciable" disputes that might arise among them to arbitration, including matters that affected their "national honor" and their "vital interests." The Senate, however, agreed with Roosevelt rather than with Taft and inserted so many amendments that Taft sorrowfully laid the treaties aside. "So I put them on the shelf," he explained later, "and let the dust accumulate on them in the hope that the Senators might change their minds or that the people might change the Senate; instead of which they changed me."

The words "dollar diplomacy" that became identified with the Taft administration described something that had gone on long before Taft reached the White House and that continued long after he left. "The diplomacy of the present administration," said Taft a month after his defeat for re-election, "has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic human sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims." The following year William Jennings Bryan offered a less flattering description of dollar diplomacy in action in this account of United States policy in Central America: "The financiers charge excessive rates on the ground that they must be *paid* for the risk they take, and as soon as they collect their pay for the risk, they then proceed

to demand of the respective governments that the *risk* be eliminated by governmental coercion."

Taft felt that the way to keep peace in small, backward countries was to "knock their heads together" from time to time. But when a social revolution broke out in Mexico he resisted interventionist pressure. In the fall of 1909 President Taft and President Díaz of Mexico exchanged visits on both sides of the border. For the first time in history a President of the United States stepped off his native soil while still in office. Taft admired Díaz. "My impression has been," he wrote his brother, "that Díaz has done more for the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done for his people." But Taft foresaw trouble ahead for Mexico and expressed the hope that Díaz's tenure of office would outlast his own. It didn't, and after Díaz fled from Mexico to Paris in 1911 Taft wrote him in his own hand, "In your highly honorable retirement, I would send this message of appreciation and good will."

Porfirio Díaz came of poor, part-Indian stock. He had instigated three revolutions and rose to the rank of major general in the fighting that drove the French and the would-be Emperor Maximilian from his country during the 1860's. In 1877 the Mexican Congress recognized Díaz as President. He pledged himself to "effective suffrage and no re-election" and had the support of the poor Indian masses and of the liberal and radical democrats. After serving one term, he stepped down, but then returned to power and stayed on. The revolutionary democrat became the ruthless dictator. He selected as his Vice-Presidents the most unpopular men he could find. He played his generals and provincial governors off against each other. His opponents he jailed or murdered. "Better shed bad blood now to save good blood later," he said.

Díaz made himself independent of his own people by selling concessions to foreigners and filling the Mexican treasury with the proceeds. By 1892 foreign land companies owned one-fifth of the land in Mexico. By 1910 almost half of Mexico belonged to less than three thousand families—native and foreign. Ninety-five per cent of the rural population owned no land at all. Seventy per cent of all Mexicans above the age of ten could neither read nor write. Wages had remained fixed for a century, while the price of wheat had doubled, the price of corn had tripled, and the price of beans had multiplied almost six times over. By 1910 United States capital in Mexico came to a billion dollars, or more than the Mexicans themselves had invested in their own country. British investments, most of them in oil fields, came to more than three hundred million dollars. Total foreign investments came to two billion dollars.

In 1911 Mexico had a population of more than fifteen million persons—less than one-fifth of them of pure Spanish stock, more than one-third


pure Indian, the rest of mixed descent. Díaz had given them more than thirty years of peace, during which time foreign interests, a few native landowning families, and the Roman Catholic Church had prospered. People said Díaz had made Mexico the mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans, but he claimed he understood his people and that they needed a strong man's rule. In 1910, at the age of eighty, he had himself elected to another six-year term as President. He had amused himself, shortly before the elections, by receiving a bearded midget of an idealist—Francisco I. Madero, son of one of Mexico's oldest and richest landowning families, who was seeking the Presidency as the quixotic leader of the anti-re-electionist party. In 1908 he had written an excellent book on the presidential succession. He also founded a liberal newspaper, made speeches in a high falsetto voice, ate no meat, and consulted astrologers and ouija boards.

Neither Díaz nor Madero's own family took Madero seriously, but a surprising number of other Mexicans did. As a precaution Díaz therefore locked him up in jail during the fall elections of 1910, but he released him soon afterward on bail, whereupon Madero skipped across the border into Texas and began to plot an insurrection. Madero took the American Declaration of Independence as his model and advocated nothing more radical than representative democracy. His own summons to an insurrection failed completely, but a cattle-rustling bandit named Pancho Villa proved more successful, and under his leadership the revolution against Díaz swept northern Mexico. Madero and Villa met for the first time on Mexican soil in February, 1911. The idealist and the bandit found they had the same purposes, and though their methods could not have been more different, each respected the other. Their movement snowballed. The Díaz supporters melted away. On May 24, 1911, Díaz abdicated and took ship for Europe. "They have unleashed dangers they will not be able to control," he predicted. Unlike some deposed dictators, Díaz took no loot with him into exile.

Madero entered Mexico City on June 7, 1911, and won the presidential election five months later. Henry Lane Wilson, the United States Minister, at first sized him up as "highly nervous and uncertain," and within a year accepted the prevailing foreign view that he was insane. Wilson and the other foreign diplomats in Mexico City—especially the British and the Germans—encouraged Felix Díaz, the nephew of the banished dictator, and General Victoriano Huerta, commander of the government armies, to overthrow Madero. Huerta, a dope addict and dipsomaniac, arrested Madero on February 19, 1913, and had him murdered three days later. Twenty thousand United States regulars had been patrolling the border for almost two years, but Taft had steadily resisted the pressure from Mexico, from the United States, from Europe,



BROWN BROTHERS

Porfirio Díaz

CULVER

Francisco I. Madero

and even from Henry Lane Wilson to intervene. The British, German, and Spanish Governments recognized the Huerta regime at once, but Taft refused to go along and left the final decision to his successor.

• V •

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY under Taft frightened the smaller Latin-American republics and antagonized the rest. In Mexico it helped create a crisis that only social revolution could cure. But it was in the Far East, not in Latin America, that dollar diplomacy collided with European and Asiatic diplomacy and suffered its worst defeats.

As long as John Hay lived and remained Secretary of State, Theodore Roosevelt had accepted his doctrine of the Open Door in China. It had justified the annexation of the Philippines and the first American efforts to stop the Russo-Japanese War. But Hay's life and the Russo-Japanese War ended almost simultaneously, in the summer of 1905, whereupon the face of the Far East and the mind of Roosevelt changed together. Japan emerged from the war a great power. Russia had lost some ground but remained firmly established in East Asia. The Chinese Empire, on the other hand, had proved unable to maintain domestic order and helpless to prevent Japan and Russia from fighting some of the greatest battles in history on its own soil. Finally, the Japanese victory over Russia shattered the myth of white superiority among the peoples of Asia. What sense, under these conditions, did it make for the United States to continue John Hay's Open Door policy?

Not much, in the opinion of Theodore Roosevelt, who did what he

could to liquidate the Hay tradition during his last two years in the White House. In the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, signed two months before the Peace of Portsmouth, the United States recognized Japan's "suzerainty over" Korea and Japan's special position in Formosa and Manchuria in return for Japanese promises of nonintervention in the Philippines and Hawaii. In November, 1908, Secretary of State Root and Ambassador Takahira of Japan signed another agreement to maintain the *status quo* in the Pacific and uphold the Open Door in China, but at the same time to recognize Japan's privileged position in Manchuria. As a member of Roosevelt's Cabinet and as the negotiator of one of these agreements with the Japanese, Taft knew that his predecessor had, in effect, scrapped the Open Door. Roosevelt also spelled the whole thing out all over again in February, 1909, to Philander C. Knox, who was becoming Secretary of State under Taft. Finally, on December 22, 1910, Roosevelt, at Taft's request, wrote a long memorandum on his Far Eastern policy.

Here Roosevelt pointed out that Japan's vital interests lay in Manchuria and Korea and that the United States must accept this state of affairs or risk serious trouble with the Japanese in connection with the exclusion of Japanese immigrants. Roosevelt also opposed any alliance with China because it meant an additional obligation, not a source of strength. Recalling the old frontier maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to shoot," he warned against a policy of bluff. "I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards Manchuria if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it, unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany. The Open Door in China," he continued, "was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement; but, as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the Open Door policy as a matter of fact completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forgo its intention."

Between 1905 and 1909 Roosevelt had scrapped John Hay's policy in the Far East by narrowing the Open Door. Between 1909 and 1913 Taft then tried to push it wider open. But the second of these two shifts did not originate exclusively in the White House or the State Department. It received additional inspiration and support from a young man named Willard Straight, born out of his time, with most of the gifts the gods can bestow. Straight was graduated from Cornell in 1901. He had courage, brains, looks, and charm, high principles and ambitions, a

gift for languages, a talent for music, painting, and literature. To such a young man, business, politics, and the professions as they were practiced in the United States during the early 1900's all seemed humdrum. So many of the arts came to him so easily that he found it impossible to concentrate upon one. Straight liked people, and he liked adventure even more.

If Willard Straight had been born a Frenchman or an Englishman at the turn of the century he could have found an outlet for his energies in his country's foreign service. But a career in the American State Department offered little to a young man of ambition and talent: all the worth-while jobs went to political appointees. Straight therefore set out for China and spent the years from 1901 to 1904 with the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs Service. As a member of this unique group of international civil servants who administered the Chinese customs, under British direction, serving the foreign powers and China alike, Straight learned the Chinese language and gained a firsthand knowledge of the Far East. After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War he became a correspondent in Korea, where he acquired a passionate hatred of the Japanese, based on personal observation of their methods. In Korea he entered the United States consular service and in June, 1906, was appointed Consul General of the first American Consulate in the Manchurian city of Mukden. What he saw of Japanese methods in Manchuria confirmed and intensified the emotions that his experiences in Korea had already stirred. Straight also defined dollar diplomacy as "the financial expression of John Hay's Open Door policy" and "a logical manifestation of our natural growth" because it "makes of international finance a guaranty for the preservation rather than the destruction of China's integrity."

In 1908 William Phillips, the Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, summoned Straight back to Washington, because—as Phillips wrote at the time, "Wall Street" is feeling confident again and is looking for the investment of capital in foreign lands." Railroad construction in Manchuria seemed to offer a profitable outlet, and Straight could give Wall Street the factual background. His return to Washington coincided with the announcement of the Root-Takahira Agreement, which he described as "a terrible diplomatic blunder to be laid at the door of T. R." But T. R. was on the way out. The kindly Taft, with whom Straight had made friends in the Far East a few years before, was on the way in. Straight regarded himself as a man with a mission: a mission to help China and thwart Japan. He therefore made what use he could of the material that lay at hand.

Straight found a valuable ally in the person of E. H. Harriman, who dreamed of extending his network of American railroads to encircle

the globe. Harriman introduced Straight to his banking friends at Kuhn, Loeb and Company. Straight's superiors in the State Department then invited J. P. Morgan and Company and the National City Bank of New York to join forces with Harriman and Kuhn, Loeb and become the official American agency to promote American railroad construction throughout China. The invitation was accepted and the new consortium persuaded Straight to leave his post as Acting Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and become its Peking representative. His first assignment was to promote American railroad construction in Manchuria, where the Russians and the Japanese had everything their way, but just before he left Washington he got himself another. He prevailed upon his new employers and the State Department to seek a share of the new railroad construction in Central and South China, where British, French, and German influence predominated.

American interests in China operated under several disadvantages. The Japanese and Russian Governments used state funds to finance railway construction in Manchuria. The German Government subsidized German trade and investments all over the world. The British and French Governments had staked out the richest spheres of influence for the exclusive benefit of their nationals. The United States Government, on the other hand, had no large-scale investments of its own abroad. It did not subsidize foreign trade or investments. It had no spheres of influence. It had not even learned how to co-operate with private American enterprise.

When Straight set out for China he was starting from scratch against a strong field of competitors, all of whom enjoyed a big head start. First Straight and Harriman tried and failed to persuade the Japanese to sell the South Manchurian Railway to American interests. Then they set out for Europe together, in the summer of 1909, and tried to persuade the Russians to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway which connected the Trans-Siberian with the South Manchurian. The Russians also turned them down. On September 10, 1909, Harriman died. Straight—in China—negotiated a preliminary agreement with the Manchurian Provincial Government to build a new railroad in Manchuria with some British participation. Secretary Knox followed up with a letter to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, proposing that the European powers join the United States in neutralizing all the Manchurian railroads. The prospect horrified Grey, who feared antagonizing his two allies, Russia and Japan. He therefore wrote Knox an evasive reply which Knox coolly regarded as an acceptance in principle and so informed the French, Russian, German, and Japanese Foreign Offices. France, as the ally of Russia, rejected the Knox proposal. The Russians and Japanese warned China to make no move

without consulting them. Only the Germans accepted Knox's program—not because they felt any love for China but because they welcomed the opportunity Knox had unwittingly given them to push their way into China and to embarrass the British, French, Russians, and Japanese. Finally, on July 4, 1910, Japan and Russia—the recent enemies—signed a convention to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria. This served notice on the world that the two countries had settled all outstanding differences and had slammed the Open Door in Manchuria.

The parallel efforts that Straight and the State Department made in the rest of China proved equally unavailing. On June 6, 1909, the Chinese Government signed an agreement to permit a group of British, French, and German bankers to finance railway construction in Central China. When Britain objected to American participation, President Taft cabled a personal appeal to Prince Chun, the Regent of China. Both the British and the Chinese stalled and resisted, but the British gave way first and agreed to let the United States join the consortium, whereupon the Chinese refused to sign the revised and enlarged agreement until all four of the foreign powers, including the United States, brought more pressure to bear.

The agreement never got beyond the blueprint stage. During the summer and fall of 1911 the two-thousand-year-old Empire of China came tumbling down, even as Straight and the State Department blundered into a third attempt to throw their weight about in the Far East. On September 22, 1910, the Imperial Chinese Government had asked for an exclusively American loan to bolster its currency and to finance industrial development. Knox accepted the offer and invited the British, French, and Germans to come in too, since they had let the United States join their railway consortium. But the Russians and Japanese at once objected. They conferred with each other. They conferred with their British and French allies. It became necessary to enlarge the financial consortium to include Russia and Japan just as the railroad consortium had been enlarged to include the United States. This took time, and even after the six powers finally came to an agreement on April 15, 1911, they failed to raise the projected fifty-million-dollar loan. The downfall of the Manchu dynasty the following October intervened.

Dollar diplomacy never so much as got started in the Far East because Taft, Knox, and Straight ignored and opposed the two chief forces at work in that part of the world. They ignored the fact that the center of world power did not lie in Asia but in Europe. They opposed the rising tide of revolution. They did not see that fear of Germany in Europe caused Britain and France to back Russia and Japan in Asia. They did not see that the Kaiser welcomed every opportunity to make

trouble among all these potential enemies wherever and whenever he could. Hence all the delays and disappointments in connection with the naïve American efforts to establish a community of international interest that did not in fact exist.

Taft, Knox, and Straight misjudged the condition of China as fatally as they misjudged the condition of Europe. The proposed railway loans intensified Chinese hatred of foreign exploitation. The proposed currency loan intensified Chinese hatred of the Manchu dynasty. But the revolution that overthrew the Manchus in October, 1911, was not the only new force that the twentieth century had released in the Far East, and Washington was not the only capital that failed to heed the storm warnings that went up all over Asia as a result of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.

SUMMING UP

THE WHITE HOUSE disagreed with Taft as much as it had agreed with Roosevelt. The times also dealt more harshly with Taft than they had with his predecessor. During the Roosevelt years the American people did not ask for much more than a good show. By the time Taft came along they wanted action, and he didn't give them enough of it, or the right kind. Events abroad also bewildered him. His own people were not prepared to surrender as much of their national sovereignty as he was prepared to forgo in the cause of peace, and he found it impossible to understand the revolutionary forces that had begun to sweep Mexico and China. While the American people were trying to reform their way of life, other peoples were trying to turn theirs upside down.

Revolution Comes to China

The same revolutionary wave that had already risen in backward Russia, Turkey, and Mexico reaches China—the largest and most backward country of them all.


PREVIEW

WITH THE TURN of the century, China's Manchu Dowager Empress had begun to put through a few reforms and to promise many more. Japan's victory over Russia then gave the Chinese both a warning and an opportunity to catch up with the times or take the consequences. When the Dowager Empress died in 1908 the Regency that followed her dismissed General Yuan Shih-kai, the chief support of the old order. At the same time, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leading Republican revolutionary, redoubled his long-prepared efforts. Civil war broke out during the summer of 1911, and early in 1912 the Manchus capitulated. Dr. Sun Yat-sen turned over the Provisional Presidency to Yuan Shih-kai and devoted all his time to continuing the revolutionary task that he had just begun.

• I •

REFORM in the more advanced countries, revolution in the more backward parts of the world—that was the shape the twentieth century had begun to take during its first decade. The British Liberals, the French anticlericals, the German Socialists, and the American Progressives had either come to power or gained a lot of new popular support. And after the attempted Russian Revolution of 1905 had come the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

In 1911 China experienced the most extensive revolution of all. For almost seventy years foreigners had enjoyed special privileges under one-sided treaties that robbed the Chinese of their independence without making the foreigners responsible for their welfare. And for more than two and a half centuries the alien Manchu dynasty had dominated the increasingly corrupt, inefficient, and outmoded Empire. The dis-



BROWN BROTHERS

A Chinese Traveling Barber. Note the boy at left shielding his eyes from the evil spirit inside the camera

astrous war against Japan in 1894, the Boxer uprising of 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War started China along the road to revolution. Discontent infected almost every class and region. The peasants resented the imperial taxes. The dwellers in the seventeen "treaty ports" resented the extraterritorial privileges that the foreigners enjoyed. The Manchurians resented the Russians and the Japanese. The city of Canton, always a center of revolt, resented the power of Peking. Chinese who had made fortunes abroad contributed money to revolutionary organizations, most of which maintained headquarters at Canton. The younger generation revolted against the old. The mission schools had more success in converting Chinese to Western ideas than in making them into good Christians. The oldest civilization on earth faced new challenges from every quarter.

By the time the Russo-Japanese War had ended, the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi had ruled China openly or from behind the scenes for almost half a century. The "Old Buddha," as they called her in North China, recognized that changes had to be made, but she proposed to make them in her own way. In 1904 she ordered the examination system for the Chinese civil service reformed along Western lines and the old-

fashioned competition in writing essays on the texts of Confucius eliminated. In 1905 she pledged herself to grant China a modern Constitution based on Western models and sent a group of her highest advisers to study and report on conditions in Japan, the United States, and Europe. In 1906 she issued a decree forbidding the growth, importation, and use of opium.

But she believed in making haste slowly and declared that several years would be required to prepare even a rough outline of the reforms that her advisers proposed. "As for Ourselves," her decree read, in part, "it is necessary to make a careful investigation into the matter and prepare Ourselves to initiate this Government by Constitution, in which the supreme control must be in the hands of the Throne, while the interests of the masses shall be entrusted to their nominees chosen by their suffrage. This, it is to be hoped, will be the means of strengthening the foundations of an everlasting Empire. But up to the present no method of procedure has been drawn up while the understanding of the masses is very limited. Any undue haste shown in the introduction of these reforms will end in so much labor lost. How can We then face Our subjects under such circumstances and how regain their confidence and faith in Us?"

• II •

THE RULERS of Japan had taken thought sooner and acted faster than the Manchus. As a result, Japan had become a great power. Unified, strong Japan bit deep into the body of weak, divided China. Victory over Russia had strengthened Japan's rulers at home and abroad. During the space of half a century they had created an authoritarian state based on a labor system that tied the peasant to the soil and the factory worker to the bench. The war against Russia left the Japanese state more authoritarian than ever and the average Japanese family no better off than before.

Because the common people of Japan had always lived and worked hard, they did not rebel against the burdens their rulers laid upon them. Indeed, a fortunate and increasing minority found new opportunities in government service and the professions. But Japan lacked almost every essential of world power—land, resources, and technological skill. It could not therefore afford the luxuries of democracy, social legislation, mass leisure. Under this heavy pressure Japan went in for extremities rather than novelties.

Between 1903 and 1906 the Japanese more than doubled their military and naval expenditures. They planned to increase their trained Army from one million to two and a half million men within ten years.

By 1908 they had built the two largest battleships afloat and had plans for two new dreadnoughts considerably larger than any the British had projected at that time. The rulers of Japan made their own kind of revolution, promoted their own kind of reform. The Japanese people had no time, no opportunity, and little inclination to do anything but what they were told.

In 1906 for the first time in history Japanese exports exceeded Japanese imports. Subsidized railroads, subsidized industries, subsidized shipping lines, and subsidized banks enabled Japan to undersell many competitors on world markets. Ostensibly, the Japanese had fought the Russians to free Korea and Manchuria from foreign control. Actually, the Japanese took over everything the Russians had held in Korea—and more besides. During the war the Emperor of Korea signed away most of his powers to the Japanese. After the war the Japanese forced him out entirely and took over the country for themselves. The people of Korea found themselves paying taxes and bribes to two equally corrupt sets of officials—their own and the Japanese. The newly established Oriental Colonization Company operated with funds from the Japanese Government, which had given it a blanket charter to engage in almost any kind of business in Korea. The Japanese had not only destroyed what remained of Korean independence: they slammed the door shut on foreign traders and investors.

It was the same story in southern Manchuria. There the Japanese took over the southern extension of the Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railway and renamed it the South Manchurian. On December 22, 1905, China signed a treaty with Japan recognizing the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Portsmouth and assigning to Japan all of Russia's former properties in South Manchuria. The Japanese thus took over all the coal mines, forests, and real estate that the Russians had begun to exploit before them and in addition acquired still more property from the Chinese, during and after the war, at a fraction of its real value. A large but undisclosed number of Japanese troops remained in Manchuria, calling themselves police and railway guards, as the South Manchurian Railway properties became a permanent zone of Japanese occupation. Japanese-owned ships and railroads transported merchandise from Japan to Japanese traders at cut rates or free of charge. Chinese and foreign business languished. Japanese immigrants began to arrive in Manchuria—some of them bent on get-rich-quick schemes, others seeking escape from difficult conditions at home. An English missionary, eager to believe the best of the Japanese, commented in 1908:

"I am very much disappointed at some of the results of Japanese administration. Its general effect has been decidedly to lower the moral

standards of Chinese life. The conditions under which the people have been compelled to exist, the necessity for constant evasion and lying to save their lives and property, the deteriorating influence of Japanese traders who are supported in their pretensions by the military courts, and the presence of thousands of Japanese men of low character and immoral Japanese women who ply their avocation in the streets of the cities and towns, are corrupting influences new to the country, or only felt before in a limited degree."

The outside world knew and cared little about the seamier side of life inside Japan, Korea, or Manchuria. The British had allied themselves with the Japanese to counterbalance Russian power in Asia. Yet in spite of Russia's defeat by Japan, two-thirds of Manchuria remained an exclusive Russian sphere of influence and Russia's own possessions in East Asia remained intact, except for the transfer of the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan. The British Foreign Office therefore felt nothing but relief when the Japanese and Russian Governments signed a supplementary treaty at St. Petersburg on July 30, 1907, pledging themselves to respect each other's territories and spheres of influence in East Asia. And in 1910 the bungling of America's dollar diplomats forced the Russians and Japanese still closer together and caused them to sign an agreement banning all foreign interests from their exclusive fields of influence in Manchuria.

Difficulties at home and in Europe had forced the Russians to abandon, indefinitely, the "forward policy" in East Asia that had led to war with Japan. The Japanese also had their hands full, for the moment, establishing themselves in Korea and South Manchuria. This relaxation of tension between Japan and Russia, coupled with the increased tension in Europe, took some pressure off China. The Dowager Empress lived on until November 15, 1908, but she never did get around to promulgating the reforms she had promised. Her own death remains a mystery, but there is reason to suspect that when she felt it approaching she had her nephew, the childless and futile Emperor Kwang Hsu, poisoned. In any case he died twenty-four hours before she did and the title of Emperor passed to his two-year-old nephew, Pu-yi. Prince Chun, the young Emperor's father, then assumed the duties of Regent and dismissed Yuan Shih-kai, the strong man of the previous regime.

Yuan Shih-kai had not yet turned fifty. He had spent more than twenty years working for the Manchu dynasty, first coming to the fore in the 1880's as aide to Li Hung-chang, the last Chinese Viceroy of Korea. Foreigners regarded Yuan Shih-kai as a safe, stabilizing force. He believed that the Chinese needed a monarchy, yet he also recognized the weaknesses of the Manchus and the appeal of Western ideas.

Prince Chun, however, distrusted him and in 1908 issued a decree dismissing Yuan because—in the polite language of the Chinese court—he had been “seized with a disease in the feet which makes it difficult for him to move about and thus renders him unfit for the performance of his duties. We therefore decree that as a mark of compassion he shall forthwith vacate his posts and retire to his native place for the purpose of treating this complaint.”

Prince Chun had traveled abroad. He believed in Western ideas. Within a year he invited China's eighteen provinces to hold provincial assemblies and draw up recommendations for a new Constitution. These assemblies met in October, 1909, and Prince Chun invited them to send representatives to a national assembly, or Senate, at Peking the following year. There the fifty members of this Senate urged the early election of a regular Parliament and the establishment of a cabinet form of government. Prince Chun succeeded in postponing the election of a Parliament, but he agreed in December, 1910, to permit the Senate to start work on a new Constitution. Six months later he appointed a responsible and representative Cabinet to replace the hand-picked, advisory Crown Council. By this time, however, China's middle classes and younger people had become tired of waiting for reforms to come to them from above, and the whole established order that had existed for more than two thousand years began to crumble.

The Chinese had always regarded the Manchus as foreign usurpers whose rule originally rested on superior force. But the power of the Manchus had steadily waned and Western domination over China had steadily increased. Many Chinese held the Manchus responsible for having sold out their country to the foreigner. The Central Government at Peking, which should have kept China united and strong, became identified with the hated foreigner who had made himself rich by keeping China divided and weak.

Yet foreign influence in China cut two ways. Although the foreigners had exploited and humiliated the Chinese, they had also brought China railroads, factories, new ideas, the possibilities for the more abundant life. The foreign missionaries did not convert 1 per cent of the Chinese



BROWN BROTHERS

Yuan Shih-kai



Pieces of China: How the Major Powers had divided China into spheres of influence

people to Christianity. But mission schools taught a number of the Chinese how to read and speak foreign languages, and introduced them to the teachings of Rousseau, Washington, and Lincoln as well as to the precepts of Jesus. Mission hospitals improved public health.

Of course only a tiny fraction of the people of China came under the direct influence of these foreign ideas, but the seeds that foreign missionaries, foreign doctors, and even foreign businessmen had sown in China for more than half a century yielded a sudden and simultaneous harvest during the fall and winter of 1911. The mass of the Chinese people, starving and illiterate, could hardly understand what it was all about. They had never known anything but misery. But scattered among all classes were enough leaders who had become aware of new possibilities to rouse the people from their lethargy. And the Manchus

had become so divided and confused that they permitted power to slip from their hands almost by default.

• III •

THE CHINESE who overthrew the Manchus acted for innumerable reasons. One man, however, had made himself the symbol and spear-head of the events that culminated in the proclamation of a Chinese Republic on January 1, 1912, and the complete abdication of the Manchus six weeks later. That man was Dr. Sun Yat-sen, born in 1866, the youngest son of a peasant family of moderate means who lived forty miles outside Canton. The boy received his early education at the village school, always got enough to eat, and at fourteen sailed to Honolulu to join his oldest brother. Here he learned English, became a devout convert to Anglican Christianity, and associated with young exiled Chinese of the lower middle classes who found emancipation in Western ways. His older brother, disturbed by the boy's conversion, shipped him home after four years, and Sun Yat-sen returned carrying a pigskin-covered Bible and filled with revolutionary Western ideas. He denounced his native religion in the village temple, attacked the Manchu dynasty, and had to flee to Hong Kong, where he found protection in a local Church of England school. His family secretly sent him funds that enabled him to marry and attend Queen's College—the best school in Hong Kong. But within a year he had sent his wife back to his native village, made his peace with the villagers, and paid a brief visit to his brother in Honolulu.

By this time young Sun Yat-sen had become a kind of Christian anarchist. He quarreled with his brother, returned to Hong Kong, and took up the study of medicine. He received his doctor's degree in 1892 and wrote in his autobiography, years later, "All the years between 1885 and 1895 were like one day in my fight for national liberty, and my medical practice was no more to me than a means to introduce my propaganda to the world." In 1886 he joined one of the many secret societies that flourished in South China for the purpose of overthrowing the Manchus. In 1894 Dr. Sun Yat-sen and seventy other young men organized a tighter association of their own for the purpose of creating a Chinese republic, but the Manchus arrested and beheaded three of his fellow members. The war with Japan had begun and the young doctor again went to Hawaii, where he made many converts—including his brother—to another secret revolutionary organization known as the Revive China Society, with headquarters at Shanghai. This society consisted of a series of cells of fifteen men each, sworn to overthrow the Manchus and set up a republic.



Dr. Sun Yat-sen

ACME

In 1895 Dr. Sun Yat-sen took part in his first attempt at insurrection. The Revive China Society had won the support of a wealthy Shanghai millowner, Charles Jones Soong, a devout Methodist and the father of three daughters and three sons, all of whom received their educations in the United States. The Revive China Society attempted an insurrection in Canton, but it failed, and Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan, where he cut off his pigtail, adopted Western dress, and passed for a Japanese. During the next fifteen years Dr. Sun conspired in ten more attempts to oust the Manchus, usually from abroad. He traveled in Europe and

the United States raising money among Chinese communities, never spending more than six months in any one place. One Chinese laundryman in Philadelphia handed him a linen bag containing all his life savings, in cash. The Chinese Government once set a price of half a million dollars on his head. Disguised as a bespectacled peddler, Sun Yat-sen traveled widely in China, visited coolies and plantation owners in the Malay States and the Straits Settlements, preaching bloodless reform and nonviolent revolution. His simple, selfless devotion worked wonders. He talked so eloquently to a government agent who might have made a fortune by turning him over to the authorities that the man not only let him go free but hanged himself rather than remain in government service.

Japan became the chief center of Chinese revolutionary organization. In 1905 Dr. Sun Yat-sen helped to found a tight but comprehensive sworn brotherhood, the Tung Meng Hui, which brought together all the anti-Manchu, pro-Republican groups. During these difficult years Dr. Sun Yat-sen proved himself the most effective of all the revolutionary organizers. His direct approach and his sense of dedication attracted and held followers. He attached great importance to placing promising young Chinese abroad and educating them for the responsibility that would be theirs after the revolution. Nobody analyzed the secret of his success more clearly than Sun Yat-sen himself, who wrote:

"Men say that the revolution originated with me. I do not deny the charge. But where did the idea of revolution come from? It came because from my youth I have had intercourse with foreign missionaries.

Those from America and Europe with whom I associated put the ideals of freedom and liberty within my head and heart." In short, those same foreign missionaries who had once helped soften up China for the benefit of foreign exploitation later gave China the impetus it needed to expel the foreigner and master its own destiny.

• IV •

Just as the Chinese Revolution of 1911 found its ideal leader in Dr. Sun Yat-sen, so the defenders of the old order turned to Yuan Shih-kai, the outstanding soldier-statesman of the old school. In 1911 Sun was forty-five years old; Yuan, fifty-two. Sun, the thin-lipped dreamy-eyed idealist, had spent twenty-five years conspiring against the Manchus, living in constant peril of his life. Bullet-headed, thick-necked Yuan Shih-kai had lived dangerously, too, but as a soldier and statesman, not as an orator of revolution. In October, 1911, Republican revolutionaries staged another of their periodic insurrections and seized control of the "Three Cities"—Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang—on the Yangtze River in the very heart of China. The frantic Prince Chun asked Yuan Shih-kai to take command of the crack Imperial Army and crush the uprising. Yuan replied, with delicate irony, that he had not quite recovered from the foot trouble that had caused his dismissal three years before. But when Prince Chun invited him to become Premier on November 1, Yuan accepted and formed his own one-man Government.

Meanwhile the imperial troops had defeated the rebels at Hankow and burned two-thirds of that city of eight hundred thousand inhabitants to the ground. But other revolts broke out, especially in the south, and the Imperial Army of two hundred and forty thousand could not keep order everywhere in a country with more territory than the United States, four times as many inhabitants, and almost no modern means of communication. Separatist feeling ran strong in most of China's eighteen provinces. Hatred of the Manchu dynasty ran stronger still. Republican sentiment spread. But during the months of October and November most of the Chinese provinces regarded the revolution as primarily a struggle between the reactionary Manchus in the north and the revolutionary Republicans in the south. And the success of the imperial troops at Hankow did not augur too well for the revolution.

The tide turned on December 2, when the imperial garrison at Nanking surrendered to the Republicans, who made the city once again the Chinese capital as it had been up to the mid-seventeenth century, when the Tatars, Mongols, and Manchus had stormed down from the north and west. On December 6 Prince Chun resigned as Regent. Kwang Hsu's widow replaced him, though she agreed with the more far-



BROWN BROTHERS

Han Yang Iron Works, Hankow, China

sighted members of the court party that the days of the Empire were numbered. On December 11 the Imperial and Republican forces at Hankow negotiated an armistice after Yuan Shih-kai had ordered the imperial generals to stop fighting. On December 24 Dr. Sun Yat-sen landed at Shanghai and hastened to Nanking, where a council of provincial delegates representing fourteen of China's eighteen provinces elected him Provisional President of the Chinese Republic.

This Republic at once issued a manifesto to the world. It denounced the Manchus for their policy of "unequivocal seclusion and unyielding tyranny." But the Republic promised "equality and protection" to all Manchus "who abide peacefully within the limits of our jurisdiction." It also pledged itself to respect all prerevolutionary loans, treaties, indemnities, and concessions and to respect the persons and properties of foreigners in China. The foreigners responded by charging the Republic higher interest rates than they had exacted from the Manchus.

Young China soon proved as helpless as Old China to cope with the forces of nature. The year 1912 brought with it almost unprecedented floods and famines, for which provinces held the new Government responsible. Some provincial governors recalled that when the Manchus had come to power in the seventeenth century they had remitted all taxes for several years, in accordance with tradition, and assumed that

the Republic would do the same. Enthusiastic revolutionaries, especially in the southern cities, seized their elders on the public streets and cut off their pigtails, which were regarded as marks of servitude. During these months Yuan Shih-kai became the sole center of authority at Peking. He predicted that if the Manchus fell "there would be no peace in China for decades." But he saw which way the tide had turned and did not propose to buck it. On February 12, 1912, Kwang Hsu's widow issued an abdication proclamation in her behalf and in the name of the young Emperor. "From the preference of the people's hearts, the Will of Heaven can be discerned," the decree read. "How could We then bear to oppose the will of the millions for the glory of one Family? Therefore, observing the tendencies of the age on the one hand and studying the opinions of the people on the other, We and His Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the people and decide in favor of a Republican form of constitutional government."

The decree went on to suggest that Yuan Shih-kai and the Republican Army leaders organize a republic together. Two days later Dr. Sun Yat-sen resigned the Provisional Presidency to Yuan Shih-kai. The Nanking Council approved and on March 10, 1912, Yuan Shih-kai took office as President of the Republic of China in Peking. Yuan, who preferred a monarchy to a republic for China, had never concealed his distrust of the radicals, who more than reciprocated. Nevertheless, Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed that China needed a strong President with the widest possible popular support.

Sun Yat-sen had already evolved his "Three Principles of the People," which later became the title of his best-known book and the Bible of the Chinese Revolution. He believed that the Republic of China had three tasks to perform, in the following order. First, it must establish the "Principle of Nationalism." This meant driving the foreigners from their privileged positions and making China strong in its own strength. This was to be Yuan Shih-kai's first and principal assignment. Next, the Republic of China must establish the "Principle of People's Democracy." This would require more time and must be undertaken, at the start, by the revolutionary leaders. Third and last came the "Principle of the People's Livelihood." This called for the socialization of industry and redistribution of land so that each peasant should own the soil he worked.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen had not completed these plans when the Manchu dynasty fell. He felt he could best serve his country by continuing to develop them while permitting Yuan Shih-kai to assume the responsibility of government. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had always lived in the future and felt at home there. Yuan Shih-kai had always lived in the present. That was his element. Dr. Sun could not have his Republic without a bloody

civil war for which he had no desire. Yuan could not have the power he wanted except by dealing with the hated Republicans. Both men met their responsibilities in characteristic fashion, as their country entered a cycle of revolution that had already begun to sweep the world.

SUMMING UP

THE PROCLAMATION of the Republic of China marked the political beginning—not the economic or social end—of a revolution that had no precedent in history. It was a revolution against foreign exploitation and domestic tyranny, against ancestor worship and the precepts of Confucius. The peasant turned against the landlord, the country against the city, the south against the north, the laborer against his employer, the son against his father, the new against the old. The oppressed turned against their oppressors, but it was more than that. The common people of China—like the common people almost everywhere else—had lived hard, but they suffered no more than their fathers or grandfathers had suffered for centuries. The difference was that with the twentieth century they discovered a leadership that their fathers and grandfathers had lacked. This leadership did not come from the most depressed classes; it came from the rising, but frustrated, professional classes, especially from the students. During 1905 and 1906 these same classes in Russia had tried and failed to overthrow or at least reform the Tsarist regime. The common people of Russia had as many grievances as the common people of China, but they had to struggle against a much stronger government and a well-entrenched national church. The Russian soldiers, police, and clergy backed the Tsar. The ill-equipped Chinese troops, on the other hand, had no desire to fight; the Manchu court had lost the will to rule; China had no national religion. As a result, the Chinese Revolution went ahead so fast that the Chinese revolutionaries could not keep up with it, and the radical Dr. Sun Yat-sen had to turn over the Provisional Presidency to the reactionary General Yuan Shih-kai. By turning the administration of the new China over to the conservatives, the revolutionaries had taken one step back.

Europe Divides Against Itself

How Western Europe remained at peace but could not prevent localized wars from breaking out in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean.

PREVIEW

THE FIRST DECADE of the new century saw a wave of reform make measurable headway in every European country. But the nationalist spirit flourished more than the spirit of reform or revolution, and a clash of interests between Germany and the Anglo-French Entente almost led to war in 1911, when the Germans again sought "compensations" in Africa. A firm warning by Lloyd George caused the Germans to back down, whereupon Italy took advantage of the confusion to seize Tripoli from Turkey by force of arms. The Russians had given the Italians their blessing in advance, and neither Britain nor France moved. In 1912 Britain and Germany made a last vain attempt to reach a naval agreement. After this failure came a change of government in France and closer relations among the Triple Entente powers. The Balkan states, encouraged by Russia, drove the Turks from the Balkan peninsula in a one-month, lightning campaign. It took another year and another war for them to settle their differences among themselves. Although the great majority of Europeans—rulers and ruled—had everything to gain from peace, they lived in a condition of anarchy that offered no protection against war.

• I •

WHILE CHINA DISINTEGRATED, Europe divided against itself. In China all authority fell apart—from the authority of the Emperor over his people to the authority of the father over his family. In Europe, on the other hand, rival authorities grew stronger and stronger. Group pressures inside the major powers increased; so did the tensions between the rival groupings of the major powers themselves.

In Russia the Tsar had crushed the uprisings that followed the war against Japan. After he dissolved the first Duma during the summer of

1906, he made P. A. Stolypin Prime Minister and Stolypin made Russia temporarily safe for reaction. When the second Duma, elected in 1907, proved no more tractable than the first, the Tsar and Stolypin changed the voting rules, and the third and fourth Dumas toed the mark. Stolypin suppressed workers' and peasants' organizations, persecuted national minorities, permitted pogroms, mass arrests, deportations, and floggings. In 1911 he was shot and killed in the Kiev Opera House by a Jewish member of the Russian Secret Police before the eyes of the imperial family, whose rule continued undisturbed.

Opposition to the Hapsburg dynasty in Austria-Hungary took a less violent form, and Francis Joseph met it with a few concessions. He promised universal suffrage to his Hungarian subjects in 1905 and granted it to his Austrian subjects in 1907. But no elected deputy to any Austrian Parliament ever headed an Austrian Government. The Emperor continued to appoint his own Premiers from the ranks of his court officials, and the Governments over which they presided had no responsibility to Parliament except to present an annual budget for its approval. It was not, however, these practices that caused the Emperor his most serious trouble. It was the friction between rival national groups within his domain. When Francis Joseph celebrated his sixtieth anniversary on the throne in 1908, the Austrians and Czechs in the Czech capital of Prague had come so close to civil war that a state of siege had to be proclaimed. Although the Emperor himself had little more sympathy for his Pan-German subjects than for the Pan-Slavs, his notions of what was best for them did not quite agree with their own.

The continued growth of the Social Democratic Party in Germany continued to alarm the Kaiser. In 1912 it again received a larger popular vote than any of its rivals and for the first time also won the largest number of Reichstag seats. The Bethmann-Hollweg Government, seeking support in other quarters, enacted a new social-insurance law in 1911, giving new benefits to seven million workers employed in home industries, farming, and domestic service. Although these concessions did not save the Catholic-Conservative bloc from defeat in the 1912 elections, the privileged position of Prussia within the Empire remained unchanged, and the Kaiser's personal control over military, naval, and foreign affairs continued.

In France, too, the parties of the left asserted themselves. Six months after Briand had broken a railway strike by "drafting" the workers into military service and ordering them to run the trains, an all-radical Government headed by a nonentity named Monnis succeeded him. Events in England moved more slowly but no less decisively. When Asquith became Prime Minister in 1908, shortly before the death



BROWN BROTHERS

*"The Spending Statesman,"
David Lloyd George*

of Campbell-Bannerman, Lloyd George became Chancellor of the Exchequer. With the backing of Winston Churchill he then produced a budget that appeared revolutionary by the standards of the time. It called for much heavier land, inheritance, and income taxes. Lloyd George did not make his budget any more palatable to the propertied classes when he blandly declared that he had some difficulty deciding which "hen-roost" to "rob." He further alarmed and antagonized the Conservative opposition by announcing that he had put forward a "war budget" in the battle against poverty—which, he predicted, would one day be-

come "as remote to the people of this country as the wolves which once infested its forests." He proudly called himself a "spending statesman," and appealed to the commercial as well as the business vote. "England," he told the Liberal publicist A. G. Gardiner, "is based on commerce. No party can live by an appeal to labor alone; it must carry the commercial classes as well as labor with it."

Meanwhile, the Conservatives re-formed their ranks under Balfour's leadership. They praised the House of Lords when it held up Lloyd George's budget and other reforms that large majorities of the House of Commons had approved. In the general election of January, 1910, the Liberals nosed out the Conservatives but lost control of the House of Commons. From then on, they had to depend on the support of the Laborites and the Irish Nationalists, who preferred Asquith to Balfour and therefore kept the Liberals in power. Reform of the House of Lords had become the paramount issue, and at the height of this so-called "constitutional crisis" King Edward died. A brief party truce followed. Again the Liberal and Conservative leaders failed to agree on how to reform the House of Lords, and another general election was held in December, 1910, but it led to the same result that had occurred in January.

The Liberals continued to push their "Parliament Bill" and at last carried it, on August 10, 1911. It boiled down to a recognition and definition of the supremacy of the House of Commons. But no sooner had the Liberals broken the constitutional log-jam that had blocked

many of their reforms than three national strikes broke out—one by the railroad workers in 1911, the second by the coal miners in 1912, and the third by the transport workers that same year. In 1909 the Liberals had already put through a minimum-wage bill to aid the workers in “sweated industries”; these strikes, however, saw some of the best-paid and best-organized workers in the country—notably the railway and the transport men—going into action. The coal miners had the worst grievances, and Britain’s industrial and naval power still rested on their shoulders. The Liberal Government therefore sponsored and passed a Miners’ Minimum Wage Bill as well as a national health-insurance act.

The Irish nationalists took advantage of the Liberals’ dependence on their support to force Asquith to back a bill that would have given Ireland its own Parliament under the British Crown. This new version of home rule for Ireland became a center of political controversy in England and of physical violence in Ireland. The Ulster minority in the North of Ireland, backed by the Conservative minority in the House of Commons, threatened to refuse to acknowledge the authority of any national Irish Parliament. At the same time, more and more women in Great Britain began to agitate for the right to vote. They called themselves “suffragettes,” and their slogan, “Votes for women,” at first came in for more ridicule than respect. Gradually they won serious attention when their leaders exploited the publicity value of parades, demonstrations, picket lines, and even hunger strikes.

Although King Edward VII had reigned less than ten years, his death caused almost as great a shock as the death of Queen Victoria. His successor, George V, had few royal attributes. Edward’s eldest son, Albert Victor, had died in 1892 shortly after having become engaged to Princess Victoria Mary of Teck—a young lady more remarkable for her ambition than for her beauty. The next year this determined Princess married King Edward’s second son, who now stood next in the line of succession. But George, a harmless, colorless individual who tried to hide some of his features behind a nondescript beard, had not been trained for kingship and the royal couple soon became known as King George the Fifth and Queen Mary the Fourth-fifths. But the popularity of the strong-minded Victoria and of her dim Prince Consort augured well for their grandchild’s reign.

The French and Russian leaders mourned King Edward more genuinely than the Germans did. Bülow, in his retirement, heaved a discreet sigh of relief. The British honored “Edward the Peacemaker” because he encouraged the growth of a European coalition so powerful and firm that Germany would not dare to challenge it. The Germans honored their “Peace Kaiser” because he tried to make Germany so strong that



BROWN BROTHERS

King George V and Queen Mary

the rest of Europe would grant Germany a "place in the sun" without war. King Edward seemed about as peace-loving to the Germans as the Kaiser seemed to the British.

The end of the first decade of the twentieth century thus saw two trends developing in Europe. Rival groups inside the various countries were challenging one another for larger shares of national wealth and power. At the same time these same countries were also challenging one another for larger shares of wealth and power on a world scale. But national loyalties overrode class or group loyalties. Revolutions took place only in such backward lands as

Russia, Turkey, Mexico, and China, and only in Mexico and China—both of them non-European countries—did these revolutions succeed. Europe stood in no immediate danger of revolution. Europe did, however, live under the growing threat of war.

• II •

THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION of 1908 did much more to increase European tensions than it did to improve the condition of the Sultan's subjects. First came the Bosnian annexation crisis with its poisonous aftereffects on Germanic Europe and Slavic Europe. In the spring of 1909 Young Turk troops occupied Constantinople and forced the incorrigible Sultan Abdul Hamid to abdicate in favor of his younger brother, who called himself Mohammed V, and established a constitutional monarchy. In November the new Sultan promised the Germans new concessions in connection with the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, and a year later the Russians gave this project their approval when the Tsar and his new Foreign Minister, Sergei D. Sazonov, visited the Kaiser and his new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, at Potsdam.

The Bosnian crisis had forced Izvolski to quit as Foreign Minister and become Ambassador to France instead. In 1910 the fox-faced Sazonov, who had married Stolypin's daughter, replaced him. Stolypin had the

reputation of being not unfriendly to the Germans, who also had a new Foreign Minister in the person of fifty-eight-year-old Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, a professional diplomat and veteran of the Franco-Prussian War. Although Kiderlen's talents gained recognition, his irreverence toward his superiors caused him to be sent into virtual exile as Ambassador to Rumania from 1900 to 1908. In letters to his mistress, with whom he carried on an open affair, he called the Kaiser "the sudden one," Bethmann "the earthworm" because the Kaiser "stepped on him, and Bülow "the eel"—for obvious reasons. Nevertheless Bülow, shortly before his dismissal, had prevailed upon the Kaiser to bring Kiderlen back to Berlin as acting Foreign Secretary. The Kaiser refused to make the appointment permanent and sent Kiderlen back to Bucharest for two more years. "You're putting a louse in your shirt," the Kaiser warned Bethmann in 1910, when they finally had to place Kiderlen in charge of the Foreign Office. Kiderlen got off to a bad start on his new job when he used his first meeting with Sazonov at Potsdam to try to pry the Russians loose from their alliances with France and England. But the meeting ended happily. The Germans recognized Russia's sphere of influence in Persia, and the Russians recognized Germany's special position in Turkey.

At first the British and French Foreign Offices were alarmed. They feared that Kiderlen had succeeded in his original plan to break up their alliances with Russia and refused to help the Germans finance the Bagdad railway. But after the Russians had given them satisfactory assurances that their alliances remained intact, the British and French agreed to invest some of the funds the Germans needed to put the railway through. The Germans had already financed the construction of some seven hundred miles of railway lines in northern Asia Minor. To extend these lines down to Bagdad called for laying twice as much additional track. They would also connect the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf and the French-controlled railways in Syria and Arabia.

Germany's privileged position in Turkey did not disturb the French and British. They had won similar positions in other backward, strategic regions, and as soon as Kiderlen's diplomatic offensive against them collapsed they welcomed the opportunity to join the Germans in the profitable business of exploiting Turkey. But when the Germans, soon afterward, threatened the privileged position of France in Morocco and seemed determined to acquire an African port on the Atlantic coast, Europe again approached the brink of war.

Under the Algeciras Act of 1906 the French Government had pledged itself to respect the independence of Morocco and uphold the principle of the Open Door. But the Sultan of Morocco could not keep order; the French and Spanish police kept interfering; the Germans kept



UNDERWOOD

Mohammed V

protesting. Finally, in 1909, the German Government recognized, in effect, that France occupied a predominant position in Morocco. With Germany it was a case of first things first. The Bosnian crisis in the Balkans had forced the Kaiser to order a retreat in North Africa. "This wretched Moroccan affair must now be brought to a conclusion, quickly and definitely," he told Bülow. "There is nothing to be made of it; it will be French anyway." But Bülow and the German Foreign Office still hoped to get some concessions and succeeded in preserving for two more years the double fiction of an independent Sultan and an Open Door.

Relations between France and Germany remained friendly until the spring of 1911, when the French ordered a military force to occupy the Moroccan capital of Fez and protect the European colony there from a threatened native uprising. Foreign Minister Kiderlen urged the French to go slow, hinting that Germany would wink at any further violations of the Act of Algéciras only in exchange for the usual "compensations." The Kaiser, on the other hand, welcomed the prospect of French intervention at Fez and wanted them to send a large force, because he saw it distracting the French from Europe and diverting French troops and military expenditures from Germany's western frontier.

Meanwhile, French internal affairs had taken a turn favorable to Germany. The new Radical Cabinet that came to power in France on February 27, 1911, included a new personality, Joseph Caillaux, who first held the post of Finance Minister and within a few months replaced Monnis as Premier. Delcassé, whom Bülow had driven from the French Foreign Office in 1905, had received the post of Minister of Marine under both Monnis and Caillaux. Although this did not sit too well with the Germans, they had reason to hope that the ambitious Caillaux would carry more weight in foreign affairs.

The forty-eight-year-old Caillaux came of an old and conservative Catholic family. His father, too, had served as Finance Minister, and the son entered the civil service as an inspector of finance at the age of

twenty-five. Ten years later he was elected a Radical Deputy himself and during the 1890's served as Finance Minister under Waldeck-Rousseau. Clemenceau gave him the same post in 1906, and after he proposed an income tax the following year Clemenceau fell and Caillaux remained out of office until 1910.

Caillaux had attached himself to the left wing of the Radical Party, which accepted him at his own valuation. He did not attempt to conceal his disdain for the common man or his pride in his own ancestry and abilities. He regarded himself as the only Radical with any knowledge of finance, and did not suffer fools gladly. Caillaux looked the part he proposed to play. Clemenceau and Briand both cultivated eccentric manners, clothes, and mustaches; Caillaux got himself up as a dandy. A fringe of black close-cropped hair circled his bald, shining pate. He wore his black mustache close-clipped, too, and sported a monocle. He fancied himself as more aristocratic than the right; more radical than the left. Any opposition to his ideas sent him into a rage, and in matters of foreign policy he went far beyond his Party, agreeing with Jaurès and the left Socialists in their opposition to militarism, expansion, the alliances with Russia and England, and the policy of revenge toward Germany.

The German nationalists exploited his vanity and his views on foreign affairs. While the Pan-German press raged against the return of Delcassé to office, Kiderlen did business with Caillaux direct, behind the backs of the French Foreign Office. Caillaux had become Premier shortly after French troops had occupied Fez. Kiderlen at once demanded vague "compensations." He did not make them specific because he felt that the country which first stated its terms would be at a disadvantage in the subsequent haggling. The Kaiser angrily denounced these tactics as "sheer farce." "This kind of diplomacy is beyond my brain," he added. But he and Bethmann and Kiderlen all agreed that no matter how little France might offer, there would be no war.

Kiderlen then persuaded the Kaiser to order the German cruiser *Panther*, which happened to be proceeding up the West Africa coast, to put in at the Moroccan port of Agadir to "protect" German interests there. The *Panther* appeared at Agadir on July 1, 1911, and the German Government announced that it would leave as soon as order was restored. By this time Kiderlen had already made up his mind to ask France to cede the entire Congo to Germany. Bethmann supported him, and when the Kaiser demurred, Kiderlen threatened to resign. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Berlin, almost fell out of his chair when Kiderlen bluntly proposed the Congo deal. The Kaiser, who heard of the proposal while on a pleasure cruise in northern waters,

also came near to exploding, but had to accept the situation for what it was.

The British watched all this with mounting concern. On July 4 Grey informed Kiderlen that the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir had created a new situation and that his Government could not recognize any new arrangement to which it was not a party. Kiderlen let two weeks pass without making any reply. Grey was prepared to recognize a Franco-German deal based on French concessions to Germany in the Congo, but he became more and more afraid that the Germans wanted an Atlantic seaport on the Moroccan coast and even feared that the incident would set off a general European war. Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, could not enlighten Grey on the matter; he did not know himself what his Government wanted. On July 21, 1911, Lloyd George therefore uttered this warning at a public dinner at the Mansion House in London: "I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international good will except questions of the gravest moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

Asquith, Grey, and Churchill had all approved this speech. The fact that it came from the most radical member of the British Cabinet—a man who had opposed the Boer War and had fought the imperialist wing of the Liberal Party—gave it further weight. The Germans at once informed the British that they had no thought of establishing a port in Morocco. They also scaled down their demands upon France, and on November 4, 1911, Kiderlen and Cambon signed an agreement in which the Germans recognized the virtual protectorate that France had established over Morocco and the French turned over most of the Congo, including two river ports, to Germany. The Germans also surrendered a valueless stretch of the Sahara Desert, in the Cameroons, to France. The Agadir crisis had made two things clear: first, that Britain would support France in a war against Germany; second, that a clear, firm warning to that effect from England could preserve the peace.

• III •

THE MOMENT the French began to occupy Morocco, the Italian Government decided that the time had come to occupy Tripoli. Turkish administrators had discriminated against Italian interests there, and the Young Turk Revolution had weakened the Ottoman Empire in all its parts. The Balkan peoples also decided to take advantage of the Young Turk Revolution to eliminate Turkish rule from Europe. But neither Italy nor the Balkan states could move alone. They had to consult Russia first, and the Balkan states had to consult one another. The Russians made it easy for both Italy and the Balkan states to act.

In 1909, before Izvolski left the Russian Foreign Ministry, he persuaded the Tsar to visit King Victor Emmanuel in Italy. The two monarchs met at the castle of Racconigi, south of Turin, and the Tsar took Izvolski along. At Racconigi, Izvolski approached Tittoni, the Italian Foreign Minister, with a secret agreement under which Italy would support Russia's exclusive right to send war vessels through the Dardanelles and Russia would recognize Italy's right to seize Tripoli. This agreement, which Tittoni signed, violated other assurances that both Foreign Ministers had given both in public and in private. Moreover, Izvolski said nothing about it to his British and French allies; Tittoni kept it secret from his German and Austrian partners in the Triple Alliance. But in spite of the secrecy and double-dealing, word of the Russian-Italian agreement got around and caused "intense satisfaction" in the British Foreign Office because it drew Italy away from the Triple Alliance and toward the Triple Entente.

As soon as Izvolski had completed the Racconigi bargain, he prepared to bring the Balkan states closer together for common action against Turkey. His spadework yielded results two and a half years later when Serbia and Bulgaria joined forces to form the Balkan League. The Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria, who played a big part in bringing the Serbs and Bulgars together, recalled in his memoirs these parting instructions he received from Tsar Nicholas before setting off for Sofia in 1911:

"Listen to me, Neklindov; do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war; as a rule I shall do all in my power to preserve for my people the benefits of peace. But at this moment of all moments, everything which might lead to war must be avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years—in fact till 1917. . . . Though if the most vital interests and the honor of Russia were at stake, we might, if it were absolutely necessary, accept a challenge in 1915; but not a moment sooner—in any



UNDERWOOD

Turkish Artillery Deploying against Italian Troops outside Tripoli

circumstances or under any pretext whatsoever." This does not prove that the Tsar ever wanted war but it does suggest that the Tsar regarded war as inevitable in the long run.

While the Russians were preparing for eventualities in the Balkans, the Italians acted. During the summer of 1911, even as French troops were establishing themselves in Morocco, the Italian Government informed the major European powers that the conduct of Turkey in Tripoli and Cyrenaica was becoming intolerable. The Germans and Austrians could do nothing to check their dubious ally. France and Russia both had signed secret treaties recognizing Italy's right to acquire Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The British found it convenient not to commit themselves to anything. On September 26, 1911, the Italian Government warned the Turkish Government that Moslem fanatics were endangering Italian lives in North Africa. The next day a Turkish steamer flying the German flag landed fifteen thousand rifles at Tripoli. The following day the Italian Government sent a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to Turkey and declared war on September 29.

Many Italians, convinced that the Turks would offer no resistance and that the native Arab population hated Turkish rule, welcomed the war declaration. No major engagements occurred on land or sea. The Italian fleet did not attack the Turkish fleet in the eastern Mediterranean because the Italian Government assumed that the Turkish Government would abandon Tripoli and Cyrenaica without a fight. The Turkish

troops in North Africa offered no resistance when Italian soldiers and sailors landed, but the natives surprised the Italians by accepting arms from the Turks and sniping at the invaders.

The first Italian expeditionary force of nine thousand men landed at Tripoli on October 11. By the end of the month the Italians had also occupied the ports of Derna, Homs, Bengasi, and Tobruk, but when they began to move inland they ran into unexpected resistance from both Turks and Arabs. Cholera claimed more victims than the battlefield. More than a thousand Italian soldiers and many times that number of natives died. On November 5 the Italian Government announced the annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica but before the month had ended had to ship almost twenty-five thousand more men to the two provinces plus another twelve thousand early in December. The difficulties and dangers of desert fighting pinned them down near the coast.

Stalled in North Africa, the Italians tried to end the war quickly by extending their operations. Their warships made two faint-hearted, futile attempts to break through the Dardanelles, but they did succeed in occupying Samos, Rhodes, and a number of other Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea. In the spring of 1912 the Italians resumed operations in North Africa. Neither side attempted heavy fighting, and peace negotiations began in the summer of 1912 while sporadic warfare continued. In one engagement the Turks and Arabs lost fifteen hundred men; the Italians, six hundred. The two Governments finally made peace on October 18, 1912. The Turks renounced their sovereignty over their two North African provinces, which became known as Libya, but the Sultan remained the spiritual leader of the native population. The Italians agreed to turn the Aegean islands they had occupied back to the Turks as soon as the Turks quit North Africa.

While the Turks and Italians waged war the major European powers waged diplomacy. First the Russian Ambassador to Turkey offered the Sultan a secret treaty guaranteeing Turkey against aggression from the Balkans and recognizing Turkey's permanent right to Constantinople in exchange for a Turkish promise to give the Russian Navy the exclusive right to pass through the Dardanelles. At the same time Izvolski, now Russian Ambassador in Paris, asked the French Government to approve of such an arrangement. The French stalled. The British, when they heard of the scheme, took an even colder attitude. The Turkish Government, thoroughly suspicious of the Russian proposals, approached the British Foreign Office with a projected Anglo-Turkish alliance that the British rejected for fear of antagonizing the Russians. This left the Turks no choice but to turn to the Central powers, and the Central powers no choice but to work with the Turks.

• IV •

THE AGADIR CRISIS thus hastened the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and widened the breach between the Central powers and the Triple Entente in the Balkans and the Middle East. But it had an opposite, though momentary, effect on Anglo-German relations. Not only was the British Cabinet divided against itself on what to do about Germany: the Cabinet officials and the officials in the Foreign Office disagreed on how to do it. Sir Arthur Nicolson, who had become Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1910, backed Grey's increasing reliance on the agreements with France and Russia and his increasing firmness toward Germany. But Nicolson felt Grey should set down his understandings in black and white. Grey, on the other hand, deliberately avoided written commitments. As a Christian English gentleman, Grey knew he could do no wrong. He therefore did not feel it necessary, until February, 1912, to inform all his Cabinet colleagues that he had permitted "solely provisional and noncommittal" conversations among the commanders of the British and French armed services.

The showdown finally came when the British Cabinet sent War Minister Haldane to Berlin to explore the possibilities of a naval agreement with Germany. Haldane had studied at Göttingen, translated Schopenhauer, and called Germany his "spiritual home" but, as a British patriot, fully supported Grey and the Foreign Office. Nicolson regarded the Haldane mission to Berlin as a wild-goose chase. To the French Government it had a more disturbing—even a sinister—aspect. The French found it impossible to reconcile Haldane's trip with the personal views that Grey had repeatedly expressed to their Ambassador in London or with official British policy during the Tangier and Agadir incidents.

Before Haldane left for Berlin, the German Government agreed to base the discussions on a three-point memorandum that Grey, Churchill, and Lloyd George had approved. This called for German recognition of Britain's naval superiority, a British pledge to assist and not to block German colonial expansion, and mutual assurances of nonaggression. When Haldane arrived in Berlin, Bethmann proposed that Germany and England pledge themselves to a benevolent neutrality toward each other if either of them became involved in any sort of war. Since this would have required Britain to repudiate its alliance with France, Haldane came back with the proposal that both countries pledge themselves not to make or prepare any "unprovoked attack" on the other for "purposes of aggression." Since the Germans could not reconcile this with their naval building program, they rejected it as meaningless. As

the discussions wound up without results, Haldane received from the hands of the Kaiser a long, confidential document that he had no chance to study until he laid it before Winston Churchill and the Admiralty Office on his return to England. It outlined a supplementary program of naval construction on top of the one that had already caused them such alarm. The slim, remaining chance of Anglo-German agreement died on the spot.

The failure of the Haldane mission justified Asquith and Grey in their increasing doubts about Anglo-German co-operation and their increasing dependence on the alliance with France. But they did not openly admit the significance of this failure, nor did they reveal the protective measures they proceeded to take. The French acted more openly. When Caillaux agreed with Kiderlen to surrender most of the French Congo in exchange for a German promise to give France a free hand in Morocco, it seemed to many Frenchmen like yielding to blackmail. Still further opposition to Caillaux developed when it became known that he had kept the negotiations in his own hands and had not even told his Foreign Minister, de Selves, what he was doing. Clemenceau brought the matter into the open on January 9, 1912, when he asked de Selves to deny in the Chamber of Deputies that Caillaux had concealed certain documents from him. De Selves refused to answer the question and submitted his resignation. The Chamber of Deputies voted the Caillaux Government out of power the next day.

After Caillaux came a national—even a nationalistic—Cabinet of the Talents, headed by Raymond Poincaré, who also took the post of Foreign Minister. Poincaré had been born in Lorraine in 1860, ten years before the Germans overran and annexed that province and Alsace. He came of an intellectual family. His father had been a distinguished meteorologist. His brother became a physicist. Poincaré himself turned to the law in order to become a statesman, and he became a statesman in order to regain the lost provinces from Germany. He won his first election to the Chamber of Deputies at the age of twenty-seven; six years later, in 1893, he received his first Cabinet post as Minister of Education. Later he twice served as Minister of Finance. He always supported the Third Republic, but as a moderate conservative in domestic matters and as a strong nationalist in foreign affairs.

Clemenceau, in one of his celebrated aphorisms, once said, "Briand knows nothing and understands everything; Poincaré knows everything and understands nothing." Briand constantly adapted himself to changes in public opinion. Poincaré remained steadfast in his opposition to Germany and in his determination to avenge the defeat of 1870. He had a prodigious memory, an infinite capacity to master detail, inexhaustible vitality, incorruptible purpose. He possessed none of

Clemenceau's genius, none of Briand's eloquence, none of Caillaux's boldness. At heart, Poincaré was a prudent, timid man, but his nervous energy and moral determination carried him far. His appearance expressed his personality. Short, bustling, bearded, and beady-eyed, Poincaré resembled the local lawyer or notary in any one of a thousand French towns. He at once embodied and represented the professional middle class which had made and inherited both the French Revolution and the Third Republic.


Other strong figures served with Poincaré. He retained Delcassé as Minister of Marine. He installed Briand as Minister of Justice. The War Ministry went to bristling Alexandre Millerand, who had entered politics as a left Socialist, well trained in law. More ambitious, less charming than Briand, Millerand followed a similar course, starting further to the left and ending up further to the right.

The emergence of Poincaré's Cabinet of National Union caused great satisfaction in England. It gave Grey his chance to tell the whole Cabinet about the secret staff conversations that the military leaders of Britain, France, and Belgium had been carrying on for the past six years. To the delight of the French, the astonished Cabinet at once demanded that Grey define his commitments more precisely. On October 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to London whose brother represented France in Berlin, exchanged notes. They agreed to further discussions between British and French military and naval leaders and a British pledge to defend the northern coast of France in exchange for a French pledge to defend British interests in the Mediterranean.

The Grey-Cambon notes contained two crucial passages. The British attached supreme importance to the statement that the military and naval discussions did not constitute "an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise." The French attached supreme importance to the statement that "if either Government had grave reason to expect an attack by a third power, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." The failure of the Haldane mission and the installation of Poincaré's National Union Cabinet in France had added new teeth to the Anglo-French Entente. The enlarged scope of the Anglo-French military conversations—of which the Russians learned in due course—also convinced the Tsar and his Ministers that if war came between France and Germany, Britain would automatically enter on the French side. The British public, however, knew nothing of these conversations; neither did the German Government.

• V •

WHILE THE Anglo-French Entente was being gradually transformed into a military alliance, the defensive alliance between France and Russia began to assume a more offensive character. In August, 1912, Poincaré visited St. Petersburg and confirmed a secret understanding between the Russian and French Navies. This meant, in effect, that the Russian Navy would dominate the Baltic and the Black Seas; the French Navy would dominate the Mediterranean; the British Navy would dominate the North Sea. But Poincaré learned one disturbing piece of news at St. Petersburg. Prime Minister Sazonov informed him



UNDERWOOD

Greek Monks Join the Fight for Liberation from Turkey



UNDERWOOD

Serbian Cavalry Preparing for Battle on the Balkan Plains

that on March 12, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria acting under Russian pressure had signed a secret agreement to respect each other's frontiers, to come to each other's assistance if either party were attacked by any great power, and to prepare to take joint military action if disorders broke out in Turkey, threatening the *status quo* in the Balkans. "*Mais c'est là une convention de guerre!*" exclaimed Poincaré, indignant at having been kept in the dark by his Russian ally and fearful that Russian ambitions in the Balkans might involve France in an East European war from which Britain could remain at least temporarily aloof.

The first proposal for joint action to prevent a Balkan war came from an unexpected quarter—Vienna. Foreign Minister Aehrenthal of Austria had died in February, 1912, and his post had gone to Count Berchtold, who had served as Ambassador to Russia and vaguely wanted to maintain good relations with that country but had little idea of how to go about it. Berchtold was long on charm, conceit, and good looks; short on judgment, industry, and brains. Although ignorant of the secret treaties, he proposed on August 13, 1912, that all the great powers act together to secure reforms in Turkey, to restrain the Balkan states, and to preserve peace and the *status quo*. But having neglected even to consult his German ally, Berchtold found himself alone on a limb. Poincaré also made a last-minute effort to keep the peace through joint action by the great powers, but both he and Berchtold moved too

late. Peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey had already begun, and the leaders of the Balkan states moved. On October 8 King Nicholas of Montenegro, smallest of the Balkan countries, took matters into his own hands and declared war on Turkey. Within ten days the Turks accepted the Italian peace terms and three other Balkan states—Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria—had joined the war against them.

Even in the turbulent Balkans King Nicholas stood out as a picturesque figure. He had become the ruling prince of his tiny country at the age of nineteen and proceeded to distinguish himself as a soldier, diplomat, reformer, and poet. He had three sons and six daughters. His sons-in-law included the King of Italy and Grand Duke Peter Nikolaievitch of Russia. When one of King Nicholas's more enthusiastic supporters was asked how large a population his country had, he replied: "We and the Russians together come to a hundred and fifty millions." In 1910 Nicholas proclaimed himself King of Montenegro. He took more and more power into his own hands, looked more and more to Italy for support, schemed to make himself the ruler and Montenegro the nucleus of a South Slav confederation. King Peter of Serbia had similar plans for himself and his country, while King Ferdinand of Bulgaria aspired to dominate the Balkans by playing the Kaiser off against the Tsar. King Constantine of Greece had married the Kaiser's sister and hoped to take most of Macedonia over from Turkey, but the Serbs and Bulgarians had designs on that region, too. King Carol of Rumania belonged to the House of Hohenzollern and personally favored the Central powers, but most Rumanian politicians preferred the French and the Russians.

In spite of the rivalries and differences among the various Balkan peoples, common hatred of Turkey held them together, and their leaders recognized that only common action could get results. The Young Turks had appealed to the religious, national, and revolutionary sentiments of their people. The leaders of the Balkan countries did the same. Most of the Balkan peoples belonged either to the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox Church. Only the Albanians—who spoke their own language but had not yet, in 1912, set up an independent state—accepted Islam. Not only did religious feeling run much stronger in the Balkans than in Western Europe: a revolutionary fervor possessed the Balkan nationalists. In Western Europe certain newspapers and politicians whipped up a neurotic patriotism among the rootless members of the lower middle class and the more excitable students. The Balkan peoples took their patriotism seriously. Many of them still lived under foreign rule. Those who had won their independence feared their mightier neighbors and hoped to strengthen their own positions by liberating their blood brothers from Turkish,




L. N. DERWOOD

Greek Mountain Troops Preparing for Battle in the Balkan Hills

Austrian, or Hungarian overlords. The Balkan peoples felt they had everything to gain and nothing to lose from revolution and war.

The major European powers could not, therefore, hope to prevent by peaceful means the war that broke out in the Balkans in October, 1912. The Young Turk Revolution and the war between Italy and Turkey offered a double opportunity that the leaders of the Balkan states could not resist. All that the major powers could do was to keep the conflict localized, and this they did. The fighting itself went fantastically well for all the Balkan states except Montenegro. They put nine hundred thousand men in the field—about half of them Serbs, one-third of them Bulgarians, the rest Greeks and Montenegrins. The Turks had some four hundred thousand men to oppose them. The Serbs and Bulgarians quickly drove the Turks from Macedonia. Greek troops occupied Salonika. Bulgarian troops surrounded Adrianople and advanced to the suburbs of Constantinople. But King Nicholas of Montenegro directed most of his army of some fifty thousand men northward toward the Sanjak and Kossovo, which the Serbs felt belonged to them—and the Serbs got there first. Nicholas sent a much smaller force to his real



UNDERWOOD

Turkish Troops Leaving for the Balkan Front, October, 1912

objective, the Albanian port of Scutari, which the Serbs finally had to help him take.

All Turkey's Balkan positions collapsed within a month. It had been a war of movement, of riflemen, cavalry, and mountain troops, many of them lightly and poorly equipped. The rout of the Turks alarmed the Triple Entente almost as much as it alarmed the Triple Alliance.

Sir Edward Grey played the part of peacemaker, and he got more help from the Germans than from anyone else. In early November the Turks asked the major powers to intervene and stop the fighting. But the powers could not decide, much less agree, on just what kind of Balkan settlement they wanted. The attitude of Austria caused the most alarm. The Emperor had reappointed Conrad von Hötzendorf Chief of Staff, and Conrad had mobilized his reserves and issued warnings of war. The Serbian and Montenegrin Armies had linked forces, and Serbia was in position to break through to the Adriatic. The Russians, with the approval of the energetic Poincaré, also began to mobilize some of their forces against Austria. The Kaiser and Foreign Secretary Kiderlen-Wächter both became alarmed. Chancellor von



UNDERWOOD

Bulgarian Officers Sentencing Two Turkish Sympathizers to Death by Hanging

Bethmann-Hollweg visited Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold and warned him that the Austrian Government "must keep us informed of their intentions in advance and not, as has so often happened, face us with a *fait accompli*. We will not become the satellites of Austria in the Near East."

The warning had the desired effect. Austria's war preparations ceased. The Russians, unprepared for war themselves and relieved by the Austrian attitude, decided not to press Serbia's claim to a port on the Adriatic. Kiderlen suggested a confidential exchange of views among the major powers. Poincaré proposed an Ambassadors' Conference in Paris. The Triple Alliance powers preferred London as the meeting place, with Sir Edward Grey as chairman. On December 16, 1912, representatives of Turkey, the Balkan states, and the Ambassadors of the major European powers met in London under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Grey.

When the Turkish delegation agreed to cede Adrianople to Bulgaria, Enver Pasha, leader of the Young Turks, shot the Turkish War Minister at a Cabinet meeting, denounced the armistice, and set up a new



UNDERWOOD

Panic-Stricken Turks Preparing to Flee Constantinople

Government. This Government refused to yield all of Adrianople, and fighting was resumed on February 2, 1913. Although the Turks continued to lose ground, sharper conflicts broke out among the Balkan allies, extending to the major powers as well. Italy as well as Austria opposed the extension of Serbian power to the Adriatic. It was therefore agreed to set up Albania as an independent state. The decision had merit because the Albanians spoke their own, separate language and most of them belonged to the Moslem faith. They had more right than Montenegro to claim recognition as a separate nation, since Montenegrins, like the Serbs and Croats, were South Slavs. But the moral claims of Albania to national recognition counted for much less than the support that came from Italy and Austria. Both those great powers feared the extension of Serbian territory to the shores of the Adriatic and urged the creation of an independent Albania to forestall the creation of a greater Serbia.

On April 16 the Balkan states and the Turks again concluded an armistice and resumed their haggling in London. Harold Nicolson, in his life of his father, gives this graphic picture of the final scene:

"The delegates of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Turkey, somewhat sheepish in their frock coats, were ranged one by one upon

the carpet. Sir Edward Grey advanced toward them and fixed them with his eagle eye; he pointed toward them with an outstretched and imperative finger; he summoned to his assistance the total resources of his Wykhamist French. '*Ou signer*,' he shouted at them, '*ou partir*.'" Five days later, on May 30, 1913, they signed and departed. Neither Austria nor Serbia cared much for the final terms.

One month later the Balkan allies were fighting among themselves. On June 29, 1913, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria ordered one of his armies to deliver a surprise attack on Serbian forces in Macedonia. The Bulgarians had some claim to more territory than they received. The Serbs had expected trouble. But Ferdinand's attack gained him no sympathy abroad and proved even more disastrous closer to home as Bulgarian troops found themselves fighting Serbs, Greeks, Turks, and Rumanians. The Turks recaptured Adrianople. The Rumanians, who had stayed out of the First Balkan War, moved down from the north and helped themselves to the Dobruja region. On August 10 the Bulgarians had to sign the Peace of Bucharest and surrender almost everything they had gained the year before, plus some former territories of their own which went to Rumania.

• VI •

AS THE SECOND DECADE of the twentieth century began, Eastern Europe saw three localized wars break out in three successive years: the Italian-Turkish War in 1911, the First Balkan War in 1912, the Second Balkan War in 1913. The great Western powers—Britain, France, and Germany—had prevented these wars from spreading and had helped to bring them to an end; they had arranged a peaceful settlement of their own differences after the Agadir crisis; but they had failed to keep the peace in the East. It was not that the Western powers lacked the power or the will to enforce peace. They had failed to prevent war in the East because they had little understanding of the forces that wanted war. And no international body existed either in the East or in the West with enough authority to deal with European problems on a European scale.

Four oddly assorted groups with international connections stood to gain everything from keeping Europe at peace. Back in 1848 Marx and Engels had told the workers of the world to unite; they had nothing to lose but their chains. But the collapse of the Paris Commune in 1871 wrecked Marx's hopes for Socialism—or revolution—in his time. From 1880 to 1910 the ranks of organized labor steadily swelled. At the same time Socialist parties and Socialist ideas gained new converts. In 1889 these parties came together in the Second Socialist International, and

in 1900 they organized the International Socialist Bureau. This Bureau had no power over individual Socialist parties, but it organized international Socialist meetings and tried to make working-class solidarity the foundation of European unity. Not all labor organizations supported the Socialist cause. The Syndicalists in Spain and Italy and the International Workers of the World in the United States preferred Anarchism to Socialism. They wanted "one big union"; they refused—as some Socialists also did—to give any support to any bourgeois state. At the same time the British Trade Union Congress, the American Federation of Labor, and many trade unions in many other countries concentrated chiefly on getting higher wages, shorter hours, better social legislation. The possibilities of international working-class action received less and less attention.

The Vatican, like the Second Socialist International, had everything to gain from European unity and European peace. The Roman Catholic Church stood for something beyond the state, something greater than the nation. It had helped to unify Europe before the Reformation and aspired to convert the whole world. But belief in all forms of organized religion had steadily waned. More important still, the Vatican had allied itself with specific parties in France and Germany; it had remained the official state religion in Austria-Hungary and Spain; it had refused to make its peace with the Government of Italy. No less than the Socialists, the Roman Catholics took sides in domestic political controversies.

The ruling dynasties in all the European Empires and monarchies also had an enormous stake in European peace, yet they too found themselves compromised in many of the same ways that the Vatican was compromised. The Kaiser, the Tsar, and Emperor Francis Joseph all feared that war would destroy their three dynasties. But each of these monarchs had to identify his own prestige with the nation over which he ruled. All of them relied on the support of extreme nationalists, and these nationalists, in turn, hated and feared all rival nationalists. The Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary also hated and feared the Socialists inside their own countries no less than they hated and feared the nationalists of other countries. Much as they dreaded the prospects of war, they dreaded the prospects of revolution even more and therefore encouraged war talk to counteract Socialist propaganda. Yet they also recognized, in their more lucid moments, that war might eventually lead to revolution and that their dynasties would stand or fall together.

In addition to the Socialist International, the Roman Catholic Church, and the reigning dynasties, Europe had developed an International of High Finance and Heavy Industry. The coal and steel



BROWN BROTHERS

Kaiser William and His First Cousin, King George V

industries of Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxemburg pooled their resources. German, French, and British bankers financed railway construction together in Turkey and China. An international syndicate controlled the Suez Canal. But heavy industry in all the major European countries came to depend more and more on the manufacture of armaments at an assured profit. Their agents bribed newspapers and politicians to foment war scares. Every time the Krupp works in Germany received a new order for bigger guns, the Schneider works in France beat the war drums. The German naval construction program may have alarmed Sir Edward Grey, but it brought business and profits to Vickers-Armstrong.

Two forces—one positive, the other negative—kept Europe divided against itself. On the positive side, the larger nations tended to organize their industry, banking, and farming on a national basis. On the negative side, a condition of international anarchy prevented individuals, groups, and nations from getting together on a European basis. The workers of hand and brain—organized and unorganized; the great religions—Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant; the reigning dynasties, and the industrial, commercial, and financial dynasties all stood to gain from the creation of a European community. But

national sentiment ran stronger than class sentiment, religious sentiment, or even personal interest. The British publicist Norman Angell wrote a widely read book, *The Great Illusion*, proving that a general European war would damage victor as much as vanquished. In spite of the irresistible logic of his case, his warning led to no practical results.

Arthur J. Balfour, not Norman Angell, had the last word. "My quarrel," he declared, "has been with those who thought that the economic world as they conceived it was going to be conducted henceforth not upon national lines, but upon cosmopolitan lines. They were wrong. The world has, rightly or wrongly, insisted that in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as in days gone by, industry shall be run upon national and not upon cosmopolitan lines."

Europe paid no more heed to Balfour's complacency than it had to Angell's anxiety. So many people found life so pleasant that they let things drift. Most Europeans could look forward to leading more comfortable lives than their fathers or grandfathers had led. The rich were getting richer, and so were the poor. Anyone who did not like the Old World with its serene surface and fixed social order could find excitement in the New. The rulers of Europe took their privileged positions for granted. Even the leaders of European Socialism found that revolutionary slogans did not strike revolutionary fire. Nationalist slogans went over much better, not only with the middle classes but with the industrial workers, too. Only among the peasants of Eastern Europe did revolutionary and nationalist slogans mean one and the same thing.

All Europeans, except Russians, could travel as they pleased, without passports. Many countries had begun to raise some tariffs, but trade, on the whole, flowed freely. The higher the society, the more international its outlook. The reigning dynasties of Europe intermarried and inbred their children like so many pedigreed race horses—Hapsburgs, Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, Saxe-Coburg-Gothas, who became the Windsors in England, and even the upstart Bernadottes of Sweden, descendants of a Napoleonic general. But twentieth-century Europe, to which scientists, scholars, and creative artists had contributed so much, subordinated the scientist to the soldier, the scholar to the politician, and the creative artist to the wealthy, privileged few. The sensational press doped the masses with popular culture. "Books," said Anatole France of the smaller, more sophisticated audience for which he wrote, "are the opium of the West."

In 1893 Max Nordau had predicted that European culture would degenerate, starting at the top. Twenty years later European culture did not lack vigor or variety. But Europe's culture, like many of Europe's other good things, had remained the exclusive property of the favored few. The masses could afford few books, theaters, concerts, or paint-



Before and After: What the Balkan Wars did to "Turkey in Europe"

ings. Not until the twentieth century did the higher forms of culture begin to become widely available—thanks, in part, to rising standards of living and education and in part to new means of communication: the popular press, the motion picture, and the phonograph. But mass culture flourished in one compartment; class culture in another. And the end of the first decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the second saw one of the great geniuses of Europe put all his energies into an artistic effort that gave the limited class audience all the novelty, excitement, and escape that it craved—and more besides. The genius's name was Sergei Diaghilev. His artistic creation was known as the Russian ballet.

Diaghilev was born in 1872 of a well-to-do Russian provincial family who belonged to the intelligentsia of the time. He had far more ambition and business ability than most of the young dilettantes who came of age during the 1890's, and before reaching the age of thirty he had organized an international painting exhibition in St. Petersburg, established his own art magazine, written a book on the ballet, and produced several ballets himself. Even in Russia the ballet had gone into a decline, and though Diaghilev gave it new life, he made many enemies and left St. Petersburg for Paris during the 1905 Revolution. At a farewell banquet in his honor, he summed up his artistic beliefs and expectations this way:

"We are witnesses of the greatest moment of summing up in history, in the name of an unknown culture, which will be created by us and which will also sweep us away. That is why, with fear or misgiving, I

raise my glass to the ruined walls of the beautiful palaces, as well as to the new commandments of a new aesthetic. The only wish that I, an incorrigible sensualist, can express is that the forthcoming struggle should not damage the amenities of life, and that the death should be as beautiful and illuminating as the resurrection."

By 1907 Diaghilev had organized his first exhibition of Russian paintings in Paris. The next year he organized concerts of Russian music and presented the Russian opera *Boris Godunov*, starring the singer Chaliapin. In 1909 he produced his first Russian ballet outside his native country. Léon Bakst painted much of his scenery. Richard Strauss, Maurice Ravel, and the young Russian composer Igor Stravinsky composed special music for him. The dancers Anna Pavlova, Léonide Massine, and Vaslav Nijinsky became world celebrities under Diaghilev's guidance. Only the wealth and fashion of Europe could afford to attend these spectacles. Diaghilev also gave all his energies to a single troupe that could play only a single theater in one city at a time.

Although Russian tradition, Russian energy, and Russian talent inspired Diaghilev's ballets, the money that financed them, the audiences who applauded them, and many of the artists who helped to create them came from Western Europe. Diaghilev brought all these essential ingredients together. He fused the arts of literature, painting, acting, dancing, and music. In *Petrouchka*, Stravinsky set old Russian folk songs to new rhythms; in the *Sacre du Printemps*, he composed a new kind of music. The Austrian librettist Hugo von Hoffmansthal, who had written the book for Richard Strauss's *Rosenkavalier* in 1911, collaborated in 1914 with Strauss on a ballet based on the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife. The music of Rimsky-Korsakov was adapted to the ballet *Scheherazade*. One of Théophile Gautier's poems inspired *The Specter of the Rose*. Diaghilev created other ballets around music by Chopin and Tchaikovsky.

Much of the new painting, music, and literature that had bored, bewildered, or infuriated certain sections of the public suddenly acquired purpose and meaning. From apparent anarchy and chaos Diaghilev created a new synthesis that dazzled a wider public in search of new sensations. His ballets added little to the sum of human wisdom. They had slight bearing on the urgent problems of an anxious time. Their importance lay in the fact that they gave a certain public what that public wanted—novelty, excitement, escape from reality—and Diaghilev himself ministered to that public with a zeal and skill worthy of the highest cause.

Something more than the tradition of art for art's sake reached its apotheosis in Diaghilev's ballets. They summed up and expressed in one blinding, dizzying burst of sound, color, and movement the restless

*Anna Pavlova and Partner*

CULVER

questing spirit of contemporary Europe. Only a cosmopolitan society could have brought together so many diverse national traditions. Diaghilev and his collaborators had little in common with the rebellious aesthetes, the decadent poseurs, the rootless bohemians of the 1890's. They had to submit themselves to discipline as individuals; they had to work together as a highly trained and talented corps of experts in many fields. Only a vigorous society could have combined all these traditions and skills into a new art form. But the Diaghilev ballets suffered from a characteristic defect. Not 1 per cent of Europe's three hundred million people could ever hope to see a Diaghilev ballet with their own eyes. And the favored few who could attend found only the new sensations that they craved, not the new wisdom that they needed.

These select audiences saw upon the stage an allegory of their own lives. The privileged classes of Europe had to specialize as much as any member of Diaghilev's troupe. They went through as fixed a routine; they followed as rigid a discipline; they observed as strict conventions. This routine, this discipline, these conventions had little connection with the twentieth-century world. Just as Diaghilev's ballets created a

world of their own for a few hours each day, so Europe's upper classes created a world of their own in which they passed their whole lives. Both these make-believe worlds existed for the sensations they provided—but what refined, what varied sensations they yielded. Diaghilev's ballets drew upon all the arts; they re-created every human emotion, every historical period, every national style. The audiences responded with the fervor of fellow specialists. Some members of these audiences had devoted themselves to such serious pursuits as science, scholarship, diplomacy, the arts. Others had thrown themselves no less completely into sports, hobbies, or the pursuit of pleasure, and with few exceptions all went through their prescribed motions like so many actors in a vast pageant for which all of Europe served as the backdrop.

But this European pageant, unlike the Russian ballet, had no Diaghilev to co-ordinate the performers and to establish contact between performers and audience. Diaghilev had no politics, but he had enough business sense to understand that the kind of performances he wanted to present required money, publicity, and popular support. One purpose only inspired him—to create beauty—and to that purpose he devoted all his energies and talents. No such sense, and no similar, single purpose inspired the real-life actors in Europe's upper-class pageantry. Certain national leaders had brought together many specialists within their own countries; they had even made alliances and agreements with other national leaders in other countries. They staged spectacular performances, too—army and navy maneuvers, royal weddings and funerals, international conferences and expositions. The masses, by and large, accepted and enjoyed the spectacle, even though they had little to say about what went on. As for the principals in this European pageant, they had not only lost touch with the masses: they had lost control of themselves.

SUMMING UP

LLOYD GEORGE'S MANSION HOUSE speech at the height of the Agadir crisis helped to preserve the peace among the Western powers. But his threat of force galled the German leaders and caused them to step up their naval program. As a result, Haldane's attempt to come to a naval agreement with Germany got nowhere. Nor were the Western powers able to prevent three localized wars in Eastern Europe. Almost everybody in Europe feared the drift that had set in; hardly anybody in Europe seemed able to stop it. Between 1910 and 1914 Europe's classes and Europe's masses moved further and further apart. The masses enjoyed new privileges; the classes enjoyed new luxuries. West-

ern Europe, with its orderly ways, had less and less in common with the more turbulent, backward lands to the east. The nineteenth-century prophets of decadence and degeneration had missed their mark. Europe's civilization did not die as the new century dawned; it took a new lease on life. What ailed Europe was not degeneration but specialization. Europe's specialists lost touch with the people and even with each other. They acknowledged no single authority; they lived by their own laws for their own purposes. If they wanted to work for something beyond themselves, nobody set them a goal. In the field of art, however, twentieth-century Europe did achieve a new synthesis. Diaghilev's Russian ballets brought together all the most vital artistic forces of the time for the sole and single purpose of distracting a pleasure-loving public. The upper classes to whom Diaghilev appealed had already turned their whole lives into a sort of collective ballet, but they had no super-Diaghilev to direct their steps.

Wilson Gives America the New Freedom

*The progressive movement in the United States
at last finds a leader who moves forward toward
the Promised Land until two tragedies halt him
part way.*

PREVIEW

IN THE PERSON of Woodrow Wilson, one of the most complex figures in American history enters the White House. Wilson did not go into politics until he had reached his mid-fifties, but he made up for lost time. His personality and experience made him an effective leader in a period of general excitement, hope, and change. He achieved prodigious results during his first year and a half in Washington; then the outbreak of war in Europe threatened to destroy his work and the death of his wife hampered his own ability to carry on.

• I •

IF THE SPIRIT of the Russian ballet pervaded Europe between 1910 and 1914, the spirit of a revival meeting seized the United States during those years. The climax arrived with the election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency in 1912, when the dreams of a whole generation of Populists and Progressives appeared to have come true. Having failed in three bids for the Presidency, Bryan at the 1912 Democratic convention threw his support to Wilson rather than to Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives and favored candidate of the professional politicians. Although Bryan's support of Wilson made the headlines, it was the shift of some of the big political machines from Clark to Wilson that made the difference—and embittered Clark. And the bosses liked Wilson not because of what he stood for but because of the popular following at his command. Back in 1910 when somebody asked one of the state bosses in New Jersey whether Wilson would make a good governor, the boss replied, "How the hell do I know whether he'll make a good governor? But he'll make a good candidate. That is the only thing that interests me." The professional politicians

whose bread and butter depended on their understanding of the public mind knew that the masses wanted the kind of reforms that Wilson promised. The bosses recognized in Wilson—however vaguely, however unwillingly—a new type of politician suited to the needs of a new time.

In Wilson's case, more than in most, the child was father of the man, and the son the child of two remarkable parents. From his dominating Presbyterian father, the Reverend Dr. Joseph Wilson, who stood out as a great preacher even by the high standards of the time, Wilson learned to reverence the power of words almost as much as the power of God Himself. Wilson always regarded his father as the greatest man he had ever known, and from him he learned to read his Bible daily and to pray daily to God for guidance. With Wilson, as with most Presbyterians, principles always prevailed, especially one's own principles, which, naturally, had divine sanction behind them. "The stern Conventer tradition which is behind me," said Wilson in later life, "sends many an echo down the years."

Wilson did not, however, take entirely after his dominating, extraverted father, who had a sharp wit and a sharper tongue. He inherited a shy, poetic streak from his sensitive, affectionate mother. To her he turned for the sympathy that it was not in his father's nature to give. Dr. Joseph Wilson had married Jessie Woodrow in 1849. Her father, a Scottish Presbyterian minister, had recently come to the United States. She bore her husband two daughters before the birth of their eldest son, Thomas Woodrow, at Staunton, Virginia, in 1856. The next year they moved to Savannah, Georgia, where they spent the following eleven years. Their eldest boy—they had a second son in 1866—remembered the Civil War years vaguely; the Reconstruction period vividly, and bitterly. "The only place in the country, the only place in the world, where nothing has to be explained to me is the South," wrote Wilson in a life of Robert E. Lee.

Yet Wilson had no Southern blood. He came of Scotch-Irish stock on both sides of his family. His father's father had owned newspapers in Steubenville and Pittsburgh. Unlike most of their Southern neighbors, both Dr. Joseph Wilson and his wife had modest but independent means. Woodrow Wilson attended private schools and then spent four years at Princeton, three years at the University of Virginia Law School, two years at the Johns Hopkins Graduate School—all at his family's expense. His Southern childhood gave him a horror of war and its consequences. His family circumstances protected and insulated him from the competitive rough-and-tumble of the market place. His delicate health, which he overstrained several times by overstudy, cut him off from "the strenuous life" that Theodore Roosevelt forced himself to live.



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President-Elect Wilson and President Taft on Inauguration Day, 1913

As a good stepchild of the South, Wilson accepted the conventional white Southerner's attitude toward the Negro, just as he also believed in the Democratic Party and free trade. But he had ideas of his own, too. He admired the prose of Edmund Burke and the oratory of William E. Gladstone. He preferred the English system of cabinet government to the American system of checks and balances. Economics bored him. He loved poetry and music, singing and dancing, attending the theater, and, above all, speechmaking. While still a schoolboy he developed a passion for organizing and presiding over debating societies. While an undergraduate at Princeton he dreamed of himself as "Thomas Woodrow Wilson, United States Senator from Virginia."

Wilson became a lawyer in order to become a statesman, but he quit the law after spending a futile year trying to build up a practice in overcrowded Atlanta, Georgia. He took up the study of American history at Johns Hopkins and during his second year as a graduate student wrote his most distinguished book, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics*. Perhaps the most original statement it contained was his observation that the United States Senate is "separated from class interest." But this first book made Wilson's reputation and he accepted the chairmanship of the history department in a new college for women, Bryn Mawr. This also gave him the salary he needed to marry the lovely girl to whom he had been engaged

for two years, Ellen Axson, daughter and granddaughter of Presbyterian ministers.

From Bryn Mawr Wilson went to Wesleyan, from Wesleyan to Princeton. Everywhere students flocked to his classes. In 1902 his popularity among Princeton undergraduates and his talent as a public speaker won him the presidency of the university, by unanimous vote of the trustees. His record of unbroken success continued for three more years. At the age of fifty he had become the outstanding president in Princeton's history. "Princeton for the nation's service" became his slogan as he reorganized the undergraduate curriculum and set up the so-called "preceptorial system," based on Oxford and Cambridge models. But when he wanted to go further and break up Princeton into a series of "quads"—again like the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge—and reduce the influence of a few socially select eating clubs, the alumni turned against him. "Wilson wants to make a gentleman eat with a mucker," one of them growled.

Wilson also came into conflict with many faculty members—and many alumni, too—because of his high-handed attitude about the location of a new graduate school. His appeals over the heads of the trustees to the alumni body misfired. In 1910 he told a group of Pittsburgh alumni: "The great voice of America does not come from the seats of learning. It comes in a murmur from the hills and woods, and the farms and factories and the mills, rolling on and gaining volume until it comes to us from the homes of common men. Do these murmurs echo in the corridors of universities? I have not heard them."

In the corridors of his own university Wilson heard something louder than a murmur, and it did not come from the homes of common men. It came from his persistent adversary, Dean West, who wanted to establish a graduate school at some distance from the undergraduate campus. Wilson had rejected a gift of a million dollars to build such a graduate school where Dean West wanted it, but he could not reject a second bequest of five millions, left by a well-to-do alumnus. "We have beaten the living, but we cannot beat the dead," said Wilson and submitted his resignation. He had just received the Democratic nomination for the governorship of New Jersey and hoped that the trustees would take no action until after the election. To his chagrin, they let him quit at once.

Wilson waged a successful campaign and became a strong Governor, although he asked some newspapermen the day after his election, "How does one go about the business of being Governor? I don't even know how to appoint my secretary." He learned fast, however, and within two years had transformed one of the most boss-ridden states of the Union into one of the most progressive. He broke up the connections between

the politicians and the public utilities. He made it possible for cities and towns to adopt the commission form of government. He reorganized the school system, the health services, the employer-liability laws. And he did not hide his light under a bushel. He spoke up and down the state; then up and down the nation, impressing himself on audiences everywhere as one of the great orators and outstanding progressives of the time.

Wilson had not only transformed himself from a pedagogue into a politician. He had changed from a conservative into a progressive. In 1906 Wilson had suggested the creation of "a common council, a sort of people's forum" to give popular leadership, and J. Pierpont Morgan seemed to him the ideal chairman. At the same time he declared, "I am glad to see that in all this turmoil of undefined wickedness, Mr. Morgan's name has not been among the celebrities." The Morgan bank was the chief creditor of *Harper's Weekly*, of which George Harvey, an ambitious young journalist from Vermont, had become editor in 1901. Five years later Harvey told a dinner at the Lotos Club in New York that it was with a sense "almost of rapture" that he contemplated "even the remotest possibility" of voting for Wilson as President of the United States on the Democratic ticket. Wilson had opposed Bryan's free-silver program in 1896; he regarded Bryan as a potentially dangerous demagogue "with no mental rudder." In 1906 he wrote to a friend, "Would that we could do something at once dignified and effective to knock Mr. Bryan into a cocked hat." In 1908 he had asked two Democrats not to embarrass him by having Bryan speak at Princeton. The following year Wilson declared, "I am a fierce partisan of the open shop and of everything that makes for individual liberty."

A mixture of motives and pressures accounted for the strange transformation of Woodrow Wilson. He had shown a capacity for growth and change rare in any American at any time. Having made his mark in one profession, he shifted, during his middle fifties, to another. Having held to a conservative political philosophy most of his life, he moved suddenly to the left. Unsuccessful Americans found it relatively easy, in Wilson's time, to switch from one calling to another. But the successful American, once established in one line of work, seldom cared or dared to change. And in all times and all countries, the youthful radical usually turns conservative; the youthful conservative usually stays that way. Wilson said of himself in 1911: "I am *not* conservative. I am a radical."

Wilson did not undergo any sudden, radical conversion like St. Paul on the road to Damascus. His complex nature simply made a new and necessary adjustment to internal and external pressures. He had always nourished political ambitions; he had never shown capacity for original

scholarship. The literary and intellectual level of his books steadily declined. Whereas Henry Adams's masterpiece consisted of a detailed study of seventeen years of American history on which the author worked for more than two decades, Wilson's most ambitious piece of writing took the form of a hastily composed popular history of the American people. The Hearst press once described it as "Toryism of the blackest type," and Wilson the politician removed some of the strictures that Wilson the popularizer had composed against foreign-born American citizens. Anyone familiar with the academic life knows the Wilson type. Some professors excel at administrative work; others at original research. Wilson excelled as a teacher. He loved to lay down the law to young, eager, admiring audiences who never talked back.

But Wilson's ambitions extended beyond the classroom. Like many preachers and sons of preachers, Wilson loved the wider spotlight. He had no liking for the give-and-take of conversation and negotiation. Though in no sense effeminate, he was not a man's man either. The Presbyterian Providence that predestined him for the White House saw to it that his wife bore him three daughters who formed an admiring circle around the family fireside of an evening, listening to the man of the house read Browning aloud. The admiration of the young, the adoration of women, and the applause of the crowd stimulated Wilson to his best efforts. But once he took up any cause, any attack upon that cause became a personal attack; and since he knew that he always spoke and acted with divine sanction, all who opposed him served the Fiend of Hell.

The fullness of Wilson's character did not unfold until he became President of Princeton. Blocked by his own faculty and trustees, he carried his fight to the mass of the graduates, and when they too turned against him he sought vindication from a far wider public. Actually, Wilson had opposed Princeton's exclusive eating clubs for academic reasons, not for democratic ones; nevertheless, he found himself the champion of democracy. He then entered politics at the moment when the progressive movement was reaching its peak. As a traditional Democrat, he of course opposed the Republicans, and George Harvey made the mistake of sizing him up as a conservative who would liquidate the disastrous Bryan. Harvey's error lay in underestimating Wilson's appetite for power and inclination toward reform. Nor could Harvey foresee, in 1906, the effect that the Princeton fight would have on Wilson's ego. Back in 1897 Wilson had told a meeting of the Virginia Bar Association, "This is not a day of revolution; but it is a day of change, and of such change as may breed revolution, should we fail to guide and moderate it." Wilson subsequently became a progressive because he decided that reform offered the best protection of those traditional


values in which he had always believed, and the best way of promoting those political ambitions that he had always cherished.

Wilson's pictures never did him justice. His narrow, close-set eyes, his stiff figure, his oversized jaws appeared forbidding. Yet his courteous manner and his beautiful speaking voice could charm and compel an audience. His masklike features became animated when he spoke; his blue eyes and glowing complexion radiated light and warmth.

On December 18, 1910, W. S. Couch of the *New York World* wrote this vivid description of the way Wilson looked to his contemporaries: "Woodrow Wilson's face is narrow and curiously geometrical. It is a rectangle, one might say, the lines are so regular. His forehead is high and his iron gray hair retreats from it somewhat, which adds to this effect. His face is refined, a face that shows breeding and family in every line, but it is heavily boned. The cheekbones are rather high and the jaw thrusts forward in a challenging way. The mouth is small, sensitive, with full lips, a mouth almost too well shaped for a man, and a woman might envy the arched eyebrows. But the almost brutal strength of the bony structure of the face, and that aggressive jaw promise an active, iron-willed, fighting man. His eyes, blue-gray they looked in that light behind his nose-glasses, are very penetrating. They have a way of narrowing when he talks that gives him a stern, almost grim expression."

The record he made during his two-year term as Governor of New Jersey paralleled his first two years at Princeton, but this time he knew where he was going. Shortly before the Democratic Party's 1912 convention he made up with—and to—Bryan at a Jackson Day Dinner. The Democratic Party, said Wilson, had but one fixed point during the previous sixteen years: "the character and devotion and teachings of William Jennings Bryan." And Bryan, not to be outdone, praised Wilson's plea for party unity as "the greatest speech in American political history." Several months later, as the campaign was drawing to a close, Wilson told a meeting of progressive Republicans in New York that "the processes of prosperity" were destroying the middle classes.

"There is a weight above them," he said, "a weight of concentrated capital and of organized control, against which they are throwing themselves in vain; and beneath them the great body of the working people, the great majority of people in this country upon whom that control is directly exercised by the determination of the industries of the country and the determination of the share that the working people shall have in the industries of the country." He continued: "The sap of manhood may never be allowed to express itself in action in America if we do not see to it that the places where the sap produces the fruit are kept free for this beneficent action. We are in danger of this taking



BROWN BROTHERS

President Wilson

place in the upper strata, the great financiers, the organizers of combinations of industry, the masters of monopoly bearing down with their great intolerable burden of controlled enterprise until this originaive class is absolutely squeezed out and America consists of masters and employees."

Wilson possessed the ideal qualifications to lead the progressive crusade. He knew from his own experience how the great middle class—to which most Americans believed they belonged—felt the squeeze of monopoly. He had never known the bitterness of poverty or the corrosion of great wealth. From his religion he derived dignity if not humility; from his intellect he derived pride if not inspiration. Unlike Bryan, Wilson had no roots in the Populist soil of the West; unlike Lodge and Roosevelt, he had no social connections with the moneyed interests of the East. Wilson was born to the manse, not the manor. His moral emphasis commended him to a churchgoing people. His genteel

self-assurance commanded respect. His proudest and most popular boast came at the end of the New Jersey campaign: "Nobody owns me."

• II •

"FIFTY YEARS from now," wrote the editor of *Collier's Weekly* in his issue of January 24, 1914, "the future historian will say that the ten years ending about January 1, 1914, was the period of greatest ethical advance made by this nation in any decade." Wilson's moral purpose had gone on from where Roosevelt's blind energy and Taft's ineffective good will had left off. Roosevelt stimulated the American people; Taft confused them; Wilson led them. Wilson's stay in the White House also coincided with the most important renaissance of the American mind since New England's golden day before the Civil War.

The hub of the universe had long since moved from Boston. The Middle West suddenly brought forth a crop of writers and magazines. Carl Sandburg wrote poems to Chicago—"hog-butcher of the world." Vachel Lindsay put the new jazz rhythms of the American Negro into verse. Edgar Lee Masters's *Spoon River Anthology* reproduced the frustrations and ironies of American small-town life—and death. Chicago became the center of the new movement, promoted by a group of eager and talented young newspapermen: Floyd Dell, Burton Rascoe, Harry Hansen, Francis Hackett.

New York soon outstripped Chicago, if only because it had already become the financial and publishing capital of the country. Floyd Dell came east to join the staff of the *Masses*, which began appearing in New York in 1911. Three years later Herbert Croly, originator of the "New Nationalism" that Theodore Roosevelt had appropriated, established the *New Republic*, which called itself "A Journal of Opinion which seeks to meet the challenge of the new time." Its contributors included Walter Lippmann, the young Harvard Socialist, who declared "our business is to tear down this mighty structure of words, these will o' the wisps," and Van Wyck Brooks, also of Harvard, who called for "a warm, humane, concerted, and more or less revolutionary protest against whatever incubuses of crabbed age, paralysis, tyranny, sloth, stupidity, commercialism, lay most heavily upon the people's life."

Even cold-roast Boston felt the warmth of a new dawn. Amy Lowell, whose half brother had recently become President of Harvard, was shocking the last Puritans by writing free verse, based on French models, and smoking large, black cigars. Idaho-born Ezra Pound was also experimenting with free verse, living in Paris, and predicting an "American Risorgimento" that would make "the Italian Renaissance

look like a tempest in a teapot." Edwin Arlington Robinson and Robert Frost were recapturing the American spirit in more orthodox verse forms. Of the new writers of fiction, no one had yet appeared to rival Dreiser, and Dreiser still awaited general recognition.

When Wilson went to the White House the revolutionary Jack London was the highest-paid author in the world. He had won fame and fortune writing about the great outdoors for mass magazines that paid fabulous sums for stories and articles. These magazines received most of their revenue from advertising and thus performed a new and essential economic function by finding new markets for

the glut of goods. While Europe continued to depend largely upon coal as its main source of energy, the United States had developed water power to generate electricity, natural gas to provide heat, and the gasoline-driven internal-combustion engine to replace the horse and buggy, to threaten the streetcar, and to weaken even the mighty railways. These new sources of power, harnessed to mass-producing industries, were turning out so many goods that distribution had become the problem and mass advertising seemed to be the solution.


The professional writer in the United States therefore became, in a sense, the promoter of the new wares that American industry produced in such profusion and at such low cost. The writer received a handsome return for his labors, but he tended to follow—not lead—public taste. At best the magazine editor, at worst the magazine advertiser dictated the reading habits of millions of Americans and the literary productions of hundreds of American writers. The short story, with the surprise ending popularized by O. Henry, became the favorite literary medium—that and the serial story, each installment of which had to leave the reader in a state of suspense. Art for the masses assumed other forms. David Wark Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* marked the coming of age of the motion picture. Irving Berlin's first song hit, "Alexander's Ragtime Band," set a style in popular music that has apparently come to stay and that has influenced serious music, too.

American architects loomed large in the artistic renaissance of the



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*Theodore Dreiser when He Served as
Editor-in-Chief of the Butterick Publi-
cations, 1907-1910*



BROWN BROTHERS


David W. Griffith and the Cast of One of His Early Motion Pictures, Including Richard Barthelmess in Fur Coat (center), Lillian Gish (right), and Lowell Sherman (far right)

early 1900's. The New York firm of McKim, Mead, and White borrowed freely—sometimes almost too literally—from European, Roman, and Greek originals, finally going so far as to model the great Pennsylvania Station in New York City on the Roman Baths of the Emperor Diocletian. Ralph Adams Cram of Boston specialized in adaptations of the Gothic style, using steel girders to get effects that no medieval architect working only in stone could have achieved. His more versatile partner, Bertram Goodhue, designed a bold, original Capitol for the State of Nebraska; Henry Bacon's Lincoln Memorial went straight back to the Greeks. Most of the libraries, churches, railway stations, public buildings, and memorials erected in the United States during the first two decades of the new century either reproduced European originals or drew from America's own past.

Many leading American architects of the time had received at least part of their training abroad—usually at the Paris École des Beaux-Arts. Cass Gilbert, the most original of them all, came from Zanesville, Ohio, attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and began to practise in St. Paul, Minnesota. Later, he came to New York where limita-

tions of space were forcing the builders of offices to develop something new under the sun: the sky-scraper. The Singer Building in downtown Manhattan and the Metropolitan Life Building towered briefly over their neighbors. Cass Gilbert's Woolworth Building, completed during Wilson's first term in the White House, was the tallest of them all, rising to a height of 760 feet. It also remains to this day the one, distinctive artistic masterpiece. Here was a truly and unique American synthesis of the Old World and the New, using re-inforced concrete for a functional, not a decorative, purpose, adapting the Gothic style to new uses and dimensions. In the Woolworth Building American architecture suddenly came of age.

If one man, more than any other, impressed his personality on American life during the second decade of the twentieth century, that man was Henry Ford. Like thousands of other mechanically minded young Americans at the turn of the century, Ford had gone into building and driving racing cars in a small way. Like hundreds of these thousands, he set himself up in business. But nobody else saw as Ford did the possibilities of mass production. First, he decided to build a single, standard model year after year. Its parts would be standardized and mass produced. "Customers," said Ford, could "have any color they want so it's



Nebraska State Capitol, Designed by Bertrand Goodhue

UNDERWOOD


black." And having built a car that the masses could purchase at less than five hundred dollars, Ford took the next logical step and paid his own workers enough money to buy the products of their toil. On January 5, 1914, he announced that his thirteen thousand employees would receive a minimum wage of five dollars a day, for an eight-hour instead of a nine-hour stint.

Ford described the wage increase as "a plain act of social justice." He



UNDERWOOD

Woolworth Building, Designed by Cass Gilbert



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Henry Ford in the First Car He Built, 1892

said, "I can see no purpose in one man or a few men accumulating a great fortune." He talked of leaving what he had made "to the boys in the factory," since his hard-working son needed no help. Good business as well as good morals and economics lay behind Ford's new policy. His plant suffered from a high rate of labor turnover; the possibility of unionization had begun to appear. By offering higher pay and shorter hours, Ford could get the cream of the labor market, tighten labor discipline, and reduce labor turnover. And as things actually worked out, almost one-third of his employees never did qualify for the five-dollars-a-day minimum. Socialists declared that Ford "had purchased the brains, life, and souls of his men by a raise in pay of a few dollars a week." Rival automobile manufacturers denounced him as a Socialist. The Democratic New York *World* called him "an inspired millionaire."


Overnight Ford became a national figure. Wall Street never cared for him because he had done his own financing and personally controlled his entire organization. Ford despised philanthropy and the business methods that most philanthropists adopted in order to get the money they later gave away. In some respects he recalled the old-fashioned boss who used to run his own shop in person. In other respects he had advanced beyond most of his contemporaries because he stressed maximum production rather than maximum profits and low prices rather than low pay.

• III •

THE AUTOMOBILE AGE that Ford had done so much to hasten impressed itself on the Wilson inaugural. In 1909 Taft had made the conventional journey from the White House to the Capitol behind four horses. Only three years before that, Wilson himself had predicted that automobiles would spread socialistic feeling because "to the countrymen they are a picture of the arrogance of wealth with all its independence and carelessness." In March, 1913, Wilson rode from the White House to the Capitol in a six-cylinder automobile and proceeded to deliver one of the shortest inaugural addresses in history—only fifteen hundred words—and then revived a practice that no President since John Adams had resorted to: he delivered his first message to Congress in person and gloated in the reflection that Roosevelt had not thought to beat him to it. He also showed himself a practical politician and after a moment of conscience-searching turned over to his Postmaster General, Albert S. Burleson, the award of thousands of postmasterships to loyal Party workers.

Foreign affairs took brief but immediate precedence over domestic matters. Four days after Wilson became President two representatives of J. P. Morgan called upon Bryan, the new Secretary of State, to inquire if the Taft policy of dollar diplomacy continued in force and what about American participation in the proposed six-power loan to China? Wilson and his Cabinet decided that the loan threatened the administrative integrity of China and, in effect, violated the principle of the Open Door. The American bankers withdrew from the consortium.

Soon afterward a much more explosive situation came to a head in near-by Mexico. General Huerta had murdered President Madero and seized power himself. The major European powers recognized Huerta, but Wilson refused to go along and told Congress, in August, 1913: "We shall yet prove to the Mexican people that we know how to serve them without thinking first how we shall serve ourselves." His actions, however, did not entirely match his words. Early in 1914 nineteen American sailors and marines were killed when they landed in Vera Cruz in an attempt to establish order on foreign soil. War threatened, and Wilson accepted an arbitration offer from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, thus bringing about the resignation of Huerta and the installation of Carranza, who had been trying for more than a year to avenge the murder of Madero and oust Huerta. In other Latin-American countries Wilson also refused to uphold the interests of private, foreign capital, and in the Philippines he saw to it that natives would hold a



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Woodrow Wilson and Four Members of His Cabinet. Left to right, William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, J. C. McReynolds, Attorney-General, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State

majority of seats in the controlling council and pledged the United States to speed the day when the islands would become free and independent.

This reversion to the anti-imperialist practices of the Democratic Party went through smoothly enough and received general support. The big tasks of the new administration lay at home in the fields of tariff reduction, currency reform, and anti-trust legislation. Tariff reduction came first, and by early October, 1913, Congress had passed the most substantial tariff cuts since the Civil War. Currency reform came next, and by the end of 1913 Senator Glass, of Virginia, and Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo had put through Congress the Federal Reserve Act—prepared in large measure by Paul Warburg and other Wall Street leaders. Some antediluvian bankers opposed the measure because the Democrats favored it and it represented change. Actually, the Federal Reserve Act proved universally beneficial. It set up a nation-wide system of banking, supervised but not controlled by the Federal Government. It freed local banks and small businesses from their depend-



Garment Workers Picketing in New York City

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ence on a few large banks and at the same time put the Federal Government behind most of the country's banking system.

During the year 1913 the Wilson administration also laid the foundations for a comprehensive anti-trust program. With Representative Pujo of Louisiana in charge of the investigation and Samuel Untermyer as chief counsel, Congress conducted the first complete airing of the charges that the muck-rakers had been making against big business ever since the turn of the century. The results spoke for themselves. On February 23, 1913, the Pujo Committee released its report showing that the directors of a few dozen New York, Chicago, and Boston banks controlled almost every great American industry by a system of interlocking directorates. J. Pierpont Morgan had left the United States for Egypt a month before the release of the Pujo Report. He died the following month, leaving an estate valued at close to seventy million dollars, of which he left only seven hundred thousand dollars to charities. Although his departure and death had no connection with the Pujo Report, the end of Morgan marked the end of an era.

On January 3, 1914, the new head of the House of Morgan and other bankers announced that they planned to resign some of their posts. In



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Textile Workers on Strike, New York City, 1912

language that might have been copied from an imperial Chinese rescript of abdication, the son, heir, and namesake of the original J. P. Morgan announced: "An apparent change in public sentiment in regard to directorships seems now to warrant us in seeking to resign from some of these connections. Indeed, it may be, in view of the change in sentiment upon this subject, that we shall be in a better position to serve such properties and their security holders if we are not directors."

Wilson welcomed the move and told Congress on January 20, "The antagonism between business and government is over. The Government and businessmen are ready to meet each other halfway in a common effort to square their methods both with public opinion and the law." The administration followed up its advantage by putting three anti-trust bills through Congress. The Clayton Anti-Trust Bill prohibited interlocking directorates and at the same time declared that labor unions were not illegal combinations or conspiracies to restrain trade. The Rayburn Bill extended the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Congress also created a new body, the Federal Trade Commission, with power to investigate "unfair" business practices and to recommend changes to Congress.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

New York and Vienna Newspaper Headlines the Day after the Murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand

Wilson's supporters pointed with pride to his practical achievements during his first eighteen months in office. Wilson's opponents viewed with alarm the substantial progress he had made. On December 8, 1914, he informed Congress, "Our program of legislation with regard to the regulation of business is now complete." He had put on the statute books many of the principles for which the progressives had fought for more than twenty years. Had the New Freedom already run its course? Could Wilson initiate and would the country accept more reforms? The questions had already become academic. The good times that had lasted since the panic of 1907 were petering out. More important, two tragedies—one on a world scale, the other purely personal—struck Wilson down just when his success reached its zenith.

On June 28, 1914, a Serbian terrorist assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in the streets of Sarajevo, capital of the province of Bosnia. Within a month Austria had sent an ultimatum to Serbia and the major European powers were beginning to mobilize against each other. War came on August 1, and on August 6 Wilson's wife died. He kept her in ignorance of the war in Europe and tried to console himself with the reflection, "I cannot help feeling that she was taken in order to be spared that dreadful spectacle." Of himself he said at her funeral, "I never dreamed such loneliness and desolation of heart possible." Wilson, always dependent upon women and supremely dependent upon a wife with whom he had lived in supreme happiness, thus faced the sternest test of his career—alone.

SUMMING UP

IN 1910 what fame Woodrow Wilson enjoyed rested on his achievements as President of Princeton University. Four years later he had become world-renowned. As Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States, he had shown that he could get things done fast—if he had his own way. He also had shown a rare capacity to grow and to adjust himself to change. During his first year and a half in the White House he pushed through a series of reforms for which progressives had agitated since the 1890's. Radicals regarded them as inadequate and delayed. Certainly their enactment had not checked a business recession or given the unemployed workers and ruined farmers much more security than they had enjoyed under Republican rule. In Britain the Liberals had adopted more drastic measures over a longer period, but there, too, the reforms had not changed the fundamentals of an economic system which operated as cruelly and capriciously as ever. Nor did these reforms mitigate in any way the system of international anarchy under which the whole world lived. Thus, the domestic programs of the American Democrats and the British Liberals reached a dead end at the same time. Conditions abroad confronted the leaders of both countries with far more important decisions than any they had ever made at home.

Five Weeks That Wrecked a World

How one assassin in the Balkans started a train of events that led, within five weeks' time, to general European war.

PREVIEW

THE STORY of the outbreak of the First World War falls into four parts: 1. Serbian terrorists directed from Belgrade assassinate Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, in Sarajevo. 2. The Austrian Government decides to send an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia, and the Kaiser gives Austria a free hand. 3. The Russians prepare to back the Serbs; the Germans fail to restrain the Austrians. Russia mobilizes; Germany declares war. 4. The war which began in the East at once spreads to the West. France and Germany mobilize; Germany declares war and invades Belgium; Britain declares war on Germany. But where did responsibility for these events lie?

• I •

ANARCHY in the Balkans led up to the murder of the heir of the Austro-Hungarian throne. Anarchy in Europe led up to the war that followed a month later. The two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 had made more troubles than they had ended. The Turks schemed to regain their lost positions in Europe. The Bulgarians schemed to revenge themselves on their neighbors. The Serbs schemed to liberate their fellow Slavs from Austro-Hungarian rule. The Russians schemed to help them; the Austrians, to block them. The statesmen at London, Paris, and Berlin detested Balkan adventures, but their ties with Russia and Austria involved them anyway.

Time was when Slav, Teuton, and Magyar, Orthodox and Roman Catholic, had stood together against the Turkish infidel. During the nineteenth century, however, Turkish power had waned, Russian power had increased, and rivalry between Slav and Teuton overshadowed rivalry between Christian and Moslem. While the Great Russians looked upon themselves as the leaders of the Slavic world, the Serbs looked

upon themselves as the leaders of the South Slavic portion of that world. During the 1860's and 1870's Serbian and Russian revolutionaries used to forgather in Switzerland. The Serbs received schooling in Russian ideas and methods and prepared to organize terrorist attacks on their own Government, which at that time favored Austria rather than Russia. One of these young Serbian students, Nikola Pashitch, who preferred to make haste more gradually and less violently, created the Radical Party with a view to unifying the South Slavs under Serbian leadership as the northern Italians had just unified their country. His program, which he announced in 1881, was "the people's welfare and freedom at home and the country's independence and unification with the other parts of Serbdom abroad." He looked forward to eventual war with Turkey and Austria.

Younger men preferred quicker action closer to home. Some of the junior officers who organized the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 helped establish the Narodna Odbrana, or National Defense movement, five years later. This group soon shifted its attention to cultural matters, and after the Balkan Wars the leaders of the Radical Party decided that the time had come to slow down and consolidate their gains. Pashitch had become Premier and hoped to preserve the peace until 1917, for had not the Tsar and his advisers warned that not until then would Russia be ready for war?

Again, however, the younger generation wanted action and organized still a third group, "Union or Death," commonly known as the Black Hand. According to its Constitution the Black Hand sought "the union of all Serbs" and frankly stated, "This organization prefers terrorist action to intellectual propaganda." The Black Hand maintained an all-powerful central committee in Belgrade. It also had members and delegates in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and every corner of the Balkans. Only the central committee at Belgrade knew the names of all the members, who, when they joined, took an oath "by the sun that warms me, by the earth that nourishes me, before God, by the blood of my ancestors, on my honor and on my life, that I will from this moment till my death be faithful to the laws of this organization, and that I will always be ready to make any sacrifice for it." The official seal of the Black Hand included a skull and crossbones, a dagger, a bomb, and a bottle of poison. And at the head of the Black Hand terrorists stood General Dragutin Dimitrijevitich, chief of the espionage department of the Serbian General Staff.

The Black Hand organization had no more zealous followers anywhere than among the young people of Bosnia, who found it easy to attribute all their personal frustrations to Austrian rule. In March, 1914, the Bosnians learned that Archduke Francis Ferdinand and General



ACME

Archduke Francis Ferdinand and His Wife Entering the Car in Which They Were Assassinated

Potiorek, the Austrian Military Governor of Bosnia, would command summer maneuvers on Bosnian soil near the Serbian border. Several young Bosnian members of the Black Hand organization at once began plotting in Belgrade to assassinate the Archduke sometime during the course of his visit. General Dimitrijevitich gave them the money they needed to buy the necessary bombs and revolvers. Finally, three young Bosnian students—Gavrilo Princip, Trifko Grabez, and Nedjelko Chabrinovitch—set out for Bosnia after having received training in bomb throwing and revolver marksmanship under Black Hand officials. The Serbian frontier guards, who already belonged to the Black Hand organization, let the young men through.

Princip came from the mountain regions of western Bosnia. At the age of sixteen he left school and went to Belgrade, where he tried to join the Serbian Army to fight the Turks. Rejected for reasons of health, he threw himself into revolutionary work, filled with the ambition to become an assassin. Chabrinovitch had also left school and home, after failing in his studies and fighting with his father. He read anarchist literature, tried his hand as a typesetter, became involved in strikes, and got into trouble with the Austrian authorities in Sarajevo. Chabrinovitch and Princip met at Belgrade. Grabez had been expelled from school at Sarajevo in 1912 for slapping a teacher, but he continued

his studies in Belgrade, where he met Princip and Chabrinovitch.

These three unbalanced Bosnian youths, with the help of more experienced Serbian members of the Black Hand and of the National Defense organization, planned to assassinate the Archduke as he rode through the streets of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28, 1914. The Archduke, his wife, and General Potiorek all rode in the same automobile, and as they entered Sarajevo to receive the local dignitaries at the town hall, Chabrinovitch threw his bomb into the Archduke's car. The bomb either bounced off the back of the car or Francis Ferdinand tossed it out—accounts differ—and it exploded near the next car, seriously wounding an Austrian lieutenant colonel and several bystanders. Police seized Chabrinovitch before he could escape. The Archduke had the procession stopped, saw to it that the wounded people received hospital attention, and then declared, "Come on. The fellow is insane. Gentlemen, let us proceed with our program."

The party arrived safely at the town hall, but when the Mayor, reading from his prepared speech, spoke of the Bosnian people's loyalty to the Hapsburgs and their joy in the Archduke's visit, Franz Ferdinand angrily interrupted, "Enough of that. What! I make you a visit and you receive me with bombs." The officials then decided, with the approval of the Archduke, not to have the procession follow the long route that it had expected to take from the town hall to the Governor's residence



ACME

Austrian Police Seize Gavrilo Princip, Assassin of the Archduke

for the formal luncheon reception. But the chauffeur of the Mayor's car, which led the procession, misunderstood the orders and followed the original route. When the Archduke's car took the same turning, General Potiorek ordered the chauffeur to stop, back up, and take the more direct way. It so happened that Princip had stationed himself at this fatal corner, having chanced to leave the spot from which he had expected to make his assassination attempt. He could not have planned it half so well. As the Archduke's car stopped and prepared to back up, Princip stepped forward from the sidewalk and fired two shots point-blank. The first hit the Archduke in the throat. The second—which may have been aimed at Potiorek—hit the Archduke's wife in the stomach. Both died within a few minutes.

"Gentlemen," General Potiorek declared, "this is a terrible misfortune. Nevertheless, one must eat. Let us go to luncheon." When Emperor Francis Joseph heard the news, at noon in his castle at Ischl, he at first appeared stunned. Then he paced the room saying, "Terrible, terrible." At last—remembering that Francis Ferdinand had flouted his wishes and married beneath him—he exclaimed, "The Almighty cannot be defied with impunity. A higher power has restored an order that I, alas, could not maintain." He announced that he would return to his palace at Schönbrunn the next day and then—in the words of the official court circular—"he retired to his room and ate alone."

• II •

AT FIRST, the aged Emperor received the world's sympathy. Such acts of terrorism threatened constituted authority everywhere. The Serbian Government feared the worst. "It will mean war," declared Premier Pashitch, who had heard rumors, in May, of an assassination plot against the Archduke and had sent a general warning to the Serbian frontier authorities and to the Austrian Minister in charge of Bosnia. But the Austrian officials, fearing that any concessions to Serbian nationalism would look like weakness, chose to disregard the warning. The Archduke also refused to be intimidated. He wanted to change the Dual Monarchy into a Triple Monarchy, putting the Slavic majority on an equal basis with the German and Hungarian minorities, and therefore felt it necessary to defy the Serbian nationalists by showing himself in one of their strongholds.

When the Serbian terrorists carried out their plans, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, the fiery Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Armies, demanded immediate mobilization against Serbia. Since 1913 he had urged attacking Serbia on no less than twenty-five separate occasions. But Foreign Minister Berchtold warned that mobilization

would outrage public opinion and that Austria must have Germany's advance consent in any case. Premier Tisza of Hungary favored a more gradual approach. He argued that the Russians had inspired the assassination of the Archduke as part of a considered plan to encircle the Hapsburg Empire. Because Tisza feared Russian expansion, he urged Berchtold to move cautiously and try to bring Rumania and Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance before challenging Russia. Berchtold had favored Tisza's strategy before Sarajevo, but the assassination of the Archduke brought him over to Conrad's view and convinced him that for Austria it was a question of now or

never. Berchtold therefore composed a long memorandum which he asked Emperor Francis Joseph to sign and forward to the Kaiser. The first part of the memorandum set forth Tisza's program, but it closed with Conrad's demand for war and a strong plea to "eliminate Serbia as a political factor in the Balkans."

The Kaiser received this message at Potsdam on Sunday, July 5. He had returned, less than a month before, from a visit to his friend the Archduke, whose assassination shocked and terrified him. The Kaiser had agreed with Tisza's policy before the assassination and urged the Austrians to go slow in all their dealings with Serbia. But when he read a dispatch in early July stating that Count Tschirschky, his Ambassador to Vienna, was "using every opportunity to warn calmly but energetically and earnestly against any overhasty steps," he wrote in the margin: "Now or never! Who authorized him to do this? That is very stupid! It's none of his business, for it is purely Austria's affair to consider what to do in this matter, for it will be said afterwards, if things go wrong, Germany was not willing! Tschirschky will please drop this nonsense! Matters must be cleaned up with the Serbians *and that soon*. That's all self-evident and the plain truth."

It was in this frame of mind that the Kaiser received the memorandum from the Emperor, written by Berchtold. He at once summoned General von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to Potsdam, but told Falkenhayn to make



UNDERWOOD

Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf



BROWN BROTHERS

Foreign Minister Berchtold of Austria-Hungary (right) with Italy's Foreign Minister, the Marquis of San Giuliano

no military preparations though serious developments might follow. Bethmann then informed the Austrian Ambassador to Berlin that Germany, in line with Tisza's suggestions, would try to bring Bulgaria and Rumania closer to the Triple Alliance, though he had his doubts about Bulgaria. "Finally," Bethmann's message concluded, "concerning Serbia His Majesty naturally cannot take any stand in the questions between Austria and Serbia, for they are beyond his competence, but Francis Joseph may be sure that His Majesty, in accordance with treaty obligations and old friendship, will stand true by Austria's side."

This gave Berchtold the blank German check he wanted. He informed Tisza that Germany was not only prepared to back any action Austria might take against Serbia; he informed both Francis Joseph and Tisza that Germany wanted that action to be strong. Tisza replied

that it was none of Germany's business and that an unacceptable ultimatum or an attack on Serbia would be a "fatal mistake" that would automatically mean war. But Berchtold, supported by all his other Cabinet members and the entire High Command, argued that even the most complete diplomatic triumph over Serbia would not suffice. A way had to be found to launch a military attack. "A purely diplomatic victory," said Berchtold, "even if it ended with a striking humiliation of Serbia would be worthless. Consequently the demands presented to Serbia must be so far-reaching that their rejection would be a forgone conclusion and so the way would be prepared for a radical solution through military attack." Although Tisza finally dropped his original proposal to bring Bulgaria and Rumania closer to the Triple Alliance, he continued to oppose the dispatch of an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. Berchtold's assertion that Germany favored immediate political action also left him unmoved.

Emperor Francis Joseph, under whose rule Austria had never waged a successful war, surveyed these events with helpless gloom. "I see a very dark future," he remarked on July 2. He agreed with Berchtold and Tisza that they must send some kind of demand to Serbia, and on July 14 Berchtold finally argued Tisza into accepting his plan for a short-term war ultimatum, subject to the single provision that "Austria, aside from slight regulations of boundary, seeks no acquisition of territory as the result of the war with Serbia." Berchtold at once informed the Emperor that Tisza had come around, and he even held out hope that if Serbia yielded promptly "a peaceful solution would still be possible." Tisza had fewer illusions, and wrote his niece a month later that he had agreed on a war ultimatum only because he could see no other way out for Austria. Finally, Berchtold promised the German Ambassador to show him the text of the ultimatum before submitting it to the Emperor.

Since July 14 Berchtold had maintained the closest secrecy, masking his belligerent intentions behind peaceful gestures. He had the Austrian Chief of Staff and the Austrian War Minister leave Vienna as if on vacation. He ordered all government officials to tone down any announcements they might make. On July 16 the British Ambassador to Vienna telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that the Austrian Government was preparing "a kind of indictment" against the Serbian Government and "will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used." Two days later the German Government heard that the Austrians were drawing up a deliberately unacceptable ultimatum against Serbia of which "the result would be war." On July 19 Berchtold summoned a Ministerial Council at his private house instead of at the Foreign Office. The Ministers arrived in their private, not their official,



ACME

The Kaiser and Francis Joseph

cars and agreed to present a forty-eight-hour war ultimatum to the Serbian Government on the afternoon of Thursday, July 23. The ultimatum would expire on Saturday afternoon and permit the Austrians to send out their mobilization orders over the week end.

The ultimatum demanded that the Serbian Government publish on the front page of its official journal a declaration condemning anti-Austrian propaganda, expressing regret concerning the anti-Austrian activities of Serbian officers and functionaries, and repudiating all attempts to interfere with Austro-Hungarian affairs. The ultimatum also listed ten other demands, including suppression of all anti-Austrian publications, dissolution of the National Defense organization, elimination of anti-Austrian propaganda from Serbian schools, dismissal of anti-Austrian officials and officers, acceptance of Austro-Hungarian officials to help suppress anti-Austrian agitation in Serbia, judicial proceedings against all accessories to the Sarajevo assassination, and the arrest of two Serbians already implicated in the crime. Finally, the ultimatum demanded a reply within forty-eight hours.

Berchtold broke his promise to show the ultimatum to the German Ambassador before submitting it to the Emperor. Indeed, he did not show it even to the Emperor until July 21—the day after the text had

been forwarded to the Austrian Ambassadors throughout Europe and to the Austrian Minister to Serbia, who was to present it to the Serbian Government on July 23. Francis Joseph gave his approval—he had little choice in the matter—and since none of the other powers, either in the Triple Alliance or in the Triple Entente, knew what the ultimatum contained, the most they could do was to urge the Serbians to make a conciliatory reply and the Austrians to moderate the terms they had already set.

Berchtold had reasons for this policy of delay and concealment. Raymond Poincaré, the newly elected President of France whose political enemies called him "Poincaré-la-guerre," was visiting Russia from July 20 to July 23, and Berchtold felt he had to conceal the terms of the ultimatum during the visit and delay its dispatch until Poincaré had started home. For Poincaré had worked hard to strengthen the Triple Entente, especially in the direction of Russia. In 1912 Ambassador Izvolski had bribed certain French newspapers to support Poincaré for the Presidency, and Poincaré himself had helped distribute more Russian funds to more French newspapers that supported Russian policy in the Balkans. These investments repaid themselves many times over. On June 27, 1913, the French Government agreed to loan the Russian Government between four hundred and five hundred million francs a year in exchange for a Russian promise to build more strategic railways near the German frontier, with the help of the French General Staff, and to increase the peacetime strength of the Russian Army "considerably." And a month later Foreign Minister Sazonov wrote Ambassador Izvolski: "It is a great joy to be able to inform you that the request of the President of the Republic regarding the amounts to be put by us at the disposition of the press has, after some natural hesitations, been granted by His Majesty."

In spite of Berchtold's precautions, Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg naturally strengthened the war party in Russia. The strains of the revolutionary "Marseillaise" greeted him at official gatherings, while workmen who sang it in the streets were being cut down by Cossacks. Poincaré arrived in Russia distrustful of Foreign Minister Sazonov's mercurial temperament and told Paléologue, the French Ambassador, "Sazonov must be firm and we must support him." Poincaré therefore joined the Russians in urging Austria to show moderation to Serbia, whereas Sir Edward Grey refused to associate Britain with what he considered a veiled threat. It made no difference in any case. The Austrian ultimatum had already gone out, although Berchtold had seen to it that the details did not reach St. Petersburg until after Poincaré had left. When Sazonov saw the text of the ultimatum he quietly remarked, "*C'est la guerre européenne.*"

• III •

THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR in Paris and the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg agreed. "*Cette fois, c'est la guerre*," they told each other. Paléologue renewed the assurances of complete support that Poincaré had already given Sazonov. Britain's Ambassador Buchanan could not go so far. He had to consult Sir Edward Grey, who described the ultimatum as "the most formidable document he had ever seen addressed by one state to another that was independent," and then made a series of suggestions that satisfied nobody. The Russian General Staff urged the Tsar to reply to the Austrian ultimatum by ordering complete mobilization against both Germany and Austria, knowing, of course, that mobilization meant war. Sazonov had no intention of permitting the Austrians to repeat on a much bigger scale the triumph they scored in 1908 when they annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he thought the General Staff wanted to move too fast and too far. He therefore advised the Tsar to order "partial mobilization" of more than a million men against Austria only. In this way he hoped to force the Austrians to back down, to keep Germany neutral, and to mask any future military measures.

Russia's generals saw no hope of peace and tried to get themselves and their allies on a complete war footing as soon as possible. The German Government, on the other hand, wanted to "localize" the conflict. This would permit Austria to settle accounts with Serbia and leave the rest of Europe at peace. As Sir Arthur Nicolson wrote to the British Ambassador to Russia, "The talk about localizing the war merely means that all the powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia. This to my mind is quite preposterous, not to say iniquitous."

When the Russians refused to stand by and let their fellow Slavs go to the wall, Sir Edward Grey proposed direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. The German Government seconded the motion. Poincaré, fearful of weakening his ties with Russia, called the proposal "very dangerous." The Russians liked it even less because it would have compelled them to put pressure on the Serbs. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to London, wanted Germany to mediate between Austria and Serbia. The Germans refused to bring pressure on their Austrian allies for the same reason the Russians refused to bring pressure on their Serbian protégés.

The Italian Government suggested that the major European powers save Serbia's face by urging acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum on the theory that the Serbs would make concessions to all the powers that they would not make to the Austrians alone. France and Russia did not

take the Italian plan seriously, and on July 25 Austria declared war on Serbia. Just one day before, Albert Ballin, the German shipping magnate, reminded Winston Churchill in London of Bismarck's prediction: "The great European war will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans."

At the last moment Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference of the "four less directly interested powers"—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The Ambassadors of these nations plus the Ambassadors of Austria and Russia had acted under his chairmanship during the Balkan Wars, and Grey



BROWN BROTHERS

King Peter of Serbia

wanted to restore this same method but to exclude Russia and Austria. Only the Italians accepted Grey's proposal. The French hesitated, then said they would come in if the Germans would put pressure on Vienna. Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, begged his home Government to accept Grey's invitation, but the German Government would not press any course of action on the Austrians.

Meanwhile the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum arrived within the time limit. The man who wrote the original ultimatum described the reply as the "most brilliant" diplomatic paper he had ever seen. The Serbs appeared to have accepted all the Austrian demands, in spirit if not in letter. Actually, they refused to permit Austrian officials to help Serbian officials round up anti-Austrian plotters inside Serbia. Three of the other ten points they evaded or partially rejected. Five of the ten points they accepted completely or substantially.

Of course, the Austrians never expected the Serbs to accept the ultimatum, as the Serbs well knew. One Serbian Minister remarked after he had read it, "Well, there is nothing to do but die fighting." The Prince Regent of Serbia addressed an appeal to "the noble Slav heart" of the Tsar. The most striking feature of the Serbian reply was not its negative essence but its affirmative appearance. Austria's prestige sank again. The Serbian reply took in the Kaiser, who thought the Austrians had won hands down. But the Austrians at once broke off relations with Serbia and ordered immediate mobilization. General Conrad von Hötzendorf urged Foreign Minister Berchtold to hold up the declaration of war on Serbia until August 12. It would take that long to get the

Austrian armies ready for action, even against Serbia. But Berchtold said, "The diplomatic situation will not last as long as that," and prepared to declare war at once. Serbia had already begun to mobilize before replying to Austria. The Black Hand Society wanted war and demanded that Premier Pashitch quit.

Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, warned the Russians on July 26 that their partial mobilization against Austria and rumors of troop concentrations near the German frontier might force his country to take "countermeasures." He also succeeded in bringing Sazonov and Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador, together. Sazonov told Szapary that if the Austrian Government would modify the ultimatum terms, he would guarantee fulfillment by Serbia. When the suggestion reached Berchtold, he refused to budge. It was the same story when the German Government passed on to Vienna the British proposal of a four-power conference. Berchtold said it had arrived too late and that Austria was already committed to the ultimatum terms.

Germany's Chancellor Bethmann took all these developments far too lightly. It was not through him but through a news agency that the Kaiser had first learned of the Austrian ultimatum. Hastening back to Potsdam from his cruise in northern waters, he arrived on July 27, but the Austrian mobilization orders had already gone out. The Germans did not get the text of the Serbian reply to Austria's terms until the next day, and even then it was the Serbians, not the Austrians, who revealed the true story. Berchtold had withheld the Serbian reply from his German allies until he had time to send an annotated copy.

By this time—July 28—the German Government had come over to the British point of view and was prepared to bring pressure on Austria and to offer to mediate the dispute. But Berchtold had now committed himself to an immediate localized war against Serbia and told Emperor Francis Joseph that the Serbs would resort to delaying tactics unless Austria declared war at once, adding that the Serbs had already begun fighting anyway. Francis Joseph permitted war to be declared against Serbia on July 28. The declaration included a pledge by the Austrian Government not to annex any new territories in the Balkans. Berchtold vaguely hoped that this would reassure the Russians and keep them neutral.

The hope proved vain. Pressure upon the Tsar for complete mobilization against Germany and Austria increased. The Kaiser sent a series of frantic telegrams to "Nicky" warning him that war would mean the end of both their dynasties and begging him not to mobilize against Germany. The Kaiser had once said, "The Tsar is not treacherous, but he is weak. Weakness is not treachery, but it fulfills all its functions." The Tsar lived up to this description. Having ordered general mobilization

on the morning of July 29, he revoked the order twelve hours later and then restored it to effect the following morning. General Janushkevich, Chief of the Russian Imperial General Staff, soon found the Tsar's indecision so infuriating that he told Sazonov to persuade the Tsar, by telephone, to order general mobilization. "After this," he continued, "I will retire from sight, smash my telephone, and generally take all measures so that I cannot give any contrary orders for a new postponement of general mobilization." When Sazonov finally prevailed upon the Tsar to issue the necessary order, he telephoned Janushkevich, "Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day."

The Kaiser hesitated, too. He did not agree to general mobilization against Russia until August 1, but when he did he declared war at the same time. Austria did not declare war upon Russia until August 6.

• IV •

By THIS TIME, cause and effect, alliance and counteralliance had made the war spread from Eastern to Western Europe. Austria's moves against Serbia had led to Russian countermoves, and these, in turn, had brought Germany into the fight. The German moves against Russia led the French to concentrate troops along the German border, and the Germans to concentrate troops against France. The French, desiring British support, took care not to repeat the mistake they had made in 1870 when their declaration of war on Prussia made them look like aggressors. Instead of declaring war against a mobilized Germany, they ordered their advance posts to withdraw six and a half miles from the German frontier, all the while encouraging the Russians to stand firm and promising support in any case. The Germans, caught between the French and the Russians, had to move fast. The Kaiser mobilized and declared war against France on August 2. He and his generals decided to launch their first great offensive in the west, and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg demanded that Belgium permit the passage of German troops to invade France from the north. The Belgian Government refused, and on August 3, German troops marched in anyway. Bethmann further antagonized world opinion by describing the treaty that Germany had signed to respect the neutrality of Belgium as "a scrap of paper."

On August 2, leaders of the British Conservative Party informed the Liberal Government that "it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture, and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures that they may consider necessary for that

*Ich bestimme ferner: Das Deutsche Gewehr und die Karabiner-
ische Marine für. I nach Maßgabe des Mobilisierungsgesetzes
für das Deutsche Gewehr und die Karabinerische Marine Anzucht-
beamt aufgeführt*

*Der 2. August 1914 wird als erster Mobilisierungstag
festgesetzt. Berlin, den 1. August 1914*



Wilhelm
F.R.



Bethmann-Hollweg

*Die den Reichs-Blätter (Reichs-Merkur) sind den Deutschen
Kaiser.*

ACME

German Mobilization Order Signed by the Kaiser, August 1, 1914. The text above the Kaiser's and Bethmann's signatures reads: "I decide hereby that the German Army and the Imperial Navy are to prepare themselves for war according to mobilization plans made for the German Army and the Imperial Navy. The second of August is set as the first day of mobilizing. Berlin, the first of August, 1914"

object." The next day Grey revealed to the House of Commons that the British and French General Staffs had been in consultation for years and that the Cabinet had already agreed to defend the northern coast of France from a German attack in return for French support of British interests in the Mediterranean. Originally, Grey had planned to speak only of this one topic, but shortly before he took the floor the news of the German ultimatum to Belgium arrived. He expressed the personal view that Britain had an "obligation" to intervene and should not stand aside, but that the final decision lay with Parliament and British hands

therefore remained free. The House gave him an ovation but took no vote. The following morning the news of the German invasion of Belgium reached London, and at two o'clock that afternoon the British Government sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding immediate withdrawal and a satisfactory reply by midnight. The British declaration of war upon Germany automatically followed.

This declaration did not come from Parliament but from the Government, which alone had the power to issue it, in the name of the King. The House of Commons, however, overwhelmingly approved Grey's course, although two members of the Cabinet resigned: Lord Morley, government leader in the House of Lords, and John Burns, president of the Board of Trade. Ramsay MacDonald and a minority of Laborites also opposed the war, but even the Irish members of Parliament whose constituents had been demanding home rule rallied around the flag.

The reception that greeted Grey's speech showed how shrewdly he had judged the temper of the British Parliament and the British people. He had made a series of secret agreements with the French that neither Parliament nor the people would have been likely to support at the time he made them, although the fact that he did make them suddenly turned him into a national hero. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, understood Grey's difficulties and only once—on August 2—did he have any doubts. After learning from Grey that England could not yet move to help France, Cambon blurted out to Wickham Steed of the *London Times*, "I am waiting to discover whether the word 'honor' is to be stricken from the English vocabulary." When Grey finally did call for war, it was the turn of the Germans to feel that they had been duped.

Grey not only stands out as the key figure in the events leading up to the outbreak of war: he now and then transcended his political role as British Foreign Secretary. When he finished his triumphant speech before the House of Commons, he alone of all the men around him felt no elation. As he watched the lights of London go out he observed, "The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." An hour after the speech Grey appeared in the Foreign Office, where Sir Arthur Nicolson congratulated him on his effort. "Sir Edward did not answer," wrote Harold Nicolson in his life of his father. "He moved into the center of the room and raised his hands with his fists clenched above his head. He brought his fists with a crash upon the table. 'I hate war,' he groaned, 'I hate war.'"

• V •

WHERE DID RESPONSIBILITY for the events of July, 1914, lie? Responsibility includes freedom to choose and power to act. Only the Govern-

ments of Serbia and Austria-Hungary deliberately chose war. But they had no power to protect their vital interests by methods short of war. The Austro-Hungarian leaders believed, almost to a man, that nothing less than war upon Serbia could end the growing Slavic threat to Hapsburg rule, inside and outside the Empire, especially with Russian power on the rise, and they gambled everything on the chance that they could keep this war localized. The Serbian leaders believed, almost to a man, that nothing less than a general European war could destroy the Hapsburg Empire and lead to the creation of a Greater Serbia. They gambled everything on the chance that their defiance of Austria would provoke such a war.

Now for the Russian point of view. If Sazonov had not persuaded the Tsar to order at least partial mobilization against Austria, the Hapsburg Empire would have crushed Serbia, and Russia could not permit that to happen without forfeiting its own claim to leadership of the Slavic peoples. But Sazonov and the Tsar hoped that partial mobilization against Austria would gain their purpose without war. Because the Tsar did not want war and was not ready for it, he delayed his mobilization orders against Germany.

The leaders of the French Third Republic had no choice but to back the leaders of Tsarist Russia. After their defeat in 1870 at the hands of Prussia, the French had remained isolated and impotent for twenty years. Their alliance with Russia then offered protection against another German attack and perhaps an eventual opportunity to regain the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in the event of another war. No responsible French leader wanted war against Germany in order to regain the lost provinces, or for any other cause. But if war should come, the French proposed to be on the winning side. They recognized that Russian interests in the Balkans exposed them to certain risks, but when they made their Entente with England in 1904 and when the English settled their differences with Russia in 1907, there did seem reason to hope that the Triple Entente would more than counterbalance the Triple Alliance and thus preserve the peace.

If Poincaré seemed, in some respects, more belligerent than Sazonov in July, 1914, it was not because Poincaré wanted war. It was because Poincaré wanted to assure Sazonov of French loyalty. In 1910 the Germans and Russians had composed their differences in the Middle East. German influence still ran strong in Russia. The Kaiser and the Tsar remained on good terms. Just as Bismarck had suffered from the nightmare of coalitions directed against Germany, so Poincaré suffered from the nightmare that Germany might produce another Bismarck who would bring Germany and Russia together again.

Past commitments and present emergencies left the leaders of Serbia,

Austria, Russia, and France with little power to act, less freedom to choose. How about the leaders of Germany and Britain? The Germans found themselves as closely tied to Austria-Hungary as the French were to the Russians and the Russians to the Serbs. Although the British did not feel themselves so tightly bound to either France or Russia, they had to fight in order to prevent Germany from dominating Europe. Yet the German and British leaders did have somewhat more power and somewhat greater freedom than the leaders of the other belligerent countries.

Consider the record. On July 5 nothing compelled the Kaiser to give the Austrian Government a free hand to proceed as it saw fit against Serbia. He knew that the Austrians contemplated war; they had laid their cards on the table and asked his approval, which he gave. No clause in the German alliance with Austria required the Kaiser to give that approval. German vital interests did not force his hand. Just the reverse. Several times Germany had warned Austria not to risk war in the Balkans, and the fact that the Kaiser thought the Austrians should have accepted the Serbian reply to their ultimatum showed that he did not want war, even though he overestimated the Serbian concessions to Austria.

The sins of omission committed by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg matched the Kaiser's sins of commission. Bethmann saw the drift to war more clearly than the Kaiser did. He shared the Kaiser's fears of what war would mean to Germany. He knew he had no real power, but he clung to his office because he believed that if he quit, a more belligerent Chancellor might replace him. The one man who might have brought the Kaiser up short had died in 1912. Foreign Secretary Kiderlen-Wächter went in for rough methods, but he feared war much more than he feared the Kaiser. Many of his colleagues and contemporaries believed that if Kiderlen had lived he would have acted more boldly than his innocuous successor, von Jagow, or his cautious superior, von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Neither the Kaiser nor any of his statesmen-servants transcended themselves or the imperial German system. In Britain, on the other hand, no national leader rose to the possibilities of the occasion. The Kaiser emerged from the crisis of July, 1914, a pathetic puppet, the victim of his own character, his special situation, and forces quite beyond his grasp. Sir Edward Grey emerged as the sole tragic figure in the drama. British firmness toward Germany had averted war at the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911. In 1913 Grey had organized a pacifying concert of Europe that had brought the First Balkan War to an end. As late as July, 1914, he had accommodated the Germans by initialing an agreement that permitted them to complete the Berlin-

Bagdad Railway. Grey saw more clearly than the Kaiser did that war meant disaster to all of Europe. And just as the Kaiser feared that war would overthrow his dynasty, so Grey sorrowfully told the Austrian Ambassador to London that he regarded war as "the greatest step toward Socialism that could possibly have been made."

Unlike the Kaiser, Grey almost transcended himself. He respected the letter of his secret military and naval agreements with France. He respected the spirit of the British Constitution in that he made no final commitment before taking the House of Commons into his confidence. But some paralysis of the will prevented him from seizing the initiative the moment he learned, on July 16, that Austria planned to send a deliberately unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. The British people and the people of Europe waited in vain for the lead that only Sir Edward Grey could give.

On July 31 Prime Minister Asquith, a man of smaller moral stature and cooler emotion than Grey, defined British foreign policy: "All turns on what England may do, and the object of our Foreign Office is to keep Europe in suspense on that point. So long as Europe does not know what England is likely to do, there is a great steadying influence upon both France and Russia, for they both feel that Germany might be difficult to tackle unless the other powers had us supporting them. Germany in the meantime shrinks from aggressive action—e.g. through Belgium—because it does not know whether we should vehemently oppose; and, if we did, their task would be doubled in difficulty. Hence the expediency of our not saying at present what we will and will not do."

The professionals in the Foreign Office could not have made a worse miscalculation, and Grey had accepted their advice. The Liberal Manchester *Guardian* declared in its issue of July 28, "We ought to remain neutral throughout the whole course of the war. It is strange that Sir Edward Grey should not have referred to this fact which is the chief source of our moral authority in Europe." It was perhaps even stranger that Grey also failed to deliver the clear kind of warning with which Lloyd George had preserved the peace at the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911.

Because Sir Edward refused to commit himself either to intervention or to neutrality, the drift to war soon proved completely irresistible. He himself had no doubt that Britain should support France and Russia in all eventualities. But his respect for public opinion and the democratic process made him overcautious. His personal tragedy came to an ironic climax when his policy failed to prevent war but succeeded, as perhaps no other policy could have succeeded, in uniting Britain behind a war that Sir Edward would have given his life to avoid.



BROWN BROTHERS

Prime Minister Asquith

CULVER SERVICE

Sir Edward Grey

His life—but not his week ends in the country. Throughout the whole critical month of July, Grey did not miss a single long week end at his country estate and grudged even the warm, pleasant, summer weekdays that he had to give to directing the affairs of the Foreign Office. Winston Churchill responded quite differently. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill took it upon himself to keep the fleet together, ready for battle at Scapa Flow when its annual maneuvers ended on July 26; yet Churchill foresaw the disastrous consequences of war as clearly as Grey. In the first volume of his *World Crisis* he evoked this vivid memory of Europe in July, 1914:

“Like many others, I often summon up to my memory the impression of those July days. The world on the verge of its catastrophe was very brilliant. Nations and Empires crowned with princes and potentates rose majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A polite, discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of connections over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation by an ambassador, a cryptic phrase in Parliament seemed sufficient to adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words counted, and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after all to achieve world security and universal peace by a marvelous system of combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and counterchecks on violent action, ever more complex and

more delicate? Would Europe thus marshaled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one universal and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in undreamed-of abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in hand to give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.”*

So many different European forces had remained in such delicate balance for so many years that peace and progress seemed assured forever. But many of these forces kept changing. The Triple Entente had grown steadily stronger while Italy drifted away from the Triple Alliance and the position of Austria steadily weakened. The Pan-Slav movement had extended its influence. The Tsar had outlawed but had not crushed the revolutionary movement in Russia. The Kaiser rightly feared the increasingly rapid growth of the German Social Democratic Party. The military and naval commanders in all the major powers suffered from itching trigger fingers. The middle classes, everywhere, responded to the steady crescendo of nationalist propaganda. Any disturbance in any part of the European edifice threatened the entire structure. These shifting forces did not automatically balance off and compensate each other. Rather did they lead to more dislocations. And those who benefited from the ancient, precarious balance that Europe still maintained instinctively sought to let well enough alone. They regarded any change as a change for the worse.

The glowing summer of 1914 made it all too easy for many Europeans to deceive themselves about their future prospects. The fields gave promise of record harvests. Seldom had Europe's weather made itself so inviting to the soul of man. Never had aristocratic society thrown itself with such zest into its round of pleasures—regattas, hunts, races, music festivals, long country week ends. But so fragile had this world become that it took just two revolver shots to bring it to an end.

SUMMING UP

AGAIN and again during the years since 1914 commentators on current affairs have announced that the next twenty-four hours, the next fortnight, or the next hundred days would determine the fate of the world for centuries to come. And they were always right, largely because every second that ticks by determines the fate of the universe through all eternity. But whoever tries to single out the most decisive month since 1900 will be hard put to it to improve upon July, 1914, if only

*Reprinted from *The World Crisis* by Winston Churchill. Copyright, 1923, by Charles Scribner's Sons and used by permission of the publishers.


because it set off a chain of violence that continues to shake the world. To define the forces that shaped that month is therefore to define the forces that have shaped our whole history ever since.

Naturally, such decisive events have given rise to varied interpretations. There is the school of thought that holds Germany mainly if not solely responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. There is the "revisionist" school of historians who lay most of the blame on Austria and Russia. There is the Marxist school which traces every crisis of the past fifty years back to the crisis of capitalism itself. There are the fatalists who believe that the history of our time follows the remorseless logic of Greek tragedy. Henry Adams, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold J. Toynbee have encouraged this trend with their attempts to formulate certain "laws" of history—scientific in the case of Adams, philosophic in the case of Spengler, mystical in the case of Toynbee. In their view—as in the view of Marx—the events of so brief a period as July, 1914, can be understood only in relation to a much wider perspective.

As this observer looks back on that time and reviews the record as we now know it, he reaches mixed conclusions. Both Frederick the Great and Bismarck taught Germany how to make war pay. The Germans had prepared for war more thoroughly than any other people, and their leaders occasionally threatened and often glorified war. Yet Austria moved against Serbia before Germany moved against Belgium. Russia mobilized before Germany did—and mobilization automatically meant war. Or, again, following the Marxist line of thought, all the ruling classes in all the countries of Europe faced the threat of mounting social unrest—especially in Russia, Austria, and Germany. War not only meant national unity: it meant full production, full employment, increased profits—or so it seemed. Hence, as we view the events of July, 1914, in perspective, the best that many of us feel we can do is try to find some general laws to which man, unconsciously perhaps, submits.

Yet what a role either blind chance or an all-seeing Providence played. A faulty diagnosis caused the Kaiser's father to die in middle life. If he had reigned for fifteen years instead of for ninety-nine days, especially with his Empress, the beloved sister of Edward VII by his side, Anglo-German relations might not have followed quite so disastrous a course. And consider the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. If one chauffeur had not misunderstood his orders and if Princip had not happened to find himself at the exact spot where the Archduke's car had to stop and turn, the month of July, 1914, would not necessarily have ended in war.

Chance, or Providence, started Europe toward war on June 28, 1914. Then the accident of personality intervened. Poincaré and Bethmann-



Europe in 1914: "The old world in its sunset was fair to see."—Winston Churchill

Hollweg, Sazonov and Berchtold, Asquith and Francis Joseph, King George V and Tsar Nicholas II—these men went through their motions automatically. Almost any other men in the same positions would have had to act almost exactly the same way. Almost, but not quite. For it so happened that during July, 1914, two exceptional men occupied two positions of exceptional importance: the Kaiser and Sir Edward Grey.

The accident of birth put the Kaiser in position to wield incalculable power. Further accidents of heredity, physique, temperament, and environment made him singularly unfitted to exercise this power. It was an irony of history and a commentary upon the character of the German Empire that a man so abnormal as the Kaiser—such a psychological and even biological "sport"—happened to occupy such an important position at so crucial a time. The record reveals that he was never the war lord that hostile cartoonists depicted—or that he, on occasions, imagined himself to be. He neither planned nor wished for the war that he finally declared against Russia on August 1 and against France on August 2. His responsibility lay in his failure to use his powers to prevent the war that he did not want. Yet never, to the end of his days, did he appear to regret or even understand what he had done and left undone.

Sir Edward Grey presented a complete contrast. The Kaiser fell

victim to weaknesses, Grey to virtue. Like a Hamlet in modern dress, Grey strove throughout July, 1914, to transcend himself and spent the rest of a burdened, unhappy life trying to justify his conduct to his conscience and the world. Although he never confessed that he had acted unwisely, he never quite silenced the doubts that ate at his soul. He was too good a Christian gentleman to act with the ruthlessness of Lloyd George, who sloughed off the pacifism and anti-imperialism of the Boer War period to deliver a strong warning to Germany in 1911. Had Grey shown similar boldness, three years later, he might have delayed if not averted war. But the same conscience that prevented him from behaving like Lloyd George was not strong enough to make him behave like Lord Morley, who resigned from the Cabinet rather than give his sanction to a war of which his conscience disapproved.

With Lloyd George, patriotism overruled morality; with Morley, morality overruled patriotism; with Grey, morality and patriotism fought a seesaw battle. Moreover, because Morley had not faced all the prior decisions and made all the prior commitments that Grey's position as Foreign Secretary forced him to take, he did not face so hard a choice. Yet Grey's conscience always questioned the wisdom of some of his actions, although his patriotism also told him that, God helping, he could do no other. A more sensitive or a less sensitive man would have had fewer doubts. Grey's tragedy, like Hamlet's, lay in his inability to make conscience and intellect work together. His temperament had nothing in common with the Kaiser's, yet it was a temperament as ill-suited to a British Foreign Secretary as the Kaiser's was to a German Emperor. The supreme irony of Grey's character lay in the fact that his inability to keep the peace made him ideally suited to reconcile the British people to war. His vacillations reflected theirs. In a democracy only those leaders who sincerely "hate war" can persuade the masses to fight.

Whatever the historians of a later day may think of the Kaiser or Sir Edward Grey, their journalistic contemporaries rated them high. Shortly before the outbreak of war the British Liberal journalist A. G. Gardiner described the Kaiser as "easily the foremost man in Europe." He went on in his book *Prophets, Priests, and Kings*: "Divest him of his office and he would still be one of the most considerable men in his Empire. When the British editors visited Germany, they were brought in contact with all the leaders of action and thought in the country, and I believe it is true to say that the Kaiser left the sharpest and most vivid personal impression on the mind." And of Sir Edward Grey, whom Gardiner did not greatly admire, he wrote: "If one were asked to say whose word carried the most weight in Parliament today, there could, I think, be only one answer. Whether in office or out of office, whether to friend

or foe, Sir Edward Grey is intrinsically the weightiest speaker of his time."

All this does not imply that the Kaiser or Grey or anybody else could have prevented a European war from breaking out at some time or other. But the accident of their characters did help to make the war happen when and as it did, just as the accident of the chauffeur in the car ahead of the Archduke's played its essential part in the chain of events. Nor do any of these accidents of circumstance or character have much importance apart from the impersonal forces that underlay the outbreak of war. The philosophers of history have given their interpretations of how these forces work. This observer must report the minor accidents, too, and as he does so he cannot resist suggesting that accident as such may play a larger role than is dreamed of in any historian's philosophy.

Europe had come close to general war in 1906, 1908, and 1911; just how close remains a matter of conjecture. Nor can any man say what would have happened if Europe had gone to war either before or after August, 1914. All we do know is that if a general war had broken out either before or after August, 1914, history would not have followed exactly the course it has pursued. More important, however, than any "might-have-beens" is the fact that the condition of Europe had become so precarious, so uncertain, so delicately balanced during the early years of the twentieth century that the fate of the world had come to depend more and more upon pure chance. The summer of 1914 then witnessed a series of accidents that finally brought about the war that so many people had feared for so long. The nature of these accidents and the character of the people who helped to bring them about also throw light on the nature and character of Europe. Chance had helped to prolong the nineteenth century into the second decade of the twentieth. Now chance brought the new forces of the new century violently into their own.

Part Three

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WORLD WAR I

I

1914

*How all the 1914 offensives failed on all fronts
and what repercussions the war had on Europe
and the rest of the world.*

PREVIEW

EUROPE'S MILITARY LEADERS all suffered from the same handicaps and made the same mistake when war came in 1914. None of them had any experience with the new weapons of the new century; all of them overrated the power of attack and underrated the power of defense. The mobilization proceeded much more smoothly than the fighting, and morale continued high on both sides of all fronts and behind all lines. The Germans called the tune when they adopted the Schlieffen Plan and delivered their heaviest, opening blow in the West. But the Schlieffen Plan fell apart in the fumbling hands of Moltke, the German commander, whereupon Joffre, the French commander, failed to follow up his defensive victory at the River Marne. In the East the Austrian armies suffered the worst defeats of all, although the Russians lost more men. At Tannenberg the improvised German team of Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoffmann won the only battle of annihilation against the Russians. They alone had mastered, or at least appeared to have mastered, the art of modern war, but the Eastern front remained subordinate to the Western. Britain's small professional army threw the Germans off schedule in Flanders while the Royal Navy swept enemy commerce from the seas and blockaded Germany. Turkey joined the Central powers, but Italy remained neutral. The end of 1914 saw the people of Germany, France, and Britain steeling themselves for a long war; the people of Russia and Austria-Hungary a little less confident, a little more shaken. In the United States, President Wilson's neutrality policy won almost universal support, but it was a neutrality that favored the Allies.

• I •

STRATEGY

EUROPE went to war in 1914 under the leadership of men who had never used twentieth-century weapons under battle conditions. No two major European powers had fought each other since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The Russo-Japanese War had produced extensive battles, but even by the standards of 1905, Russian and Japanese equipment did not compare with French and German equipment. No British Army had fought in Western Europe since the time of Napoleon. The Boer War had taught the British the importance of rapid and accurate rifle fire; the Balkan Wars and the war between Italy and Turkey had given the soldiers of the minor powers some battle experience with antiquated weapons. But the conditions under which these wars were fought and the weapons that the soldiers in these wars used bore little resemblance to European conditions and the weapons of 1914.

The rapid-fire machine gun—sometimes called the Maxim, after its American inventor—had revolutionized infantry fighting. Each British infantry battalion had two such guns; each German infantry battalion had sixteen. In 1914 the chief European armies possessed an average of one machine gun for every five hundred men, and it took just one machine gun and two gunners to throw back a thousand riflemen. The Germans had eight times as many machine guns as their opponents; they used them better; they had more heavy artillery, twice as many shells, and twice as great a capacity to produce shells as the British and French combined. The Germans' 17-inch howitzer gave them a sizable offensive edge on their enemies. Their superiority in machine guns made them almost impregnable on the defense. Only in light artillery did the French have the edge, thanks to their famous "75."

The German General Staff had also worked out what looked like the best war plan of the lot. Taking its name and inspiration from Count von Schlieffen, who had retired as Chief of the General Staff in 1906, it assumed that in case of a two-front war France would attack Alsace and Lorraine, but that the Russians could not mobilize soon enough or supply their troops well enough to get far into East Prussia. Von Schlieffen therefore planned to have the bulk of the German armies sweep westward across Belgium and then swoop southward into France. He expected the invasion of Belgium to bring Britain into the war, but he counted even more heavily on a lightning war of annihilation against France. The whole campaign would not last more than a


few weeks, and then the Germans would turn and settle with the Russians at their leisure—preferably around a conference table. German land power would then stalemate—if not checkmate—British sea power, and England, also, would have to come to terms.

The Schlieffen Plan looked good on paper, but it called for resolution and nerve. It required the Germans to let French troops advance into Alsace and Lorraine. It required the Germans to let the Russians invade East Prussia and even menace Berlin. Everything depended on the heaviest possible concentration of German troops in Belgium. Any diversion of German troops to Alsace-Lorraine or to East Prussia would spell disaster.

The Kaiser's infatuation with history led him to entrust the execution of the Schlieffen Plan to General Helmuth von Moltke, nephew of the Moltke who had commanded the Prussian armies of the Kaiser's grandfather in 1870. But the Kaiser's Moltke dreaded the job. "Everything in me dislikes the thought of the appointment," Moltke declared the year before it was made. "I do not lack personal courage, but I do lack the power of rapid decision; I am too reflective, too scrupulous, or if you like too conscientious for such a post. I lack the capacity to risk all on a single throw." This mood grew upon him with the years. When war finally came, sheer nervousness reduced Moltke's huge body to the verge of physical breakdown. The Schlieffen Plan had fallen into fumbling hands.

Moltke's irresolution saved France. For in 1913 the French General Staff decided to place all its reliance on the so-called "Plan XVII," which called for just what Schlieffen had anticipated—an immediate offensive into the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Colonel Loyseau de Grandmaison, the chief spokesman for this plan, rationalized its strategy this way: "The least caution in the offensive destroys all its efficiency and loses all its advantages. In the offensive, imprudence is the best safeguard. Only the offensive method can force the victory. It is necessary to prepare it and to prepare others for it. Cultivate with passion, with exaggeration, and even to the smallest details of instructions, all that is marked by the offensive spirit; let us go to excess and perhaps that will not be enough." As one military historian has pointed out, Grandmaison's strategy had much in common with Bergson's philosophy. Both men emphasized intuition and instinct rather than logic and reason. As Frenchmen, they expressed themselves clearly, but what they had to say ran counter to their country's classic, intellectual tradition. Even in France, the cult of unreason had triumphed.

Responsibility for carrying out Plan XVII fell to General Joseph Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff. Joffre looked like a diminutive



Blueprint for German Victory: The "Schlieffen Plan"

Galic version of William Howard Taft. Politicians described him as born to be a member of the Chamber of Deputies. The mass of Frenchmen called him "Père Joffre." He belonged to the anticlerical Grand Orient Lodge of Freemasons and made scenes if meat were *not* placed on his table on Fridays. He liked to eat well. He kept a sharp eye on household accounts. He retired at ten o'clock every night—rain or shine, war or peace. All this commended him to the bourgeois leaders of the anticlerical Third Republic. The other generals, most of them devout Catholics, respected his tenacity, trusted his loyalty, admired his way with the politicians. They found him the ideal stalking-horse to promote their offensive war plans.

General Conrad von Hötzendorf, the supreme commander of the Austro-Hungarian forces, thought and planned exactly like the French. He needed no stalking-horse. Conrad was a soldier's soldier and a political nincompoop. But this ablest of all the commanders in 1914 had the worst material with which to work. The Austrian and Hungarian officers and soldiers gave Conrad's armies some semblance of discipline, but his Slavic and Rumanian conscripts had little fighting equipment and less fighting spirit. Yet Conrad himself planned and acted boldly. He had six armies and two strategies. One strategy called for a three-army offensive against Serbia. The other called for a four-army offensive against Russia. The first strategy ruled out anything more than

defensive action against Russia. The second strategy allowed for a limited offensive against western Serbia.

Russia's Imperial General Staff also had two strategic plans. Both assumed that Russia would have to fight Germany and Austria simultaneously. The first plan assumed that the Germans would launch their main offensive in the East; it called for sending three Russian armies against the Germans and three against the Austrians. The second plan assumed the Germans would launch their main offensive in the West. It called for sending two Russian armies against Germany and four against Austria. Both plans called for the evacuation of Russian Poland, west of the Vistula River. But the second plan called for a counter-offensive by the Russian armies across western Poland and on into East Prussia and western Galicia.

Grand Duke Nicholas, the supreme Russian commander, wore a goatee and stood six feet six in his socks. He was a first cousin of the Tsar's father and at the age of fifty-eight had a distinguished military record. During the war with Turkey in 1877-78 he had joined the General Staff and won the Cross of St. George for valor. Like so many other commanders in 1914, the Grand Duke had served chiefly with the cavalry. When Russia set up a Council of National Defense in 1905, the Grand Duke became its president, but in 1908 he resigned and went into partial retirement. The Tsar wanted to assume personal command of all the Russian armies when war came in 1914 but was finally prevailed upon to assign the job to the Grand Duke, who found himself ordering men with whom he had never worked to carry out plans that he had never made.

These plans tended to give French interests priority over Russian interests. Russian armies had always excelled at defending their own soil. They had thrown back Napoleon in 1814 but had suffered defeat in the Crimean War and in the war against Japan. Only against Turkey had the Russians waged successful war abroad, and then they had fought in behalf of fellow Slavs on territories the Turks had usurped. However, as a result of the alliance with France, a gradual change came over Russian war strategy. The French generals not only preached their doctrine of the offensive to their Russian friends: the French urged the Russians to invade Germany if the Germans ever threw their main weight against France. The French pointed out that Russian Poland extended westward to within one hundred and eighty miles of Berlin. It looked like a dagger aimed at the heart of Germany. But Russian Poland lay open to German and Austrian attack from the west, north, and south and lacked the strategic railways that the Germans had built on their side of the frontier.

History and geography had made the British even less offensive-

minded than the Russians. For exactly a century British security had rested on the Royal Navy's control of the seas and on the balance of power in Europe. But the German threat to British naval supremacy and the mounting tension between the Central powers and the Russian-French alliance forced the British to modify their war plans. With an expeditionary force of only one hundred and fifty thousand men, the British had to subordinate their military strategy to the military strategy of their French allies. Sir Henry Wilson, the chief of the British Staff College who had worked out a common strategy with his opposite numbers in France, had received his early education from French governesses. As a cavalryman, he shared the French obsession about the importance of offensive warfare. Sir John French, the supreme British commander in France, was a cavalryman, too. So was his successor, Sir Douglas Haig, who commanded the First British Army Corps in France. These three top British commanders accepted the French thesis that Germany could be defeated only by mass offensive action in Western Europe.

The Royal Navy and Winston Churchill, the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty, took a different view. The Royal Navy, which proudly called itself "the senior service," planned to sweep German commerce from the seas, blockade German ports, make it possible for British and overseas factories to supply the half-equipped French and Russian Armies, and finally storm the German coast. British navalists argued that to train and equip a large British army to fight in Europe would waste time and lives. But the French General Staff thought differently, and so did most British generals. In 1914 Joffre and Castelnau did not value the British Navy "at one bayonet." Moltke advised letting the British send their troops across the Channel so that his armies could swallow them up "at the same time as the other armies." But when Admiral von Tirpitz, who had inspired the whole German naval program, heard that the violation of Belgian neutrality would bring England into the war, he exclaimed, "All is then lost."

The British declaration of war on Germany found the men responsible for the defense of Britain split two ways. The British Army, by and large, accepted the offensive strategy of the French. The British Navy believed in exploiting British control of the seas to blockade the enemy and to pour British military equipment into Europe. Most members of the British Cabinet suffered from the usual civilian complexes about generals and admirals. In time of peace, civilians have an exaggerated suspicion of professional soldiers and sailors. In time of war, civilians go to the other extreme. As soon as war had been declared upon Germany, Prime Minister Asquith turned over the War Office, which he had temporarily headed, to Lord Kitchener of Khar-

toum—the outstanding British commander of his generation. No war lord on the European Continent had so much power and responsibility as Asquith had put into Kitchener's hands.

The appointment made an instantaneous and universal appeal to the British people. The Conservatives had agitated for years to have Asquith put Kitchener in the War Office. They had objected to Lord Haldane, who quit the War Office to become Lord Chancellor shortly after his failure to reach a naval understanding with Germany in 1912. But it was Haldane who had supervised all the plans that Kitchener carried out when he rushed a fully equipped army

of more than one hundred thousand men across the Channel in August, 1914, to check some of the heaviest German attacks at the western end of the Western front.

Kitchener had already distinguished himself several times in his country's service. In 1896 he led the expeditionary force that restored the Sudan to Egypt. In 1900 he assumed command of the British forces in South Africa and brought the Boer War to a successful finish. He then took command of the armed forces in India, where his reorganization work won him the rank of Field Marshal, and the posts of Commander in Chief and High Commissioner in the Mediterranean. In 1911 Kitchener was appointed British Consul General in Egypt and in the summer of 1914 had gone to England to receive an earldom and spend a month's vacation when the outbreak of war projected him into the Cabinet.

Here his experience, reputation, and personality overawed his civilian colleagues. Like all his military contemporaries, Kitchener sported a mustache, which in his case looked like a large patch of bearskin rug attached to his upper lip. George Steevens, a London newspaperman who covered Kitchener's campaign in the Sudan, wrote this description of him: "He stands several inches over six feet, straight as a lance, and looks out imperiously above most men's heads; his motions are deliberate and strong; slender but firmly knit, he seems built for tireless steel-wire endurance rather than for power or agility. . . . Steady



ACME

Kitchener of Khartoum

passionless eyes shaded by decisive brows, brick-red rather full cheeks, a long mustache behind which you divine an immovable mouth; his face is harsh and neither appeals for affection nor stirs dislike." Steevens dubbed Kitchener "the man who has made himself a machine," adding, "He has no age but the prime of life, no body but one to carry his mind, no face but one to keep his brain behind." One private soldier who served under Kitchener said, "His eyes are like the bloomin' Day of Judgment." A lady who met him in Egypt declared, "I never met so stupid a man." But another woman said of him, "He sits in a chair as if it were a throne," and Margot Asquith described him as a "recruiting poster" even before his picture was, indeed, put to that purpose.

Kitchener had reached the age of sixty-four when he assumed virtual one-man responsibility for directing the British war effort against Germany. His father had also served in the British Army, retiring as a lieutenant colonel of cavalry and marrying the daughter of a Church of England clergyman. They took advantage of the low land prices that prevailed in Ireland during the "hungry forties" to buy a considerable estate and made a good thing of their investment of three thousand pounds. Their second son, Herbert, broader of shoulder than of mind, became a soldier because his father told him to. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out, young Kitchener quit his military studies in England to volunteer in the French Army. He saw some action outside Paris and when he returned to England told one of his superiors, who reprimanded him for serving under a foreign flag, "I understood, sir, that I should not be wanted for some time; I don't like being idle; and I thought perhaps I might learn something."

Kitchener continued to apply himself to his career. In 1871 he received his commission as a lieutenant in the engineers and spent most of the next quarter century in Egypt, where he learned to speak Arabic like a native and became a terror to all who served under his command. The woman he asked to marry him turned him down; this turned Kitchener against almost all other women—except for two gentle old maiden ladies in London with whom he used to correspond and whom he always found time to visit on his occasional trips home. He loved England and its countryside but forced himself to follow, in the best Kipling tradition, a military career among the lesser breeds without the law.

The British, who considered themselves far less warlike than the peoples of Europe, therefore went to war under the leadership of a ready-made military hero. Lacking military traditions and experience, they found it easy to place their reliance in a man of Kitchener's attainments and character. When he first stepped into the War Office on August 6, 1914, he is said to have remarked, "There is no army." He

also shocked his cabinet colleagues—and disturbed many of his fellow soldiers—by predicting at once that the war would last three years. Actually, Kitchener could do little, in 1914, except approve previous commitments of policy-makers and current decisions of commanders in the field. But his name possessed just the kind of magic that the British people needed to unify them for the ordeal that lay ahead. It was not the kind of magic that hypnotized the shrewd Lloyd George, who wrote of Kitchener that his mind resembled “a revolving lighthouse whose beam would occasionally shoot out, showing one Europe and the assembled armies in a vast, illimitable perspective, till one felt one was looking along it into the heart of reality—and then the shutter would turn and for weeks there would be nothing but a blank darkness.”

As the cabinet member in charge of army affairs, Kitchener had the same constitutional powers as Winston Churchill, who headed the Admiralty Office. But Kitchener's military rank and record and the role that the alliance with France forced the British Army to play gave him unique prestige. Constitutionally, Prime Minister Asquith could overrule either Kitchener or Churchill, provided Parliament did not rebel. And Parliament, sensitive to the wishes of the British people, welcomed the appointment of Kitchener, thanking God, with one voice, that a man of destiny had appeared.

• II •

MOBILIZATION

THE MOBILIZATION orders and the declarations of war set off popular celebrations in all the major belligerent countries. As Germany's soldiers marched to the railway trains that would carry them to the fighting fronts, women threw garlands of flowers about their necks and over their guns. Such a large proportion of the young manhood of Germany had received military training that the Army and the people were one. “I recognize parties no more,” declared the Kaiser on August 4; “I recognize only Germans.” Even the Social Democrats, who never ceased criticizing the Empire in peacetime, at once respected the *Burgfrieden*, or peace of the city, that followed the declarations of war. The name referred to the civil truces of the Middle Ages.

The entire German people accepted Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's assurance, “We act in self-defense. Necessity knows no law.” While Allied statesmen invoked moral principles, Bethmann frankly told the Reichstag, “We have broken the law of nations. The French Government indeed has declared that it will respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as its enemies do likewise. The French can wait; we cannot! A



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

German Police Post Mobilization Notices, Berlin, August 1, 1914

French invasion on our flank in the lower Rhine would be fatal to us. We have been forced to disregard the just protests of Belgium and Luxembourg. The wrong—I say again—the wrong we have done we will try to make good as soon as our military objectives have been achieved. He that is threatened as we are threatened thinks only of how he can hack his way through.” Bethmann dwelt on the danger from the West. But what frightened most Germans much more was the danger from the East. The Social Democrats were not the only Germans who believed that in taking up arms against Russia Germany was fighting for civilization against barbarism.

While crowds in Berlin shouted, “*Nach Paris!*” crowds in Paris shouted, “*À Berlin!*” As soon as the French Government issued mobilization orders on August 1, throngs on the Paris boulevards marched in military formation singing the “Marseillaise,” waving French, British, and Russian flags, and shouting, “*Conspuez l’Empereur Guillaume!*” The newsboys selling extras that told of the declaration of war on

Germany yelled, "Good news!" Only a few days before they had hawked a different story. While Europe's leading diplomats were wrestling with the war crisis the Paris press was featuring the murder trial of Mme. Joseph Caillaux, who had shot Gaston Calmette, editor of *Le Figaro*, for having printed letters she had written to Caillaux while still married to another man. Later she had divorced the other man and married Caillaux, and her defense was that she had acted to avenge her husband's honor and her own. The jury acquitted her, and the case aroused political as well as personal passions because of Caillaux's opposition to the alliances with Britain and France.

The war crisis displaced Mme. Caillaux on the front pages, which soon featured another murder of a purely political nature. On July 31 a nationalist fanatic shot and killed Jean Jaurès, leader of the French Socialist Party, who had opposed the three-year compulsory military service law and had urged a general strike as war broke out. Whether Jaurès would have tried to call a general strike under the conditions that presently developed no one will ever know. Quite possibly he might have reacted like Anatole France, who had espoused Socialism, opposed nationalism, and then volunteered, in August, 1914, at the age of seventy, to serve his country as a common soldier. In any event, the elimination of Jaurès removed the only potential leader of an anti-war party in France. President Poincaré summoned all Frenchmen to form a Sacred Union—the *Union Sacrée*—and declared, "They are brothers inspired by a common faith and joined together in a common indignation against a common aggressor." The French Chamber of Deputies at once voted the necessary war appropriations and ratified Poincaré's proclamation of a state of siege, giving the Government almost unlimited powers and permitting the President to rule by decree. The Government thereupon proclaimed wholesale amnesties, even of men who had evaded military service, and the nation closed ranks in a common effort. On August 26 Premier Viviani, who headed one of those temporary stopgap governments that happened to find itself in power when war broke out, announced a new all-party, *Union Sacrée* Ministry.

What the Germans called the *Burgfrieden* and the French called the *Union Sacrée* took the form of a party truce in Great Britain. The proposal came from the Conservative opposition, and the Liberal Government at once accepted it. More important, John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists, who had been agitating for home rule, promised that his minority group in Parliament would support the war. This announcement caused far more relief in England and among England's allies than the pledges of support that came in from all the overseas Dominions and from the Indian Princes. Even Bernard Shaw



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Russian Priest Blessing Russian Soldiers about to Depart for the Front

gave the British war effort a characteristic endorsement: "I felt," he wrote later, "as if I were witnessing an engagement between two pirate fleets with, however, the very important qualification that as I and my family and friends were on board the British ships, I did not intend the British section to be defeated if I could help it. All ensigns were Jolly Rogers; but mine was clearly the one with the Union Jack in the corner."

The British Government set up a Council of War consisting of five civilians, five generals, and Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord. Prince Louis, because of his German ancestry, resigned in October and was replaced by Lord Fisher, who enjoyed a popular reputation second only to Kitchener's. The British Government took measures to establish controls over the country's industrial and financial life. It put through a Defense of the Realm Act, similar to the state-of-siege measures that the French Chamber of Deputies had approved. On August 5 the Royal Navy cut the German transatlantic cables and the British Government set up a Press Bureau, under the direction of F. E. Smith—later Lord Birkenhead—who had won distinction at the bar and as a Conservative Member of Parliament. On August 6 Parliament voted to increase the army by five hundred thousand men and ordered an enlistment campaign to begin. Before the year had ended, Parliament voted to enlist a million more. So many volunteers responded to Kitchener's "call to arms" that they could not be housed, trained, and equipped as fast as they rushed to the colors.

Russia staged the mightiest mobilization of them all when five million



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Russian Infantry Marching toward the Front, 1914

men went into uniform. Germany declared war against Russia on August 1. The next afternoon—a hot Sunday—three hundred thousand men and women of every station in life stood for hours outside the Tsar's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg enduring the heat of the sun in the hope of catching a glimpse of their supreme ruler. Inside the palace Nicholas II repeated the oath that Alexander I had taken in 1812: "I shall not make peace so long as a single enemy remains on the soil of Russia." Then he stepped out on the balcony, and the entire multitude before the palace went down on its knees. Demonstrations continued throughout the night. Some crowds sang "God Save the King" outside the British Embassy. Others broke into the German Embassy and threw furniture, statues, and pictures out the windows.

Throughout Russia the masses greeted the war as a religious crusade. A government official described the mobilization among the Cossacks in the Ural Mountains: "On July 31st the village awoke to find a red flag waving before the government building, the sign that a general mobilization had been ordered. Immediately everything was in a state of uproar. Nobody knew who was the enemy and nobody cared. It was sufficient that there was war. Only the women made conjectures as to whom it was against. There was no thought for work. Horses were groomed, uniforms put on, rifles and sabers cleaned with enthusiastic vigor.

"On Sunday the whole village assembled before the little wooden church. It was a stirring sight to see these great warriors in their full battle array kneeling before their Maker and solemnly asking His aid.

At the conclusion of the service each man was blessed by the priest and anointed with holy water. Then he led his horse away and received the blessing of his family. On the following day they set off on a journey of thousands of miles. Women, children, and old men watched them. Their eyes gleamed with tears and their breasts heaved. Then, when the last man had disappeared from view, they turned away, walked to the fields, and took over the labors which the men had left unfinished."

The Tsar convoked the Duma for a one-day session on August 8, "so that I may be in perfect union with my peoples," whereupon all the deputies except a few left Socialists voted to turn over all their limited powers to the Tsar and adjourned for six months. But a Provisional Committee of deputies did organize itself to help the bureaucracy administer relief, and on August 12 the zemstvos or provincial organizations sent delegates from the thirty-five Russian provinces to Moscow to set up an "All-Russian Union of Zemstvos for Relief of Sick and Wounded Soldiers." On August 22 the Union of Towns set up a parallel organization to represent the cities of Russia. At the same time a conflict began to take shape between the bureaucracy and the Stavka, or Imperial General Staff, which arbitrarily proclaimed martial law in military zones behind the fighting fronts. The mobilization proceeded more rapidly than the enemies of Russia had expected, but it was a poorly equipped army that marched into battle. Many Russians lacked guns; some even had no shoes. They had been supplied—not too adequately—to fight a short war.

Mobilization in Austria-Hungary proceeded according to plan. Most of the officers and almost half the enlisted men came of Austrian and Hungarian stock. They hated and feared their Serbian and Russian enemies more, perhaps, than they revered their own Emperor. As for the Slavic and Rumanian conscripts who made up more than half of the rank and file, they accepted Hapsburg rule as they accepted the weather. The Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles wanted independence. The Rumanians wanted to join a Greater Rumania; the South Slavs wanted to join a Greater Serbia. The Czechs, Slovaks, and South Serbs looked to the Russians as their friends and protectors. The Poles and Rumanians saw little to choose between the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs.

When war came the Austrian authorities tried to anticipate trouble by banning newspapers, forbidding public meetings, and impressing all men up to the age of fifty into the service. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, had dissolved the Reichsrat back in March, 1914. When war came, five months later, the bureaucracy turned over its authority to a new unconstitutional body known as the War Surveillance Office, operated by the General Staff. The aged Emperor, unable to assume command of his armies, appointed Archduke Frederick of the

House of Hapsburg supreme commander, but Frederick delegated virtually all authority to Conrad, his Chief of Staff. The Hungarians made as much trouble at the outset as the Slavs. Hungary had a bad harvest in 1914 and most of the crops had already been gathered by the end of July. Prime Minister Tisza at once made difficulties about shipping these crops to Austria, with the result that the Austrians had to buy Rumanian grain before the year ended.

Almost everywhere in Europe the mobilization period confounded the skeptics and pessimists. Troops assembled at their appointed places. Trains ran on time. The moral consequences of mobilization overshadowed the material achievement. Pacifist talk and Socialist agitation had apparently made no headway among the masses in any country. All the churches supported the war. French Roman Catholics and Austrian Roman Catholics showed themselves equally patriotic, for nationalism had become the new religion. What opposition there was to the war did not come from religious or political revolutionaries, but from subject nationalities who did not object to war as such but objected only to the cause for which they were being drafted to fight. The long peace that ended in August, 1914, had not left the people of Europe loving peace less but rather loving their countries more.



UNDERWOOD

Serbian Troops Resting behind the Lines

• III •

THE WESTERN FRONT

DURING the first week in August the mobilization period merged into the period of war, with the Germans setting the pace. They had the most powerful army in Europe. They occupied the central position. The same offensive spirit that possessed all the other belligerents possessed them. The German commanders lost no time in putting the Schlieffen Plan into effect. Luxembourg offered no resistance to the German armies, but in Belgium Moltke ran into his first snag. On August 5, German troops reached Liège, which controlled the narrow entrance into eastern Belgium between the Dutch and French borders. Thanks to the initiative of General Ludendorff, Chief of Staff of one of the seven

German armies moving against France, some of these troops quickly got inside one of the Liège fortresses. The Kaiser awarded Ludendorff the highest of all German decorations, the Pour le Mérite medal, for this feat, but even Ludendorff's enterprise was not enough. Other forts at Liège held out for ten more days until the Germans brought up the new seventeen-inch howitzers that their Austrian allies manufactured in the great Skoda munitions works near Prague. The British, French, and Belgians took advantage of this delay in the German timetable to demolish railway tunnels and bridges and thus to slow down, still further, German progress across Flanders and toward Paris.

General Leman, the Belgian commander of the Liège fortifications, wrote this description of his capture after the howitzers had opened their final attack: "We heard them come, heard the moaning of the air swell to the proportions of a raging hurricane, and end in a fearful thunder crash. Indescribable clouds of dust and smoke rolled over the trembling ground. I set out for the central observation post, but had hardly set foot in the gallery when a mighty rush of air threw me on my face to the ground. I picked myself up and tried to walk on, but found my way blocked by a veritable flood of poisonous fumes. I made my way out. To my horror I saw that the fort had collapsed and that its fragments filled the ditch. Soldiers were running about, and I thought they were Belgian gendarmes. I called to them, but choked. Vertigo seized me and I fell fainting to the ground. When I regained consciousness, I saw myself surrounded by members of my suite, but there was a German captain among them, and he gave me a drink of water. I was a prisoner."

The new Austrian howitzer completely surprised and stunned those who came under its fire. But in failing to use this weapon against Liège during the first week of the war, the Germans sacrificed much of its potential value and suffered their first setback in a strategy that called for a tight schedule and quick victory. The French High Command, however, failed to exploit this initial German blunder. Joffre, even more obsessed than the Germans with the psychology of the offensive but less well equipped to carry out an offensive strategy, sent two armies against Alsace and Lorraine just before the Germans broke through the Liège gap. In fact, the Belgian stand at Liège added to Joffre's confidence. But the French ignored the defensive value of the machine gun, and their infantrymen, clad in the bright red trousers and blue tunics of 1830, proved easy marks to the gray-clad German machine-gunners, whose modern uniforms merged into the surrounding landscape. Airplanes had made cavalry obsolete for reconnaissance, and the motor truck had begun to appear. But horses and mules pulled most of the light and medium artillery, especially in rough country.



ACME

German Soldiers Fighting in Belgium

One week after German machine guns and barbed wire had broken the first French attempts to liberate Alsace and Lorraine, Joffre decided that he had erred only in choosing the wrong point of attack. The Germans had thrown him back at the eastern end of the front. Their advance across Belgium showed they were preparing to deliver their main blow in the West. Obviously, their weak spot lay at the center. On August 21 Joffre therefore ordered a new offensive between the Moselle and the Meuse, just beyond the Luxembourg border. Relying on cavalry reconnaissance, he did not see that the enemy had concentrated considerable forces in the wooded Ardennes hills. Again, on August 22, the French attacked. Again German machine guns mowed them down. But the Germans did not follow through, and by August 23 the French armies in the east and at the center had begun to retreat beyond the positions from which they had launched their first attacks. The British Expeditionary Force, which had moved across the Channel without mishap to take up positions at the western end of the line, also withdrew.

Joffre had underestimated by exactly 50 per cent the number of troops the Germans had sent across Belgium. He had wasted time and men with futile attacks in the east and center and laid his armies open to the encirclement and attack from the rear that Schlieffen had planned. Thereupon Moltke made a far bigger mistake. Schlieffen on his deathbed just a few years before had gasped, "Make the right wing strong"—a warning that Moltke ignored. On the one hand Moltke assumed that the French and British Armies were already doomed. On

the other hand he became obsessed with fear of the Belgians, who had withdrawn from Liège, who still held Namur, and who had pulled the bulk of their Army into Antwerp behind some of the heaviest fortifications in Europe.

Moltke not only kept worrying about a possible Belgian attack on his flank. He let himself believe that the British and even Russians had landed on the Belgian coast. Already he had sent more troops to hold Alsace-Lorraine and to cross Luxembourg than the original Schlieffen Plan had provided. He now detached six divisions from his depleted right wing to besiege Antwerp, Namur, and Maubeuge. Nor was this all. On August 25 he received a panic-stricken telephone call for help from General Prittwitz, the commander in the East, who told him that two Russian armies were advancing against one German army in East Prussia and that the Germans would have to withdraw beyond the west bank of the Vistula River. Moltke, again ignoring the Schlieffen Plan, ordered two of the six divisions that he had detached from his crucial right wing in Belgium to shuttle back across Germany to the East-front.

General von Kluck, who commanded the German Army at the westernmost end of the Western front, compounded Moltke's errors. Irrked by the ten-day delay at Liège, von Kluck forced his troops across Belgium at such a pace that they outran their supplies and began to collapse from exhaustion. The way also lay open for von Kluck's troops to occupy the Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, but he passed up the opportunity in his blind determination to drive his weary warriors into a battle of annihilation against the retreating French.

Nevertheless, the sweep of the German hordes made a formidable show and gave the war correspondents their first chance to bring some of the realities of war home to civilians and neutrals. Richard Harding Davis, the most celebrated of the American correspondents, wrote this classic description of the entry of the German Army into Brussels. "At the first sight of the first few regiments of the enemy we were thrilled. After, for three hours, they had passed in one unbroken steel-gray column, we were bored. But when hour after hour passed and there was no halt, no breathing time, no open spaces in the ranks, the thing became uncanny, inhuman. You returned to watch it, fascinated. It held the mystery and menace of fog rolling toward you across the sea.

"The gray of the uniforms worn by both officers and men helped this air of mystery. Only the sharpest eye could detect among the thousands that passed, the slightest difference. All moved under a cloak of invisibility. Only after the most numerous and severe tests at all distances, with all materials and combinations of colors that give forth no color, could this gray have been selected. That it was selected to clothe and



ACME

German Troops Goose-Stepping through Brussels

disguise the German when he fights is typical of the German staff in striving for efficiency to leave nothing to chance, to neglect no detail.

"After you have seen this service uniform under conditions entirely opposite, you are convinced that for the German soldier it is his strongest weapon. Even the most expert marksman cannot hit a target he cannot see. It is a gray-green, not the blue-gray of our Confederates. It is the gray of the hour just before daybreak, the gray of unpolished steel, of mist among green trees."

A British war correspondent with the *London Standard* wrote this eye-witness description of the progress of the German Army as it swung across the Belgian frontier and into France:

"The road was wide and they marched eight abreast. There seemed to be no end to them. Such typical German faces and figures! These men were short rather than tall, stalwart in form, round heads and close-cropped hair, their gray-green uniforms covered with dust. The rate of their march was more than four miles an hour, probably, indeed, a mile in thirteen minutes. Considering the weight of their equipment, to which must be added that of the rifle, this speed was amazing, but it was clear that their physical strength was being taxed to the uttermost. Some of the troops were singing Volkslieder, but many were staggering along, barely able to hold their places in the ranks.

"The equipment of the German Army is wonderfully complete. Huge motor lorries stretched for miles and miles, and came along after the troops at a speed of nearly twenty miles an hour. Guns, ammunition, Maxims, and general stores were on the big motor cars. Field kitchens,

traveling pharmacies, field telephones and telegraph lines, portable wireless apparatus—nothing was missing. It was a scientifically and systematically equipped army which moved southward toward Paris.

"The number of German troops was a never-ending source of awe and terror to the French peasantry. 'What chance have we of stemming this tide of armies?' they asked in despair. They filled the roads and overflowed into the fields; when thousands had gone by more thousands approached and continued the march to the front, and when these thousands had disappeared to the south more tens of thousands arrived from the rear and went marching on to the front. An endless swarm of human ants."


Before this relentless German advance streamed columns of refugees whose plight quickly excited sympathy abroad and brought down condemnation upon the Germans. F. Alexander Powell, war correspondent for the *New York World*, described the procession of refugees on the road to Ghent: "I saw women of fashion in fur coats and high-heeled shoes staggering along, clinging to the rails of the caissons or to the ends of wagons, white-haired men and women grasping the harness of the gun teams or the stirrup leathers of the troops, who, themselves exhausted from many days of fighting, slept in their saddles as they rode; springless farm wagons, literally heaped with wounded soldiers with piteous white faces; the bottoms of the wagons leaked and left a trail of blood behind them; a very old priest, too feeble to walk, trundled by two young priests in a hand cart, a group of Capuchin monks abandoning their monastery; a little party of white-faced nuns shepherding a flock of children—many of them fatherless—who had been entrusted to their care. Confusion was beyond all imagination, the clamor of hoofs, the cracking of whips, the curses of drivers, the groans of the wounded, the cries of the women, the whimpering of children, threats, pleadings, oaths, screams, imprecations, and always the monotonous shuffle, shuffle of countless weary feet."

Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality gave the Allies a strong moral advantage at the very start of the war. The German bombardment of Belgian cities and the executions of Belgian civilians by German troops added fuel to the flames of Allied propaganda. The message that the Kaiser addressed in 1900 to his soldiers in China when he told them to emulate the Huns was recalled and widely publicized. Allied denunciations of Teutonic frightfulness soon got under the Germans' skins. The Conservative Catholic *Kölnische Zeitung* had this to say in reply: "By nobody is the fate of Belgium, the burning down of every building, the destruction of Louvain, so deeply deplored as by the German people and by our brave troops who felt bound to carry out to the bitter end

the chastisement they were compelled to inflict." It was not blood lust, the *Kölnische Zeitung* continued, that led civilized Germans to commit acts of violence. It was the attitude of the civilians in the conquered cities. "Our youth go to war with the watchword, '*Deutschland über Alles.*' They could not understand that the inhabitants of captured towns and villages would lodge in their backs the murderous bullet as soon as it was dark, firing at them from windows and cellars. Soldiers are almost stupefied by such atrocities, and as their officers gave the order would of course wreak punishment on the offenders, set fire to the houses from which their comrades had been shot, and execute the culprits."

When this line of argument failed to make many converts to the German cause abroad, certain extremists spoke out more bluntly. Having destroyed the library of Louvain in Belgium, German troops went on to shell the French cathedral of Rheims. Again Allied propagandists denounced the Huns, and a retired Major General von Disfurth came up with this reply: "We owe no explanations to anyone. Whatever act is committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating, and destroying the enemy is a brave act and fully justified. Germany stands the supreme arbiter of her own methods. It is no consequence whatever if all the monuments ever created, all the pictures ever painted, all the buildings ever erected by the great architects of the world be destroyed, if by their destruction we promote Germany's victory. War is war. The ugliest stone placed to mark the burial of a German grenadier is a more glorious monument than all the cathedrals of Europe put together. They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and their abuse. For my part, I hope that in this war we have merited the title, barbarians. Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease to talk of the cathedral of Rheims, and of all the churches and all the castles in France which have shared its fate. Our troops must achieve victory. What else matters?"

But victory was just what the Germans failed to achieve. As early as August 30, General von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, wrote in his diary: "Only one thing is certain; our General Staff has completely lost its head. Schlieffen's notes no longer help and Moltke's wits have come to an end." The notebook of an officer on von Kluck's staff contained this entry, dated September 2, 1914: "Our soldiers are worn out. For four days they have been marching forty kilometers a day. The ground is difficult, the roads are torn up, the trees felled, the fields pitted by shells like strainers. The soldiers stagger at every step, their faces are plastered with dust, their uniforms are in rags; one might call them living ragbags. They march with closed eyes, and sing in chorus



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

German Shells Bombarding the Cathedral of Rheims

to keep from falling asleep as they march. The certainty of victory close at hand, and of their triumphal entry into Paris, sustains them and whips up their enthusiasm. Without this certainty of victory they would fall exhausted. They would lie down where they are, to sleep at last, no matter where, no matter how. Only the delirium of victory keeps them going."

The next day, September 3, the tide turned for the first time against the Germans, but it took Joffre several days to see what had happened. General Galliéni, under whom Joffre had once served in Madagascar and who commanded the five hundred thousand troops garrisoning Paris, perceived that von Kluck was wheeling his army across the French front in such a way as to invite a flank attack. Joffre, made cautious by his defeats in the early weeks of the war, hesitated to order a general offensive. Galliéni appealed to a British officer, who refused to take him seriously because his button boots and long, unkempt mustache made him look like a music-hall comedian. Finally, on September 5, Joffre heeded the appeals of his former chief and ordered a general counter-offensive. From the highly respected General Ferdinand Foch, commander of one of the armies outside Paris, came this message: "My left is broken, my right is weakening; the situation is excellent: I am attacking."

The Germans had advanced to within eighteen miles of the French capital when Galliéni won the hearts of the Parisians by commandeering the city's taxicabs to rush part of one of his divisions to the front.

A series of engagements that became known as the Battle of the Marne followed, and on September 9 the two German armies at the western end of the front—von Kluck's and von Bülow's—had begun to retreat. The French called it the "miracle of the Marne," and at least one German, von Kluck, agreed with them: "That men may stand fast and be killed is an understood thing which is discounted in every plan of battle. But that men who have retreated during ten days, that men sleeping on the ground and half dead with fatigue should be able to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds is a thing upon which we never counted. It was a possibility of which there was never any question in our schools of war." Perhaps the French with their reliance on intuition, emotion, and the spirit were proving themselves more realistic than the methodical Germans, after all.

The German High Command had lost the Battle of the Marne before it even began. The delay at Liège, the detachment of six divisions from the sweep across Belgium and into northern France, the transfer of two of these divisions to the Eastern front, von Kluck's failure to seize the Channel ports and keep his right wing strong—all these developments during the first month of the fighting had torn the Schlieffen Plan to shreds. Nor did the fault lie entirely with Schlieffen's successors. Schlieffen thought and planned only as an offensive-minded soldier. He spread Germany's limited resources so thin that any unexpected delay, like the one that occurred at Liège, subjected Germany's fighting men to a greater physical strain than they could bear. More important, he quite ignored the moral effect that a Russian invasion of East Prussia and a French invasion of Alsace would produce on the German people and their leaders. This is not to suggest that the Schlieffen Plan was foredoomed to failure. It is merely to point out that the execution of any plan calls for the highest ability and that Schlieffen's great mistake lay in his failure to allow for the factor of human error.

After the Battle of the Marne the German commanders continued to blunder. Von Kluck's exhausted army had wheeled across the French front before Paris in the hope of surrounding and annihilating all the French forces then and there. But von Kluck and the commanders of the other German armies had lost touch with headquarters and with each other. In their determination to achieve the final purpose of the Schlieffen Plan, they ignored the step-by-step progress that Schlieffen had outlined. Von Kluck's cardinal mistake lay in swinging his troops to the east before he had established a firm, unbroken line right up to the English Channel in the west. Because of this failure, the Germans not only had to withdraw at the Marne. They had to spend the rest of September and half of October fighting a series of engagements with the

French and British to secure the Channel ports that von Kluck could have taken in August without opposition.

Galliéni now urged Joffre to throw all his reserves toward the northwest, where von Kluck had left himself open to attack. But Joffre, jealous of his own authority, restricted Galliéni to the Paris garrison again and lost a priceless opportunity to outflank and envelop the Germans from the west. Not until September 17 did Joffre see what Galliéni had in mind, and by this time it was too late. German reinforcements had begun to arrive on the 13th. The next day General von Falkenhayn succeeded Moltke as Chief of Staff while still remaining Prussian War Minister. Falkenhayn had no great qualities, but he had no such serious defects as Moltke. Falkenhayn had also called attention to Moltke's blunders at the time they were made and before the consequences had become generally apparent.

The so-called "Race to the Sea" that followed the Battle of the Marne led to some of the fiercest fighting that had yet occurred. Britain's small professional army of less than one hundred thousand men, which had made its way across the Channel between August 11 and August 17 without losing a single man, horse, or gun, carried a heavy burden. According to British news sources, the Kaiser ordered his commanders to annihilate "the contemptible little British Army," whose soldiers promptly called themselves "the Old Contemptibles." Moreover, the ten-day delay at Liége had given the British time to prepare for battle, and the threat of more landings behind the German lines in Belgium kept Moltke on edge. On September 28 Falkenhayn, who had vainly urged Moltke to take Antwerp and the Channel ports in August when the taking was good, ordered the bombardment of Antwerp to begin.

Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had kept pointing to the need for British reinforcements on the Channel coast, and at the last minute he did succeed in persuading the Government to send a few thousand partly trained marines and almost untrained naval volunteers to fight as foot soldiers at Antwerp. The whole project excited him to such a point that he rushed across the Channel and spent several days in and near the front lines, directing operations. Kitchener was said to have suggested making him a Lieutenant General.

The Germans finally took Antwerp on October 10, but the small British detachment of troops made it possible for the bulk of the Belgian Army to escape and hold the Channel ports. In the first volume of his *World Crisis* Churchill emphasized the unprecedented effects achieved by new German methods of warfare: "Antwerp presented a case, till the Great War unknown, of an attacking force marching methodically without regular siege operations through a permanent fortress line behind advancing curtains of artillery fire. Fort after fort



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Belgian Refugees Flee the Advancing Germans

was wrecked by the two or three monster howitzers; and line after line of shallow trenches was cleared by the fire of field guns. And following gingerly upon these iron footprints, German infantry, weak in number, raw in training, inferior in quality, wormed and waddled their way forward into 'the second strongest fortress in Europe.'

After the fall of Antwerp no important changes occurred on the Western front in 1914. The Schlieffen Plan had fallen apart, and no other recipe for quick German victory lay at hand. The Allies had held the Germans, but they had failed to exploit the victory at the Marne. So far, the war in the West had remained a war of movement, not unlike the Napoleonic campaigns and the battles of the American Civil War. After the Marne came a series of bloody engagements in Flanders, and then the entire Western front settled down to trench warfare, which nobody had anticipated but which the Germans took the lead in improvising. A zigzag line of trenches, five hundred miles long, wound its way from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier. The front lines lay exposed to the weather. Open passageways led back to deeper, covered huts which housed kitchens, dormitories, and storage depots—some of them half a mile and more to the rear. Between lay more trenches. Human labor dug these underground cities. Human labor laid the telephone lines, built the concrete flooring, carried the planks that lay on the concrete. Several million men who had spent their lives in cities, towns, and farms where they had come to take for granted some degree of shelter, cleanliness, and comfort suddenly found themselves condemned to the existence of underground animals.


Merely to survive under such conditions presented challenge enough to civilized human beings. To carry on warfare as well, at all hours of the day and night, seemed a superhuman task. Barbed wire and machine-gun nests gave the defense a tremendous advantage. It required heavy artillery barrages to knock down the barbed wire and force the defenders back, and even then the defenders would retire to prepared positions and cut down the attackers. The defending artillery would also come into action and pulverize the attack, just as the attacking artillery had pulverized the defense. All the belligerents learned the high cost of offensive trench warfare the hard way, and the year 1914 saw some of the bloodiest, most wasteful fighting in all the history of warfare. Herbert Corey, an American reporter in Flanders, sent the New York *Globe* this account of what happened at one tiny segment of the Western front:

"Imagine a perfectly level field, five miles long, a mile wide. Picture to yourself that the ends bend together like an unstrung bow. Carpet that field with dead men. Try to comprehend that these men have been three weeks dead. Draw around that field deep trenches from which savage riflemen face each other across the ghastly charnel-patch. That is war."

Mr. Corey went on to summarize an eye-witness account of the fighting that raged across this stretch of ground for four days: "On the northern line—roughly speaking—the Germans entrenched themselves. On the southern line the French and English dug new trenches. Neither side would retire and neither side could advance. There was not a minute day or night that fighting across that awful mile was not going on at some point. Shells aimed at the trenches were continually falling in them. Through the glasses the ground seemed carpeted with the dead. The greenish gray of the German uniform, the khaki of the English, and the brilliant red and blues of the French were mingled in a frightful fellowship. There were rods where the dead were piled and heaped upon each other. Again there would be a little stretch of bare ground.

"Neither the Germans nor the British could rescue their injured. During the day a movement might be seen here or there in that litter of misery. But no sound came. If they cried, the thunder of the guns, the staccato rattle of the mitrailleuses, drowned out their voices. But at night the firing usually dies down. The cooling air seemed to revive those dying creatures on that awful mile. There had been no attempt on either side to bury the bodies. Neither asked for an armistice. The sun and rain beat down upon those poor, unburied dead bodies. Let this sentence told by the shuddering witness tell the story: 'The corpses have burst their clothes.'"

Some years afterward in his book *Disenchantment*, the British jour-



The Western Front, 1914: Showing the furthest limits of the German advance in early September and the line on which the front was stabilized in late November

analyst C. E. Montague described "staff work that hung up whole platoons of men, like old washing or scarecrows, to rot on uncut German wire, of little splendid bands of company officers and men who did take their bits of enemy trenches in spite of it all, and then were bombed to death by the Germans at leisure, no supports coming up, no bombs to throw back, while in England old Regular Colonels were saying to hollow squares of their men: 'I hear that in France there is a certain amount of throwing some sort of ginger-beer bottles about, but the old Lee-Metford [a rifle] is good enough for me.'

"We had asked for it. We had made the directing brains of our armies the poor things they were. Small blame to them if in this season of liquidation they failed to produce assets we had never equipped them to learn, mental nimbleness, powers of individual observation, quickness to cap with counterstrokes of invention each new device of the fertile specialists opposite."

Nobody had bargained for anything like this. Nobody could discover any cheap short-cut to victory. In late October, General Foch prevailed upon Field Marshal French to take the offensive against almost equal

German forces in Flanders. Shortly afterward Falkenhayn made one last attempt to carry out the Schlieffen Plan and launched a much heavier offensive at the Belgian city of Ypres. Both offensives failed, but the Germans came closer to breaking through. By the end of November rain, mud, and cold finally rang down the curtain on the 1914 campaigns in the West.

The German decision to bet almost everything on the quick defeat of France made the Western front the most important theater of war in 1914. If the Germans had tried to knock the Russians out first, the crucial battles of 1914 would have been fought in the East. If the British Navy had tried to destroy the German Navy at the very outset or if Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, had carried out his project to land on the German coast, the war at sea would have overshadowed the land fighting. But none of these things happened. The Germans had the power to decide where the land fighting should occur. The British did not use their naval superiority to force the issue at sea. Nevertheless, the fighting in Eastern Europe and the war at sea helped to determine the outcome of the fighting in the West.

• IV •

THE WAR IN THE EAST

THE blunders of Austria's statesmen led Austria's blundering soldiers to disaster. General Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian commander, had warned Foreign Minister Berchtold not to declare war until August 12 because of the time required for mobilization, but Berchtold felt he had to declare war at once before the Germans could stop him. The declaration came on July 28 and Conrad chose the strategy that called for a quick, crushing offensive against Serbia. General Potiorek, the man who had sat in the same automobile with the murdered Archduke at Sarajevo, deployed the Sixth and Fifth Austrian Armies against Serbia's western border. The Second Army deployed to the north and at once began shelling Belgrade, which lay just across the Danube from Austrian territory. The Serbians had eleven and a half divisions plus forty thousand Montenegrin troops to throw against a total of nineteen Austrian divisions.

On July 31 the full mobilization of Russia began. The Kaiser, who scorned the strength of the Serbs but feared the Russians, telegraphed Francis Joseph: "I count the second of August as the first day of mobilization and am prepared, in fulfillment of my duties as an ally, to begin war against Russia immediately. In this momentous struggle it is of the greatest importance that Austria should direct her main forces

against Russia and not divide her forces by an offensive against Serbia. This is the more important as a large part of my Army will be tied by France. In the battle of giants that we are entering shoulder to shoulder, Serbia plays a quite subsidiary part, which calls only for such defensive measures as are absolutely necessary."

This threw Conrad into a dither. Having already prepared to attack Serbia from the north with his Second Army, he switched strategies and ordered it to proceed to the Russian front. General Potiorek, the commander of the attack on Serbia, pleaded with Conrad to countermand the decision, and Conrad let him keep one army corps. It was not strong enough to do that job; it also left the rest of the Second Army too weak to launch a successful offensive against the Russians. The Austro-Hungarian armies required twenty days to mobilize. The Russian armies required thirty days. If Conrad could not deliver telling blows against the Russians between the twentieth and thirtieth days after mobilization, he would have to fight against steadily rising odds. The twenty to thirty extra days it took him to shift his Second Army from the Serbian to the Austrian front lost him this advantage.

The fighting between Austria and Russia began with three Austrian armies taking the field against four Russian armies on a two-hundred-mile front running from northeast to southwest across southern Poland. The two Austrian armies at the northern end of the front defeated the two Russian armies that faced them. But the two Russian armies at the southern end of the front advanced against the third Austrian army before the Austrians had time to reinforce themselves from the Serbian front. Conrad then had to order all his armies to withdraw one hundred and fifty miles and permit the Russians to overrun the province of Galicia, including the fortress cities of Lwow—or Lemberg, as the Austrians called it—and Przemyśl—which nobody outside Eastern Europe knew what to call. By this time the Russians had put a fifth army in the field. More than two million men had engaged in seven distinct battles, some of which lasted several days. In eight weeks of fighting Conrad had lost three hundred and fifty thousand of the nine hundred thousand men he had sent into action. Russian losses totaled about half as much. Another major offensive had ended in disaster.


At the same time, the Russians embarked on an equally extravagant gamble that proved more rewarding to their allies than to themselves. When war came, Maurice-Georges Paléologue, the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, lost no time urging an immediate Russian offensive against Germany. Grand Duke Nicholas assured him that he would not even wait until the Russian armies had completed their mobilization. He promised action on or about the fourteenth of August, and he kept

his word. The Grand Duke knew that the Germans had left only one army in East Prussia and were sending troops from their East Prussian garrison to the West. He therefore sent the First Russian Army, commanded by General Rennenkampf, against the northeastern border of East Prussia and the Second Russian Army, commanded by General Samsonov, against the southeastern border. Rennenkampf entered East Prussia on August 17, just above the Masurian Lakes, which form a natural barrier about fifty miles long. On August 20 Samsonov appeared just south of the Masurian Lakes.

General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, who had earned the nickname of *der dicke Soldat* (the stupid soldier), commanded the German forces in East Prussia. When Rennenkampf's army drove the Germans from the little town of Gumbinnen, Prittwitz fell into a panic. Without informing any of his staff, he telephoned to Moltke's headquarters on the evening of August 20 pleading for reinforcements and announcing that he was ordering his troops to retreat beyond the Vistula River. It was this telephone call that persuaded Moltke to shift to the Eastern front two of the six divisions he had already detached from his all-important right wing in Belgium. But the hysteria in Prittwitz's voice also led Moltke to install a new commander in the East.

It took the officers at imperial headquarters two days to pick their man. They finally decided upon sixty-seven-year-old Lieutenant General Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg—as the Army Directory listed him—who had retired in 1911 and lived at Hanover, on the direct route between imperial headquarters at Coblenz and the Eastern front. Moltke remembered Beneckendorff's years of faithful service, his reassuring bulk, his heavily lined face, his firm jaw, his sweeping mustaches. The Kaiser either forgot or did not choose to remember the imperial maneuvers of 1908 when this same Beneckendorff committed the social error of permitting the army corps under his command to defeat the army corps the Kaiser commanded.

On the afternoon of August 22 the old soldier whose comrades had known him as Beneckendorff emerged from retirement under his second family name of Hindenburg. He had received a telegram from the Kaiser asking if he could at once take command of the German forces in the East and had instantly wired back, "Am ready." His wife spent the rest of the afternoon and the evening letting out the waistbands of his military trousers and tunics. At three o'clock the following morning Hindenburg arrived at the Hanover railway station, dressed in the blue peacetime uniform of the German Army and more than a little upset because he had no wartime field-gray equipment. A special train consisting of an engine and two cars arrived. Another general—not so tall and not so stout as Hindenburg—stepped out, saluted, extended his



ACME

The Kaiser with Hindenburg (left) and Ludendorff (right) Surveys War Plans for the Eastern Front

hand: "Major General Ludendorff, your excellency, by order of August 21 of the All Highest's Military Cabinet, appointed Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army." Hindenburg returned the salute and the handshake, stepped aboard the train, and sped east.

The men in charge of the German war effort had made an imaginative decision, for Hindenburg had been born and trained to command. Both his father's and his mother's families traced their ancestry back to the twelfth-century Knights of the Teutonic Order. He and his two younger brothers received the conventional Prussian upbringing which began with a nurse who instilled discipline by barking at her toddling charges: "Order in the ranks!" Paul joined the Prussian Cadet Corps at the age of eleven. He first saw action as a second lieutenant of infantry when, still in his teens, he took part in the Seven Weeks' War against Austria, receiving a wound and the Order of the Red Eagle. Four years later he won the Iron Cross for bravery in the field against the French and represented his regiment when the new German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles.

During the next forty years Hindenburg rose gradually from the rank of captain to lieutenant general. In 1905 the Kaiser pronounced him too dogmatic to succeed Schlieffen as Chief of Staff. Six years later, at the

age of sixty-four, Hindenburg reconciled himself to retirement on his modest family estate in East Prussia. "My military career," he wrote later, "had carried me much further than I had ever dared to hope. There was no prospect of a war, and as I recognized that it was my duty to make way for younger men, I applied in the year 1911 to be allowed to retire." From then on he devoted himself to hunting, collecting pictures of the Madonna and Child, and following the military career of his only son, Oskar. When war suddenly came he had to depend on the local Hanover papers for information. Chafing at inaction, he wistfully watched the troops departing for the various fronts. "I placed myself in the hands of fate," he wrote, "and waited in longing expectation."

Hindenburg was long on dignity, character, and experience; short on originality, imagination, and capacity to master detail. General Erich Ludendorff, who had already distinguished himself at Liège, supplied all these lacks. He had worked with the General Staff since 1904 and had headed its war plans division since 1908. But Ludendorff had no "von" before his name. He came of a middle-class family and boasted that he had risen to the top only by "hard stand-up fighting." When war broke out he held the position of Quartermaster General—or Chief of Staff—to General von Emmich, commander of the Second German Army. Ludendorff wore a mustache like the Kaiser's. He carried himself stiffly, drew his retreating chin down close against his collar. His courage was the courage of the man who fears to show himself afraid. His stiffness betrayed inner tension, not disciplined self-control. At forty-nine he lacked the experience as well as the character to assume responsibility for an entire front. But no better Chief of Staff existed in the German Army.

Although a native of East Prussia, Hindenburg had never laid eyes on the Masurian Lakes region that he had been called upon to defend, and Ludendorff knew even less about it. Neither man had any definite campaign plan in mind when they arrived at Eighth Army headquarters. They needed none. Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffmann of Hesse, who had served as operations chief under General Prittwitz, had everything in hand. While Prittwitz had been telephoning imperial headquarters, talking himself out of his command, Hoffmann had drawn up complete plans for a counteroffensive and awaited only the O.K. of the new commanders to go ahead.

Hoffmann's proposals appealed to Ludendorff's intelligence and to Hindenburg's judgment. Hoffmann suggested withdrawing almost all the German forces that had given ground before *Rennenkampf* in the north and dealing first with *Samsonov* in the south. Hoffmann suggested luring *Samsonov's* army into a trap by offering very weak resistance at the center of the line and then closing in from the flanks. The Russian

armies were sending uncoded wireless messages from which the Germans learned that Rennenkampf had no plans for immediate action in the north, but that Samsonov planned to push ahead in the south. Some German officers at Eighth Army headquarters could not believe that the Russians would reveal their real plans in uncoded wireless messages that anyone could pick up and understand. But Hoffmann knew his Russians. He also knew his Rennenkampf and Samsonov. For Hoffmann had accompanied the Japanese armies in Manchuria as a military observer during the Russo-Japanese War, and he had picked up some valuable information about Russian methods and Russian personalities. He remembered, for instance, that two Russian generals had become so angry at each other after one of the Japanese victories that they fell to fighting on a Manchurian railway platform, ending up rolling on the ground, locked in struggle. And the names of these two generals were Rennenkampf and Samsonov. Hoffmann therefore insisted that the Eighth Army could throw its whole weight against Samsonov, safe in the knowledge that Rennenkampf would ignore any appeal for help that might follow. He carried his point. Hindenburg informed his staff on the night of August 25, "Gentlemen, our preparations are so well in hand that we can sleep soundly tonight."

The next day Samsonov's army fell into the trap that Hoffmann had prepared. The weakly held German center deliberately gave ground; the Russians poured into the gap; the German flanks closed in. At this moment Ludendorff almost threw away the victory. Hearing that Russian cavalry was attacking from the south and that Rennenkampf was moving down from the north, the neurotic hero of Liège urged that some of the German troops that were closing in on Samsonov be shifted to check the thrust he mistakenly expected Rennenkampf to attempt. Hoffmann pleaded for the continued execution of his original plan. He predicted that Rennenkampf would under no circumstances come to the aid of the hated Samsonov—who, sure enough, presently began to plead, in vain, for support. The stolid Hindenburg brushed Ludendorff's panicky advice aside and backed Hoffmann's bolder counsels.

For the next three days the Germans fought one of those battles of annihilation of which their General Staff had always dreamed. By the evening of August 29 they had killed more than one hundred thousand Russians and had taken another one hundred thousand prisoners. The relentless Germans pocketed Russian soldiers and their horses by the hundreds and thousands in swampy hollows. Their death cries drowned out even the roar of the German artillery and drove some of the Germans who participated in the slaughter insane. In one stretch of wooded country, German troops came upon the dead body of General Samsonov, shot with his own pistol by his own hand.

Hoffmann had the holocaust named the Battle of Tannenberg, after a little Prussian village where, five centuries before, an army of Slavs and Lithuanians had annihilated an army of Teutonic Knights in whose ranks a Hindenburg and a Beneckendorff had lost their lives. The descendant of these knights had avenged them, but Hoffmann, who had planned the victory, attributed his success to the disastrous feud between Rennenkampf and Samsonov. "If the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton," Hoffmann declared afterward, "the Battle of Tannenberg was lost on a railway platform in Manchuria."

Having annihilated Samsonov's army at Tannenberg, the Germans turned north to face Rennenkampf, who now paid the price for having permitted Samsonov to go to his doom. One thing only Rennenkampf had learned from Samsonov's horrible example: the danger of encirclement. He occupied a stronger natural position than Samsonov. He had larger reserves. But he refused to charge. The Germans therefore moved against his flank and his center, with mixed results. The action began on September 8. Two days later Rennenkampf ordered a general withdrawal. His retreat became a rout, and by September 14 all of Rennenkampf's troops had left German soil. His army had lost one hundred and forty-five thousand men in casualties and prisoners.

The rulers of Germany lost no time in glorifying the two victories on the Eastern front. Overnight Hindenburg became the national hero. When he left for the front, the citizens of his home city of Hanover did not know what he looked like; neither did the troops he commanded at Tannenberg. His fellow generals scarcely knew him by the name with which he had emerged from retirement. But within a few weeks after the Battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, Hindenburg had become a household god throughout Germany. Universities conferred honorary degrees upon him. Brewers gave his name to their beers. His glorification distracted popular attention from the fact that Germany had suffered a much worse defeat at the Marne than Russia had suffered at Tannenberg. But it did not conceal from the unhappy Austrians that they had suffered, in Galicia, the worst defeat of all.

Conrad, the Austrian commander, blamed this defeat on the failure of the Germans to get the jump on the Russians before the Russians got the jump on them. Moltke, on the other hand, blamed Conrad for launching a rash offensive against Russia after having learned that the Germans were throwing most of their forces against France. By the time the new Hindenburg team had swept the Russians from East Prussia, Falkenhayn had replaced Moltke as Chief of the German General Staff, and Falkenhayn decided to make one last stab at executing

the Schlieffen Plan. He therefore ordered the so-called "Race to the Sea" which the British stopped at Ypres. This meant that Hindenburg could expect few reinforcements from the West to aid Austria in the East.


Nevertheless, the Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoffmann team scraped together a new German Army—the Ninth—to which they added part of the Eighth. The efficient German railways rushed these troops from East Prussia to Silesia, where at the end of September they opened a drive against Warsaw from the southwest. The Grand Duke Nicholas threw a million and a quarter Russians against them. The Germans, outnumbered three to one, advanced sixty miles in less than two weeks and some of them pushed to within twelve miles of their objective. But two Austrian armies which had lined up south of the Germans failed to go ahead. On October 17 Hindenburg ordered a general withdrawal and pulled his men out as fast as they had rushed in. German casualties totaled forty thousand men.

What to do next? Hindenburg's successes had won him command of all the German forces in the East, and on November 3 he summoned a conference at his headquarters. Never a man to waste words, he merely raised his left hand. All present at once understood that they were to make another lightning shift, this time northwards. General Mackensen, a Prussian of Scottish ancestry, had now become Commander of the Ninth Army, which he ordered to advance upon Warsaw from the northwest. Within a week Mackensen claimed twenty-five thousand prisoners, but again Russian manpower proved too much for the Germans and Mackensen barely got his troops out of a Russian trap at the city of Lodz. Both Mackensen and the Grand Duke had failed to win the battle of annihilation that each had expected to score, but the Germans had checked the Russian threat to Silesia even though they had not made it possible for the Austrians to recover any of the lost province of Galicia.

At this time the Russian war machine began to crack. Three months of fighting had exhausted its supply of artillery and rifle ammunition. Green troops went into action without guns in their hands or shoes on their feet. They equipped themselves from their fallen comrades. By December, mass desertions had begun among the Russian soldiers who opposed the Germans. One Russian general reported, "My men are saying, 'Why should we perish of cold and hunger, without boots; the artillery is silent, and we are killed like partridges. The Germans are better off. Let us go.'"

The arrival of winter ended the war of movement in the East. But the fighting on the Eastern front never degenerated into the kind of trench warfare that had produced a deadlock in the West. As long as

any troops had the spirit and equipment to attack, the lines of battle remained fluid. At one point in the Battle of Lodz, for instance, Russian and German troops formed eight successive lines, fighting back to back. Nothing like that had ever developed in the West, because in the West



The Eastern Front, 1914: Showing the scene of the German victory at Tannenberg and of the Austrian reverses in Galicia

the opposing forces were more equally matched and all of them had better equipment and more ample supplies.

Cold weather and sheer exhaustion gave Hindenburg's headquarters a breathing spell as the month of December drew to a close. But Austria's troubles had not ended. Having squandered the bulk of their armies on vain offensives against the Russians, the Austrians threw the remainder of their forces against the Serbs, who also outnumbered them. Serbian troops had defeated the Turks only two years before. They hated the Austrians. They knew the country in which they fought. Nevertheless, General Potiorek launched two Austrian drives against Belgrade—the first from the north in August, the second from the west in December. The Serbians drove the Austrians back both times. Of the three hundred thousand Austrian troops who had invaded Serbia, barely two hundred thousand returned, and the year 1914 ended with Serbia cleared of all invaders. Although the Serbians had won a startling moral victory over the Austrians, they too had lost one hundred thousand men and had suffered heavy material damage as the result of the two Austrian invasions and the shelling of Belgrade. During the last five months of 1914 the three principal armies in Eastern Europe—the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Serbian—had knocked themselves and each other out. Only the Germans faced the New Year as strong in the East as they had been when the war began. But German defeats in the West more than counterbalanced German victories in the East.

• V •

THE WAR AT SEA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ONLY ONE of the major belligerent powers got through the year 1914 with its original war plan more or less intact. In Flanders the small professional British Army held one of the most important sectors of the Western front. At sea, Britain's Royal Navy made a far greater contribution to the Allied cause. Thanks to the foresight of Winston Churchill, the British Navy went on a virtual war footing on July 26, after the Grand Review, concentrating all vessels at the North Sea base of Scapa Flow, facing Germany. These ships not only shielded the British Expeditionary Force when it safely crossed the Channel within two weeks after war broke out; on August 29, a squadron of cruisers accompanied by destroyers sank several German light cruisers just off the great German base at Helgoland. This demonstration of power and daring caused the Germans to keep the bulk of their Navy bottled up and established Britain's command of the North Sea.

At the same time British naval vessels in other parts of the world were exterminating scattered German squadrons and commerce raiders. Most of Germany's overseas colonies, except German East Africa, fell into British hands without a struggle. Japan declared war on Germany in late August and sent a division of troops and a naval squadron to besiege the German fortress of Tsingtao on the China coast. The local garrison capitulated the first week in November. Meanwhile the British Navy tightened its blockade of the German fatherland. The failure of all the military commanders to win the quick decisive victories they had expected on land made British sea power loom larger and larger.

Only once did any ships of the German Navy get the jump on the British. The outbreak of war found two of the fastest, newest German war vessels—the battle cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau*—in the Mediterranean. The German Admiralty ordered them to proceed at once to Constantinople, which they promptly did, giving the British the slip and arriving safe on August 11. On August 1 three members of the Turkish Government—which the Young Turk Party controlled—had signed a secret treaty of alliance with Germany. Enver Pasha, the War Minister in this Government, therefore yielded to German pressure and without consulting his cabinet colleagues permitted the two vessels to pass through the Dardanelles in defiance of international law, which closed the Straits to all belligerent naval vessels in time of war. Enver said he acted as he did because the British had refused to deliver two warships they had under construction for the Turks. The British had the legal right to withhold delivery, but the Turkish people who had raised the funds to buy the warships through popular subscription supported Enver. They also applauded when their Government went through the motions of buying the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* from Germany, giving them Turkish names, and issuing Turkish fezzes to their Teutonic crews.

The acquisition of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* gave Turkey control of the Black Sea. The Russians had nothing afloat that could catch up with or stand up to these two new men-of-war. Nevertheless, the Balkan states remained unimpressed. Indeed, on August 19 Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece approached the British Foreign Office with an offer to enter the war against Germany. Venizelos, a product of Crete, was more Greek than the Greeks. He had visions of a Greater Greece extending to Asia Minor and incorporating all the islands of the Aegean Sea. Since Greece could achieve these ambitions only at the expense of Turkey, Venizelos's proposal meant that he would bring his country into the war on the Allied side only if the Allies provoked Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Central powers.

Sir Edward Grey, fearing any extension of the war, rebuffed Veni-

zealous. The British had declared war on Germany with the slogan of "Business as usual," and many of their leaders assumed that they could fight a limited war in certain parts of the world while picking up commercial advantages in other regions that their German rivals had just quit. Grey also set great store by Moslem good will. The Sultan of Turkey, as the spiritual leader of Islam, could proclaim a "holy war" and thus make infinite embarrassment for the British Empire. For generations the British had supported the Moslems of India against the Hindu majority, in obedience to the classic divide-and-rule formula. The British also occupied a privileged position in Egypt and needed to keep on the good side of the Arabs who dwelt near the Suez Canal and the Persian oil fields. Then there was Russia. An Anglo-Greek deal at the expense of Turkey might lead the Russians to suspect that their British allies planned to do them out of Constantinople and the Straits.

Churchill and a minority in the British Cabinet pleaded with Grey to accept Venizelos's offer. They reminded him that King Constantine of Greece had married the Kaiser's sister and held the rank of honorary Prussian Field Marshal. For the moment, Constantine went along with Venizelos, but he might change his mind at any moment. The opportunity might never return. And if Greece joined the Allies, Bulgaria and Rumania might follow. While Venizelos dreamed of a Greater Greece, Churchill dreamed of a Balkan confederation and urged his cabinet colleagues to rally and exploit all the latent anti-Austrian, anti-Turkish sentiment in the Balkan peninsula for the benefit of the Allied cause. But he found little support for his plans in London or anywhere else. At the very moment Venizelos approached Grey, the British, French, and Russian Governments assured the Turkish Government that if it remained neutral they would uphold the independence and integrity of Turkey "against any enemies that may wish to utilize the general European situation in order to attack her." This attempt to appease the decadent Ottoman Empire soon proved a political as well as a moral miscalculation.

The Turkish Government, still proclaiming its neutrality, began to mobilize in August. Listless, underfed, ill-equipped troops straggled to the colors—many of them Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Jews, and other minorities who hated Turkish rule. The Turkish officials grafted and Turkish diplomats tried to play both ends against the middle while the dominant Young Turk Party heeded only the orders from Berlin. By late October it had become apparent that Germany's last hope for quick victory had gone. This meant that the Central powers needed Turkey in the war to seal up Russia from the south and to give Germany direct access to the Middle East. On October 28 a Turkish communiqué announced, "The Russian fleet followed the Turkish fleet and

interfered with its exercises. The Russian fleet began hostilities today." Admiral Souchon of the German Navy had taken command of the Turkish fleet, and it was under his orders that two Turkish destroyers opened fire on the Russian Black Sea port of Odessa and torpedoed an old Russian gunboat there. On the same day the *Goeben*, flying the Turkish flag, torpedoed two Russian steamers. Russian, French, and British declarations of war followed during the next few days. On November 1 the British proclaimed martial law in Egypt. They annexed Cyprus on the fifth and landed troops in the Turkish-controlled province of Mesopotamia on the sixth. On November 3 an Allied naval squadron bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles.

Two weeks later came the Sultan's dreaded proclamation of a holy war. "O Mohammedans," he declared, "true servants of God! They that join in the holy war will enjoy great felicity. They that die will win the honor of martyrdom. According to the promise of God, they that sacrifice themselves in the cause of right will have the glory and happiness of Paradise." But the proclamation fell dead. All the sins that the British, French, and Russian imperialists had committed against Islam—and the Sultan listed them in full—apparently made less impression on the Moslem world than the weakness and corruption of the Turkish Empire.

A month later Enver Pasha assumed personal command of a Turkish army that tried to invade Russia through the Caucasus Mountains. The last 1914 offensive ended in failure. It had begun five hundred miles from the nearest railhead. Camels carried artillery shells on a six weeks' journey through mountainous country. Enver made the strongholds of Kars and Ardahan in Russian Armenia his immediate objectives, but he dreamed of making his way clear across Afghanistan and on into India. His cavalry killed and plundered helpless Armenians on the Turkish side of the border, but he never saw Kars or Ardahan. On January 4, 1915, a larger and better-equipped Russian force stopped the Turks, who withdrew to Erzurum, their point of departure. Of the ninety thousand men who started, the Turks lost fifteen hundred dead and fifty-six hundred wounded. They also sent another twenty thousand men against Egypt and the Suez Canal, but this small expedition lacked the punch to get more than a few advance guards to the shore of the Red Sea.

Almost everything that had happened in the East made Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance more and more doubtful. Premier Salaandra made no effort to conceal his purposes and every effort to achieve them. "What is needed," he declared, "is a freedom from all preconceptions and prejudices, from every sentiment except that of sacred egoism." The Triple Alliance did not commit Italy to join Austria and Germany in an offensive war or in any other kind of attempt Austria or Germany might

make to change the *status quo*. The Triple Alliance also exempted Italy from having to take any action against England. On August 3 the Italian Government proclaimed its neutrality, pointing out that Austria had attacked Serbia, Germany had become involved in war with England, and both countries were fighting to change the *status quo*. The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italy's moderate Foreign Minister, died in October. The nationalistic Baron Sidney Sonnino replaced him. Although Sonnino, thanks to his Scottish mother, had received a Protestant education and favored the Allies, he informed the Central powers that the transfer of the Italian-speaking parts of Austria to Italian control might bring Italy over to their side.



CULVER

Enver Pasha

In December the Kaiser pulled Bülow out of retirement to make him Ambassador Extraordinary to Rome. Bülow and his Italian-born wife entertained lavishly, but he had little hope of keeping Italy from joining the Allies and little use for the directors of his own country's affairs. Turkey had by this time become an active belligerent, and the land-hungry Italians who had helped themselves to part of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa, only two years before, did not see how they could acquire more Turkish possessions by entering the war on Turkey's side.

• VI •

THE HOME FRONTS

BY THE END of 1914 civilians as well as soldiers in all the warring countries felt the impact of the war. The Germans had made the most extensive military preparations, but they had counted on quick victory. One man—a civilian of Jewish origin—helped to save them from quick defeat. Walther Rathenau headed the largest industrial combine in Europe—the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft, or General Electric Company—which his father had founded. Rathenau, more Prussian than the Prussians, passionately admired an aristocracy from whose inner

circles his ancestry excluded him. He had also studied and written philosophy and patronized the arts. The outbreak of war threw him into despair; he feared that it doomed the nation and the tradition which he loved.

On August 7, 1914, Rathenau warned the War Department that Germany faced economic strangulation. Two days later Falkenhayn, the War Minister, appointed him head of a new organization, the War Materials Division. Rathenau and four other men, including a retired colonel and a professor who worked for the electrical trust, set up offices behind a wooden partition in the War Department and laid plans to stock-pile raw materials. They had so little clerical help that they addressed their own envelopes, but they commandeered all the available nitrogen—first in Germany, then in the captured city of Antwerp. If they had not moved swiftly thousands of German peasants would have exhausted the bulk of the country's nitrates fertilizing their fields and thus would have brought the production of high explosives to a complete and sudden halt at the very height of the crucial battles of 1914. Rathenau also saw to it that the German chemical industry adopted the newly discovered Haber-Bosch process of making nitrogen from the air. By Christmas he had overcome the crisis and set up an organization that gradually extended its control over the entire economic life of the country.

The German people backed the war as completely in January, 1915, as they did in August, 1914. The setbacks their armies had suffered in the West did not discourage them. The victories in the East reassured them. Britain's entrance into the war seemed to confirm the Government when it announced that Germany was fighting a defensive war of survival against a circle of enemies. Philipp Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag, toured the larger cities preaching the "peace of understanding" that the Socialists endorsed and that the Government permitted them to propagate. The Government itself announced no official set of war aims. Different party leaders interpreted the war differently, but all agreed in describing it as a defensive war, and the German people accepted this label almost unanimously.

The French people supported the war as enthusiastically as the Germans, but they differed more among themselves about its aims. Premier Viviani's coalition Government of Sacred Union included representatives of all the major parties, except Georges Clemenceau, who represented only himself but still had a big following. Poincaré said of Clemenceau in 1914: "So long as victory is possible, he is capable of ruining everything. A day will perhaps come when I shall add: now that victory is lost, he is capable of saving everything." On

August 31 the Government moved its headquarters from Paris to Bordeaux, while Clemenceau remained in Paris, where his newspaper *L'Homme Libre* railed at the Army's medical and postal services. The censor suspended *L'Homme Libre*; Clemenceau at once started a new paper, *L'Homme Enchaîné*. He and other editors attacked the Government for the serious shortage of shells.

During August the national arsenals were producing thirty-six thousand shells a day. Joffre demanded seventy-five thousand shells a day for his famous 75-millimeter artillery alone. But by the time the Western front became stabilized, the Germans controlled most of the French coal deposits and 90 per cent of the deposits of iron ore. Ninety-five of the one hundred and twenty-five French blast furnaces lay in German-occupied territory. France had always depended on Germany for chemicals used in explosives. Almost half the workers in the war factories had gone to the front and more were leaving the factories every day. Not until the end of the year did French industrial production for the war turn upward. Millerand, the ex-Socialist Minister of War, proved more autocratic than the fiercest nationalists and sternest military men. Albert Thomas, who remained a Socialist and a popular working-class leader, kept the labor movement loyal. The Government extended its control over private industry, but Millerand tended to give private industry its head.

Russia and Austria-Hungary looked more demoralized than Germany and France behind the lines. The Russians had put five million men in the field—15 per cent of the male population of working age. This led to an almost complete breakdown of supply and reduced Russian exports to a trickle at a time when Russia required more imports than ever before. By the middle of December the Russians had eight hundred thousand reservists ready to go to the front, but they had no guns, no ammunition. They hoped to buy a million rifles abroad. General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, Russia's sixty-five-year-old Minister of War, proved hopelessly incompetent. His fourth wife, his love affairs, and his financial embarrassments kept him in hot water. He refused to admit that he lacked the equipment to fight the battles of 1914 until all hope of victory had gone.

If the Russians lost all hope of victory in 1914, Austria-Hungary lost all chance of averting defeat. Less than half the population of Austria-Hungary belonged to the dominant German and Magyar national groups. At least one man in four in the armed services was of dubious loyalty. Among civilians feeling ran ever stronger against the Hapsburgs. In 1913 both the Austrian and the Hungarian Parliament had passed a bill that gave the Austro-Hungarian Army dictatorial control over the civilian population and civilian property in wartime. The bill



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Eton Schoolboys Drill for War

went into effect the first week in August. It suppressed Slavic newspapers and established military governments in the provinces on the Russian and Serbian borders. Although most of the people of Austria-Hungary rallied around their old Emperor in August, the defeats in Galicia and in Serbia, the losses at the front, the hardships at home broke the brief spell of enthusiasm. By the end of 1914 the peoples of the Hapsburg lands had lost the will to fight, and no other will had taken its place. They accepted the events that followed the outbreak of war as passively as they had accepted the events that preceded it.

While popular support for the war steadily waned throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, popular support for the war steadily increased in Great Britain and the overseas Dominions. The war took the British people by surprise. They had cultivated no hereditary enemies in Europe. The assassination at Sarajevo that lit the fuse seemed remote and unimportant. Not until German troops marched into Belgium, threatening the Channel ports, not until there seemed a chance that the German Navy might attack the Belgian and French coasts, did the British feel their own security threatened. And even then they required a strong dose of moral indignation to arouse their fighting spirit. The German violation of Belgian neutrality took care of that.

Although the Germans never threatened to invade British soil, recruits volunteered faster than the Army could train and equip them, and British factories could not begin to supply the little expeditionary force with all the ammunition it needed. The shortage of shells caused

the first serious crisis inside England. David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, overcame any immediate financial troubles by keeping the banks closed during the first few days of the war, printing paper money, and floating war loans. Before the year ended he found a new outlet for his energy when he proposed that the Cabinet set up a special committee to study the munitions problem, for which no military leader had prepared any solution. He foresaw the coming shortage sooner than the soldiers did and took immediate steps to correct it. Kitchener took a more realistic view of the military prospects than any other professional soldier on either side, but even he underestimated the need for munitions.

The manufacture of shells, to mention one of many expendable items of military equipment, required the integration of many industries. The Government, under the Defense of the Realm Act passed by Parliament on August 8 and August 28, had the necessary powers to bring industry into line. By the end of 1914 Lloyd George had made plans for the war-time controls over most of British industry. He first organized businessmen into local groups under government supervision. By 1915 he was making speeches to industrial workers—most of whom supported the Labor Party—telling them that the Government was nationalizing industry and that the war was becoming a contest between Allied machinists and the machinists working for the Central powers. But all this time Kitchener's recruiting drive was draining off the best British workers into the new mass Army. The Germans had made their supreme bid for victory in the West. The British at once accepted the challenge—on Germany's terms. But the British did not let it go at that. Their imperial statesmen saw the world-wide implications of the war more clearly and more quickly than the statesmen of other countries. They had access to raw materials and factory products from overseas. British investments abroad totaled some twenty billion dollars, some of which could be used to buy war supplies. British merchant vessels could carry these supplies to all the war zones under the protection of the British fleet. Finally, a special relationship existed between Britain and the mightiest of the neutrals—the United States of America.

• VII •

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: 1914 STYLE

THE OUTBREAK of war in Europe found President Wilson crushed by his wife's fatal illness. In March, 1913, a few days before his inauguration, he had said, "It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs," and on August 4, 1914, he found him-


self writing: "The more I read about the conflict across the seas, the more open it seems to me to utter condemnation." Sitting at the dying Mrs. Wilson's bedside, he composed a brief message to all the belligerents, offering "to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any other time." Secretary of State Bryan backed Wilson's first mediation offer and urged him to follow it up. But none of the belligerents even answered him, and on August 6 Mrs. Wilson died.

When the President returned from his wife's funeral on August 12 he found a letter on his desk from President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University urging immediate American intervention in the war on the Allied side through a naval blockade of the Central powers. Eliot then wanted the United States to take the lead in forming a grand coalition to outlaw power politics and establish world peace on a secure foundation. The suggestion appealed to Wilson. He liked the idea of American moral leadership for peace and read the Eliot letter to his Cabinet. But after further discussion and reflection he wrote Eliot that the time did not yet seem ripe and on August 20 Eliot himself withdrew the suggestion.

Secretary of State Bryan proposed seeking the same objective by a different route. Bryan felt that the United States—acting with or without the other neutrals—should propose immediate peace negotiations and offer to act as mediator. He did not suggest outlining any specific settlement in advance, but his plan had two distinctive features. First, he proposed a general settlement of all outstanding differences among nations. Second, he wanted all the belligerents to state their war aims. Bryan argued that if one set of belligerents accepted and the other set opposed American mediation, there could be little doubt about where responsibility for prolonging the war would lie. Bryan, like Eliot, wanted the United States to use its moral influence for a just peace, but he believed that American neutrality would make for greater righteousness than American intervention. And Wilson agreed with Bryan.

Most of Wilson's other advisers and officials and most of Bryan's subordinates in the State Department thought differently. For instance, Wilson had chosen Edward M. House—an honorary colonel from the state of Texas—as his foreign-affairs specialist. House, the son of an English-born father, had attended Cornell University and from 1880 to 1910 divided his time between cotton planting and Democratic state politics. He backed four successive Texas governors and in 1912 boarded the Wilson bandwagon. In that same year he also wrote an anonymous novel, *Philip Dru*, describing the adventures of just such a secret agent as he himself aspired to become.

Wilson soon found himself calling House "my independent self" and before the outbreak of the war dispatched the mousy-looking colonel



BROWN BROTHERS

Colonel House and President Wilson

on a grand tour of Europe as his personal emissary. House knew almost nothing of the countries he visited, and his hosts knew as little of him. The Germans, mistaking him for a genuine soldier, filled his schedule with military displays, but the Kaiser gave him an audience and he met Bethmann and the other political leaders. The British had less difficulty sizing up the Texas Talleyrand, and Sir Edward Grey quickly won his confidence and friendship. House returned to Washington in the spring of 1914 urging the creation of an Anglo-Franco-German-American alliance to stabilize the *status quo* in Europe and the colonial world, and when war came he advised Wilson not to offer mediation. Yet Wilson still clung to the belief that he and House thought exactly alike—an illusion that the self-important House encouraged.

While House played up to his chief and played down their differences, Ambassador Walter Hines Page in London dealt much more frankly with the President. Page, like House, opposed the mediation offer. Like House, he also wanted the United States to underwrite and restore the world *status quo*. But Page never favored a four-power alliance. He wanted a closer, exclusive Anglo-American tie-up. To this end he devoted his great charm and notable literary gifts. Page came of a poor, proud North Carolina family. At school and college he had become a passionate student of Greek and English literature. In his early forties he won the coveted editorship of the *Atlantic Monthly*; a year later he and Frank N. Doubleday founded the publishing house that bore their names and that issued a new magazine, *World's Work*,

with Page in the editorial chair. Page had sided with the muck-rakers—in a nice way—and in 1913 went direct from his editorial job to the American Embassy in London. Wilson always praised his dispatches as the most informative he received from any quarter.

Page and House, like so many other Americans before them, found spiritual refreshment in the higher reaches of British society. Their hosts—especially such an understanding gentleman as Sir Edward Grey—did not need to lay themselves out; they cast an automatic spell that proved all the more effective because it contained no element of conscious guile. "Page and I," wrote Grey, "stood in very special relations to one another." He also related this typical incident: "Page came to see me at the Foreign Office one day and produced a long dispatch from Washington contesting our claim to act as we were doing in stopping contraband to neutral ports. 'I am instructed,' he said, 'to read this dispatch to you.' He read, and I listened. He then said, 'I have now read the dispatch, but I do not agree with it; let us consider how it should be answered.'" At the same time House, in Washington, toned down the instructions that Bryan, as Secretary of State, was sending to Page. On at least one occasion House showed Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, the draft of a dispatch to Page and then had it altered to meet British objections.

Neither House nor Page deliberately wrecked Wilson's neutrality policy in August, 1914. Nor did they sabotage his mediation offer. But they did nothing to further Wilson's purposes, and events moved so fast that no one in Washington could control them. Shortly after the outbreak of war Henry P. Davison, a partner in the private banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, telephoned the State Department to ask for a ruling on loans to belligerent governments. On August 10 Bryan wrote Wilson that in his opinion "money is the worst of all contrabands because it commands everything else." On August 15 the State Department officially informed Morgan's that it had no objections to loans to neutrals but that "loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality." The ruling had no practical importance at the moment. The Allies had plenty of credits to buy all the war supplies they needed in the United States. And on the same day that the State Department ruled against loans to belligerents, it sanctioned unlimited sales of war munitions to all comers.

The State Department ruling had just one purpose: to cushion the economic shock of war upon the United States. The British had announced a blockade of neutral as well as enemy ports. They stopped and searched all vessels entering the war zone, and drew up their own list of contraband goods. The United States had no merchant marine

to speak of; British vessels carried most of America's exports, and the British Government had just commandeered all these ships for the war. American businessmen and bankers wondered how they could meet their short-term indebtedness to London, totaling a quarter of a billion dollars, unless they could continue to sell goods abroad. Panic seized the South as the price of cotton tumbled from thirteen and one-half cents to six cents a pound during the first week in August. The British blockade had apparently cut the United States off from its Central European markets for the duration. And even before war had broken out, American business had gone into one of its periodic declines.

The State Department met this crisis by suggesting, on August 6, that all belligerents agree to respect the so-called Declaration of London that had been drawn up in 1909 but that no country had ever ratified. This Declaration forbade any blockade of any neutral port in wartime or any interference with any cargo on its way to a neutral port. The German and Austrian Governments naturally agreed to respect the Declaration of London on condition that the Allies accept it, too. The British, just as naturally, refused. For acceptance of the Declaration by all belligerents would have permitted the Central powers to import war materials from overseas through Holland, Denmark, Italy, and the Balkans. It would have by-passed the British blockade and have deprived the Royal Navy of its main usefulness. And it would have permitted the United States to build up a roaring wartime trade with both sets of belligerents.

The Germans cried out against the British blockade as the British had cried out against Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. The Germans argued that the British blockade violated international law and threatened millions of noncombatants with starvation. The British replied that this was a new kind of war and that the old rules—which Germany had already broken—no longer applied. And just as Bethmann frankly admitted that Germany invaded Belgium because "necessity knows no law," so Sir Cecil Spring-Rice told Wilson, "We each wish to defend our rights, but I am sure that you will remember the rights we are defending are our existence." Sir Edward Grey expressed himself with equal frankness in his memoirs. The object of British diplomacy at this time was, he said, "to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a legal rupture with the United States."

Economics never interested Wilson. It never occurred to him, during the opening weeks of the war, to threaten to embargo all munitions shipments to all belligerents. Nor did the zealous Bryan see the possibilities of economic pressure. He urged a sterile, negative neutrality at a time when an American embargo on all trade with all belligerents

might have ended the war within a year. But Wilson and Bryan were not the only men who misjudged the events of August, 1914. Plenty of professional soldiers looked for a military decision by Christmas. Plenty of businessmen and bankers asserted that all the warring powers would bankrupt themselves and have to stop fighting before the end of the year.

Wilson used to say of himself during the White House years that Woodrow Wilson the man always felt Woodrow Wilson the President of the United States standing at his shoulder in perpetual judgment. During those early August days, when he drugged his grief for his wife's death with hard work, did Woodrow Wilson the President of the United States shrink back from drastic economic threats that would have checked "the greatest business boom in history" that he had predicted for his country earlier that same year? Or did Woodrow Wilson the man shrink back from taking measures that would have worked heavily against Great Britain? Instinct, tradition, and inheritance disposed Wilson toward the British cause. English literature shaped his prose style. English history shaped his political thinking. To read aloud, no poet gave him such pleasure as Wordsworth. He admired Gladstone above all other statesmen. He felt a deep affection toward his British-born mother's native land. But Wilson also had a pride of intellect, of nationality, of calling, that made him impervious to the social glamour of British society, which dazzled House and Page.

Finally, Wilson's moral and political sense told him to keep the United States neutral and stay out of the war. The four Americans in every ten who had been born abroad may have sympathized with this side or that, but they had come to the United States to escape just such a disaster as had overtaken Europe. Most native-born Americans—especially in the country districts and in the Middle and Far Western states—regarded Europe's wars as none of their business. And even those Americans who believed that their country had a great world role to play preferred the role of peacemaker to that of belligerent. Neutrality made equally good sense to the pacifist and to the pragmatist.

On August 18 Wilson addressed a lofty message to the American people, expressing the hopes and anxieties that had preyed upon his own distracted mind since his wife's death. His closing words summed up his highest aspirations:

"The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

"My thought is, of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

"Shall we not put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?"

Wilson's neutrality message did credit to his nobility of purpose and his mastery of elevated English prose. But the fine words he uttered had little to do with the actions of his administration or the emotions of the great mass of his fellow citizens. More than a month later Theodore Roosevelt, writing on "The World War: Its Tragedies and Its Lessons" in the September 23 issue of *The Outlook*, endorsed Wilson's thesis: "It is eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would warrant our breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or another." Like Wilson, Roosevelt hoped that the United States could remain neutral in order "to use our influence for helping toward the establishment of peace when the time comes." Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt went out of his way to praise one of the belligerent powers—Germany. He said that "the iron law of self-preservation" had forced the Germans to violate Belgian neutrality and went on to express "praise and admiration due a stern, virile, and masterful people" as well as "heartly respect for their patriotism and far-seeing self-devotion." William Howard Taft, the only other living ex-President, said of his successor on October 16, "President Wilson has taken the right stand and expressed it with admirable accuracy."

Few Americans in 1914 felt so strongly about the issues of the war that they demanded open intervention one way or the other. Few Americans in 1914 felt so strongly about bringing the war to an end that they demanded an embargo on all munitions shipments to all belligerents. Intervention meant death and destruction. A munitions embargo meant depression and bankruptcy. Could not one eat one's cake and have it too?

The day before Taft endorsed Wilson's neutrality message the State Department issued one of its periodic rulings to the effect that American citizens could furnish any goods they pleased to any of the belligerents and that the Government had no right to prevent such traffic. On

October 22 Ambassador Page brought Sir Edward Grey the good news that the United States had given up its campaign to persuade Britain to accept the Declaration of London—or, indeed, any other fixed code of international law. The road lay open for the United States to step up its wartime trade with the Allies.

Wilson himself had helped to open that road. In a conversation with Robert Lansing, counselor to the State Department, he approved the extension of “credits” to all belligerents, which, in effect, meant England and France only. The President took the line that loans would have taken gold from the United States, whereas credits kept trade flowing without the “clumsy and impractical method of cash payments.” That such credits might build up an economic and emotional stake in an Allied victory apparently did not occur to him. Lansing then passed the word on to a banker, adding, “The above are my individual impressions of the conversation with the President who authorized me to give them to such persons as were entitled to hear them, upon the express understanding that they were my own impressions and that I had no authority to speak for the President or the Government.”

Charles M. Schwab, supersalesman for the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, had already made good progress along the road that Wilson had opened. When he arrived in London to peddle his wares, Kitchener told him, “This war is not going to be a short one. I foresee five years of it at least. I want you to pledge that the control of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation will not be sold by you and your associates under five years from now.” A month later Henry P. Davison arrived and made arrangements to have J. P. Morgan and Company appointed sole wartime purchasing agent for the British Government in the United States.

The Morgan bank that Davison represented in 1914 bore little resemblance to the creation of its founder. The elder Morgan—whose friends respectfully called him Pierpont—had dominated Wall Street for a generation, largely through force of intellect and character. He co-ordinated the conquests of the robber barons of an earlier day and dictated national financial policy to both Cleveland and Roosevelt. His son—known to his intimates as Jack—inherited his father’s position but little else except the good sense to delegate authority to his partners. Jack Morgan frankly preferred the social life of upper-class England to anything the United States afforded. He owned a grouse-hunting lodge in Scotland and spent part of every year in the British Isles. Genuinely unassuming and modest, he hated publicity and salesmanship. At least two of his partners—Henry P. Davison and Thomas W. Lamont—had no such dread of the spotlight. A third—Dwight W. Morrow—possessed intellectual and moral qualities of the highest order. A scholar by

temperament and a lawyer by profession, Morrow had proved himself a genius at reorganizing corporations. When he became a partner in 1914, the firm regained some of the statesmanship it lost when the elder Morgan died.

The outbreak of war in Europe gave the reorganized Morgan partnership its golden opportunity. Few American bankers or businessmen had any knowledge of any foreign country. In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king; the elder Morgan's father had established a bank in London where Pierpont learned the ropes before moving to New York and setting up in business for himself. By 1914 the Morgan firm not only had a London office—Morgan, Grenfell; it had a Paris office—Morgan, Harjes. No other American bank had such intimate, long-standing connections with the British and the French. James Speyer, Otto H. Kahn, and Paul and Felix Warburg had family ties with Germany, but the British blockade prevented them from doing much business in that quarter.

The Morgan partners lost no time solidifying relations with their British and French friends. They did not bear the public responsibilities of the professional diplomat. They avoided the stigma attached to the money-grubbing businessman. They set themselves up as the diplomats of business and the businessmen of diplomacy. It was lovely work—and it came their way in increasing abundance.

Years later Thomas W. Lamont described with engaging candor the attitude of his partners in August, 1914: "Those were the days when American citizens were being urged to remain neutral in action, in word, and even in thought. But our firm never for one moment had been neutral; we didn't know how to be. From the very start we did everything we could to contribute to the cause of the Allies." Mr. Lamont had no patience with those who believed that self-interest dictated Morgan policy during the war years. "Does anyone," he asked in a letter to *The New York Times*, "even of the postwar generation believe that business interest determined the pro-Ally sentiments of Morrow or Morgan or Davison or any of us? Surely not. Like most of our contemporaries and friends and neighbors, we wanted the Allies to win from the start. We were pro-Ally by inheritance, by instinct, by opinion, and so were almost all the people we knew on the Eastern seaboard of the United States from the moment Germany violated Belgium's neutrality." In those few words—"almost all the people we knew on the Eastern seaboard of the United States"—lies the clue to American policy in 1914. The Wilson administration had curtailed some of the monopolistic powers of Mr. Lamont's Eastern-seaboard friends. But members of that administration, from Mr. Wilson himself right on down, responded to the war in Europe just as Mr. Lamont did.

And no wonder. In addition to speaking the same language, Englishmen and Americans had the same national genius for idealizing self-interest and making idealism pay. The same kind of war propaganda that went over well with the British public also went over well in the United States. As for the Germans, they had a national genius for putting their worst foot foremost; and the behavior of their troops in Belgium and France, especially as reported by Allied propagandists, did little to endear them to the American public. After August 5, 1914, when the British cut Germany's transatlantic cable, all war news that reached the United States passed through the hands of British censors. All news from the front came from Allied correspondents, since Americans were barred. Thus, the American public heard little about the conduct of Russian troops, who behaved no better in East Prussia and Galicia than the Germans had behaved in Belgium and France.

The British Government also put Sir Gilbert Parker, whose novels had won many American readers, in charge of a propaganda organization that sent famous Britons on American lecture tours and placed the work of leading British writers in the American press. Lord Bryce, author of the celebrated *American Commonwealth*, put himself in correspondence with his American friends. Sir Edward Grey renewed his cordial relations with Theodore Roosevelt by mail. His letters soon bore fruit. Roosevelt had endorsed Wilson's declaration of strict neutrality after Wilson himself had begun to give it up. By the time that war orders from Britain and France had given the United States a growing stake in an Allied victory, Roosevelt became a passionate Allied propagandist. But it was not his love of England or his friendship for Grey that caused this sudden change. It was his hatred of Wilson and his rage that the greatest war in history found him a private citizen and America a non-belligerent. He coined the expression "hyphenated Americans" and accused them of converting the United States into a "polyglot boarding-house"—quite a change from his courageous stand in behalf of the Japanese immigrants in California only seven years before.

Meanwhile the dispassionate neutrality that Wilson had urged in August withered with the autumn rose. Economic interest plus British sea power gradually began to transform the United States into an Allied arsenal. At the same time the Allied cause made an ever-increasing appeal to American sentiments as well as self-interest. The Germans, on the other hand, looked more and more like America's hereditary enemies. Had not Hessian mercenaries tried to crush the Revolution? Had not a German squadron threatened to make trouble for Admiral Dewey at Manila Bay? As for the Kaiser, he seemed at best a bad joke; at worst, a world menace. Yet popular American support for military intervention in Europe's war added up to just about zero in 1914. The

expatriate Henry James expressed his sympathy for England and his disapproval of the land of his birth by giving up his American citizenship in order to become a British subject, and William Roscoe Thayer, Boston-born biographer of Cavour, Hay, and Roosevelt, declared, "Only a moral eunuch could be a neutral."

British propagandists understood the temper of the American masses too well to suggest that the United States abandon its neutrality. They sought only to put their case in the best possible light. And they preferred to have Americans do their pleading for them, in American terms. No other approach promised lasting results. Meanwhile America's leaders operated on a day-to-day basis. Wilson and the Democrats had gained a plurality, not a majority, of the popular vote in 1912. They faced their first mid-term Congressional election in November, 1914. The Taft-Roosevelt split had begun to heal. Would the Republicans patch up their internal difficulties and win control of Congress? The answer was no. Wilson's New Freedom at home and his prudent neutrality abroad won a clear but slim vote of popular confidence. The year 1914 ended with Wilson far and away the biggest man of his generation in American public life.

SUMMING UP

DURING the last five months of 1914 most of the peoples of Europe found themselves engaged in a war that their statesmen had not known how to prevent and that their generals did not know how to fight. Nevertheless, the popular masses almost everywhere rose to the occasion. They believed their national leaders, who told them they must make every sacrifice for their national existence. Germans and Britons, Austrians and French, men and women, soldiers and civilians, gave themselves up to a common cause. The soldiers lived and died under such conditions as they had never known in time of peace. Behind the lines the families of the soldiers "did their bit," as the expression went, submitting themselves to the authority of the all-powerful, if not all-wise, state. War, with all its waste and cruelty, released energies to which peace gave little scope. The individual at first lost and then found himself in the herd. The patriotic impulse proved far stronger than the religious impulse: to give one's life for one's country took some of the sting from death. Few members of the European clergy served their churches with such heroism and devotion as millions of European soldiers served their countries. The war confounded the prophets of decadence, degeneration, and doom, but it also challenged the ideals of progress and freedom. By the end of 1914 no responsible European

leader had defined a coherent set of war aims. War had become an end in itself and victory the sole objective. Only the neutral President of the United States raised the question of what the belligerent nations were fighting for, and even his own compatriots did not seem too interested in the answer.

1915

The year of Allied indecision when the Central powers won repeated victories in the East—victories that had repercussions in China and the United States.

PREVIEW

BOTH the Allies and the Germans launched their first offensives in the East—the Germans against Russia, the British against the Dardanelles. The Germans did not knock Russia out of the war; the British did not get to Constantinople. But the British did encourage Italy to join the Allies, and the Germans softened up the Russians for the heavier blows that fell later. Continued disappointments at the Dardanelles led to a cabinet crisis in Great Britain and the formation of the first coalition Government under Asquith. Germany's summer offensive in the East broke the Russian lines and undermined the Russian home front, but the Russian armies did not break under the strain. In the fall the Germans opened still another offensive against Serbia, bringing Bulgaria into the war against the Allies and opening the road to the Middle East. The year ended with the Allies discouraged but not defeated, the Germans hopeful but not victorious. The war at sea went as badly for the Central powers as the war on the Western front went for the Allies. Germany's submarine campaign almost brought the United States into the war on the Allied side after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but Wilson's diplomacy kept America neutral and forced the Germans to modify their attempted submarine blockade of the British Isles. Colonel House continued his futile diplomatic efforts in Wilson's behalf. Japan took advantage of the general confusion to press a new series of demands upon China. The Chinese pulled themselves together and the Japanese had to back down a little. All in all, a year of indecision lay behind; the time of decision lay ahead.

• I •

EAST OR WEST?

THE MONTH of January, 1915, found both groups of belligerents in Europe arguing the same question: East or West? Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany favored big offensives in the East for political purposes. He hoped to bring the Balkan states and Italy into the war on Germany's side, or at least to keep them neutral. The Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoffmann trinity wanted Russia knocked out of the war. Conrad and the Austrians seconded the motion. When Falkenhayn insisted that nothing decisive could be won in the East and that four-fifths of Germany's armies had already taken up positions on the Western front, the so-called "Easterners" demanded his dismissal. They succeeded in having imperial German headquarters shifted from Mézières, in France, to the Silesian castle of the Prince of Pless. They also frustrated Falkenhayn's plan to detach Ludendorff from Hindenburg and to assume command in the East himself. Germany, in effect, went into the year 1915 with two separate High Commands.

A similar controversy divided the British. The two strongest civilian members of the Cabinet urged an invasion of Southeastern Europe—Lloyd George favoring Salonika, Churchill favoring the Dardanelles as the point of attack. On January 3, Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, wrote Churchill, "I consider an attack on Turkey holds the field—but only if it's immediate." At the same time Kitchener wrote Field Marshal French in France, "The German lines in France may be looked upon as a fortress that cannot be carried by assault and also that cannot be completely invested, with the result that the lines may be held with an investing force while operations proceed elsewhere." But the British field commanders in France agreed with Joffre and the French General Staff that with a few more divisions and a little more artillery fire they could break through the German lines and win the war within the year. Only Galliéni, the hero of the Marne, and Briand, the Vice-Premier, disagreed. They shared Lloyd George's confidence in an attack on Salonika.

To both belligerent groups, offensives in the East promised greater rewards than offensives in the West. Germany's Hoffmann had learned his strategy from Count von Schlieffen, but when the Schlieffen Plan failed and the Western front became deadlocked, Hoffmann saw no hope for quick, decisive victory in the West and drew what seemed to him the only possible conclusion: Germany must make no attacks on the Western front, but must do everything possible to knock out

Russia, save Austria, get control of the Balkans, and open the road to the Middle East. Churchill took just as dim a view as Hoffmann of the prospects on the Western front. He favored using Britain's naval superiority to force the Dardanelles, get troops ashore at Constantinople, knock Turkey out of the war, cut Germany off from the Middle East, get supplies to Russia, bring Italy and the Balkan states into the war on the Allied side, and attack Austria from the south. Those who favored a landing at Salonika instead of at the Dardanelles had the same objective in view.

The attitude of the West European neutrals contrasted with the attitude of the neutrals in the East. The Scandinavians, the Spaniards, the Dutch, and the Swiss saw nothing to be gained by entering the war on either side. All of them preferred to trade with both. Individuals had their personal preferences, but no strong pro-German or strong pro-Ally party developed in any of the neutral countries of the West. These countries craved no colonies, no frontier changes, no changes in their political or social systems. All the East European neutrals, on the other hand, looked upon the war as their supreme opportunity to get more territory and make some internal reforms. Italy, lying between East and West, had the most to offer both groups of belligerents, and the most to lose. The Balkan states had less freedom of action, but they all assumed that the war could not fail to change their futures, whether they got in or stayed out. Their peoples as well as their leaders felt in their bones that the prewar *status quo* had gone forever.

The Hindenburg trinity put on the first great offensive of the new year. Early in February two German armies, soon joined by a third, started moving from East Prussia toward Warsaw, in a southeasterly direction. At the same time Conrad's Austrians moved up from the Carpathians, also toward Warsaw and the northeast. The hope was to win a series of Tannenberg victories on both fronts, culminating in a super-Tannenberg that would annihilate all the Russian armies in Poland. The plan failed. The Germans killed one hundred and ten thousand Russians and took another one hundred thousand prisoners. But they won no more Tannenbergs, and the Austrians made no headway at all. In fact, on March 22 the Austrians surrendered the besieged Galician fortress of Przemyśl to the Russians. By this time Hindenburg himself admitted that his strategy had not come off. There were too many Russians and they had too much room in which to withdraw. Although they lacked guns, ammunition, and strategic railways, their morale did not crack and their leaders showed themselves resourceful in retreat. Not only had Hindenburg suffered a setback at the hands of the Russians. The failure of his offensive restored Falkenhayn's reputation and made him the Supreme Commander in fact as well as in name.



ACME

Hindenburg and His Staff on the Eastern Front. Ludendorff stands to the left of Hindenburg, Hoffmann to the right. Note the single Austrian officer at far left

Hindenburg had attempted the impossible—and failed. Later, he admitted that he had not seen the whole strategic picture. But the memory of the “Winter Battle of Masura,” as it came to be known, never left him. “The name,” he wrote long afterward, “charms like an icy wind or the silence of death. As men look back on the course of this battle, they will only stand and ask themselves, ‘Have earthly beings really done all these things, or is it all but a fable or a phantom? Are not these marches in the winter nights, that camp in the icy snowstorm, and that last phase of the Augustow fighting, so terrible for the enemy, but the creation of an inspired human fancy?’”

• II •

THE DARDANELLES ATTACK BEGINS

WHILE HINDENBURG carried through his plan for an offensive against Russia, Churchill carried through his plan for an attack upon the Dardanelles. Admiral Carden, the British commander in the eastern Mediterranean, told the Cabinet he believed he could knock out the Dardanelles forts within a month and open the passage to Constantinople without troops. Lord Fisher made no objection, but he had his doubts. “The Dardanelles futile without soldiers,” he wrote at the time.

Kitchener commented, "We cannot make war as we ought; we can make it only as we can." He, too, endorsed Churchill's strategy.

On February 19, British warships started to bombard the Turkish forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. Fisher had grudgingly consented to let one new superdreadnought, the *Queen Elizabeth*, take part. She was accompanied by eleven obsolescent battleships—seven of them British, four of them French, all of them destined for the scrap heap in the course of the next few years. Two divisions of Australian and New Zealand troops, totaling thirty-nine thousand men, had assembled in Egypt. Twelve thousand cadets of the Royal Navy were at the

island of Lemnos in the Aegean. The French could supply a division of approximately twenty thousand men. But everything hinged on the willingness of Lord Kitchener to assign a division of British regulars, the Twenty-ninth, to go from England in case of need.

For two weeks the naval bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles went well. Admiral Carden's timetable called for the destruction of all the forts within a month; the forcing of the narrows by ships alone seemed on the way toward fulfillment. Then the troubles began. Rough water slowed down the naval bombardment. Small landing parties of marines could not gain footholds. Churchill had always said that if the expedition seemed sure or even likely to fail, it could be broken off without serious loss. The trouble was that the expedition was neither failing nor succeeding. Churchill saw victory just beyond the horizon, but Kitchener refused until March 10 to order that crucial Twenty-ninth Division to sail from the British Isles. He had understood—and hoped—that the Dardanelles could be forced by ships alone. The naval commanders had told him as much.

By early March it had become apparent that ships alone could not do the trick. Thereupon Premier Venizelos offered to bring Greece into the war on the Allied side and supply three divisions, totaling sixty thousand men, to help occupy the Dardanelles and advance upon Constantinople. But at this point the Russian Government informed the Greek



Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty

Government, "Under no circumstances can we allow Greek forces to participate in the Allied attack upon Constantinople," while the Tsar told the French Ambassador at Petrograd, "The city of Constantinople and southern Thrace must be incorporated in my Empire." This discouraged the Greeks, but it did not dampen pro-Ally enthusiasm among the Italians, Bulgarians, and Rumanians. They saw their Governments joining the Allied coalition and receiving slices of Turkey as their reward.

On March 12 the British and French Governments issued a public announcement that Constantinople would go to Russia in the event of an Allied victory. On the same day the British Government also announced the appointment of General Sir Ian Hamilton to command the land forces at the Dardanelles. Hamilton had more charm, brains, and ability than either French or Haig, the two top British commanders in France. He had seen action under the British flag all over the world, notably as Chief of Staff and right-hand man to Kitchener during the Boer War. He had accompanied the Japanese armies in Manchuria and written an engaging book on his experience. On the declaration of war against Germany he was put in command of England's Home Defense Army. French and Haig always feared that he might replace one of them in France and therefore welcomed his transfer to the Dardanelles.

Hamilton had twenty-four hours to prepare himself for his new assignment. He sat out with a 1912 handbook of the Turkish Army, a prewar Admiralty report on the Dardanelles forts, and an out-of-date map. One of his aides scouted the London secondhand bookstores for guidebooks to Constantinople. Hamilton reached Admiral Carden's flagship at the Dardanelles on March 17, but illness had forced Carden to return to England the day before and turn over his command to the less experienced, more cautious Admiral de Robeck. Hamilton did not know what transports or bases would be available. He did know that Kitchener had at last consented to send the Twenty-ninth Division out from England. This meant no landings for another month at least.

The Turkish General Staff admitted that the Allies could have landed anywhere on the Dardanelles peninsula up to February 25. Admiral Souchon, the German commander of the Turkish Navy, still expected an Allied break-through, the fall of Constantinople, a revolt against the Young Turk Government, and a separate peace between Turkey and the Allies. On March 18 Admiral de Robeck ordered the British and French warships under his command to close in on the narrows leading to the Sea of Marmora and attack the inner forts. The Turks had run out of ammunition, but one small Turkish steamer had laid a line of mines that the hasty British air reconnaissance had not seen. As a result, the French battleship *Bouvet* went down and most of the six


hundred men on board perished. Three British battleships were disabled, with a loss of sixty-three lives.

The Allied commanders assumed that shellfire had sunk the *Bouvet* but could not understand how mines had accounted for the other losses. At five o'clock in the afternoon Admiral de Robeck therefore gave the cease-fire signal, and on March 22 he informed Hamilton that he could not get through without the help of all the available troops. Responsibility for opening up the Dardanelles thus shifted from the Navy to the Army, and Hamilton sped to Alexandria, where he reshuffled his forces and prepared to put the eighty thousand men under his command ashore. But General Liman von Sanders, whom Enver Pasha had put in charge of the defense of the Dardanelles peninsula, had larger reserves. Kitchener's delay in getting the Twenty-ninth regular British Division out to the eastern Mediterranean also gave the Turks and Germans time to prepare for the action that followed.

On the Western front the fortunes of war proved equally unfavorable to the Allies. In February and March Joffre ordered new attacks in the Champagne sector, gaining five hundred yards and losing fifty thousand men. In April he lost another sixty-four thousand at Saint-Mihiel. The British attempted a smaller but equally futile attack at Neuve-Chapelle after the French press had accused them of not pulling their weight. But it took a superiority of three or four to one in manpower to launch a successful offensive, and the Allies had an over-all superiority of only five to four—two and a half million to two million men. More important, German and Austrian munitions factories were producing twice as many shells as the combined factories of Britain and France. The French were turning out five times as many shells as the British, whose infantry, in consequence, seldom had adequate artillery support except at Neuve-Chapelle, which consumed one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, or one-sixth of the entire supply then available to the troops in France. Most of the shells Britain did produce still went to the Navy, which had its hands full at the Dardanelles and elsewhere.

But the Allies did not make all the blunders during the spring of 1915. On April 22 the Germans came up with a new weapon—poison gas, containing chlorine—only to muff their opportunity as the British had muffed theirs at the Dardanelles. Germany's orthodox military leaders did not see the surprise value of poison gas and had little use for the Jewish chemist, named Haber, who had perfected it. They did not think it worth while to put large amounts of chlorine gas in shells and open a big barrage. They preferred to play it safe, in a small way, having already used it, in January, against the Russians with little effect.

When they first tried poison gas in the West, Haber had to take it in cylinders into the front lines, await a favorable wind, and then release



ACME

No Man's Land in Belgium

it on a four-mile stretch of front opposite Ypres. The green vapor that poured across no man's land sent the Allied troops staggering back, choking and bewildered. But the German soldiers who followed through were almost as bewildered as the men who faced them. Some of them did not even wear their crude respirators. No one had told them what to expect, and they did not dare advance more than a few hundred yards. Falkenhayn regarded poison gas as an experiment worth trying. He failed to foresee that its chief value lay in its surprise. Allied propagandists at once denounced this latest display of German barbarism, and the Allied leaders proceeded to develop poison gas themselves. Scientists and doctors presently described poison gas as one of the least inhumane weapons of war, and it was a weapon against which the gas mask provided almost perfect protection. Both sides resorted to poison gas after the first German attempt at Ypres, but never with decisive results.

On April 25, three days after the German poison-gas attack at Ypres, the Allies resumed their assault upon the Dardanelles. General Hamilton had sixty thousand men to put ashore on half a dozen beaches, including one on the Asiatic mainland where the French attacked. General Liman von Sanders had twenty thousand men to repel them. But the defenders had natural advantages as well as prepared positions. They could shoot down from hills and cliffs at the attackers. The Allies

barely got ashore on some of the beaches. At others they advanced inland for several miles. But after three days the defenders had dug themselves in, and the Dardanelles peninsula presently became a small-scale replica of the Western front. Hamilton's reserves of men and munitions soon ran short. The Turks, in spite of British submarines in the Sea of Marmora and the shellfire of British battleships in the Straits, managed to bring up enough men and supplies to hold their lines and force Hamilton to order two evacuations. By early May, Allied casualties totaled twenty thousand—many of them Australians and New Zealanders who had never before seen action. Neither side took any prisoners.

All this time General Liman von Sanders suffered from the same doubts that had afflicted Admiral Souchon in February. But the Allied land attack petered out for the same reason that the Allied sea attack had. Hamilton—like Carden and de Robeck before him—did not have quite enough men and equipment. He also suffered from this further disadvantage: a naval action can be broken off at any time and then resumed again at will; land action must continue, or admit total defeat and failure. General Hamilton had put his men ashore on rough beaches into rough country at a heavy cost. There could be no turning back. The drain on the limited Allied resources continued.

• III •

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DARDANELLES

THE ALLIED LANDINGS at the Dardanelles led to two political consequences. Italy hurried to the rescue of the victors, and Prime Minister Asquith brought Conservative Party leaders into a coalition Cabinet.

On April 26, the day after the landings, representatives of the Italian Government signed a secret treaty at London with British, French, and Russian representatives. The Italians agreed to enter the war "jointly with France, Great Britain, and Russia against all their enemies." In return, the Allies granted Italy the following territorial concessions: all the Italian-speaking districts of Austria up to the Brenner Pass, the city of Trieste and its surrounding province, a strip of the Dalmatian coast, the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean, a part of the Turkish Empire, and a share in any division of Germany's African colonies. The Allies also promised Italy control of Albania's foreign policy and pledged themselves to exclude the Vatican from any peace negotiations. Britain contributed a quarter-of-a-billion-dollar loan and a part of the Royal Navy to protect Italian interests in the Adriatic. The Dardanelles ex-

pedition—and the hopes it aroused—had made this offer possible and acceptable.

On May 3 Italy denounced the Triple Alliance. On May 23 came the Italian declaration of war against Austria, but no declaration of war upon Germany followed until more than a year later. Benito Mussolini, editor of the most radical of the Socialist newspapers, had already become the foremost popular propagandist for the Allied cause. The poet Gabriele D'Annunzio returned from his exile in France to urge his countrymen to build a "Greater Italy." General Cadorna, the Italian Chief of Staff, expressed his aspirations in homelier terms. He was a stiff, old-fashioned disciplinarian who loved a popular saying from the Piedmont district, "The superior is always right, especially when he is wrong." He commanded an ill-equipped, ill-trained army of a million men who faced insuperable natural obstacles when they tried to invade Austria through the Alps. King Victor Emmanuel joined them as they opened their grand assault, but they could advance only six miles. Francis Joseph's Slavic conscripts at last faced an enemy whom they could both hate and hold. Once again trench warfare brought about the familiar deadlock.

Even before Italy declared war upon Austria, the Dardanelles expedition set off a political explosion inside Britain. On May 12 the news that German submarines were approaching the Dardanelles caused Admiral Fisher to order the withdrawal of the *Queen Elizabeth*. Churchill reluctantly concurred, with the understanding that two monitors which could navigate in shallower waters and which carried big guns would serve as replacements. Two days later, however, Fisher quit his post as First Sea Lord because Churchill, in the middle of the night, had O.K.'d the transfer of several vessels from the Dardanelles to the Adriatic, noting on the order: "First Sea Lord to see after action." Churchill felt he had made a routine decision that did not justify disturbing the First Sea Lord's sleep, but for Fisher it marked the final and unforgivable impertinence of a civilian chief, young enough to be his son.

"The War Council of May 14 was sulphurous," Churchill wrote later. Kitchener claimed that he had sanctioned the Dardanelles campaign on the Navy's assurance that ships could force the passage. Now he found a large force stalemated, and Fisher had just withdrawn the *Queen Elizabeth*. Fisher replied that he had opposed the Dardanelles campaign from the start. Kitchener then gave the Cabinet a gloomy briefing on all the theaters of war, finally announcing that he would have to withhold the four new divisions he had promised to send to the Western front. He needed them at home, he said, to repel a possible invasion of the British Isles.

The War Council then turned to Churchill—"almost upon me," he wrote afterward—because he had pushed the Dardanelles campaign from the start. He recalled that neither Kitchener nor Fisher had ever openly opposed the expedition and that all members of the War Cabinet had approved all major decisions in advance. The fact was that neither Kitchener nor any of the civilians had questioned Admiral Carden's original promise to destroy the Dardanelles forts by naval gunfire alone. It was also a fact that Kitchener and the civilians had never objected, on principle, to the use of some troops to help force the passage. The trouble was that army men, navy men, and civilians all tried to do too much with too little. Churchill, still hopeful of victory, urged the dispatch of two more divisions and additional vessels of war. Fisher thereupon resigned and buried himself in Scotland.

The departure of Lord Fisher gave the Conservatives their opportunity. They had almost as much strength in the House of Commons as the Liberals and had agitated for a coalition Cabinet since August, 1914—with the backing, incidentally, of Churchill and Lloyd George. Now, Bonar Law, the Conservative leader in Commons, demanded that Asquith organize a new coalition Government, including Conservatives as well as Liberals. Fearing the vote of confidence that Law threatened and eager to remain Prime Minister, Asquith gave in. He kept Grey in the Foreign Office and Kitchener in the War Office, but he put Balfour in the Admiralty and gave other important posts to Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Lansdowne. Churchill went to the Duchy of Lancaster, a post, Lloyd George wrote, "generally reserved for beginners in the Cabinet or for distinguished politicians who had reached the first stages of unmistakable decrepitude." But Churchill remained in the inner War Council, and Lloyd George received a new post as Minister of Munitions, which gave him the power to put all of British industry on a war footing.

Much more than Fisher's resignation or the deadlock at the Dardanelles lay behind the British cabinet crisis. On May 25 Lord Northcliffe's *Daily Mail*, the most widely read newspaper in the British Isles, had brought the real issue into the open. Northcliffe attacked Kitchener by name, blaming him for the shortage of shells that doubled and trebled British casualties on the Western front. Stockbrokers solemnly burned copies of the *Daily Mail* and the *Times*, which Northcliffe also owned, on the steps of the London Stock Exchange, but Northcliffe had printed the truth and the British people and their leaders knew it. Kitchener had enjoyed and abused immunity from criticism. He had kept his own counsels. He did not show his fellow cabinet members Lord French's complaints about the losses that British troops were suffering because of insufficient ammunition—and he did not know how to go about relieving



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

British Soldiers Departing for the Front Lines in France

the shortage. From April 6 to May 14 the inner War Cabinet, which Kitchener dominated, had not held a single meeting.

Although Kitchener had lent his name and reputation to the recruiting drive for volunteers, he had far more esteem for the professional soldiers with whom he had spent his life. He had learned how to wage war cheaply in the Sudan, under the watchful eye of a pinchpenny Conservative Government. When the news of heavy British losses at Neuve-Chapelle arrived, Kitchener exclaimed, "Oh, it is terrible, terrible," hurriedly adding, "I am not thinking at the moment about casualties, but of all the shells that were wasted." Yet responsibility for the shell shortage lay at Kitchener's own door. He had dealt only with the armament firms with which the War Office had done business in peacetime. He had all weapons, all supplies, manufactured according to peacetime specifications. As a result only a trickle of war equipment came from Britain's great factories during the early months of the war.

The creation of a Ministry of Munitions under Lloyd George soon transformed the British war effort—and, indeed, British life itself. Within a month Lloyd George prepared and the House of Commons passed a Munitions of War Bill which called for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, outlawed strikes and lockouts, limited profits, and set up a system of voluntary enrollment of munitions workers. Within the week the new Government presented another bill calling for the compulsory registration of all persons of both sexes between the ages

of fifteen and sixty-five. It did not set up a compulsory "work or fight" system, but it prepared the way for more drastic measures. On September 15 Prime Minister Asquith announced that three million Britons had volunteered for military service since the outbreak of war. Casualties in killed and wounded totaled three hundred and eighty thousand, and recruiting had begun to fall off. Lloyd George persuaded Kitchener to release forty thousand newly enlisted skilled workers, but the armed services and the war industries both suffered from a manpower shortage. Although women had begun to take war jobs, production still lagged.

In October the War Office launched its last drive for voluntary enlistments, the "Derby Campaign," named for Lord Derby, who headed it. The Government announced that Britain had five million men of military age, of whom two million, two hundred thousand had not offered themselves for military service. Conscription seemed to be the only answer, and on January 4, 1916, Asquith introduced the first Military Service Bill, calling up single men and childless widowers between the ages of eighteen and forty, but exempting essential war workers, men with dependents, the physically unfit, and conscientious objectors. It took effect on March 2, and in May Parliament extended it to include married men.

Only a handful of doctrinaire radicals and religious pacifists opposed conscription, and the British press, Parliament, and public listened patiently to their arguments. Those conscientious objectors who stuck by their convictions were treated with consideration throughout the war. Labor discontent proved more of a problem. The Labor Party and the much more powerful Trade Union Congress opposed compulsory labor service, and Lloyd George respected their views. Labor felt and feared that capital was profiteering, and in July, 1915, two hundred thousand South Wales coal miners struck for higher wages. Lloyd George harangued the operators and the miners, and finally his appeal to their patriotic self-interest brought them together.

• IV •

RASPUTIN: RUSSIA'S MAN OF THE YEAR

THE MONTH of May also brought disaster to the Allied cause on the Western and Eastern fronts. On May 9 General Joffre ordered General Foch to direct an eighteen-division attack on a four-mile front between Lens and Arras. At the same time General Haig directed a similar but smaller offensive against Aubers Ridge. The expected break-through and envelopment of German forces did not come off. Instead, German



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Russian Troops Surrendering to the Germans

machine guns swept down British and French infantrymen, who lacked adequate artillery support. The French continued attacking until the middle of June, losing more than one hundred thousand men killed, or nearly twice as many men as the Germans, and an additional two hundred thousand wounded and missing. The British lost more troops at Aubers Ridge than at the Dardanelles.

At the same time the Germans opened a far more successful offensive in the East. After Hindenburg had failed in the winter campaign to annihilate the Russian armies at the northern end of the line, Falkenhayn persuaded the Kaiser to approve an attack farther south, in Galicia. Conrad, eager to drive the Russians from Hapsburg territory, put the reorganized Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army at the disposition of Germany's General von Mackensen and his Chief of Staff, von Seeckt. Mackensen had earned his first laurels commanding one of the armies under Hindenburg. Now he was put in charge of the newly formed German Eleventh Army, including eight divisions from the Western front, plus some of the Austrians. He sent all these forces, totaling one hundred and seventy thousand men, against a thirty-mile stretch of front between the towns of Tarnow and Gorlice in the Carpathian Mountains.

The Eastern front, especially on the Russian side, bore little resemblance to the front in France. Peasants continued to cultivate their crops in a peaceful no man's land a mile or more wide between the two



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

German Infantry Passing through Galicia to Join the Austrians against the Russians

armies. The Russians had no defenses in depth, few rifles, fewer machine guns, little artillery, and almost no ammunition. Artillery commanders who used more than three shells per gun per day faced the threat of a court-martial. One-third of the Russian infantrymen had no rifles; some went into battle armed only with oaken clubs. The rest often carried Mexican, Japanese, or captured Austrian equipment. The strength of Russia lay in its manpower—more than six million men in uniform—and in the vast territories through which they could retreat.

Mackensen, however, built up immense local superiority in one vital sector, tore open a thirty-mile gap between Tarnow and Gorlice, and the entire Russian line disintegrated. Throughout the summer of 1915 forty German divisions and more Austro-Hungarians hammered steadily away at the Russians, but it was the Germans who supplied the driving force. By the end of the summer the Russians had lost 15 per cent of their territories, 10 per cent of their railways, 30 per cent of their industries. In a little more than one year of war Russia had lost two million, four hundred thousand soldiers, dead, wounded, and prisoners. An estimated ten million civilians had to quit their homes. A still larger number remained under German or Austrian rule.

Mackensen's great break-through in the south led to a Russian withdrawal in the north as well. Hindenburg's armies took Warsaw on August 4 and drove the Russians from Lithuania and Kurland. In 1915

Germany had the worst harvest in forty years, but Polish farmers reaped bumper crops, most of which fell into German hands. By the end of September the Eastern front, which originally followed the bulging frontier of Poland and had bitten deep into the Austrian province of Galicia, had become a straight north-south line, almost six hundred miles long, extending from the Baltic port of Riga to Czernowitz on the Rumanian border. Yet in spite of these vast territorial losses, the Russian armies still escaped annihilation.

It was behind the lines that the summer campaign of 1915 hit the Russians hardest. In April the Tsar had made a triumphant tour among the "liberated" Slavs of Galicia, who had welcomed the Russians for driving out the alien Hapsburgs. But a few months of Russian mal-administration made the Galicians welcome the returning Austrians as they had welcomed the invading Russians the year before. When Ambassador Paléologue of France suggested to Foreign Minister Sazonov that Russian agents promote revolution in Germany—as German agents promoted revolution in Russia—Sazonov replied, "Revolution will never be one of our weapons, not even against Germany." And just as the Kaiser feared that the war would destroy all the European royal dynasties, so the Tsar commented bitterly that "the Emperor William, in starting this war, has dealt a terrible blow to the monarchical principle."

Putilov, the head of the biggest industrial and munitions combine in Russia, foresaw trouble as early as June 2, 1915, when he told Paléologue, "The days of Tsarism are numbered. Revolution is now inevitable." Three months later Paléologue informed his Government in Paris, "Until recently I could believe that revolutionary disorder could not occur before the end of the war. But that is no longer my opinion. The question is now whether at some future date Russia will cease to play her part as our ally."

Russia in 1915 presented an agonizing spectacle. The soldiers fought bravely and died stoically. The people, by and large, still believed in the war. Little popular sympathy for the Central powers existed. But the home front had let the fighting front down. In England a munitions shortage had forced a cabinet crisis. In Russia shortages of everything had begun to threaten the whole social order. All over the country people banded together in spontaneously organized committees to help the war effort. The bureaucracy, always inefficient and often corrupt, succeeded in one direction only: it maintained itself in power and prevented the leaders of the Duma and of the town and city councils from cleaning house. If the British home front needed an overhauling, how much more needed to be done on the Russian home front to keep the country in the war.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Wounded Russian Soldiers in a Polish Church

Instead of delegating more power to the people best qualified to use it, the Tsar gathered more power into his own weak hands. Yet he had no self-confidence. "I succeed in nothing I undertake. I've no luck at all," he used to say. A mystic sense of resignation sustained him. "Perhaps a sin-offering is needed to save Russia. I shall be the victim. God's will be done." Two influences—one direct, the other indirect—weakened the Tsar still further. The Tsarina kept urging him to enlarge his responsibilities. At the same time she herself—whose influence over her husband steadily increased—came increasingly under the influence of an almost illiterate religious faker who went by the name of Grigori Rasputin. The rise of the hysterical Tsarina and of the degenerate Rasputin measured the decline of the Tsarist system in which they both played such large roles.

Although the Tsarina did not have a drop of Slavic blood in her veins, she proved herself in some respects more Russian than the Russians. Her mother, one of Queen Victoria's daughters, had died when she was six years old. Her father was the German Prince of Hesse, but she received her education in the English court. She married the heir to the Russian throne while still in her early twenties. One tragedy marred a blissfully happy marriage. Their only son and youngest child suffered from hemophilia, or bleeding disease, an ailment that the women of European royal families often pass on to their sons. The Tsarevich con-

stantly suffered from bad health. Doctors kept despairing of his life. The hysterically superstitious Tsarina became convinced that only some occult power could preserve her son's life and health. And the weak-minded Tsar, who adored his beautiful, high-strung wife, accepted her belief.


Back in 1904 some of the idler members of Russian Imperial society had taken up with an illiterate hypnotist from Siberia, then in his early thirties, who called himself Grigori Rasputin. He had been born Efrim Novy, the son of a heavy-drinking horse thief, but he took the name Rasputin—a derivative of *rasputnik*, or debauchee. Young Rasputin joined a sect of one hundred and twenty thousand flagellants who held orgies and worked themselves into religious convulsions. They had no standing, even in the lax Russian Church, but called themselves monks.

In 1905 the Tsarina's own confessor, the Rector of the Theological College at St. Petersburg, introduced Rasputin to the inner court circle, saying the man spoke with "the voice of Russia." Filthy in mind and body, disheveled, bearded, and dissolute, Rasputin made conquest after conquest among the women of the court. He exploited his peasant origins and deliberately made himself as objectionable as possible. Rasputin preached—and practiced—the simple doctrine "Sin, that you may repent," but his gift of hypnotism distinguished him from other religious quacks. The wife of the Grand Duke Nicholas became one of his disciples for a while, and he soon made the acquaintance of the Tsar and Tsarina, who refused to believe the scandalous stories about him when they discovered that his hypnotic powers did the young Tsarevich more good than all the prescriptions and treatments of orthodox physicians.

Rasputin quickly became a power at court. Most members of the nobility hated and feared him, but he found influential protectors in many quarters and used his influence, in turn, in their behalf. He did not flatter the Tsar and Tsarina and thereby made still more of an impression, but in 1911 he was finally forced to leave St. Petersburg. A few months later the Tsarevich fell ill, and the Tsarina summoned Rasputin back. Again he claimed that his prayers and intercessions had saved the boy's life. Rasputin opposed the war. "There are too many dead and wounded, too many widows and orphans, nothing but ruin and tears," he declared. "For more than twenty years now we shall harvest nothing but sorrow on Russian soil." During the war his influence over the Tsarina—and through her his influence over the Tsar—steadily increased. Neither the Tsar nor his wife had any sympathy for the Germans, but some Russians suspected her loyalty because of her predominantly German ancestry. They did not know that when she

heard of the German sack of Louvain she declared, "I blush to have been a German."

The Tsarina threw herself into war work. She kept urging her husband to assume personal command of his armies. She felt no élan for victory; Rasputin's cynical fatalism poisoned her own unbalanced, mystical nature. The Grand Duke Nicholas had always despised Rasputin, and his wife had long since lost all her reverence for his gifts. In September, 1915, Rasputin got his revenge when, as a result of his influence on the Tsarina, the Tsar dismissed the



UNDERWOOD

Grigori Rasputin

Grand Duke as Chief of Staff, banished him to the unimportant Caucasus front, and assumed nominal command of all the armed forces himself. But General Alexeiev, who got the Grand Duke's former position, had the real power. Trotsky once described him as "a gray mediocrity, the oldest military clerk of the Army, worn out through mere perseverance."

Some of the practical-minded French suggested bribing Rasputin to back the Allied cause. But Rasputin was immune to the temptations of money; nor was he ever a German agent. He wanted only the power and the women that came his way in such abundance. Ambassador Paléologue understood the position perfectly, and it filled him with gloom. After he met Rasputin during the summer of 1915 he described him as having "dark, long, ill-kempt hair, stiff black beard; high forehead; broad aquiline nose. But the whole expression of the face was concentrated in the eyes—light blue eyes, with a curious sparkle, depth, fascinating. His gaze was at once penetrating and caressing, naïve and cunning, direct and yet remote."

Rasputin was not the only influential Russian who opposed the war. Count Witte, who had saved Russian diplomacy at the Portsmouth Peace Conference, and Russian credit shortly afterward, saw nothing to be gained by extending Russian power into the Balkans or annexing Constantinople. He described the Balkan peoples as Turks with Slavic names. He opposed any territorial expansion but feared that the war would create an independent Poland and several new republics in Eastern and Central Europe, thus menacing the institution of Russian Tsarism. Witte's whisperings against the war spread doubts among the

rulers of Russia, and when he died in March, 1915, the Tsar welcomed his passing as "a sign from God."

In June a Moscow mob insulted pictures of the Tsar and Tsarina and demanded the removal of Rasputin. In July the Russian press for the first time joined the anti-Rasputin campaign. The Tsar tried to conceal his weakness behind a show of strength and prorogued the Duma on September 15. An outbreak of strikes caused Russia's exiled revolutionaries to believe their hour had come. From Switzerland Lenin urged his comrades at home and abroad to spread defeatist, pacifist propaganda. If the hereditary rulers of Russia could not transcend themselves and their past, the time for a new type of leader had perhaps arrived.

Far from transcending themselves in 1915, the rulers of Russia could not protect even their own interests, not to mention the interests of their country. No one dared challenge the weak-minded Tsar when he dissolved the Duma and went to imperial headquarters to assume personal command of his armies. And as soon as he left for the front the hysterical and ailing Tsarina took over. She wrote him daily letters in misspelled, inchoate, ungrammatical English, filled with Rasputin's advice. Prime Minister Goremykin, in his eighty-eighth year, did the Tsarina's bidding in every detail. His wife, like the Tsarina, had fallen under the influence of Rasputin. Goremykin replied to all who questioned him about the progress of the war, "Ask other Ministers; the war is no concern of mine." He did, however, succeed in preventing the Duma from assembling.

The power of Rasputin still grew. For all his charlatanism and corruption, Rasputin came from a world of which the court circle knew nothing: the world of the common people of Russia. He possessed an instinctive peasant shrewdness that gave many of his judgments bite and originality. The rulers of Russia had become so remote from their people that Rasputin exerted a double power over them: the power of his hypnotic personality and the power of his peasant origins. He embodied, in twisted, perverted form, the power, the frustrations, and the desire for revenge of Russia's dumb, betrayed millions. And with what power of revenge did Rasputin's time and place in history endow him.

• V •

THE YEAR OF INDECISION ENDS

THE GATHERING crisis in Russia alarmed the Allies and excited the Germans. Kitchener feared a complete Russian collapse, followed by an overwhelming German offensive in the West. Hence his anxiety about the Dardanelles and his fear of an invasion of England. Churchill, on



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Germans Marching Belgians of Military Age to Perform War Work behind the Lines

the other hand, continued to plead for more reinforcements at the Dardanelles as the best way to open the Black Sea supply line to Russia. Lloyd George wanted to have Great Britain concentrate on munitions production. The Russians had plenty of manpower but needed a million and a half rifles, as their own factories produced only fifty thousand a month. In July, Asquith, Kitchener, and Balfour held a meeting at Calais with Joffre and the other French leaders. They decided against any more big offensives in the West that year. But within a month Joffre used the crisis in Russia to justify a reversal of this decision and prepared for a joint Anglo-French offensive at Champagne and Loos.

Once again everything went wrong—first at the Dardanelles and then in the West. On August 6 twenty-five thousand more British, French, and Australian troops landed at the Dardanelles. Again the Allies seemed on the point of knocking Turkey out of the war. And again they lacked the necessary punch. The Turks and Germans scraped together just enough men and munitions to hold firm, and by August 15 the Allies had suffered another twenty thousand casualties and defeat all along the line. A month later came the Anglo-French offensive on the Western front. The French suffered one hundred and forty-five thousand casualties at Champagne; the British, sixty thousand at Loos. German losses totaled one hundred and twenty thousand at Champagne; twenty thousand at Loos. And everywhere the German lines had held.

The Allies frittered away their strength in hopeless attacks on the Western front. They never risked enough to gain a decision at the Dardanelles. Although the Germans acted with greater decision, the end of August found their High Command in another crisis. Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Hoffmann wanted to finish off Russia as soon as possible with a new offensive at their own northern end of the Eastern front, whereas Falkenhayn wanted to break off the offensive against Russia, knock Serbia out of the war, bring all the Balkans under German control, open the road to the Middle East, and then return to the West. He had become convinced that it was physically impossible for the Central powers to annihilate a country as large as Russia and did not want to exhaust his resources seeking the unattainable.

During late August and early September Falkenhayn took ten divisions away from Hindenburg, sending some of them to the Balkans and the rest to meet Joffre's attacks. Nor was this all. "Before very long," Falkenhayn said, "the necessity was bound to arise for ten or twelve more divisions to be taken away from the army group in the north for use in other theaters of war." Hindenburg, egged on by Ludendorff and Hoffmann, refused to send any more divisions to Falkenhayn and appealed to the Kaiser, who ruled in Falkenhayn's favor, since things had gone badly for the Germans at the northern end of the front. The Austrians, in the south, had little more to show. They had lost two hundred and thirty thousand more men in the great summer offensives, and still the Russians had escaped annihilation. But the Central powers had taken more than a million Russian prisoners, whose labor proved invaluable. The Kaiser sent a jubilant telegram to his sister, Queen Sophie of Greece: "My victorious sword has crushed the Russians. They will not be able to recover for six months. Woe to them that draw the sword against me."

By early October the offensive against Serbia was ready. Falkenhayn had quietly shifted Mackensen and Seeckt from Galicia to the Balkans and had given them command of one German and one Austrian army, totaling three hundred and thirty thousand men. On September 6 General Gantshev of Bulgaria had signed an agreement with Falkenhayn and Conrad to attack Serbia the following month. On October 6 three hundred and thirty thousand Germans and Austrians invaded Serbia from the north, crossing the Danube and taking Belgrade on October 9. On the eleventh Bulgarian and Serbian troops clashed in the East, and on the fourteenth Bulgaria declared war, sending another four hundred thousand men marching into Serbia from the East. Against these combined forces of seven hundred and thirty thousand Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians, the Serbs could put only two hundred thousand in the field.

Prime Minister Venizelos had wanted Greece to go to the aid of Serbia and had already permitted the Allies to land troops at Salonika. But King Constantine felt it was a hopeless fight and ordered Venizelos to resign. The Allies had put one hundred and fifty thousand men ashore at Salonika—enough to cause another delay at the Dardanelles but not enough to fight their way through Bulgaria to the aid of Serbia. Moreover, three hundred thousand Serbs had already died of a typhus epidemic in 1915. By December, German, Austrian, and Bulgarian troops had driven Serbia's venerable King Peter, his Government, and his Army clear across their native land through the mountains of Albania. Less than one hundred

thousand survivors reached the Adriatic coast. Within the course of the year Serbia lost one-sixth of its entire population as a result of war, famine, and disease. The Serbian people had paid a heavy price for their Government's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum in July, 1914.

The outside world heard little about the Serbs, less about the Russian Jews, and least of all about the Armenian citizens of the Turkish Empire. Two hundred and forty thousand Jews served in the Russian armies, yet the Russian authorities expelled eight hundred thousand Jews from their homes in Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland, leaving them to shift for themselves. But it remained for the Turkish Government to provoke the most deliberate and cruel atrocities of all. On June 11, 1915, it ordered all non-Turkish citizens who lived near the Army's lines of supply to be deported from their homes. Parliament ratified this order, which, in practice, came down almost exclusively on the million and a half Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire.

One million of these Armenians were driven from their homes, roped together, and marched off to unknown destinations. Five hundred thousand of these million unfortunates perished. Labor battalions of men near the front were killed in cold blood. Women, children, and old people died of exhaustion, starvation, disease. Town dwellers drove transient convoys of Armenians to the open country, where they had no



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria: "I am much too popular to be treated like Tsar Nicholas." Cartoon by Raemaekers showing the fears of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria when he joined the Central powers



ACME

Homeless Children in Asia Minor

food, clothing, or shelter. The responsibility for these mass atrocities lay with the Cabinet, which ordered them, and with the local police, who carried them out. The Western world, especially the United States, continued to hear exaggerated stories of German atrocities in Belgium, vouched for by such impeccable Christian gentlemen as Lord Bryce. It heard much less about the real atrocities inflicted upon the Serbs, the Jews, and the Armenians. Truth was perhaps the first though not the only casualty of war.

The end of the year 1915 saw a routine political shake-up in France and another, more drastic, change in the direction of British affairs. In October Briand replaced Viviani as French Premier, and shortly afterward Asquith quietly curtailed Kitchener's powers. He took personal charge of the War Office while Kitchener visited the Dardanelles and in December replaced Sir John French with Sir Douglas Haig as Supreme Commander in France. Asquith also gave new powers to the Imperial General Staff and put Sir William Robertson, who had served as Chief of Staff to French on the Western front, in charge. When Kitchener returned to the War Office he found himself mainly in charge of administration and Robertson in charge of strategy. Robertson belonged to the "Western School" and had worked well with Kitchener. His re-

sistance to the pressure for side-show campaigns delighted the French, who honored him with the nickname "General *Non-non*." It described, all too accurately, the negative attitude that had made the year 1915 such a disastrous one for the Allies.

• VI •

"TOO PROUD TO FIGHT"

TO PRESIDENT WILSON, the year 1915 brought the most momentous decisions he had ever made. On January 30 he dispatched Colonel House on a peace mission to Europe after instructing his emissary not to suggest any definite terms, but to try to bring the warring Governments together. "There is not much for us to talk over," said Wilson, "for the reason that we are both of the same mind, and it is not necessary for me to go into details with you." They arranged to communicate with each other in a secret code, and House sailed aboard the British liner *Lusitania* in what one contemporary called "a blaze of secrecy."

On February 4, with Colonel House still on the high seas, the German Admiralty proclaimed all waters surrounding the British Isles a war zone, and warned that after February 16, U-boats might torpedo neutral as well as enemy shipping. As the *Lusitania* approached the Irish coast she ran up an American flag to mislead any prowling submarine—a time-honored ruse that angered the German authorities, who resented the booming war trade between the United States and the Allies and therefore regarded the United States as already their undeclared enemy. Nevertheless, Ambassador Gerard cabled from Berlin on February 15 that Germany might accept but would not initiate peace proposals. He called it "a question *almost of hours*," and on February 19 warned that the favorable moment was passing.

When House arrived in England his hosts informed him that Britain could not consider any peace proposals until after the Allies had won some military victories and begged him to postpone his projected visit to Berlin. Sir Edward Grey enchanted House with walks in the country and discussions of Wordsworth. Finally, Wilson sent a sharp cable telling the dilatory Colonel to get a move on. But Wilson himself had edged still further away from the kind of neutrality he preached back in August, 1914. On February 10, 1915, Wilson replied to the announcement of the German submarine blockade of the British Isles by warning that if a German submarine sank any American vessel in the war zone it would be a "flagrant violation of neutral rights" and that Germany would be held to "strict accountability." The German reply stressed the one-sided economic aid that the United States was shipping to the


Allies and hinted that if the United States could persuade the British to lift their blockade of Germany, the Germans would call off their submarine blockade of the British Isles. An identical American note then went to both England and Germany proposing that the British let food into Germany under American supervision and that both countries ease their blockades. The British turned the proposal down completely. The Germans replied that they must be permitted to import raw materials as well as food. What chance, under the circumstances, did Colonel House's peace mission have?

Not much. On March 1 the Allies declared a complete blockade of Germany as illegal as the German submarine blockade of the British Isles. As Britain's Lord Chancellor told Page, "We have necessity on our side; you have the law—what is left of it—on your side; we'll not seriously quarrel." Wilson at this time was reflecting, "The conditions of war have radically changed, the rules have not." Page, on March 15, 1915, saw Allied victory just around the corner with the war in its "final stage." Yet F. W. Hirst, a Liberal British journalist, told House that Wilson should take an active stand against the illegal British blockade and suggested a complete American embargo of munitions shipments to all belligerents. The suggestion horrified House as much as it horrified most of Hirst's compatriots. But it corresponded to the advice that Bryan had given since the war began.

On March 28 a German submarine torpedoed the British liner *Falaba*, which was carrying one hundred and forty-seven passengers and thirteen tons of ammunition to West Africa. One hundred and four persons, including an American citizen named Leon Thrasher, lost their lives. Lansing called the torpedoing "not only illegal but grossly inhuman" and demanded action. Bryan, on the other hand, declared that the United States must not go to war to vindicate the right of Mr. Thrasher to run the gauntlet of the German submarine blockade aboard a British vessel loaded with ammunition.

Arriving in Berlin on March 20, House found the Germans surprisingly cordial—especially Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Rathenau, the economic co-ordinator, who urged him to continue his peace efforts. He soon discovered, however, that these good people, like his good friends in Britain, did not want peace, but peace with victory, which all of them, obviously, could not have. As he cabled to Bryan, "Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it."

When House returned to London, Grey proposed "some League of Nations" in which Germany would "give and accept the same security as other nations gave and accepted." Back in the United States, ex-President Taft, President Lowell of Harvard University, and Elihu Root



The Eastern Front, 1915: Showing the line from which the Central powers began their advance in the spring and the line at which the front was stabilized in the fall. Note the towns of Tarnow and Gorlice at which the Germans scored their great break-through

had begun to agitate for a "League to Enforce Peace" that Grey, Bryce, Morley, and other British Liberals had encouraged. It combined the appeal of the Allied cause with the appeal of a just and lasting peace. It also attracted the support of those Republicans who decided to use the preparedness issue as the big stick with which to belabor Wilson.

The war drums that Theodore Roosevelt began to beat and the war boom for which J. P. Morgan was placing more and more orders drowned out the pipes of peace that Bryan still played. On April 23 Bryan wrote a long, troubled letter to the President, who had recently declared, "We are the mediating nation of the world." While Wilson gave more and more thought to mediation and a just peace, Bryan continued to fight for stricter neutrality. "If we oppose the use of submarines against merchantmen," he wrote, "we will lay down a law for ourselves as well as for Germany. If we admit the right of the submarine to attack merchantmen but condemn their peculiar act or class of act as inhuman, we will be embarrassed by the fact that we have not protested against Great Britain's defense of the right to prevent foods from reaching noncombatant enemies." Bryan could see only one possibility for the United States—"an appeal to the nations at war to consider terms of peace. We cannot justify waiting until both sides, or even one side, asks for mediation. As a neutral we cannot have in mind the wishes of one side more than the wishes of another."

Wilson took a different view. On May 1 he discussed with his secretary Joseph Tumulty a recent statement by Sir Edward Grey that Britain was fighting for America and for civilization. "He was right," Wilson commented. "England is fighting our fight and you may well understand that I shall not, in the present state of the world's affairs, place any obstacles in her way." One week later, on May 7, 1915, the German submarine *U-20* sent a torpedo without warning into the British liner *Lusitania* off the Irish coast. Within twenty minutes, presumably as the result of an internal explosion, the vessel sank. Of the 1,959 passengers and crew, 1,198 lost their lives. Of 159 Americans aboard, 124 perished. The *Lusitania* also carried 4,200 cases of rifle ammunition and other munitions of war.

When Page heard the news he cabled Wilson, "The United States must declare war at once or forfeit European respect." House, in London, foresaw a declaration of war within the month. The New York *Times* told the State Department to "demand that the Germans shall no longer make war like savages drunk with blood." President Emeritus Eliot of Harvard felt that "our flag should be somewhere in the trenches." Almost all of Mr. Thomas W. Lamont's friends along the Eastern seaboard called with one voice for war. Bryan, on the other hand, argued, "Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the

Allies and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack. It would be like putting women and children in front of an army."

Wilson did not speak his mind until Monday evening, May 11, four days after the sinking, when he addressed these words to a convention of newly naturalized American citizens in Philadelphia: "America must have the consciousness that on all sides it touches elbows and touches heart with all the nations of mankind. The example of America must be a special example, and must be an example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but because peace is a healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."

So many respectable people made such an uproar that Wilson announced that the speech did not refer to the *Lusitania*. The next day, May 12, he read his Cabinet a message Colonel House had sent him from London urging that the United States demand a German guarantee against a repetition of such an incident or face war. "If war follows," said House, "it will not be a new war but an endeavor to end more speedily the old one. Our intervention will save rather than increase the loss of life. America has come to the parting of the ways when she must determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare." All the Cabinet liked the message—except Bryan, who was appalled. He accused

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Orduna, - - Tues., May 18, 10 A.M.

Lusitania, - - Fri., May 21, 5 P.M.

LUSITANIA, Sat., May 29, 10 A.M.

Transylvania, Fri., June 4, 5 P.M.

Gibraltar—Genoa—Naples—Piraeus
S S Carpathia, Thurs., May 13, Noon

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NOTICE!

TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 22, 1915

BETTMANN ARCHIVE


Newspaper Notices Inserted by
the Cunard Line and the Im-
perial German Embassy before
the Sinking of the Lusitania

his colleagues of showing a pro-Ally bias and ignoring the President's neutrality plea. Wilson turned on him with a steely look: "Mr. Bryan, you are not warranted in making such an assertion." And Bryan apologized.

On May 13 the first *Lusitania* note, written by Wilson but signed by Bryan, went to Berlin. It asserted the "indisputable right" of Americans to travel where they pleased. It called upon the Imperial German Government to disavow the sinking, make reparation, and take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of such outrages. "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens."

The German reply, which went out on May 29, repeated the familiar arguments about the British blockade and American munitions shipments to the Allies. On May 31 the Kaiser summoned a conference of political and military leaders at imperial headquarters. Falkenhayn, speaking for the Army High Command, agreed with Chancellor Bethmann and the civilians that the submarine campaign exposed Germany to too many risks. But the navy leaders held out for all or nothing. The Kaiser then put it up to Bethmann, who declined to accept responsibility for calling off the submarine campaign. Nevertheless, a few days later Bethmann secured a secret personal order from the Kaiser forbidding any more U-boat attacks on large passenger liners. The truth was that the U-boat campaign had yielded no economic or military benefit to Germany but had given the Allied propagandists a victory of inestimable value. Ship sailings to and from the British Isles averaged about six thousand a month. Ship sinkings by German submarines totaled twenty-three in March and twenty-two in April. The Germans lacked the undersea power to make the blockade effective, and the Kaiser had quietly saved face for his blundering admirals.

Wilson's first *Lusitania* note had gone over well in Allied capitals and among the better-dressed element on the Eastern seaboard. But the American public seemed strangely unresponsive. General Wood, former Chief of Staff who had thrown himself into the preparedness campaign, noted in his diary at the time, "Rotten spirit in *Lusitania* matter. Yellow spirit everywhere in spots." The same doubts and hesitations that caused Germany's leaders to backtrack surreptitiously made themselves felt in the Wilson Cabinet. Only Secretary of War Garrison now called for a flat yes-or-no demand upon Germany. Bryan refused to sign any more notes like the first and threatened to resign. Someone proposed protesting the British trade restrictions. Wilson finally admitted that he had not made up his own mind.



ACME

The Sinking of the Lusitania: An artist's impression

But Bryan had made up his. On June 8 Wilson accepted his resignation as Secretary of State and replaced him with Robert Lansing. The strongly Democratic New York *World* said Bryan had committed an act of "unspeakable treachery not only to the President but to the nation," and for once the Republican papers agreed. But the second *Lusitania* note which went to Berlin that same day said less than the first. "The United States," wrote Wilson, "is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less sacred than the rights of humanity." But the State Department did not follow up with any new specific demands upon the German Government, nor did it threaten any specific counter-measures. And since the Germans did not have enough submarines to make large-scale inroads on Allied or neutral commerce, no more serious incidents occurred.

Again the Wilson diplomacy appealed to the majority of the American people. Bryan and the pacifists, Roosevelt and the jingoes appealed to two extremist minorities—the minority that wanted peace at any price and the minority that wanted immediate war. The issues that stirred the majority had to do with preparedness for the possibility of

war and a peace program to give the war some purpose. Senator Lodge combined the appeals of preparedness and peace in a commencement address delivered at Union College on June 9. "Nations must unite as men must unite in order to preserve peace and order," he said. "The great nations must be so united as to be able to say to any single country, you must not go to war, and they can only say that effectively when the country desiring war knows that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresistible." Roosevelt came out for a "world league for the peace of righteousness."

Within the week the League to Enforce Peace propaganda got under way. It urged that the United States strengthen its Army and Navy in order to guarantee a permanent peace system after the destruction of Prussian militarism. Wilson held aloof from the preparedness propaganda for a while, but General Leonard Wood used his position as Commanding General at Governor's Island, New York, to promote a businessman's preparedness camp at Plattsburg, where Theodore Roosevelt denounced the Wilson administration. Secretary of War Garrison, who favored a stronger policy toward Germany and more military preparedness, warned Wood that he was skating on thin ice. "I am going to skate," Wood replied. "I am out for national preparedness and I am going to get it." But Wilson, on July 21, had already announced that he would ask Congress for a preparedness plan, at once reasonable and adequate. On the same day Wilson sent a third and stiffer note on the *Lusitania* case. Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, then prevailed on his Government to delay its reply. He hoped to persuade Colonel House to persuade the British to ease up their blockade in exchange for a German back-down on the *Lusitania* issue.

• VII •

THE AMATEUR DIPLOMAT TAKES THE
PROFESSIONAL POLITICIAN IN HAND

BACK in the United States the volatile Colonel found himself getting along famously with Bernstorff until August 19, when a German submarine torpedoed the British liner *Arabic* without warning. Forty-four persons, including two Americans, lost their lives. House told Wilson he favored breaking relations with Germany at once and laying the facts before Congress afterward, but Wilson held back. Germany's Foreign Minister, von Jagow, then blurted out to Gerard that the submarine that sank the *Arabic* had violated orders not to sink large passenger vessels. This put matters in a new light, and on September 1, Bernstorff informed Lansing that German submarine commanders had been

ordered not to torpedo any more passenger liners without due warning and provision for the safety of noncombatants.

Although tension relaxed between the United States and Germany, the ties between the United States and the Allies grew closer. On September 10 an Anglo-French Joint High Commission headed by Lord Reading, former Viceroy to India and one of the great lawyers of his time, arrived in New York to float the first Allied war loan in the United States. A year had passed since the State Department had ruled against lending any money to any of the belligerents as inconsistent with the spirit of true neutrality, but now the Allies were running short of dollars and the Americans had become increasingly dependent on war orders. Thomas W. Lamont warned that the situation was equally menacing "to the British Treasury and American agricultural and manufacturing interests." On September 25 the Morgan firm signed a contract with the Reading Commission for a loan of five hundred million dollars to be floated by sixty-one New York banks, with a 2 per cent "spread" for their services. By October 14 the loan had gone over the top.

The course of the fighting in 1915 had upset the hopeful predictions of House, Page, and other American partisans of the Allied cause, who had assumed that the Central powers stood on the brink of defeat and that American intervention would quickly end the war. This false confidence reflected the equally false confidence of the Allied leaders, who had suffered nothing but defeat and disappointment while the Central powers made impressive, if indecisive, gains in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In 1914 mediation would have meant, substantially, a return to the prewar *status quo*. By 1915 the Central powers had overrun Poland and Serbia, and the Allies had secretly promised Italy extensive stretches of Turkish territory which remained securely in Turkish hands. In 1915 any suggestion of a negotiated peace therefore upset the Allies much more than it upset the Germans.

During the summer of 1915 Wilson declared that these two things seemed plain: "1. The people of this country count on me to keep them out of war. 2. It would be a calamity to the world at large if we should be drawn actively into the conflict and so deprived of all disinterested influence over the settlement." The Republicans did not call for a break with Germany or even a declaration of war; they accused Wilson of pussyfooting abroad and remaining weak at home. House therefore urged Wilson to beat the Republicans at their own game of preparedness. One evening in September, Wilson gave House another idea when he casually remarked, in the course of a brief conversation, that he "had never been sure that we ought not to take part in the conflict, and that if it seemed evident that Germany and her militaristic ideas were to win, the obligation upon us was greater than ever."

As a result of this conversation, House composed a letter to Grey proposing that the Allies accept American mediation of the war on terms favorable to themselves at a moment of their own choosing. The United States would then propose mediation to all belligerents, hinting to the Germans that the Allies would reject the offer. This, House felt, might lead the Germans to accept, but if they refused "it would be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue." Wilson approved the letter, with one "unimportant verbal change," as he called it: "It would *probably* be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue."

House could not understand why Grey took so long to answer "one of the most important letters I ever wrote," and the reply that finally arrived, weeks later, informed House that Grey had not even communicated the proposal to the other Allied Governments. "I do not see how they could commit themselves in advance to any such proposition," Grey wrote, "without knowing exactly what it was and knowing that the United States was prepared to intervene and make good if they accepted." Perhaps Grey also remembered what House appeared to have forgotten: that only Congress could declare war in behalf of the United States.

Colonel House played out his diplomatic farce behind closed doors. Only the British leaders witnessed his antics, and if they were amused they kept their merriment to themselves. Meanwhile, American pacifists performed in the full blaze of publicity and put on a show no less ridiculous than Colonel House's private performance and equally characteristic. The peace movement had always made a wide appeal in the United States, and as 1915 wore on its leaders worked out this program. They urged establishing a continuous peace conference at The Hague to which the belligerents could repair at any time and which would constantly suggest ways and means of ending the war. The idea appealed to Henry Ford, who commissioned the *Oscar II* from the Scandinavian-American Line as a "Peace Ship" to carry a large delegation of American pacifists to Europe for the purpose of setting the conference in motion and getting the troops "out of the trenches by Christmas."

Henry Ford outlined the plan to a press conference on November 24. The *Oscar II* sailed from Hoboken on December 4. By this time so many cranks had joined the rush that the serious leaders fell away. Jane Addams, the head of the famous Hull Settlement House in Chicago, pleaded illness. David Starr Jordan, President of the University of California, denied that he had accepted the invitation to go. The author of "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier" felt hurt because no invitation had come his way. Bryan decided to stay at home to fight against the preparedness movement, but he went to see the party off.



BROWN BROTHERS

Henry Ford on the Oscar II

As he made his way aboard the ship to bid Ford farewell, someone thrust a small cage containing a live gray squirrel into his hand, and he carried it solemnly about with him. One of the newspaper reporters had an impromptu wedding. There were plenty of clergymen aboard and it made a good shot for the news photographers, especially with Ford and Bryan—still carrying the squirrel—as witnesses. Bryan at last fled, shouting that he had not kissed the bride.

As sailing time drew near, Ford scattered American Beauty roses to the throng on the pier. The Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina delivered a speech in praise of Southern womanhood. Governor Hanna of North Dakota told reporters that he believed in preparedness and was making the trip in order to visit relatives in Sweden. Judge Ben B. Lindsey of Denver's famous Juvenile Court moaned, "Oh, God, why am I here?" And after the boat had left the dock, Urban Ledoux—better known as the "Mr. Zero" who handed out charity on New York's Bowery—appeared at the gangplank. He had missed the boat. For a moment he stood looking, then plunged into the river. He still didn't make it.

The ridicule that surrounded the sailing of the Ford Peace Ship not only doomed a hopeless expedition; it made a laughing stock of the whole peace movement. But there was nothing funny about the activi-

ties of German agents in the United States. In September Secretary Lansing had demanded the recall of Ambassador Dumba of Austria-Hungary after the British Secret Service revealed a report in which Dumba had referred to "the self-willed temperament of the President" and had asked his Government for funds to subsidize agitation among Austro-Hungarian workers in American munitions factories. Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, the German military and naval attachés, were then discovered to have paid saboteurs to wreck American industry, and they, too, were sent home. The egregious von Papen had written to his wife: "How splendid on the Eastern front. I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they should better shut their mouths and better still be full of admiration for all that heroism."

On November 4 President Wilson announced his conversion to preparedness and called for an army of half a million volunteers and the second largest navy afloat. In December, 1914, he had called the advocates of preparedness "nervous and excited"; now he advised preparedness "to command the respect of other nations for our rights." Theodore Roosevelt came back with a demand for conscription and an army of a million and a half. He said Wilson used "weasel words" and on almost every question "has occupied at least two almost diametrically opposite positions." To his son Kermit he had written, "I abhor Wilson," and the President's conversion to a big-navy man left him sputtering, "Wilson, with his adroit, unscrupulous cunning, his readiness to about-face, his timidity about any manly assertion of our rights, his pandering to the feelings of those who love ease and the chance of material profit, and his lack of all convictions and willingness to follow every gust of popular opinion, will be supported by the mass of our fellow countrymen." Well—T. R. spoke from experience.

Bryan, on the other hand, called the Wilson preparedness program "a challenge to the spirit of Christianity." La Follette concentrated his fire on "the Morgans, the Rockefellers, the Schwabs, the Garys, the DuPonts," and all those "who are back of the thirty-eight corporations most benefited by war orders." Wilson himself took a middle course. He said, "No thoughtful man feels any panic. . . . The country is not threatened from any quarter. . . . There is no fear amongst us." Yet he expressed "grave concern" because "voices have been raised in America which claim to be the voices of Americans" but "were partisans of other causes than that of America." He therefore called upon his countrymen "to be prepared, not for war, but only for defense." To House he wrote in confidence, "My chief puzzle is to determine when patience ceases to be a virtue."


When Congress assembled in December Wilson's caution paid off. Some Southern Democrats demanded an investigation of British inter-

ference with their cotton exports. The Senators from the industrial Northeast took a different line. "The body of an innocent child, floating dead upon the water," said Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, "the victim of the destruction of an unarmed vessel, is to me a more poignant and a more tragic spectacle than an unsold bale of cotton." But neither Lodge nor any of the other Senate Republicans openly favored war.

By this time Wilson and House began to suspect that none of the Allied statesmen wanted peace. Wilson therefore decided to send House on another mission—not to

seek peace but to "let the Allies know how our minds are running." They decided it would be a mistake for House to visit Germany unless specifically invited, and on December 22 Secretary Lansing announced that House would make his second wartime visit to Europe, this time "not on a peace mission." On the same day Ambassador Bernstorff dropped in with the embarrassing news that his Government would like to have House visit Berlin "to discuss peace upon the general terms of military and naval disarmament." Wilson remained suspicious of Bernstorff, but he also described Ambassador Spring-Rice at the time as a "highly excitable invalid." On December 28 the Colonel set forth again—still the President's trusted adviser and dearest friend.

The year 1915 had seen an important and heartening change in Wilson's private life. The fifty-nine-year-old widower had fallen in love with a pretty, buxom widow, Mrs. Norman Galt, still in her middle forties. Wilson's three daughters and Stockton Axson, his first wife's brother, all welcomed the prospect of a second marriage. They all liked Mrs. Galt, who came of old Virginia stock, her father having served many years as a judge. The Civil War had left her family with a single mule and more land than they could work. She was the seventh of eleven children and had received a rather sketchy education at home. But Edith Bolling—as she had been born—was a naturally bright and attractive woman. She had married a successful Washington businessman who had died in 1908, and she met Wilson through his cousin, Helen Woodrow Bones, who had gone to stay with him in the White House after the first Mrs. Wilson's death. Mrs. Galt joined the Wilsons



ACME

Senator Robert M. La Follette

on their summer vacation in the Cornish, New Hampshire, house of Winston Churchill, the American novelist. It was at this time that Wilson told his daughters of his engagement. He had found Mrs. Galt an intelligent and sympathetic listener. She, too, liked to hear him read Wordsworth aloud. According to "Ike" Hoover's *Forty-Two Years at the White House*, "He wrote to Mrs. Galt constantly, and the Library of Congress was put to a test to find quotations to express his feelings."

They were married on December 18, and only his political advisers objected. Wilson's dependence on feminine society had made him the easy mark for Republican gossip-mongers, who coupled his name with several Washington society women, and this marriage to a younger woman barely a year after the death of his first wife seemed to confirm the worst suspicions. But the marriage caused no public clamor. Quite the opposite. It gave Wilson himself a new lease on life and thereby added to his appeal as a popular leader. It may be doubted that the second Mrs. Wilson affected any of the decisions he made in 1915. It may also be doubted that if the first Mrs. Wilson had lived she would have approved of them all.

• VIII •

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

DURING THE YEAR 1915 neutral America became more and more closely associated with the Allies while belligerent Japan played an increasingly independent role. The longer the fighting continued, the greater the American stake in Europe became—and the stronger Japan became in Asia. The Japanese armed forces had lost no time in seizing German possessions in China and the Pacific; Japanese warships convoyed Australian and New Zealand troops to the Mediterranean. But no Japanese troops fought on European soil. They expected trouble in China at any moment.

Two years before the assassination at Sarajevo the Chinese Empire had given place to a Republic which inherited most of the unsolved problems of the Empire and developed many new ones of its own. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had led the revolution that ousted the Manchu dynasty in 1912, soon turned over the office of President—to which the Provisional Assembly had elected him—to Yuan Shih-kai, a former viceroy under the Manchus with secret imperial ambitions of his own. After Yuan Shih-kai became President of China in March, 1912, a split developed between him and the legislature. Yuan controlled the bureaucracy and the Army; he wanted to set up an all-party coalition Cabinet, whereas the National Council—or Assembly, as it came to be

called—favored a party Cabinet, representing the Republican elements exclusively. Yuan frankly doubted that a Chinese Republic could ever be made to work and used his considerable powers to establish his own hand-picked, nation-wide bureaucracy.

Late in 1912 the disillusioned creators of the Republic formed a coalition, gave it their revolutionary name of Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, and began to agitate for a “second revolution” while Yuan pushed a bill through the Assembly giving him the power to proclaim martial law. In February, 1913, Dr. Sun, who had accepted an honorary, subordinate post, visited Japan. Some of his followers objected, but the Japanese had long welcomed and encouraged Chinese revolutionaries—not because they wanted China to establish a successful modern Republic but because they wanted to promote dissension. The Chinese revolutionaries had no illusions about the motives of the Japanese. They hoped to exploit the situation one way; the Japanese hoped to exploit it another. The outbreak of war in Europe turned the scales in Japan’s favor.

During the summer of 1913 the Kuomintang led a number of scattered uprisings that Yuan quickly suppressed while Dr. Sun held aloof. On October 6 Yuan had become so strong that the Assembly formally elected him President, and a month later he ordered the Kuomintang dissolved. This unseated almost half the Assembly members and led to its complete dissolution within a year. It was at this time that President Wilson advised American bankers not to join the foreign consortium that was negotiating a loan to China. Wilson opposed the loan as an infringement of China’s national sovereignty. Yuan wanted the loan to strengthen his Army. He liked doing business with foreigners and they liked to do business with him, but he could reach agreement only with the Russians, to whom he had to grant further control over Outer Mongolia. This made the Japanese anxious. They had ironed out their own difficulties with the Russians, established themselves in Korea, and staked out a sphere of influence in South Manchuria. Now, the prospect that China might develop into a unified state filled them with alarm and threatened their own plans to become the dominant power in Eastern Asia.

As soon as the European nations fell to fighting among themselves, the Japanese took advantage of the turmoil. The Chinese, remembering how their country had become the principal theater of war between Russia and Japan ten years before, feared trouble. In early August, 1914, Yuan Shih-kai appealed to the United States and Japan—which had not yet entered the war—to persuade all the belligerents to respect the neutrality of all Chinese seas and territories. The Japanese, however, blocked this proposal by invoking the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

and ordering the Germans to get all their warships out of Chinese and Japanese waters and "to deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." When Germany refused to comply with this demand, the Emperor of Japan, whose mother had recently died, issued an Imperial Rescript declaring that the presence of German war vessels in the seas of Eastern Asia put the peace of the entire Far East in jeopardy: "It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while We are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother."

On August 24, 1914, Count Okuma, the Japanese Prime Minister, who was also President of the Peace Society of Japan, addressed a message to the American people praising Wilson's views on neutrality and stating "to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be kept as honorably as Japan always keeps promises."

Within a month Premier Okuma's Government broke its word. Japanese troops approached the German-leased territory of Kiaochow across neutral Chinese soil. The Chinese never suggested that the Japanese take over Kiaochow from the Germans; neither did the United States or any of the Allied powers. The Japanese moved in on their own, and when their flag went up at the treaty port of Tsingtao the newcomers followed the same pattern of infiltration and occupation that they had already used in Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese also took over the German-financed railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan, nine-tenths of which lay within China proper. Before 1914 ended, Japan had clearly staked out a claim to the whole Shantung peninsula, only a small part of which the Germans had ever leased.

On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister to China obtained an audience with Yuan Shih-kai. A few hours before he arrived the Japanese legation sent Yuan a document, printed on War Office stationery watermarked with battleships and machine guns, that the Minister then read in person. It consisted of twenty-one demands that fell into five groups. The first group called upon China to accept in advance any agreements Japan and Germany might reach concerning the future disposition of German holdings on the Shantung peninsula. The second group of demands entailed further concessions to Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia and further violations of the principle of the Open Door. The third group called upon China to give Japan special privileges in

some of the mines and industries of the Yangtze Valley, up to that time an exclusively British sphere of influence. The fourth group of demands forbade China to lease or cede any harbor, bay, or island to any nation except Japan.

In these four sets of demands the Japanese merely adopted and extended the same methods that the Europeans had already employed in China for almost a hundred years. The fifth and final set went much further. Here the Japanese demanded that China employ "influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs" and that "the police departments of important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese." In addition to making China a virtual Japanese protectorate, the fifth group of demands granted Japan special treatment in Fukien Province and in certain projected railway lines.

The Japanese Minister presented the demands as "friendly advice" to Yuan Shih-kai, who acted out his part with an equally straight face, remaining expressionless throughout the reading and then announcing that he needed time for reflection. The Japanese Minister warned of "complications" if Yuan revealed the content of the demands and hinted that if China did not act promptly his Government might find itself unable to restrain the Chinese revolutionaries who had found refuge in Japan. The wily Yuan soon saw to it that the twenty-one demands leaked unofficially into the press, whereupon the Japanese denied the whole story, keeping their British allies in the dark along with everybody else. Finally, one month after the presentation of the original twenty-one demands, the Japanese Government admitted that it had opened certain discussions with the Chinese and released a watered-down, summarized version of eleven of the twenty-one demands. This version omitted entirely the crucial fifth group calling for a virtual surrender of Chinese national sovereignty to the exclusive benefit of the Japanese.

At the same time that the Japanese Government presented its twenty-one demands to China, the Black Dragon Society, a secret organization of Japanese with important interests in China, issued a report that spelled out their country's real policy frankly and in detail. The preamble to this document stated that "we are not concerned so much with the question of whether it be the Dual Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerges victorious, but whether in anticipation of the further expansion of European influence in the continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to check the movement before its occurrence. Now is the most opportune time for Japan quickly to solve the Chinese question. Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come.

Not only is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in China favor the execution of such a plan. We should by all means decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be encountered in future in settlement of the Chinese question. Japan will be isolated from the European powers after the war, and will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at this very moment the Chinese question?"

The Black Dragon document went on to suggest that Japan "induce the Chinese revolutionists, the imperialists, and other Chinese malcontents to create trouble all over China." Yuan had to be overthrown, and then the Japanese "must take advantage of the present opportunity to alter China's republican form of government into a constitutional monarchy which shall necessarily be identical to the constitutional monarchy of Japan, and to no other." Both the Japanese Government and Yuan Shih-kai moved cautiously. Yuan felt he had to accept the twenty-one demands, and after a prolonged show of reluctance he succeeded in getting some concessions from the Japanese. They dropped the second group of demands, which would have made central and western China a Japanese sphere of influence. They also omitted the fifth group of demands but insisted on an exchange of notes, in which China made some of the original concessions. On May 7 the Japanese Government sent China a forty-eight-hour ultimatum demanding signature of the revised terms, and the next day China complied.

China's acceptance of the revised twenty-one demands led to a new series of negotiations between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese. They informed him they hoped to see the Republic liquidated and the Monarchy restored, even hinting that he might prove an acceptable emperor if he would take their advice. Yuan wanted to become Emperor of China and, as 1915 drew to a close, yielded to the pressure of the officials he had appointed. He declared himself willing to terminate the Republic, "accept the mandate of heaven," and found a new dynasty, but he refused to take orders from the Japanese, who at once began encouraging and financing Kuomintang leaders—including Sun Yat-sen—in a campaign of revolutionary violence. The first outbreaks took place in December, 1915—just as the Japanese press had predicted they would—in Yunnan Province.

Yuan at once backtracked, in characteristic Chinese fashion. Seeing that the rebels were receiving help from Japan, he announced in March, 1916, that he would not become emperor—he had not yet assumed the office—but would continue the Republic. Part of his statement of renunciation read as follows: "A perusal of our history reveals in a vivid

manner the sad fate of the descendants of the ancient kings and emperors. What, then, could have prompted me to seek the throne? Yet, while the representatives of the people were not willing to believe in the sincerity of my refusal, a section of the people appear to have suspected me of harboring a desire to gain more power and privileges. Such a difference of thought resulted in an extremely dangerous situation. As my sincerity has not been such as to win the hearts of the people, my judgment has not been sound enough to appraise every man. I, myself, am alone to blame for my lack of virtue. The people have been thrown into misery and soldiers made to bear hardships; further, the people have been cast into a panic and commerce has rapidly declined. When I search my heart, sorrow fills it. I am therefore not unwilling to suppress myself in order to yield to others." He then canceled his official acceptance of the throne, adding, "In brief, I now confess that all the faults of the country are the result of my own faults. Now that the acceptance of the throne has been canceled, every man will be responsible if he further disturbs the peace."

The Japanese Government feared that the Chinese Republicans would not press on for Yuan to resign, and their fears proved only too well founded. Yuan took some of the radicals into his Cabinet. He gave more power to the Assembly. He called off military attacks on the rebels. He started a series of conferences to effect a general settlement. On June 6, 1916, Yuan Shih-kai suddenly died—whether of natural causes or as the result of one of the many plots against his life no man could say for sure. Vice-President Li Yuan-hung, who had the respect of the radicals, took over. The new President also opposed the Japanese, but he lacked Yuan's experience. Meanwhile, the war in Europe had entered its bloodiest phase. If the Chinese were to protect themselves from the Japanese, they would have to do it on their own.

SUMMING UP

DURING 1915 the war's chief battles moved from Western to Eastern Europe, where the Central powers won victories that killed all hope of a negotiated peace. The great campaigns of 1914 had taken place in the West and proved so indecisive that mediation, based on a return to the prewar *status quo*, still seemed to have some chance. But in 1915 the Central powers overran Poland and Serbia and, with most of Eastern Europe under their control, saw no reason to surrender their costly, precious gains. Yet these successes served only to make the Allies more determined than ever to fight on. They still ruled the seas and commanded far greater reserve strength. The British abandoned "business

as usual" as they moved toward conscription of manpower and nationalization of production. Even in Russia defeat had not broken the spirit of the armies at the front or of the masses behind the lines; it was the rulers, above the battle, not the ruled, in the thick of the fight, who appeared demoralized. In every belligerent nation most of the people displayed more vitality and more virtue in war than they had ever had a chance to show in peacetime. Nevertheless, the purpose of the fighting remained negative, the outcome uncertain, the end far away.

Although the year 1915 brought no decision in a military sense, the fact that so much action had taken place in the East put the whole war in a new, broader perspective. In the summer of 1914 a murder in the Balkans had provided the spark that set all Europe on fire. Austria and Russia then dragged their reluctant Western allies into a general conflict. Germany, France, and England had greater material capacity and greater moral determination to wage war than either Austria or Russia, yet neither side could overwhelm the other in the West; both sides had too much to lose to consider capitulation. Before 1914 ended, the deadlock on the Western front had become complete.

Eastern Europe presented an utterly different picture. There, too, deadlock had set in, but it was the result of weakness, not strength. Neither Russia nor Austria had the power to knock the other out, whereas the Germans several times routed the Russians by diverting only a fraction of their forces to the East. But the Germans never diverted quite enough strength to the East to knock Russia out of the war, just as the Allies refused to divert enough strength to the Dardanelles to knock out Turkey and get supplies through to the hard-pressed Russians.

Self-preservation being the first law of nature, especially in time of war, the French concentrated almost all their efforts on the Western front. They had lost so much to the Germans in 1914 that they dared not risk losing any more the following year. The British regarded the Channel ports as their first line of defense against invasion; they also felt that they had to subordinate their strategy to the strategy of the French, who continued to bear the heaviest sacrifices. The Western Allies had forgotten—perhaps they had never really known—the risks and the losses that the Russians had taken in 1914 when their costly invasion of East Prussia had done so much to save both Paris and the Channel ports. Britain and France had done their best to avenge the rape of Belgium; they had done less to avenge the rape of Poland and Serbia. Yet the Serbs, the Poles, and the Russians had not only suffered heavier losses than the British, the French, and the Belgians; the conditions under which the people of Eastern Europe had lived in time of peace had caused the war to come when and as it did. Any just,



ACME

Joffre, Poincaré, and King George V Visit the Western Front

durable peace, any peace worth fighting for, required a completely new deal throughout Eastern Europe.

Military strategy and political strategy always go together. The trouble, during 1915, was that professional soldiers shaped the grand strategy of both England and France, and their ignorance of Eastern Europe made them see the whole war in false perspective. In England, Lloyd George and Churchill saw the importance of the war in the East; so did Briand in France. But the generals, with their narrow, specialized vision, had the last word. Lloyd George, in his *War Memoirs*, pointed out some of the opportunities on which the Western powers had failed to capitalize by throwing so much of their energies into the fighting in France: "Had we sent to Russia half the shells subsequently wasted in these ill-conceived battles and one-fifth of the guns that fired them, not only would the Russian defeat have been averted, but the Germans would have sustained a repulse by the side of which the capture of a few bloodstained kilometers in France would have seemed a mockery. What more? Austria would have been crumpled up. Only prompt transference to the Austrian front of several divisions of German infantry and several batteries of German guns from France could have saved the Dual Monarchy from utter collapse. Had Russia been victorious, then Bulgaria would have entered the war on the Allied side. A Balkan Federation—including Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, and

perhaps Bulgaria—on the South, and an Italian Army on the West, with a victorious Russia on the East marching against a routed and divided Austria, might have ended the war in 1915.”

Britain and France, however, preferred to treat the war in the East as a secondary affair and did far less to save Russia than to save themselves. Their statesmen recognized much more clearly than their soldiers that they had made a momentous political decision and had played into the hands of those Pan-Germans who saw the Teutonic peoples bringing civilization to the backward Slavs, the lowly Balkans, and the outcast peoples of the Middle East. By the same token, the Allied war strategy made the Russians and the other Slavic peoples feel that Western Europe had let them down.

1916

The war's greatest land and sea battles bring new leaders to power in Germany and England, weaken the Russian and Austrian Empires, and bring the United States closer to war.


PREVIEW

DURING the first half of 1916 the German Army's attack on Verdun and the German Navy's attempt to surprise the British fleet at Jutland both failed. General Brusilov's Russian offensive against Austria succeeded. But a quick switch in the German High Command and a rash Allied offensive on the Somme made the tide flow the other way. Rumania entered the war on the Allied side only to suffer immediate and total defeat. An Allied offensive from Salonika got nowhere, but the British launched a successful little campaign against the Turks in Mesopotamia. By the end of the year Lloyd George had ousted Asquith as British Prime Minister; Hindenburg and Ludendorff had pushed Germany's civilian leaders into the background. Pro-German leaders gained ground in Russia. On the death of Emperor Francis Joseph, his successor, Emperor Charles, made a futile effort to get Austria out of the war. President Wilson's notes to Germany postponed a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare until 1917 and kept the United States neutral. Wilson won re-election on the slogan "He kept us out of war."

• I •

THE GREATEST BATTLES IN HISTORY

BEFORE 1915 ended the commanders of all the warring powers had laid their military plans for the coming year. Early in December the chiefs of the Allied armies met at Chantilly, under the chairmanship of General Joffre, and agreed to launch offensives on all fronts on or about July 1. By that time the British expected to have Kitchener's new, volunteer armies, totaling some two million men, ready for action.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Crown Prince Frederick William of Germany and Two of His Officers at the Western Front

plus a conscript army of almost equal size, in training, and the Russians expected to have received more than a million rifles from the United States and Japan. The Central powers had done well in 1915 because they had prepared themselves more thoroughly for war and had coordinated their strategy more closely than the Allies. Would 1916 tell a different story?

Not if the Germans could help it. On Christmas, 1915, General von Falkenhayn, the Supreme German Commander, submitted a memorandum to the Kaiser outlining his proposed strategy. "The history of the English wars against the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Napoleon is being repeated," Falkenhayn argued. He described England as Germany's "archenemy" and the French, Russian, and Italian armies as English "weapons." The 1915 fighting had paralyzed Russia; Italy did not count; only France remained. "France has arrived almost at the end of her military effort. If her people can be made to understand clearly that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, the breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Kaiser and His Staff Plotting Field Maneuvers, 1916

out of her hand." Falkenhayn also perceived, before the British leaders themselves knew it, that the war was becoming a war of exhaustion which the Germans must either win soon or eventually lose.

Falkenhayn recognized that orthodox military strategy could not break the deadlock on the Western front. But he believed that the French, with their fanatical patriotism, could be forced to destroy themselves. The French, argued Falkenhayn, regarded their great fortress at Verdun as the keystone of their defenses. Here, throughout history, Gaul had fought Teuton, and to hold Verdun the French would make senseless, irrational sacrifices, bleeding themselves white until their morale cracked. Verdun stood at the point of a salient that threatened German communications; its narrow supply lines lay exposed to German artillery fire. With far better supply lines than the French, with his objective already half surrounded even before the attack began, Falkenhayn counted on his mighty howitzers to hammer the French armies to pulp against the anvil of Verdun. And he still called only for a limited offensive, with the result that the Crown

Prince, under whose command the battle was fought, begged vainly for more troops.

The Kaiser approved Falkenhayn's plans and agreed to shift the war's center of gravity back from East to West. Germany's "Easterners" feared the worst. The men around Hindenburg had even opposed the Serbian campaign in the autumn of 1915, arguing that Russia could have been finished off then and there. The decision to attack Verdun irked them even more, but Falkenhayn was riding high on the strength of his 1915 triumphs; Hindenburg remained in the shadows because of his indecisive winter campaign against the Russians.

Winston Churchill, in *The Unknown War*, later outlined the opportunities Falkenhayn missed and the risks he ran. According to Churchill, if Falkenhayn had pursued an Eastern rather than a Western strategy in 1916, Rumania would have joined the Central powers and thrown twenty more divisions against Russia. Germany would have controlled the entire Balkan peninsula and would have occupied the Russian Ukraine. The Black Sea would have become a German lake. "Germany, cut from the oceans by the British Navy, would regain in the vast Continental spaces the means of continued life and power. Persia, Afghanistan, and India would all in succession be violently excited by the rumor and fame of distant but steadily approaching legions. Great Britain, whose war direction had now sunk to its lowest ebb, would be thrown on the defensive throughout the East and forced to divert to the plains of India divisions now preparing for the fields of France."

Events in 1916 moved with mounting speed, widening scope, and awful simplicity. On February 21 the armies of the German Crown Prince, acting under Falkenhayn's orders, opened the bombardment of Verdun. Fortunately for the French, the Germans did not attack on a wide front and thus lost their best chance of breaking through. For the French had assumed that no fortifications could stand up against German siege guns and had therefore dismantled the forts outside Verdun and used them as shelters. Also, the imperturbable Joffre refused to take the assault on Verdun too seriously and let several days pass before appointing the equally stolid General Pétain to take over that sector. On January 16 he had remarked, "I ask only one thing, that the Germans should attack, and should do so at Verdun."

The Germans soon revealed their strategy, and as fast as they poured men and munitions against Verdun, the French poured more men and munitions back. The forts outside Verdun held out longer than anyone had expected. Some French machine-gunners always survived the heaviest German artillery attacks and mowed down the German infantry as German machine-gunners had mowed down the British and French the year before. The French artillery also got the range of the



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Results of German Bombing of Verdun

German artillery, knocking out all the biggest howitzers and exploding a German artillery park that contained four hundred and fifty thousand pieces of heavy shell ammunition.

Between late February and early July the French and German Armies fired twenty-three million shells at each other around Verdun. By the end of the year each side had suffered about three hundred and fifty thousand casualties—dead, wounded, and missing. Three lines scribbled by a French soldier on the wooden casing of a bomb shelter outside Verdun expressed the spirit of the defenders:

*Mon corps à terre
 Mon âme à Dieu
 Mon cœur à France.*

[My body to dust; my soul to God; my heart to France.]

The Germans could not crack Verdun, or the determination of the French to hold on. By July 1, Falkenhayn also found himself in trouble on other fronts. General Conrad, the Austrian commander, had quarreled with Falkenhayn's decision to return to the West and proceeded to avenge himself on the treacherous Italians. He refused to let Falkenhayn have any of his heavy artillery for use against Verdun, but sullenly

agreed to hold the Galician front which Falkenhayn had stripped of its German troops. Then, on May 15, Conrad suddenly launched a great, private offensive of his own against the Italians, heading for Verona through the Trentino mountains. The King of Italy appealed to the Tsar of Russia for an offensive in Galicia.

The Tsar at once came to the aid of his Italian ally. The Russians had agreed at the Chantilly meeting to launch a big offensive near the village of Krevo, at the northern end of their front, at least two weeks before the offensive that the British planned to launch along the Somme on July 1. But the Tsar, who had come to the aid of his French ally at the time of the Battle of the Marne, again ordered his armies to rush into the breach. Scrapping the original plan for an offensive at Krevo, he told General Brusilov, who commanded the Galician sector of the Eastern front, to attack as soon as possible. On June 3 Brusilov's artillery opened fire on a two-hundred-mile front extending from the Pripet marshes to the Rumanian border, and thirty hours later more than a million infantrymen surged forward. The Austrian line collapsed. By the end of June the Russians had taken two hundred thousand prisoners, many of whom surrendered gladly to their Slavic cousins. In killed and wounded Austrian losses totaled an additional two hundred and fifty thousand.

Conrad soon had to call off his offensive against Italy and subordinate himself completely to the German High Command, but not before fourteen British and five French divisions launched their long-projected offensive at the Somme, one hundred miles north of Verdun. Only six months of the year 1916 had passed, and Falkenhayn's strategy of victory at Verdun had already failed. He ordered the attacks to slacken and prepared to hold his threatened lines elsewhere, whereupon the military tide shifted in Germany's favor. Fifteen German divisions from the West stiffened the Eastern front. Russian casualties soared and within six months of the opening of Brusilov's offensive totaled one million.

The Allied offensive on the Somme proved as futile as the German attack on Verdun, and more costly to the attackers. During the month of July alone the British suffered almost two hundred thousand casualties; by the end of the year the figure reached half a million. French casualties at the Somme came to more than three hundred thousand, and they lost almost another one hundred thousand men counter-attacking at Verdun. Nevertheless, the Allied position still looked so strong that on August 27 Rumania, following the unhappy example of Italy, rushed to the aid of the victors and declared war on the Central powers.

This finished Falkenhayn, but within another three months it almost

finished Rumania, too. Rumania's entrance into the war stunned the Kaiser and the German people. Only a year before Bulgaria had joined the Central powers, and the fate of Serbia showed who ruled the Balkan roost. Yet the Rumanian Government, never one to put idealism before interest, apparently counted on an Allied victory. Allied morale soared, while the Catholic South German Princes and the Catholic Emperor of Austria threatened to sue for a separate peace unless the Kaiser dismissed the disastrous Falkenhayn. The Kaiser had already begun seeking Hindenburg's advice—so openly, in fact, that Falkenhayn refused to appear with his rival at the Imperial dinner table. The Rumanian declaration of war decided matters. The Kaiser appointed Hindenburg in place of Falkenhayn as Chief of Staff and gave Ludendorff the new title of "First Quartermaster General" with authority equal to Hindenburg's. Falkenhayn was put in charge of operations against Rumania.

Hoffmann, who remained in charge of the Eastern front, wrote in his diary at this time: "When one gets a close view of influential people—their bad relations with each other, their conflicting ambitions—one must always bear in mind that it is certainly much worse on the other side among the French, English and Russians, or one might well be nervous." And again: "The race for power and personal position seems to destroy all men's characters. I believe that the only creature who can keep his honor is a man living on his own estate; he has no need to intrigue and struggle—for it is no use intriguing for fine weather."

Again the war took an unexpected turn. While the bulk of the Rumanian Army marched westward to liberate Transylvania from Hungary, Mackensen, Germany's most experienced master of the lightning campaign, attacked from the south with a mixed army of Bulgarians, Germans, and Turks. At the same time Falkenhayn, with an Austro-German army, closed in from the north. The two commanders met in the Rumanian capital of Bucharest, which fell on December 6. The retreating Rumanians had ruined most of their oil wells and burned some of their grain. The remains of their Army and Government withdrew to the northeast, where the Germans did not follow: they had shipped enough loot from the rest of Rumania to get themselves through the bitterest winter of the war. If Rumania's entrance into the war marked a diplomatic defeat for Germany, the campaign that followed marked a military—and economic—victory.

Neither the Germans nor the Allies could take much satisfaction in the results of the 1916 campaigns on the Western front. During the first part of the year the French at Verdun made good on their defensive boast "*Ils ne passeront pas.*" Before the year had ended, they made equally good on their offensive boast "*On les aura,*" and retook the ground they had lost. The Allied offensive at the Somme then proved



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Crown Prince: "We must have a higher pile to see Verdun, father." Cartoon by Raemaekers

as disappointing to the Allies as the fighting at Verdun had proved to the Germans. The Allied attacks on the Somme fell into four separate phases, lasting from July 1 until November 18. At the Somme the Allies showed they had the manpower, the material, and the morale to attack the Germans. At the Somme the British became equal partners with the French on the Western front. But the fighting there prolonged the deadlock. Allied losses at the Somme also exceeded German losses by more than two to one. On the first day the British lost 60 per cent of the officers and 40 per cent of the men who took part in the attack. Casualties for that one day totaled sixty thousand.

Yet the Allies missed a great opportunity on the Somme, for it was there that tanks first saw action. They had been developed by Colonel Ernest Swinton, of the British Army, who had written popular fiction under an assumed name and the official British history of the Russo-Japanese War under his own. Swinton derived his inspiration from Benjamin Holt, the American inventor of the caterpillar tractor, which first revolutionized agriculture and then revolutionized war. But Holt had nothing to do with transforming the tractor into the tank. Colonel Swinton hit upon that idea in 1914, when he became convinced that caterpillar tractors equipped with machine guns could break the deadlock on the Western front. Colonel Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense, encouraged him, but the almighty Kitchener turned thumbs down. Winston Churchill then saw the tank memorandum that Swinton had prepared for the Cabinet and undertook, on his own responsibility, to get Swinton the necessary government funds for experimental work. It took Swinton almost two years to have sixty tanks made and their crews partly trained. They appeared so promising that hundreds of better models had gone into production and more crews were being trained to man them. But the Somme offensives had gained so little ground and cost so many lives that Marshal Haig, eager for a quick, spectacular success, threw the sixty early-model tanks and their green crews against one small sector. Only


eighteen of them got into action, and they moved at the speed of a walk and lacked the fire power and armor of the improved models. The history of the Germans' premature use of poison gas repeated itself. The tanks scored a local break-through but could not follow it up. The secret was out. The British tank program slowed down. The Germans started making a few tanks themselves. Another year and a half passed before the orthodox soldiers who directed the British war effort permitted the tank to come into its own.

• II •

"SIDE-SHOWS" AND THE WAR AT SEA

THE YEAR 1916 also witnessed two side-show campaigns on land and the only major naval engagement of the entire war. The side-shows took place in Greece and Mesopotamia; the naval battle took place off the Danish peninsula of Jutland.

Early in January the British evacuated the Dardanelles with negli-




The Western Front, 1916: Arrows indicate the points at which the Germans launched their vain assault on Verdun in February and the points at which the British launched their vain assault along the Somme in July

gible losses although the entire campaign had cost them more than one hundred thousand casualties. They had recalled General Ian Hamilton in October, 1915. Of his successor, General Munro, Churchill said, "He came, he saw, he capitulated." Some of the troops and equipment went to near-by Salonika, where the anticlerical French General Sarrail built up a force of four hundred thousand French, British, Italian, Russian, Greek, and Serbian troops by the summer of 1916. The Rumanian Government had agreed to declare war on the Central powers on condition that General Brusilov's Russians in Galicia and General Sarrail's mixed force at Salonika open joint, simultaneous offensives. But the Brusilov offensive went ahead so fast that Rumania rushed into the war before Sarrail could strike, and after receiving orders to attack on August 10 he delayed another month. Sarrail and the British commanders hated each other almost as much as they hated their enemies, especially after Sarrail set himself up in luxurious quarters where he lived in open, unashamed sin with his mistress. When the troops under his command finally moved he could muster only fourteen divisions against twenty-three divisions of Bulgarians and Germans. Only the Serbs, who attacked at the western end of the line weeks ahead of Sarrail, made any progress. Bulgarian troops took the Greek seaport of Kavalla and a whole Greek division at the eastern end of the line. The British and French in the center did well to hold their own.

After the setbacks at the Dardanelles and Salonika, the British snatched victory from defeat in Mesopotamia. Their performance hardly confirmed the judgment that Grey arrived at years later when he wrote in his autobiography: "The chief mistakes in strategy may, in my opinion, be summed up in the two words 'Side Shows.'" Back in 1914 a single division of Indian troops had occupied Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, thus assuring the British Navy of an uninterrupted supply of petroleum from the near-by oil fields. A second Indian division strengthened the British grip on this region, and early in 1915 General Nixon, who had command of the entire area, ordered General Townshend to proceed up the Tigris River. The first hundred miles were the easiest: Townshend reached Amara with one division while another division moved up the Euphrates. Encouraged by this success, Townshend continued another eighty miles to Kut-el-Amara, where he again routed the Turks and drove them halfway to Bagdad—still another hundred miles upriver. But he had overextended himself. The Turks hit back. Townshend withdrew to Kut-el-Amara. The Turks closed in and on December 8, 1915, had the British surrounded. On April 29, 1916, Townshend surrendered.

Sir William Robertson, the new Western-minded Chief of the Imperial General Staff, favored a defensive strategy in Mesopotamia and



The Battle of Jutland: The progress, in time and space, of the only major naval engagement of the war

a withdrawal to Amara. But General Maude, whom Robertson himself had sent out to Mesopotamia, soon became convinced that he could not only take Kut-el-Amara but could reach Bagdad, too. He spent most of the year 1916 making his preparations, and on December 12 his advance began. Maude entered Bagdad on March 11, 1917, after one of the most skillfully and economically contrived offensives of the war. The victory meant little in a military way, but it revived British prestige in the Middle East, especially with the Arabs, and sent Turkey's diminishing prestige into a corresponding decline.

The indecisive land battles of 1916 cost more lives than the decisive battles of two years before. It was a different story at sea. There the British and the Germans both hoped for a fight to the finish, but the Germans avoided the showdown that the British sought. In January, 1916, Admiral von Tirpitz had his aggressive protégé Admiral Scheer put in command of the High Seas Fleet. On May 31 Scheer sent a scouting force, under Admiral Hipper, to demonstrate off the Norway coast while he and the main fleet followed fifty miles astern. It was the first time since the outbreak of war that the Germans had put the bulk of their Navy to sea, and Scheer hoped that Hipper would lure part of the British Grand Fleet into action and that he could destroy it in a surprise attack. He had no intention of fighting a naval "battle of annihilation." He knew he lacked the strength for that.

Admiral Jellicoe, the Commander of the British Grand Fleet and "the only man," as Churchill said, "who could lose the war in an afternoon," accepted the German challenge. He brought the Grand Fleet out from Scapa Flow and ordered swaggering Admiral Beatty, an expert huntsman and polo player, who liked to be photographed with his hat askew, to bring six battle cruisers and four battleships out from Rosyth, near



BROWN BROTHERS

"The Only Man Who Could Lose the War in an Afternoon," Admiral Jellicoe

Edinburgh. The two fleets were to meet near the expected battle area, about one hundred miles west of the Danish peninsula of Jutland and almost two hundred miles northwest of the German base at Helgoland. The British, through their excellent intelligence service, knew that Scheer as well as Hipper had put to sea and they felt confident of victory. Britain had 37 capital ships to Germany's 23; they had maneuvered continually for almost two years while the Germans had remained in port.

Total confusion followed. The two main battle fleets never did close on each other, but Hipper's scouting force disabled Beatty's flagship and two of his battle cruisers and got away almost unscathed. The British did not see their own flag signals in the fog. The Germans showed far better marksmanship. But both Jellicoe and Scheer missed opportunities to destroy each other—not through lack of courage or ability but because neither commander could get his own vessels where he wanted them or discover what the enemy was up to. Several exchanges of fire occurred, but the hasty German withdrawal was matched by the cautious British attack.

The Battle of Jutland ended with the British losing three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, and eight destroyers with a total of 6,097 officers and men to German losses of one battleship, four light cruisers, five destroyers, and 2,545 officers and men.

German propagandists claimed a great victory. Later, however, Tirpitz wrote, "The countries that were still neutral had lost their belief in our victory." Scheer himself informed the Kaiser that the only hope for Germany lay with the submarine, not with his own High Seas Fleet. The official British naval historian declared, "Nothing in the two years had done more to change the position in England's favor; for a possibility which had before been only demonstrable was then actually demonstrated." B. H. Liddell Hart did not go nearly so far as that. According to his *History of the World War*, "The worst fault of the Jutland battle is that it was ever fought." Nevertheless it had its compensations and advantages. It jolted the complacency of the British Navy and called the attention of the British people to the importance of the war at sea. And though the German people took what satisfaction

they could from the "box score," Jutland left Britannia more than ever the mistress of the seas, and the German fleet more securely bottled up.

Within a week British prestige and morale suffered an unmistakable reverse, also at sea. On June 5, three days after the British Admiralty announced the truth about Jutland, the cruiser *Hampshire*, carrying Lord Kitchener on a mission to Russia, struck a mine and sank off the Orkneys. The War Minister and most of his staff perished. The loss of Kitchener, so shortly after the losses at Jutland, sobered the British people still more, but it may well be that Kitchener went at the right time. During the better part of two difficult years the British people looked to him and him only as the symbol of endurance. The armies that he had created were about to go into action and assume an ever-increasing share of the burden on the Western front. But Kitchener himself had played out his role. Lloyd George had taken over the home front. Robertson had taken over military strategy. Not until the latter half of 1916 were the British people to learn—what their French and Russian allies and their German enemies already knew—that the war had consigned a whole generation to death.

• III •

THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR

WHAT the human mind cannot grasp words cannot describe. All of us know from real life and great literature what pain and tragedy can mean. A mother's loss of her son, a wife's loss of her husband, a girl's loss of her father, a man's loss of his health, his legs, his sight, his mind—nothing moves us so deeply as the plight of an individual human being. "There, but for the grace of God, go I," we say, identifying ourselves with the victim. To undergo, to witness, or even to read about one such tragedy is an all-consuming experience. But the individual human being has a limited capacity for suffering; after a certain amount of nervous tension, our minds give way. Our capacity to sympathize with the sufferings of others is limited, too. Even the most humane doctor cannot suffer and bleed for all his patients, nor can he minister to more than a tiny fraction of the human race. When suffering extends beyond our immediate and intimate circle, it has almost no meaning.

It therefore seems futile to try to describe the ever-widening agonies of the war years. In 1914 the British got off comparatively easily. They suffered "only" about one hundred thousand casualties. Multiply one tragedy by one hundred thousand and the imagination breaks down.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Relatives of British Soldiers Awaiting News Outside the War Office, London

Yet the French suffered eight hundred and fifty thousand casualties during the first three months of the war, and Russian casualties ran at the rate of a million and a half every six months through 1914, 1915, and 1916. By the end of 1916 the Germans had lost almost one million killed; the Austrians more than half as many. British casualties suddenly increased as two million more men went into action during the summer months. This meant that all the warring powers were suffering casualties on such a scale that almost every family in almost every European country had either lost at least one of its members or lived in the perpetual shadow of fear.


In 1914 and 1915 the war had killed its millions, but it had also spared its millions. The campaigns of 1916 spared nobody. Individual tragedy became collective tragedy. Because the war hit every family, it changed the lives of whole nations. It became more difficult than ever to grasp the scope of so extensive a disaster, but it did become possible to reach certain judgments and make certain generalizations that did not apply in either 1914 or 1915. By 1916 the war had become the one universal, overriding fact in the life of Europe. Long before 1916 the war had already changed the surface pattern of Europe's life. Governments fixed prices and wages, rationed necessities, controlled labor. Governments also used censorship and propaganda to control the minds of men. But all these things happened on the outside. What made the year 1916 different from the years that had gone before was that nobody could escape the war's personal, intimate impact any more. Civilians felt that if they matched the sacrifices of the soldiers, perhaps peace might come sooner. Although many—perhaps most—of the citizens of the Austrian

and Russian Empires had little faith in their countries' war aims or their countries' leaders, they wanted to help their men at the front. Although they did not accept the war, although they did not believe in victory as the people of Britain, France, and Germany did, they were no less ready to make sacrifices in behalf of a common enterprise larger than themselves.

The convulsions that seized the fighting fronts produced convulsions of other kinds at home. The French Chamber of Deputies became more and more agitated about the heavy losses at Verdun and increasingly hostile toward General Joffre, who had ignored the reports of his own intelligence service predicting the German attack. General Galliéni, Briand's War Minister, vainly tried to overrule Joffre in March and died two months later after quitting his post in disgust. The Chamber meanwhile remained dissatisfied, and at a secret session in June someone suggested removing Joffre. Nobody yet dared to force the issue, and at a second secret session in July, Albert Thomas—a popular labor leader who had become Minister of Munitions—reported that the war had taken a turn for the better. Briand received an almost unanimous vote of confidence. Only six Senators—among them the intransigent Clemenceau—voted against him.

The end of the year saw Briand as firmly entrenched as ever and the General Staff on the defensive. By midsummer France had already survived the worst, but the failure of the Allied offensive on the Somme and the collapse of Rumania brought the year to a gloomy close. The pressure for Joffre's removal increased, and President Poincaré finally intervened with a decree subordinating Joffre to the War Minister and appointing young General Nivelle, who had made a good record at Verdun, commander of the armies of the north and northeast. On December 26 Joffre resigned as Commander in Chief and was at once created a Marshal of France.

The year 1916 did not threaten Britain's national existence as it threatened the national existence of France. It did, however, set the stage for Lloyd George to head a political revolution of sorts and for Ireland to attempt a national revolution. The Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons had supported the war and agreed to postpone their home-rule program for the duration. The people of Ireland also felt a certain fear of Germany, a certain loyalty toward Britain, and perhaps a certain sympathy for the people of Belgium, Serbia, and other victims of aggression. In any case, one hundred and thirty-four thousand Irish volunteers served under the British flag. Had the British allowed them to serve under their own flag, more might have joined up. But Irish support of the war weakened when Conservative leaders declared that home rule had become a dead issue.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

German Zeppelin Returning from a Raid on Britain

In 1914 most of the population of Ireland wanted home rule; only the Protestant minority in the North favored continued union with Great Britain. A minority of Catholic Nationalists supported the extremist Sinn Fein ("Ourselves Alone") movement until wartime prosperity gave the Sinn Feiners the funds they needed to spread propaganda and purchase arms. Sir Roger Casement, an Ulster Protestant and former British consular official whose humane work for the natives of Africa had earned him a knighthood, had taken up the Sinn Fein cause before the war. During the war he made contact with the Germans and arranged to have a boatload of arms landed on the Irish coast, shortly before Easter, 1916. He accompanied the vessel in a German submarine and went ashore in a collapsible boat, whereupon the British intercepted both the arms and Casement. In spite of this misadventure and against the warnings of many Irish leaders, the Sinn Feiners staged an uprising in Dublin on the Monday after Easter, seized several government buildings, and set up a Provisional Irish Republic. Within a week some twenty thousand British troops had crushed the little Sinn Fein army of two thousand men and captured the ringleaders. Fifteen of them were executed and Sir Roger Casement was hanged for treason.

While British casualties on the Western front ran into the thousands,

even on "all quiet" days, British and Irish casualties during the Easter Week Rebellion ran only into the hundreds. Yet the results of this fighting—nearly all of which took place in Dublin—led to immediate, sweeping results. Prime Minister Asquith paid a quick visit to Ireland. Sinn Fein stock shot up. A week of local violence had made a greater impression on the British than years of peaceful, Parliamentary pressure. The executed leaders and Sir Roger Casement became martyrs. Irish-American sentiment ran more strongly than ever against England. Order was restored, but little else in Ireland remained the same.

Asquith's conciliatory attitude helped to smooth matters over in Ireland, but his larger usefulness as a war leader steadily declined. The judicial temperament that made him the ideal Prime Minister during a period of transition handicapped him in time of war. He had also retained several Liberal colleagues with more leisurely tolerance than martial spirit. In January, 1916, Sir John Simon resigned as Home Secretary because he opposed conscription. Sir Edward Grey, whose failing energies affected his eyesight, knew how to deal with Colonel House, but he proved less effective when pitted against professionals. The Liberals had got the war off to a good moral start, but they could not follow through without the aid of the more aggressive Conservatives, and Asquith's first coalition Cabinet soon proved an ineffective makeshift.

General Sir Henry Wilson, commander of the Fourth British Army Corps in France and former chief liaison man between the British and the French, told Lloyd George in November that "the present Government stank in the nostrils of the whole Army" and that if Lloyd George broke away and founded a new Government the whole Army would back him. On December 1 Lloyd George suggested that Asquith set up a new all-powerful three-man War Committee, of whom Asquith himself should not be one—a suggestion that did not commend itself to the Prime Minister. Two days later the Conservative members of the Asquith coalition demanded that he resign, and he had to yield. Since no Conservative could hope to command majority support, King George asked Lloyd George to see what he could do.

Some Liberals regarded Lloyd George as a renegade and refused to co-operate, but other Liberals and all the Conservatives supported him. This gave him a safe majority, and he set up an almost exclusively Conservative Cabinet, with Balfour as Foreign Secretary and Bonar Law as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the House of Commons. Lord Curzon and Lord Milner belonged to the inner War Cabinet; so did Arthur Henderson, sole representative of the Labor Party. Lloyd George wanted to include Winston Churchill, but the

Conservatives could not forgive his early apostasy and he remained for another year on the outside looking in.

The composition of Lloyd George's first coalition Cabinet showed what the war had done to Great Britain. The laissez-faire Liberal had failed; the old-line Conservative could not take over; only Lloyd George, who had entered political life as a radical of sorts, possessed the necessary qualities of wartime leadership. He had the common touch that the Conservatives lacked, as well as a demagogic, almost dictatorial streak that the orthodox Liberals distrusted. Lloyd George also brought the Labor Party's Arthur Henderson—who would not serve under Conservative leadership—into a coalition that appeared truly national. What Briand had done the year before in France, Lloyd George did in 1916 in England. Like Briand, too, Lloyd George distrusted professional soldiers and agreed with Clemenceau that war was too serious a matter to be left to the generals.

While civilians extended their power at the expense of soldiers in France and England, soldiers extended their power at the expense of civilians in Germany. French and British soldiers, unused to power in time of peace, intervened in nonmilitary matters in time of war, and when it became apparent that they did not understand even their own business, the civilians asserted themselves. German politicians, unused to power at any time, found themselves more inadequate than ever when war came. Germany's soldiers therefore extended their power in every direction.

The setbacks that Germany suffered in 1916, culminating in Rumania's declaration of war, brought about the inevitable crisis. And just as Briand and Lloyd George emerged as the natural, national leaders of France and England, so Hindenburg and Ludendorff emerged as the natural, national leaders of Germany. They had won the greatest battle of the war at Tannenberg. Falkenhayn, whose military strategy appeared superior in 1915, had lost his great gamble at Verdun. His decision to shift the war's center of gravity from East to West could not be reversed, but he could at least be replaced by men who had shown better judgment. These men were not civilians who had caviled at the way the soldiers fought the war. They were soldiers who had caviled at everybody.

Not much more could be done than Rathenau and his War Materials Organization had already done to put the German home front on a war basis. More could, however, be done to break the British blockade. In 1915 the pleadings of Ambassador Bernstorff in the United States and the pressure of Chancellor Bethmann and the political leaders at home had caused the Kaiser to call off the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. But the German Reichstag and the German people were

becoming discontented. Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and the Admiralty demanded action, and a resumption of submarine warfare seemed the logical answer. In 1915 twenty-one German U-boats had sunk impressive quantities of merchant shipping. By the end of 1916 Germany had built one hundred and twenty U-boats of superior design. The Admiralty guaranteed that they could sink six hundred thousand tons of shipping a month and force England to sue for peace within half a year. On October 7, 1916, spokesmen for the Catholic Center Party in the Reichstag announced that if Hindenburg and Ludendorff favored unrestricted submarine warfare and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg did not, they would vote against Bethmann.

The *Burgfrieden*, or civil peace, that had prevailed in Germany since the outbreak of war showed its first symptoms of serious strain. During 1915 a growing minority of Social Democrats in the Reichstag had voted against further war credits. On March 24, 1916, Hugo Haase, one of the leaders of this faction, attacked the Government from the Reichstag floor, accusing it of mismanaging the food supply, abusing its powers of censorship, and prolonging the war. Philipp Scheidemann, the majority leader, who had just spoken in behalf of the Government, tried in vain to silence the upstart. After Haase's speech seventeen Social Democrats bolted the Party and set up a new Social Democratic Labor Fellowship. On May 1 Karl Liebknecht, who had started voting against war credits back in December, 1914, was arrested for distributing revolutionary literature and addressing an anti-war meeting in Berlin. On June 7 the majority Social Democrats voted with the minority group against further war credits, but merely as a demonstration against the delays of the Government in granting social reforms. On October 1 a mass meeting of thirty thousand workers in Frankfurt passed a resolution demanding peace on the basis of the prewar *status quo*. Soon afterward the Reichstag voted three hundred and two to thirty-one to have its Committee of Supplies, which ordinarily confined itself to analyzing the budget, "meet for the discussion of foreign policies and of the war" even if the Reichstag itself were not in session.

By the end of 1916 a growing minority of Germans no longer believed in victory. A majority would certainly have welcomed a compromise peace. But belief in the Hindenburg myth still ran strong—perhaps stronger than ever. Hindenburg himself happened to be suffering from attacks of low fever at the time he became Supreme Commander. This sent Ludendorff's temperature up and gave him a welcome chance to show his new authority. In August, 1916, the Austrian and German Governments were considering the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland. "Let us found a Grand Duchy of Poland with a Polish army under German officers," urged Ludendorff. "Such an army

is bound to come someday and at the present moment we can use it."

Bethmann opposed offering anything to the Poles. He had established contact with certain Russian leaders who favored a separate peace, and any concessions to the Poles would kill that prospect. But Bethmann finally gave way to Ludendorff, and the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed on November 5. It proved a total fiasco. The Poles did not want a kingdom. They did not want patronage of the Central powers. Ludendorff had not offered the Poles anything like enough to win their support. He had offered them only enough to antagonize the Russians and thus to kill Bethmann's hopes for making a separate peace in that quarter. In the twentieth century, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth, Germany and Russia seemed unable to make peace with each other except at the expense of Poland.

In spite of Brusilov's great summer offensive, conditions inside Russia went from bad to worse throughout 1916. On February 2, 1916, the Tsar appointed sixty-seven-year-old Boris Vladimirovich Stürmer Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. Ambassador Paléologue of France described Stürmer as a man of "third-rate intellect, mean spirit, low character, doubtful honesty, no experience, and no idea of state business. The most that can be said of him is that he has a rather pretty talent for cunning and flattery." Stürmer came of German stock and worked closely with the men around Rasputin. He and Rasputin were said to confer with each other secretly at midnight. The Tsarina sponsored Stürmer, who repaid her by doing her bidding.

A few days after appointing Stürmer to the Premiership the Tsar opened the Duma—in person. It proved a mere gesture, as the bureaucracy kept all its powers while the Tsarina and Rasputin manipulated the Tsar by remote control. In 1914 the Russian armies numbered five millions. By 1916 they had grown to fourteen and a half millions. This led to shortages of food and clothing, and the Government failed to set up any uniform national system of rationing. City dwellers lacked food. Farmers had no boots. Before the war, workers struck for political equality. In 1915 and 1916 they struck against starvation. The Government sent strikers at its munition plants to the front or subjected them to military discipline.

On July 23 Stürmer dismissed Sazonov as Foreign Minister and took his job. Rasputin had said, "I've had enough of Sazonov. Quite enough." The Tsarina also disliked Sazonov because he had tried to prevent the Tsar from taking personal command of the armies in the field. But the Allied leaders felt they had lost their best and perhaps their only remaining friend at the Russian court. A month later a Russian aristocrat confided to Ambassador Paléologue, "Obviously, regicide is the necessary corrective to autocracy," but nobody assassinated the Tsar.

On the night of December 29, however, Rasputin met his death—not at the hands of a revolutionary mob but at the hands of three aristocrats in Prince Yusupov's palace. They fed him poisoned cakes and poisoned wine, shot him point-blank with a revolver, and, when he still refused to die, beat him and shot him twice more and thrust his body into a hole in the ice on the Neva River. Nobody accused any of the conspirators of murder, but they were kept under guard in their homes. The Tsarina had Rasputin's body recovered, and she and her husband, their four daughters, and a few intimates held secret obsequies in their private chapel. The Tsarina could not forget one of the dead man's prophecies: "If I die or you desert me, in six months you will lose your son and your throne."



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Tsar Nicholas II and His Only Son, Prince Alexis, the Tsarevich

Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* contains vivid sketches of the Tsar and Tsarina at this time: "Nicholas was not only unstable but treacherous. Flatterers called him a charmer, bewitcher, because of his gentle way with courtiers. But the Tsar reserved his special caresses for just those officials whom he had decided to dismiss. Charmed beyond measure at a reception, the Minister would go home and find a letter requesting his resignation. That was a kind of revenge on the Tsar's part for his own nonentity. Nicholas recoiled in hostility before everything gifted and significant. He felt at ease only among completely mediocre and brainless people, saintly fakers, holy men, to whom he did not have to look up. He had his *amour propre*—indeed it was rather keen. But it was not active, not possessed of a grain of initiative, entirely defensive."

Although Trotsky depicted the Tsar as mightily and increasingly under the Tsarina's influence, he described her "intellectual force" as lower than his. "Even more than he, she craves the society of simpletons." He went on: "This German woman adopted with a kind of cold fury all the traditions and nuances of Russian medievalism, the most meager and crude of all medievalisms, in that very period when the people were making mighty efforts to free themselves from it. This

Hessian princess was literally possessed by the demon of autocracy. Having risen from her rural corner to the heights of Byzantine despotism, she would not for anything take a step down. In the orthodox religion she found a mysticism and a magic adapted to her new lot. She believed the more inflexibly in her vocation, the more naked became the foulness of the old regime. With a strong character and a gift for hard, dry exaltations, the Tsarina supplemented the weak-willed Tsar, ruling over him."

In December, 1916, she wrote the Tsar: "Everything is getting quiet and better, but people want to feel your hand. How long have they been saying to me for whole years the same thing: 'Russia loves to feel the whip.' That is *their* nature."

The Tsar had adjourned the Duma and forbidden the Zemstvos to meet. On January 1, 1917, President Rodzianko of the Duma spoke his mind frankly to the Tsar: "Sire, there is not an honest or reliable man left in your entourage. The Tsarina issues orders without your knowledge, the Ministers report to her on matters of state, and those whom she regards with disfavor are replaced by incompetent or inexperienced persons. Hatred of her is growing throughout the country. She is looked upon as Germany's champion. Even the common people speak of it." The Tsar, holding his head in his hands, replied, "Is it possible that for twenty-two years I have tried to act for the best, and that for twenty-two years I have done wrong?" And Rodzianko answered, "Yes, Your Majesty, for twenty-two years you have done wrong."

For another ruler the year 1916 marked the end of an equally tragic and far longer life. In November the Emperor Francis Joseph came down with bronchitis, but he insisted on remaining at his desk and following his customary routine. On the morning of November 21 the court chaplain administered the last sacrament. The Emperor worked on. In the late afternoon he permitted himself to be put to bed, reminded his secretary to call him at seven o'clock the following morning, and died before midnight. The young, new Emperor, Charles wanted peace at almost any price. He had quick intuitions, real courage, a genuine devotion to his people, and an ambitious, meddlesome wife. The Empress Zita, daughter of Duke Robert of Bourbon, belonged to a family that regarded itself as the peer of the Hapsburgs. Zita had relations and connections in France and Italy, and she determined to use them for peace. Charles, with his pudgy, undistinguished face and nondescript little mustache, looked like the caricature of a weak-minded, inbred monarch. Zita, with large, dark eyes and wide, thin-lipped mouth, looked the part of international intriguer that she tried to play. They made a devoted couple who raised a large family in the Roman Catholic faith, but history had already passed them by.



BROWN BROTHERS

Emperor Charles and the Empress Zita

One month before Francis Joseph died, Friedrich Adler, son of Viktor Adler, one of the most respected Austrian Social Democrats, had assassinated Prime Minister Stürgkh. Ernest von Koerber, the former Finance Minister, who replaced Stürgkh at the head of the Government, set up a new Food Office based on the German model. The Austrian military commanders had already subordinated themselves to the Germans, and Austria's civilian leaders had no choice but to follow German precedent. And the year 1916 ended with another demonstration of Austro-German unity. On December 12 the Central powers told the world the terms on which they would make peace.

The idea of the peace offer originated with Foreign Minister Burian of Austria and had the approval of Emperor Francis Joseph before he died. The Germans and Austrians worked out the details together in Berlin and made them public within a week of the fall of Bucharest. But all that "Germany and her allies" promised was to make "propositions which have for their object a guarantee of the existence, honor, and liberty of development of their nations" and thus lay "an appropriate basis for a lasting peace." The Central powers made no specific offers. They did not mention Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, or Serbia. On December 19 Lloyd George, in his first speech as Prime Minister, told the House of Commons: "There has been some talk about proposals of peace. What are the proposals? There are none. To enter, upon the invitation of Germany proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany."

The peace offer had served its purpose in so far as it convinced the people of the Central powers that their Governments wanted to end the war. It had also elicited from Lloyd George exactly the response that Ludendorff had hoped for. On December 20 Hindenburg told the Foreign Office that unrestricted submarine warfare must be resumed in 1917, and three days later he informed Bethmann that the

peace offer of the Central powers had failed and that the peace proposals President Wilson had issued on December 18 would prove equally ineffective. Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff continued to press the issue. The Kaiser could not postpone action long after the first of the year. And events in the United States had made it clear that a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany would lead to a declaration of war by the United States. Karl Helfferich, Germany's new Vice-Chancellor, recognized that unrestricted submarine warfare was his country's last card. "If it is not trumps," he commented, "Germany is lost for centuries."

• IV •

WHAT PRICE AMERICAN NEUTRALITY?

DURING 1914 and 1915 President Wilson tried to achieve two conflicting purposes. He wanted to keep the United States out of the European war and at the same time prevent an Allied defeat. American mediation of the war on terms favorable to the Allies seemed to him the ideal solution. Neutrality, in Wilson's hands, thus became a means to an end, not an end in itself. He wanted America to remain neutral, not merely because he wanted to keep America at peace, but also because he wanted to bring peace to the world. And only a neutral America could arbitrate such a peace.

By the end of 1915, however, the United States had abandoned strict neutrality and peace seemed further away than ever. Wilson therefore decided to send House on a second wartime mission to "let the Allies know how our minds are running" and perhaps look in on the Germans if they invited him. "You need no instructions," Wilson wrote House on December 17, 1915. "You know what is in my mind and how to interpret it, and will, I am sure, be able to make it plain to those with whom you may have the privilege of conferring."

The day before Christmas, 1915, Wilson set down this statement of his own—and House's—attitude: "I agree with you that we have nothing to do with local settlements—territorial questions, indemnities, and the like—but are concerned only in the future peace of the world and the guarantees to be given for that. The only possible guarantees, that is, the only guarantees that any reasonable man could accept are (a) military and naval disarmament and (b) a league of nations to secure each nation against aggression and maintain the absolute freedom of the seas. If either party to the present war will let us say to the other that they are willing to discuss peace on such terms, it will clearly be our duty to use our utmost moral force to oblige the other to parley, and I

do not see how they could stand in the opinion of the world if they refused."

Perhaps House shared Wilson's vision when the two men talked together in Washington, but he saw the world through other eyes as soon as he arrived in London. On January 11, 1916, a group of Britain's top war leaders asked him just exactly what the United States Government wanted the British Government to do. House replied, "The United States would like Great Britain to do those things which would enable the United States to help Great Britain win the war." Yet the next day Wilson cabled House in their private code: "It now looks as if our several difficulties with Germany would be presently adjusted. So soon as they are, the demand here—especially from the Senate—will be imperative that we force England to make at least equal concessions to our unanswerable claims of rights. This is just at hand."

Page denounced the "fierce, blue-bellied Presbyterian tone" of Wilson's cable, which certainly did not express the views that House had transmitted to his British hosts the day before. But Page reflected Wilson's views even less than House did; in fact, it was to by-pass Page that Wilson sent House to London. Why had not Wilson worked through Lansing and the State Department? Because Lansing, though less incendiary than Page, favored stronger action against Germany than Wilson himself wanted to take. Wilson chose Colonel House as his personal emissary because the Colonel always seemed to agree with him. The trouble was that the Colonel agreed with almost everybody else. If historians have not yet unraveled the threads of American diplomacy at this time, think of the confusion of Wilson's contemporaries.

Or, for that matter, think of the confusion of Wilson himself. The final responsibilities and decisions lay with him, and he had to keep reconciling half a dozen different forces. One day he had to take account of the preparedness lobby. The next day the pacifists clamored for attention. American prosperity had become dependent on Allied war orders. At the same time, the entrance of the United States into the war would throw business into a panic. Great Britain maintained a blockade as illegal as the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that the Germans had abandoned. But the Germans waged war more ruthlessly than the Allies. In 1916 they began impressing French and Belgian civilians behind their lines into war work. German agents had promoted strikes among American war workers and had even blown up American war plants. Wilson was holding the German Government to "strict accountability" if it permitted a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. The decisions whether the United States should remain at peace or go to war lay with Berlin. And if war should come, House had

already thrown away most of the bargaining points he might have pressed upon the Allies in behalf of the kind of peace settlement he and Wilson wanted.

By February, 1916, Wilson had committed himself so deeply to the Allied cause that Congress threatened to revolt. Senator Gore of Oklahoma and Representative McLemore of Texas—both good Democrats—had prepared a resolution that would have forbidden American citizens to travel on armed, belligerent, merchant ships. Congressional leaders warned the President that both Houses would almost surely pass the measure. Through personal conferences and public statements, Wilson persuaded both the Senate and the House to table the resolution. "I cannot," he declared, "consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens to any extent. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesman even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and the right."

Most Democrats finally supported Wilson: so did about half the Republicans, including Senator Lodge. But Senator Stone, Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote Wilson: "I insist that neither a private citizen, nor the President, nor the Congress of the United States can be justified in driving this nation into war or endangering its peace by any such false sense of courage or national prestige or dignity." Wilson, for his part, told a Cleveland audience on January 29, 1916, that he interpreted the desires of the American people this way: "You have laid upon me this double obligation: 'We are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep us out of this war; but we are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep the honor of this nation unstained.'"

Colonel House returned from Europe early in March. He had spent four days in Berlin and had failed to convince the German leaders that they had lost the war and should therefore agree to let Wilson mediate the peace. He had also visited Paris, where he gave the French leaders the same reassurances he had just given the British: "I have told them all that what we wanted most was for them to do the things which would help us to help them best." He came home, after a final visit to England, with a memorandum, signed by himself and Sir Edward Grey, repeating the gist of his proposals of the previous fall but containing no commitment.

On March 24 a German submarine sank without warning the unarmed French passenger steamer *Sussex*. The vessel reached port, but the explosion had killed eight of her three hundred passengers, including a number of Americans. Lansing and House both urged the President to send an ultimatum to Germany, but Wilson wanted to wait until he had all the facts. On April 13 the German Government dispatched what Bernstorff called "probably the most unfortunate document" it ever transmitted to Washington. The Germans admitted that one of their submarines had attacked another vessel near the scene of the *Sussex* torpedoing, but that it was not the *Sussex*. Wilson believed the Germans had deliberately lied and retorted with the strongest message he had yet sent to Berlin. "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger- and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

On May 4 the German Government agreed to modify the submarine campaign in accordance with Wilson's demands, but asked the United States to insist that the British Government also observe international law and restore the freedom of the seas. Otherwise, "the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision." Wilson accepted the German pledge to modify submarine warfare methods; he rejected Germany's right to resume these methods unless the British modified theirs. For the moment, Wilson had won. The *Sussex* torpedoing led, among other things, to the removal of the aggressive von Tirpitz from the German Admiralty. Afterward Wilson wrote: "There were multitudes of messages from the country, offering all kinds of suggestions, but they always ended: 'We will stand by what you think best to do.' The awful and overwhelming thought was that the country trusted me." Yet, as he said to Secretary Daniels, "I can't keep the country out of war. They talk of me as though I were a god. Any little German lieutenant can put us into the war at any time by some calculated outrage."

• V •

"HE KEPT US OUT OF WAR"

UNDER these circumstances what could Wilson do but go "joy-riding with the jingoes," as Bryan called it? Even in 1916 the United States had only the third-largest navy in the world—and a poor third, at that, to Germany's—plus a professional army with an authorized peacetime strength of one hundred thousand men. A loosely organized National

Guard, maintained by the states, provided several hundred thousand partially trained, part-time soldiers. In November, 1915, Wilson called for "the training within the next three years of a force of four hundred thousand citizen soldiers." Secretary of War Garrison already favored outright conscription and had little use for the National Guard. Wilson insisted on integrating the National Guard with his enlarged training program, but preferred to emphasize the Navy as "the first and chief line of defense." He wanted to make it "incomparably the greatest Navy in the world" and early in 1916 laid his whole preparedness program before the country.

The Navy appeared to most Americans—as it did to Wilson—a defensive weapon. It rested on the volunteer system. It did not violate the spirit of neutrality but might cause both the British and the Germans to show more respect to Americans on the high seas. In 1915 Congress had appropriated an additional forty-five million dollars to increase the Navy. In 1916 the appropriation was tripled. Congress also approved and the President signed legislation more than doubling the size of the regular Army. Most important of all, Wilson set up a Council of National Defense consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The experience of Europe at war had shown the necessity of co-ordinating the armed services and the civilian economy. Wilson also felt that such co-ordination would unite the country "for the victories of peace as well as those of war."

Events in Mexico as well as events in Europe forced Wilson to plump for preparedness. In October, 1915, he had recognized the provisional Carranza Government, which had more popular support and a more radical program than the usurper Huerta whom Wilson had forced to quit by withholding recognition. But Carranza could not control the entire country. General Pancho Villa was waging successful guerrilla warfare in northwestern Mexico and threatening to shoot any Americans he might find. The State Department warned Americans citizens to leave the area, but on January 10, 1916, Villa's soldiers killed eighteen of them near Chihuahua. On Capitol Hill the Republicans, led by Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, pressed for intervention and two months later they got it. Villa and fifteen hundred men crossed the border and killed eight American soldiers and nine civilians near the little town of Columbus, New Mexico. The next day, March 10, the White House announced that a punitive expedition of some five thousand regulars would "endeavor to capture Villa by a swift surprise movement." General John J. Pershing, who had helped subdue the Moros in the Philippines, commanded the party. Although Pershing never did catch Villa, his punitive expedition boosted the whole preparedness movement. During the course of eleven months one hundred



ACME

General Pershing and Pancho Villa before the American Punitive Expedition into Mexico

thousand members of the National Guard and almost half as many regular soldiers trained or served under Pershing at a cost of one hundred and thirty million dollars. In March, 1917, a month after Pershing had left, the Mexican people elected Carranza to the Presidency and Mexican-American relations became normal.

By and large, Wilson had similar success with most of the other Latin-American republics, although he failed to put through a universal Pan-American pact by which all the American republics would guarantee each other's independence and territorial integrity.

Revolutions in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic required him to intervene with troops. But he always moved too slowly and cautiously to suit the Republicans, and most of Latin America regarded his administration as a great improvement over Taft's and Roosevelt's. At the end of 1916 the United States finally arranged to purchase the Danish West Indies, or Virgin Islands, with the understanding that the United States "will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland."

The day before Wilson announced Pershing's punitive expedition against Villa, he acquired a new Secretary of War. Secretary Garrison had resigned because he wanted bigger military preparations and fewer concessions to the Filipinos. Wilson replaced Garrison with Newton D. Baker, the nationally celebrated reform mayor of Cleveland, Ohio. Baker was a small, spectacled lawyer with pacifist leanings and proven abilities as an organizer and an orator. The preparedness crowd raged. Already Josephus Daniels—a prohibitionist as well as a pacifist, a Bryanite as well as a progressive—headed the Navy Department. What was the country coming to? The eventual answer was military conscription and a navy second to none. Wilson needed all the moral prestige of the two liberal pacifists who headed the War and Navy Departments to reconcile the American people to such a sharp break with their traditions as his policies, and the times, required. "In the last analysis," Wilson told a pacifist delegation on May 8, 1916, "the peace of society is maintained by force." He continued, "If you say, 'We shall not have any war,' you have got to have the force to make that 'shall' bite."

Having committed himself to preparedness, Wilson committed himself still further to world organization. On May 27 he told a League to Enforce Peace meeting at Washington that he favored "a universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations of the world and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence." But he felt that only the belligerents should determine the settlement of the war in Europe. "With its causes and its objects we are not concerned," he declared. "The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore." But he did declare that "the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible organization of nations" to promote his broad objectives.

In all the belligerent countries Wilson's speech received a bad press. In England some Liberal and Labor Party leaders decided that his endorsement of a league of nations outweighed his aloof attitude toward the causes and objects of the war; most neutrals and most Americans also approved. Once again, as in his instructions to Colonel House, Wilson dismissed the war's causes and objects, thus appearing at once priggish and impractical. But he saw a chance to make the war transcend its original causes and objects by establishing a new world order. For the first time he also committed himself, as President of the United States, to bring his country into a world confederation to keep the peace.

Slowly, reluctantly, and alone, Wilson had converted himself to the preparedness cause—not for its own sake, not as a prelude to entering the European war, but as a necessary corollary to his long-cherished belief in world organization for peace. As he saw his ancestral urge to help the British and block the Germans forcing him further and further away from neutrality and closer and closer toward war, he tried to rationalize the inevitable. In April, 1916, he challenged and startled a Jefferson Day dinner with this cry from an anxious mind and a tortured heart: "God forbid that we should ever become directly or indirectly embroiled in quarrels not of our own choosing, and that do not affect what we feel responsible to defend; but if we should ever be drawn in, are you ready to go in only where the interests of America are coincident with the interests of mankind and to draw out the moment the interest centers in America and is narrowed from the wide circle of humanity?" He paused. "Are you ready for the test? Have you the courage to go in? Have you the courage to come out according as the balance is disturbed or readjusted for the interest of humanity?"

In late June the Republican, Progressive, and Democratic Parties held their national conventions to nominate candidates for the Presidency. The Republican and Progressive conventions met simultaneously in Chicago. When the Progressives tried to nominate Roosevelt he infuriated them by urging them to return to the Republican fold and support the reactionary Senator Lodge, and when Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio urged the Republican delegates in his keynote speech to "forget the differences," many Progressives decided to bolt to Wilson and the Democrats. The Republicans selected Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who had made an honest, liberal Governor of New York and had found refuge on the Supreme Court before Taft and Roosevelt split the Republican Party. Roosevelt called Hughes a "whiskered Wilson" but backed him anyway.

The Democratic convention at St. Louis nominated Wilson as a matter of course, but not before former Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York had delivered the most important convention address since Bryan's "Cross of Gold" oration twenty years before. Glynn, whom Wilson himself had selected as temporary chairman, called Wilson's avoidance of war "the paramount issue." The audience liked it. Glynn warmed to his theme and began listing other Presidents of the United States—Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Harrison, Grant—who had ignored provocations that might have led to war. "But we didn't go to war" became Glynn's extemporaneous theme. Bryan, in the press gallery, wept. The delegates bellowed for a vote before all the usual speeches had been completed, and Wilson was renominated with only one dissenting voice. Wilson had already approved the party platform, plank by plank, but at St. Louis some unknown hand added these words which summed up the feelings of the convention and became the chief issue of the campaign: "In particular we commend to the American people the splendid diplomatic victories of our great President, who has preserved the vital interests of our Government and its citizens, and kept us out of war."

Although Wilson himself never referred to the "kept us out of war" slogan that many of his supporters invoked, he did represent the Republicans as the war party. He also called for "a just and settled peace" and "the organization of that peace upon world-wide foundations that cannot easily be shaken." At the grass-roots level, the 1916 campaign excited more personal bitterness than any since the McKinley-Bryan contest of 1896. Republicans started whispering campaigns against the President's private life; about his alleged flirtations, his alleged neglect of the first Mrs. Wilson's grave. Her brother, Stockton Axson, came to Wilson's defense with a widely circulated article, "The Private Life of President Wilson."

Hughes conducted the most dignified and dull campaign since Alton B. Parker's in 1904. "I stand for two things," he declared: "first for the principle of fair, impartial, though candid arbitration; and second for legislation on facts according to the necessities of the case. And I am opposed to being dictated to, either in the executive department or in Congress, by any power on earth before the facts are known and in the absence of the facts." No wonder Wilson wrote one of his friends: "I am inclined to follow the course suggested by a friend of mine who says he has always followed the rule never to murder a man who is committing suicide, and clearly this misdirected gentleman is committing suicide slowly but surely."




CULVER

Charles Evans Hughes Speaking in New York's Union Square

Wilson could of course count on winning the solid South. Hughes seemed equally certain to run strong in the Northeast. The outcome of the election hinged on the West and Midwest, where Wilson's progressive record gave him the edge. Not until October did Wilson make any formal campaign speeches, and his occasional public appearances excited much more enthusiasm than the incessant efforts of Hughes. It took Roosevelt to supply the punch that Hughes lacked. "It is dreadful to think," he wrote Lodge in July, "that some millions of Americans will vote for Wilson. They can't so vote without incurring moral degradation."

On November 3, as Wilson retired to Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, to await the outcome, Roosevelt wound up his final address with this spontaneous outburst: "There should be shadows now at Shadow Lawn; the shadows of the men, women, and children who have risen from the ooze of the ocean bottom and from graves in foreign lands; the shadows of the helpless whom Mr. Wilson did not dare protect, lest he might have to face danger; the shadows of babies gasping pitifully as they sank under the waves; the shadows of women outraged and slain by bandits." He concluded: "Those are the shadows proper for Shadow Lawn; the shadows of deeds that were never done; the shadows of lofty words that were followed by no action; the shadows of the tortured dead."

On Election Night at midnight the shadow of defeat did seem to lie



BROWN BROTHERS

*President Wilson and His Second Wife
at His Second Inaugural*

across Shadow Lawn. Hughes was sweeping the East, and most of the major newspapers—Democratic as well as Republican—announced that he had won. The Republican candidate went to bed at one-thirty, happily convinced that he was President-Elect. Early the next morning a newspaper man called to inform Hughes that the outcome in California remained in doubt, only to be notified that the President could not be disturbed. “Well,” said the visitor, “when he wakes up just tell him that he isn’t President.”

Wilson had retired somewhat earlier, relieved by the prospect of returning to private life. He had already made up his mind to appoint Hughes Secretary of State and then resign, along with Vice-President Marshall, thus making Hughes President at once. But with the morning came the news that Ohio had gone for Wilson by sixty thousand. He was also sweeping the West, as Hughes had swept the East. The outcome finally hinged on California, where Hughes had carelessly slighted Senator Hiram Johnson, Roosevelt’s Progressive running-mate in 1912. Not until three days had passed did the final count show that Wilson had carried California by less than four thousand votes. John W. Dwight, a former New York Congressman schooled under Boss Platt, said that a dollar bill could have elected Hughes: “A man of sense with a dollar would have invited Hughes and Johnson to his room when they were both in the same hotel in California. He would have ordered three Scotch whiskies, which would have been seventy-five cents and that would have left a tip of twenty-five cents for the waiter. That’s all that would have been necessary, that little Scotch would have brought these men together . . . and Hughes would have carried California and been elected.”

Throughout the country Wilson received six hundred thousand more votes than Hughes—slightly over nine million to eight and a half million. But the minor party candidates had received nine hundred thousand votes. This meant that for a second time less than a majority of the American people had voted for Wilson. But he made a far more impressive showing in 1916 than in 1912, when he ran one million, three hundred thousand votes behind the combined Taft-Roosevelt vote. In

1916 Wilson also ran far ahead of the Democratic ticket. The Democrats and Republicans each won two hundred and fourteen seats in the House of Representatives. The Democratic majority in the Senate dropped from sixteen to ten. One thing at any rate seemed clear. Nearly all the Wilson vote, plus some of the Hughes vote, plus the nine hundred thousand votes that the small-party candidates rolled up showed that a substantial majority of the American people wanted to keep on keeping out of war.

SUMMING UP

ONE WORD led off all the unanswered questions that the year 1916 had raised—Why? Why had neither side gained victory? Why did both sides continue the struggle? The questions took different forms in different countries because each country had gone to war with its own national traditions, habits, and hopes. Not since Napoleonic times had a sizable British Army fought on European soil. For a whole century between 1815 and 1914, war to the British meant large-scale naval action or small-scale land fighting—and as little as possible of either. Peace had become the normal way of life; only professional sailors and soldiers concerned themselves with warfare. Moreover, the Royal Navy, as the so-called “senior service,” enjoyed singular prestige. The “two-power standard” had not only kept Britain safe from attack: it had made the whole world safe for peace. A small professional army saw sporadic action against the tribesmen of the Indian North-West Frontier. The Boer War had proved a more disagreeable affair, but it had taught a valuable lesson that never needed to be repeated.

Although Germany's naval building program had made war with Britain inevitable, nearly all the fighting had taken place on land. And here the British suffered losses for which their people were utterly unprepared. Under the volunteer system, the finest young men of all classes had sacrificed themselves first; and in a country with a declining birth rate, and a small, highly trained, highly patriotic ruling class, the results proved disastrous. During the first two years of the war most of the rising generation of British leaders—the young men in their twenties and thirties—had sacrificed their lives. Conscription came too late to save them. It had also taken two years for competent British civilians to wrest control of the war effort from incompetent soldiers. No one understood what had happened better than Lloyd George, who later wrote in his *War Memoirs*: “Of all the problems which Governments had to handle during the Great War, the most delicate and probably the most perilous were those arising from the home front. Armies might gain successes or meet with reverses; but once great nations had

become mobilized for war, they could not be forced to surrender unless the home front just broke down." The Clausewitz conception of war as a mere instrument of policy had gone out of date. War had become a popular struggle for national existence. Victory required more than the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in the field; it meant destroying the will to war of a whole people.

The French had prepared themselves better than the British for the kind of war they had to fight. They allocated their manpower more wisely. Their professional soldiers had better training, more prestige. Yet their superior preparations meant that during the first two years of the fighting they had to suffer far heavier losses than the unprepared people of Britain. The first two years of the war had decimated the future leaders of England; the first two years of the war had decimated the future fathers of France. The Germans had occupied the country's chief industrial centers; trench warfare laid waste still more. France had staved off defeat at Verdun, but victory seemed as far away as ever, and even when it came, would it be worth the cost? The Parisian crowds who shouted, "*À Berlin!*" in August, 1914, had not foreseen anything like this.

On one score, at any rate, they could take a certain comfort. The war had not shocked the Parisians any more severely than it had shocked the Berliners, who had gone to war shouting, "*Nach Paris!*" True, the Germans had prepared more thoroughly than any of their enemies; they had also fought more successfully—but on how many fronts, at what cost, and to what purpose? The great German gamble on quick victory had failed long ago. The great German victories in the East in 1915 had proved empty. The U-boat had not proved decisive. The German Navy had failed to break the British blockade at Jutland: Britannia still ruled the waves. The German people felt themselves encircled by a hostile world and therefore fought on, through sheer desperation. Their Austrian allies had proved almost more a liability than an asset. The death of the aged Francis Joseph and the accession of young Emperor Charles, who deeply and sincerely wanted peace, symbolized the impending collapse of a dynasty and an empire. The only satisfaction that the Austrians could feel, as the year 1916 drew to an end, was that the war had proved the bitterest kind of disappointment to their Italian enemies, whose hopes for quick, cheap victory had vanished long since.

The experience of Russia since 1914 confirmed the proposition that moral factors far outweigh material factors in time of war. Although enemy armies had overrun both Serbia and Belgium, the spirit of the people of both those small lands remained unbroken. The Russians had suffered greater numerical losses than any of the other belligerents, but they suffered far more from corrupt leadership that had lost touch with

the masses. The Serbian and Belgian leaders never promised their people anything more than glory, and the Serbian and Belgian armies performed valiantly with the best equipment available. The Russian armies fought valiantly, too, but their leaders had sent them to war with false promises, false hopes, inadequate equipment. The home front also fell down on the job; it could not produce sufficient guns or ammunition, sufficient medical supplies or clothing. Yet the Russian leaders and the other Allied leaders, too, urged the Russian armies and the Russian people to fight on, while doing far less than enough to keep them in the struggle.

In large countries and small, among the Central powers and among the Allies, the war had shown that the masses were prepared to fight and die for a patriotic cause over and above themselves. But the people had to have confidence in their leaders, and neither the Russian leaders nor the leaders of the other Allied countries had given the Russian people that confidence. Almost everywhere, as the year 1916 ended, people were asking why the war must go on, but in most countries fear of defeat, hope for victory, and sheer force of habit sustained morale—even in the face of sentiment and reason. Only in war-weary Russia and neutral America did “peace without victory” seem an acceptable war aim.

War for America: Revolution for Russia

Wilson bids for world leadership by demanding a people's war for democracy, while Lenin prepares his rival bid for world revolution.

PREVIEW

PRESIDENT WILSON followed up his re-election with two appeals for peace: the first addressed to the warring Governments, the second to the peoples of the world. Nothing came of his first appeal. By the time he had issued his second, in late January, the German Government had already decided to order a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. In early February Wilson broke off relations with Germany and two months later asked Congress to declare war and "make the world safe for democracy." At the same moment that Wilson was calling for a popular crusade for world democracy, a voice from Russia called for mass uprisings in behalf of world revolution. In March the Tsarist regime had collapsed with a speed that dazed everybody, except Lenin, the exiled leader of the Bolsheviks. The opportunity for which he had spent almost thirty years preparing himself had at last arrived. Early in April he traveled across Germany from Switzerland to Russia and continued, on the spot, the attacks he had begun from afar on the democratic Provisional Government. He called for peace with Germany, land for the peasants, power to the workers, and the international socialist revolution everywhere. All his friends and most of his enemies thought him insane.

• I •

WILSON SPENT the first six weeks after his re-election concocting a new kind of peace proposal. He had become convinced that the war must end in a stalemate and that the time had come to discuss its purposes. On December 18 he dispatched a note to all the belligerents asking them to state the terms on which they would negotiate peace. His opening sentence galled the Allies: "The objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually

the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world."

Most of the London papers raged against a man who could see no difference between British and German war aims. General Sir Henry Wilson, one of the top British commanders, wrote in his diary: "That ass, President Wilson, has barged in and asked all belligerents their terms." King George V wept. The Paris press called for victory first and peace afterward.

Wilson's peace note never had a chance. In the first place, Lloyd George—apostle of the "knockout blow"—had succeeded Asquith as British Prime Minister in early December. In the second place, the German Government beat Wilson to the draw with a suggestion that all the warring powers send delegates to some neutral meeting place to discuss terms. Lloyd George said that the Germans wanted the Allies to put their heads in a noose. His Government rejected both the German and the Wilson proposals, but it rejected the German proposal first. Hindenburg, who had already approved the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, accused Wilson of playing Britain's game.

Actually, Wilson was playing a game of his own. He professed, with some mental reservations, to take at face value the lofty public utterances of all the war leaders. In his heart he believed that he alone expressed the common people's universal desire for peace. His appeal to the leaders having failed, he made up his mind to speak over their heads to their people and to call not for victory but for peace. On January 22 he delivered his appeal in the form of a personal message to the Senate. "Victory," he declared, "would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory on which terms of peace would rest, not permanently but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit."

Wilson went on to propose "not a balance of power but a community of power . . . government by the consent of the governed . . . freedom of the seas . . . moderation of armaments." He wanted to "adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

The phrase "peace without victory" made the headlines and increased the arguments. It overshadowed even the proposal that the people of the United States "add their authority and their power to the authority

and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." Wilson—and others—had made similar proposals before. What set his statement to the Senate apart from all other public statements of the time was its opening: "I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have already come upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear." And a week later he wrote to his friend John P. Gavit: "The real people I was speaking to was neither the Senate nor the foreign Governments, as you will realize, but the *people* of the countries now at war."

Wilson, the shy, introverted intellectual, had stepped entirely out of character. Others had anticipated his specific proposals. His originality lay in his decision to appeal to the people of the world and in his conviction that he spoke for the silent millions. Overnight a new type of leader had appeared. Here also lay the clue to the affection and hatred that Wilson inspired: affection from those who believed that in Wilson the common people had at last found a voice, hatred from those whose fear of the common people was exceeded only by their hatred of Wilson's arrogant belief that he and he alone spoke for the dumb masses.

Wilson's revolutionary decision to speak out for the millions overshadowed the content of his message. And no wonder. For in no time at all it became apparent that Wilson knew next to nothing about the events he had discussed in such lofty tones. On January 9, several weeks before Wilson spoke, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and the disciples of Tirpitz in the German Admiralty overrode Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and within half an hour persuaded the Kaiser to sanction a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1. As Hindenburg declared at the time, "Things cannot be worse than they are now. The war must be brought to an end by the use of all means as soon as possible." Everyone concerned assumed that the decision meant a break and almost certainly war with the United States. No German leader believed in a negotiated peace or in Wilson's impartiality. Many civilians were prepared to welcome the decision. The fighting on the Western front had obviously reached a deadlock. Even the total collapse of Russia could not win the war for Germany. Fresh offensives could lead only to fresh casualties. The British lay open to the same weapon, blockade, that they had used against Germany. This weapon could end the war before America could intervene decisively.

Bernstorff had already received the news of the decision before Wilson had delivered his peace-without-victory speech. When he pleaded with his home Government to delay the announcement even for a few days, he received the reply that the instructions had already gone out

"All the News That's Fit to Print."

The New York Times.

THE WEATHER
New York City, Feb. 1, 1915. Partly cloudy, with light rain or snow, and a cold wind from the north. High, 40; low, 30; wind, N. by E., 10 to 15 miles per hour.

WED. FEB. 1. 1915. PRICE 10 CENTS. PUBLISHED DAILY, EXCEPT SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS. ESTABLISHED 1857. VOL. 51, NO. 15,151.

GERMANY BEGINS RUTHLESS SEA WARFARE; DRAWS 'BARRED ZONES' AROUND THE ALLIES; CRISIS CONFRONTS THE UNITED STATES

Text of Germany's Note to the United States

THIS PORT CLOSED
Collector Malone

A SHIP A WEEK FOR US
To and From Fal-

Germany's Campaign of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare Begins

BETTMANN ARCHIVE

to the U-boat commanders. Bernstorff exacted only one concession: the Imperial German Government would permit one American passenger vessel, carrying no contraband, painted with three red and white stripes amidships, and flying a checkered red and white flag to go to Falmouth each week. When Bernstorff glumly deposited the final announcement at the State Department on February 1, this supposed concession aroused almost more fury than any other part of the announcement.

Two days later President Wilson addressed a joint session of both Houses of Congress. He had consulted his Cabinet and all members agreed that he must keep his pledge of a year ago and break off relations with Germany. Wilson himself still believed in peace without victory. Most of his Cabinet—notably Lansing, McAdoo, and Secretary of Commerce Houston—wanted an immediate declaration of war. But Daniels, Burleson, and Secretary of Labor Wilson agreed with the President and proposed waiting until Germany committed an overt act of war. Wilson's message to Congress did not, therefore, go beyond announcing that he had broken relations. "I refuse to believe," he added, "that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they feel at liberty to do." He said he would await "actual overt acts" and would then "take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people." Four days later the Senate passed a resolution endorsing Wilson's action by a vote of seventy-eight to five.

Wilson still clung to two hopes. "I take it for granted," he had said in his message, "that all neutral Governments will take the same course." They did not. They felt that Wilson had ignored them for more than two years and did not care to pull his chestnuts out of the fire now. He then tried to prevail upon the Austrians, with whom he had not broken relations, to make a separate peace. But the Allies did not like Wilson's proposals and the Austrians liked them even less. Meanwhile, Germany's

unrestricted submarine campaign confounded Winston Churchill and other experts, who had regarded it as a mad piece of bluff. Ship sinkings jumped from 368,000 tons in January to 540,000 tons in February. Although the other neutral nations refused to follow Wilson's lead and break with Germany, they also refused to send their ships to sea without convoys or armaments. More American citizens lost their lives on British vessels, but few American vessels sailed. It looked as if the German Admiralty had not miscalculated the importance of the submarine after all.

At this point the British Foreign Office and the unexcelled British Intelligence Service went into action. On January 16 the British Naval Intelligence had intercepted a message, signed by German Foreign Minister Zimmermann and addressed to the German Minister in Mexico, suggesting that he reach an understanding with that country offering to reconquer in its behalf "the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona" and informing the Mexicans that the Japanese would also receive some American territory if the two countries supported Germany in case of war with the United States. Zimmermann still hoped to keep America neutral as long as possible. His note dealt only with what Japan and Mexico might expect from Germany after a possible break with the United States. The British, therefore, did not reveal the contents of this note until February 25, and when they did what shocked Wilson almost more than its terms was the duplicity of the German authorities at the time. For the State Department had granted the German Embassy the singular privilege of sending messages to Berlin through the American cipher in order to circumvent Britain's control of all transatlantic cables. That the Germans had taken advantage of this privilege to plot against the nation that granted it seemed to Wilson the ultimate in betrayal.

Even before the British revealed the contents of the Zimmermann note, Wilson had already decided to permit American shipowners to arm their vessels and carry United States Navy gun crews. Although he had the authority to issue this order on his own, he preferred to seek Congressional approval and, on February 26, addressed a personal message to Congress asking for quick passage of an Armed Ships Bill. He had just read the Zimmermann note, but held it back for fear of stimulating an atmosphere of panic. Wilson had reckoned without Senator La Follette, one of the five Senators who had already opposed the break with Germany and who now proceeded to lead a filibuster against the Armed Ships Bill. Congress had to adjourn by March 4. Wilson's Second Inaugural had to take place on March 6. Administration leaders suddenly became alarmed by the vigor—even by the extent—of the opposition. On March 1 the President released the Zimmermann note.

It caused far more indignation than the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. The House at once passed the Armed Ships Bill by a vote of four hundred and three to fourteen. But eleven Senators, led by two progressive Republicans—La Follette and Norris—proceeded to talk the bill to death. On Sunday, March 4, two days before he was to take his second oath of office, Wilson denounced the filibusterers: "A little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible." Bryan, however, lined up with the opposition and released this statement: "This nation does not need burglar's tools unless it intends to make burglary its business. Wire immediately to the President, your Senator, your Congressman. A few cents now may save many dollars in taxation and possibly a son."

By the time Wilson delivered his Second Inaugural he had regained control of his temper. He warned that armed neutrality might at any moment lead to war, repeated his peace objectives, but no longer spoke of "peace without victory." On March 9 he announced a special session of Congress for April 16. Three days later he declared, as his authority entitled him to do, that armed guards would be placed on all American vessels entering the war zones. For ten days a heavy cold confined him to his room, where he saw only two or three visitors a day.

Allied credits in the United States were running out, and Page warned him on March 5, "Perhaps our going to war is the only way in which our pre-eminent trade position can be maintained and a crash averted. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of a financial world crash." Two weeks later House wrote: "Everybody I have talked to connected with the English and French Governments tell me that if we intend to help defeat Germany that it will be necessary for us to begin immediately to furnish the things the Allies are lacking." The German submarines sank more and more vessels; they spared neither neutral nor American shipping. American clergymen and American labor leaders added their voices to the clamor for war.


On March 15, while Wilson still wrestled with his conscience, he learned that a democratic Revolution in Russia had bloodlessly swept away the Tsar. Two chief impressions reached the outside world. The leaders of the Revolution would transform Russia into a democracy and at the same time continue the war against the Central powers. The danger of a separate peace faded momentarily. It was the Tsarina and her reactionary supporters who had flirted most ominously with the Germans. On March 22 the United States recognized the new Russian Government, headed by Prince Lvov, a middle-aged Liberal. Wilson had intervened personally and saw to it that the United States was the first Government to take such action. He agreed with Lansing, who said

at the time, "The Revolution in Russia removed the last obstacle to viewing the war as one for democracy and against absolutism."

On March 20 Wilson summoned his Cabinet. At a two-and-a-half hour meeting all present agreed that war with Germany had become inevitable and that Congress should be summoned on April 2 to hear the President ask for a formal declaration. Jane Addams, the Chicago pacifist, gave this account of the President's reasoning, based on a conversation she had with him at the time: "He used one phrase which I had heard Colonel House use so recently that it still stuck in my memory, the phrase was to the effect that as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the United States would have a place at the peace table, but that if he remained the representative of a neutral country he could at best only 'call through a crack in the door.' The appeal he made was, in substance, that the foreign policies which we so extravagantly admired could have a chance if we were to push and to defend them, but not otherwise. It was as if his heart's desire spoke through his words and dictated his view of the situation."

Wilson showed the text of his war message to House the day before delivering it to Congress, and the Colonel wrote in his diary: "It is needless to say that no address he has yet made pleases me more than this one." Nevertheless, doubts still preyed on Wilson's own mind. That same night he invited Frank I. Cobb, editor of the *New York World* to the White House, and unburdened all his fears. "W. W. was uncannily that night," Cobb wrote afterward. "He said that when a war got going it was just war and there weren't two kinds of it. It required illiberalism at home to reinforce the men at the front. We couldn't fight Germany and maintain the ideals of government that all thinking men shared. He said he would try it but it would be too much for us."

No hint of these misgivings crept into the war message that Wilson delivered the next day before Congress. He described the German submarine campaign as warfare against mankind. "We will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our Nation and our people to be ignored or violated." But in calling for "force without stint or limit," Wilson made two things clear. America's quarrel was with the German Government, not with the German people: "We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval." He no longer called for peace without victory, but for a peace based on a "partnership of democratic nations . . . a league of honor, a partnership of opinion." No other war leader had spoken in such friendly terms of an enemy people; no other war leader had called for the kind of peace Wilson outlined.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

President Wilson Asks Congress to Declare War on Germany

He went out of his way to hail the Russian Revolution: "The great, generous Russian people have been added in all their native majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor." He continued: "We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its people, the German people included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." As he approached the end of his war message Wilson declared, "It is a fearful thing to lead this great and peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance." But, he concluded, "The right is more precious than peace. . . . The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."

Several seconds of dead silence followed this ending; then tumult followed. Wilson himself showed no elation, and left the speaker's stand rapidly, but not before Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had time to shake his hand and say, "Mr. President, you have expressed in the loftiest

manner possible the sentiments of the American people." Senator La Follette sat silent, with his arms folded across his chest. Claude Kitchin, a Democratic Congressman from North Carolina, who voted against a declaration of war, predicted that "the whole yelping pack of defamers and revilers in the nation will be set upon my heels." Republican Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio took a different view. He declared that he "was not voting for war in the name of democracy" but for "the maintenance of just American rights." How did Wilson himself feel? His secretary, Joseph Tumulty, saw him that evening, alone in the cabinet room. "My message today," Tumulty quoted Wilson as saying, "was a message of death for our young men. How strange it seems to applaud that." And then the President laid his head on the cabinet table and wept.

Not until April 4 did the Senate adopt the war declaration by a vote of eighty-two to six. La Follette succeeded in postponing the vote for a day, and then he delivered a four-hour speech attacking Wilson's war message point by point. He denied that Germany had ever pledged itself not to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. He pointed out that the Allies had refused to modify their blockade. He ridiculed the distinction Wilson had drawn between the German Government and the German people and scoffed at the whole concept of war for democracy. La Follette also claimed to speak for the people, who, he predicted, "will have their day and they will be heard." But Wilson—not La Follette—had the mass of the people with him at that time and led a united United States into war. From this point on, his task was to carry that unity over from the kind of war he had to fight to the kind of peace he hoped to build.

• II •


WHILE President Wilson prepared to lead America to war and the world to peace, a rival messiah appeared in Russia, preparing to lead his country to peace and the world to revolution. This man, who called himself Lenin and sometimes wrote the single capital letter "N." before his assumed name, had played an obscure part in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and had passed the intervening years abroad, making himself and his faction in the Social Democratic Party ready for the greater crisis that he knew must come. Character and experience suited him to his chosen role.

Lenin's father—Ilya Ulyanov—served as a school inspector in the central Russian province of Simbirsk. He held conservative political views, belonged to the Orthodox Church, associated with the local petty nobility. Lenin's mother, the daughter of a doctor, came of a part-

German family. Private tutors had taught her English, German, and French and how to play the piano; to her husband, who had been raised to the rank of hereditary nobility, she bore six children. Her second son, Vladimir—the name means “ruler of the world”—grew up to become Lenin.

The Ulyanovs led an idyllic family life until the father died in 1886. At once the 16-year-old Vladimir lost his faith in God, tore off the cross he had always worn around his neck, spat on it, and threw it away. The next year the eldest son, Alexander, was hanged for taking part in a plot to kill the Tsar, and Vladimir Ilyich vowed revenge. In 1888 he was graduated from the local secondary school, where he won a gold medal as the outstanding pupil in ability, development, and conduct. From his mother he had learned to play the piano. He had been able to defeat his father at chess. He was an expert skater, skier, and swimmer. At the age of eighteen, as a university student at Kazan, Vladimir Ilyich began to read the works of Karl Marx and lead discussion groups, but he never embarrassed or endangered his mother, whom he adored, by holding these meetings at her house. The university authorities finally expelled him after he took part in a protest meeting, and at the age of twenty-one he went to the University of St. Petersburg, where he passed his law examinations with honors.

In 1892, the year after he had received his law degree in St. Petersburg, a famine hit the province of Samara, where he had gone to live with his family. “The famine,” declared the twenty-two-year-old Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, “is the direct consequence of a particular social order. So long as that order exists, famines are inevitable. They can be abolished only by abolishing that order of society. Being in this sense inevitable, famine today performs a progressive function. It destroys the peasant economy and throws peasants from the village into the city. Thus the proletariat is formed which speeds the industrialization of the nation.” Vladimir Ilyich welcomed the famine because it



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Joint Resolution Announcing American Declaration of War with Germany

seemed sure to "speed the victory of the revolution." The best people tried to feed the starving because "the famine threatens to create serious disturbances and possibly the destruction of the entire bourgeois order." To Vladimir Ilyich, however, "this talk of feeding the starving is nothing, psychologically, but the saccharine sweet sentimentality so characteristic of our intelligentsia."

The following year he returned to St. Petersburg, where he practiced law after a fashion, but devoted most of his energies to expounding Marxism before a small group of workers who belonged to one of the illegal, underground parties of the time. His prematurely bald head, serious manner, and harsh voice earned him the nickname of "the old man." After two years at St. Petersburg he went to Switzerland to recover from an attack of pneumonia and there met the two men who later led the Russian Social Democratic Party—Plekhanov and Axelrod. They sized him up as one of the future leaders of the Russian labor movement and gave him some illegal political literature to smuggle back into Russia. He got it through all right, but the police soon discovered that he was planning to publish a Social Democratic paper in St. Petersburg itself, and he was sentenced to more than a year in jail followed by three years of exile in Eastern Siberia.

Political prisoners in Tsarist jails could receive two visitors a week and unlimited quantities of books, magazines, and newspapers. Vladimir Ilyich became an expert at writing in invisible ink, devising code messages in the books he had read, and manufacturing "ink wells," as he called them, from pellets of bread. He boasted of having devoured six of these pellets in a day to escape the attention of the prison guards. His three years in Siberia proved a pleasanter experience. There he not only enjoyed more liberty; after the first year he was joined by Nadezhda Krupskaya, who had also taught St. Petersburg workers and had taken him literature in jail. The police had seized her, too, but she got herself transferred, along with her mother, to Lenin's place of exile in Siberia by describing herself as his fiancée. They married soon after her arrival and spent their mornings translating *The Theory and Practice of Trade Unionism*, by Beatrice and Sidney Webb, and their afternoons copying the manuscript of the book on which the bridegroom was at work: *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. "I have yet to meet a woman who can do these three things," said Lenin in later life: "understand Marx, play chess, and read a railroad timetable." But in the demure, loyal, and tireless Krupskaya he found the perfect secretary, collaborator, and comrade.

His Siberian exile ended in 1900 before hers did, but she presently followed him to Munich, where he and Plekhanov and Axelrod and several younger men established a revolutionary newspaper, *Iskra* (*The*

Spark), printed on onionskin paper to be smuggled into Russia. In 1903 the Social Democrats split into two factions. The majority, or Bolshevik, group favored direct, revolutionary action. They based their strategy on Marx, but their violent tactics reflected the influence of Russian Nihilists and Anarchists. The minority, or Menshevik, group favored evolutionary methods. They also based their strategy on Marx and therefore kept insisting that Russia could not leap overnight from a semi-feudal to a Socialist state, but must first pass through the liberal democratic stage that Western Europe entered during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lenin made himself the intellectual leader of the Bolshevik faction, and during his first month of exile in Munich he and his wife shared a three-room apartment with a German worker, his wife, and their six children.

Two years after his release from Siberia, Lenin wrote his first book on the theory and practice of revolution, *What Is To Be Done?*, which soon became the professional revolutionary's handbook. "The history of every country teaches us," said Lenin, "that by its own ability the working class can attain only a trade-unionist self-consciousness, that is to say, an appreciation of the need to fight the bosses, to wrest from the government this or that legislative enactment for the benefit of the workers. The Socialist doctrine, on the other hand, is the outgrowth of those philosophical, historical, and economic theories which had been developed by the representatives of the well-to-do, the intellectuals.

"By their social origin, Marx and Engels, the founders of modern scientific Socialism, were themselves members of the bourgeois intelligentsia. Similarly, in Russia, the theoretical principles of the Social Democrats originated independently of the unconscious strivings of the laboring classes. They were a natural and inevitable result of the development of the ideas of the revolutionary Socialist intellectuals."

Lenin accepted Marx's interpretation of history and economics as fully as a devout Catholic accepts the Pope's interpretation of faith and morals. No scientist ever endorsed the findings of a fellow scientist so completely as Lenin endorsed the "scientific" Socialism of Marx. "Marx's theory is objective truth," wrote Lenin, early in 1905. "Following the path of this theory, we will approach the objective truth more and more closely, while if we follow any other path we cannot arrive at anything except confusion and falsehood. From the philosophy of Marxism, cast of one piece of steel, it is impossible to expunge a single basic premise, a single essential part, without deviating from objective truth, without falling into the arms of bourgeois-reactionary falsehood."

Marx supplied the theory; Lenin applied it. "Workingmen," he wrote, "are not and cannot be conscious of the antagonisms of their interests to those of the existing order. Only the educated representatives of the



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N. Lenin

possessing classes are conscious of it. The history of all countries shows that the working classes alone can create only trade unionism. The workingman can be saved only by an organization which, unlike the labor unions, must consist exclusively of people whose profession is revolutionary activity. Such an organization must not be too wide and must be as secret as possible."

The defeat of the 1905 Revolution reduced the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party to a small, hard core that clung to Lenin's leadership. Lacking mass support and wealthy backers, the Bolsheviks financed

themselves by robberies, holdups, counterfeiting, smuggling, and marrying rich women. Because Lenin had no "bourgeois scruples," the Bolsheviks soon had more funds than the Mensheviks, although Lenin himself often went hungry. When a professor asked Lenin how he could justify one of his comrades, named Victor, who had married a Moscow heiress to get her fortune for the Party, Lenin replied, "That is exactly why he is useful to us. Precisely because he will stop at nothing. Now tell me frankly, would you consent to be a gigolo? To live with a Moscow heiress for her money? You would not. Neither could I bring myself to do it. But Victor did and he is therefore a very useful man who cannot be replaced." Although Lenin regarded his little band of Bolsheviks as revolutionary shock troops, his cynical humor did not fail him when he assured a group of his comrades, "Among one hundred so-called Bolsheviks, there is one real Bolshevik, thirty-nine criminals, and sixty fools." And to his friend Maxim Gorky he once confided: "Between ourselves, there are many workers who are disloyal and treacherous to us; partly this is due to cowardice, partly to confusion and fear that their beloved theory will be injured by coming into conflict with practice. We are not afraid of that. For us theory is not a sacred thing, but merely a working tool."

Lenin led a hard life between 1905 and 1917 and in spite of his tough constitution and strong nerves developed insomnia and chronic headaches. He denied himself the pleasure of chess playing, the relaxation of music. Often he spent fifteen hours a day in libraries. Unlike many

revolutionaries, he followed an orderly routine and his personal morals conformed to the highest puritan standards. He rarely smoked or drank. When he visited the theater he seldom stayed to the end of the performance. He enjoyed literature, especially fiction, but felt he could not indulge himself. However, he knew that good health requires regular exercise and went in for walking and bicycling. He loved hunting, and although a poor shot, he made up in leg work for what he lacked in marksmanship. He enjoyed cats and children, and regretted that he had no son of his own.

Raphael Abramovich, one of the Menshevik leaders who knew Lenin for years, said Lenin never felt any need for women, gambling, luxury, or money. "It is not that Lenin is purposely starving his flesh, but simply that he feels no need for all that. He is wholly in the grip of one idea, one passion: Revolution. He agitated and worked for a dictatorship in the Party as far back as twenty years ago. But not because he is ambitious, not because he likes to be flattered and glorified, but because he regards himself as the most suitable and accurate interpreter of the ideas of socialism and revolution. He alone correctly understands Marx, therefore he alone among the Socialists is entitled to head the Revolution. That is his deep and indestructible conviction, as strong as a maniac's."

The Russian poet N. M. Minsky, who edited the daily paper that Lenin founded during the 1905 uprising in St. Petersburg, gave this description: "One might say that Lenin lived outside his own personality and this is why he had no intimates. He was a devotee of his cult, a hermit of his vow. He met and parted with people on party grounds. This is why some of his associates now call him a 'hangman.' But he is really a monomaniac, a man with a fixed idea. Whoever met for the first time this ungainly, poorly dressed, somewhat round-shouldered bald-headed man with his impenetrable Mongol face and slow movements would take him for a small bureaucrat, and would never believe that he was face to face with one of the most fearless, crafty, and willful maniacs of our time. Only after scrutinizing his narrow, sharp eye and unforgettable smile might one guess the extraordinary will power concealed behind the ordinary mask of his face."

The Russian historian M. N. Pokrovsky, who also knew Lenin well, summed him up this way: "There was above all his enormous capacity to see to the root of things, a capacity which fully awakened in me a sort of superstitious feeling. I frequently had occasion to differ with him on practical questions, but I came off badly every time. When this experience had been repeated about seven times, I ceased to dispute and submitted to Lenin even if logic told me that one should act otherwise. I was henceforth convinced that he understood things better

and was master of a power denied to me, of seeing ten feet down into the earth." And Lunacharsky, one of the most gifted Bolsheviks, wrote: "I believe that Lenin never looks at himself, never glances into the mirror of history, never even thinks of what posterity will say of him—simply does his work. He does his work imperiously, not because power is sweet to him, but because he is sure he is right and cannot endure to have anyone spoil his work. His love of power grows out of his tremendous sureness and the correctness of his principles and out of the inability, if you please—an inability very useful in a political leader—to see from the point of view of his opponent."

Lenin agreed with Emerson that consistency is the hobgoblin of petty minds. He also believed that the best defense is an attack. By 1907 the Mensheviks had become the dominant faction in the Russian Social Democratic Party, and they charged Lenin before a Party tribunal with having slandered them. Lenin proudly admitted the charge: "I purposely chose a tone calculated to evoke in the hearer hatred, disgust, and contempt for the people who carry on such tactics. That tone, that formulation, is not designed to convince but to break ranks, not to correct the mistake of an opponent but to annihilate him, to wipe him off the face of the earth. Indeed that approach evokes the worst thoughts and suspicions against the opponent and, it is true, instead of convincing and correcting, introduces confusion into the ranks of the working class."

While Woodrow Wilson was fighting the Princeton alumni, Lenin was fighting the Mensheviks. While Wilson broke away from the academic life to take up the political career he had always yearned for, Lenin stuck to his original calling of professional revolutionist. Wilson, an accepted and acknowledged leader, came to believe more and more in his ability to reform mankind from above. He brought his religious convictions into politics. Lenin, who chose to consort with the insulted and injured, believed in his ability to organize revolution from below. Both were men of faith: in Wilson's case it was Presbyterian Christianity; in Lenin's case it was Marxian Socialism. Both men also regarded themselves as world messiahs. As a Marxist, Lenin had no scruples about imposing his own conception of proletarian dictatorship to attain his supreme goal of world revolution. As a Christian, Wilson shrank from war as Lenin never shrank from dictatorship. But a time finally came when Wilson reconciled himself to accepting war as the best means to achieve his supreme goal of a world made safe for democracy. The strength of Lenin lay in his firm, ruthless leadership. In a confused and tortured world, he alone seemed to know exactly where he wanted to go. Wilson's strength lay in the tortured confusion of his own spirit. It took him years to persuade his mind and conscience to lead his country to war. But his confusions mirrored the confusions of millions of

other Americans, and when he solved them in favor of war, most of his fellow countrymen accepted his solution as their own.

Yet it took Lenin, with all his superior assurance, some months after the outbreak of war to formulate his own views, and he made a bad miscalculation at the start. He had predicted that the German Social Democrats "to appease their conscience" would vote against the war, "if for no other reason than for fear that the working class will rise up against them." When he read in *Vorwärts*, the Berlin organ of the German Social Democrats, that they had voted for the war credits that the Imperial Government demanded, he exclaimed, "It is impossible. The copy is certainly a forgery. The bourgeois German canaille must have published a special number." When he finally learned the truth he announced, "The Second International is dead." The first war slogan that occurred to Lenin in August, 1914, was, "Turn your guns against your officers." It never appeared in print and he chose instead, "Turn the imperialist war into a civil war."

On November 11, 1914, he summed up his views of the war: "War is no accident and no 'sin' as the Christian reverends think. They, like all opportunists, preach patriotism, humanitarianism, and pacifism. War is an inevitable part of capitalism. It is just as legitimate a form of capitalism as peace. The strikes of the conscientious objectors and similar opposition to war are nothing but pitiful, cowardly, idle dreams. What idiot believes that the armed bourgeoisie can be overthrown without a struggle? It is simply insane to talk about abolishing capitalism without a frightful civil war or without a succession of such wars. It is the duty of Socialists to agitate for class struggle in time of war. The only duty of the Socialists when an imperialist war breaks out between the bourgeois classes of different nations is to transform this war between nations into a war between classes. Down with the sentimental, hypocritical slogan: 'Peace at any price.' Long Live the Civil War."

Lenin held to this position throughout the war, and more and more Socialists everywhere came to agree with him. In 1915 these anti-war Socialists held their first international congress in the Swiss town of Kienthal. They met again the next year in the Swiss town of Zimmerwald. Lenin attended both meetings and after the Zimmerwald affair he wrote, "The content of the next revolution in Russia can be only a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." The Zimmerwaldists, as they called themselves, never attracted more than a minority of the Socialists in any of the belligerent nations, but their influence steadily grew. The war also stimulated Lenin to carry his revolutionary theory further than Marx had ever gone. Marx had predicted that capitalism would destroy itself from within. Instead, however, of succumbing to proletarian revolution, the chief capitalist coun-

tries turned to imperialism, which, in turn, set off the most destructive war in history. The British economist J. L. Hobson had already analyzed imperialism in a book of that title that appeared in 1902, and it was under Hobson's inspiration that Lenin, in 1916, wrote one of his most influential pamphlets, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

A few sentences from his closing chapter sum up his line of reasoning: "First, monopoly arose out of the concentration of production at a very high stage of development. This refers to the monopolist capitalist combines: cartels, syndicates, and trusts. . . . Second, monopolies have accelerated seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for the coal and iron industry, which is the basic and most highly trustified industry in capitalist society. . . . Third, monopoly arose out of the banks. The banks changed from modest intermediary enterprises into the monopolists of finance capital. . . . Fourth, monopoly arose out of colonial policy. To the numerous 'old' motives of colonial policy finance capital had added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for 'spheres of influence,' i.e. spheres of good business, concessions, monopolist profits; in fine, for economic territory in general. . . . Monopolies, oligarchy, striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by an extremely small group of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism."

On January 22, 1917, less than a year after he had formulated these ideas, Lenin told a meeting of workers in Zurich: "The present grave-like stillness of Europe must not deceive us. Europe is charged with revolution. The monstrous horrors of the imperialist war and the suffering caused by the high cost of living engender everywhere a revolutionary spirit; and the ruling classes, the bourgeoisie, and their lackey Governments are moving more and more into a blind alley from which they can never extricate themselves except by tremendous upheavals."

The moment drew near. The man was ready.

• III •

THE END of 1916 found Russia on the verge of total collapse. Premier Stürmer had lulled the Tsar and the Tsarina into a state of false confidence by having the secret police flood them with enthusiastic telegrams—apparently from the common people. But Stürmer's secret and futile efforts to conclude a separate peace with Germany led to his dismissal in late November. The Tsar replaced him with A. F. Trepov, the Minister of Transport. "It is unpleasant," said the Tsar of his new

Premier, "to have to speak to a man one does not like and does not trust. But first of all it is necessary to find a substitute for him and then kick him out—after he has done the dirty work. I mean to make him resign after he has closed the Duma." But the Duma refused even to listen to Trepov and within a month the Tsar had replaced him with Prince Golitsyn, a country gentleman without political experience or ambition who had headed a committee for the relief of Russian war prisoners, sponsored by the Tsarina. Asked why he accepted the Premiership, Prince Golitsyn replied, "So as to have one more pleasant recollection."

In January, 1917, the British and French Ambassadors to Russia were warning their home Governments that revolution might break out in Russia at any moment. The murder of Rasputin had boomeranged on its perpetrators, who had hoped to save and purify the Russian monarchy. Rasputin had diverted the imperial family with the illusion that through him they maintained contact with the soul of their people. His death devastated the Tsarina, who had this last message put in his coffin by one of the nuns whom the dead man had—as he put it—"exorcised." "My dear martyr," she wrote, "give me thy blessing and may it always follow me on the sad and dreary path I have yet to traverse here below. And remember us from on high in your holy prayers. Alexandra."

Soon after the turn of the year, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, addressed the Tsar with unprecedented bluntness: "Your Majesty, if I may be permitted to say so, has but one safe course open to you—namely, to break down the barrier that separates you from your people and regain their confidence." The Tsar drew himself up: "Do you mean that *I* am to regain the confidence of my people or that they are to regain my confidence?" "Both, sire," the tactful diplomat replied and urged him to appeal to the Duma to support the war. The Tsar expressed gratitude but ignored the advice of Buchanan, who wrote, gloomily, "Revolution was in the air, and the only moot point was whether it would come from above or below."

For almost two and a half years the bureaucracy and the Army had run Russia and the war. The civilian officials and the army officers supported the Romanov dynasty but intrigued against each other and ignored or brutalized the mass of the people. The masses had their own organizations: the Duma, the town and city councils, and the councils of workers, known as "Soviets." Many members of these organizations also belonged to one of the fifteen or twenty political parties and splinter groups of the time. Only a few of these parties played important parts in the events of early 1917. The Constitutional Democrats—or Kadets—controlled the largest bloc in the Duma. They drew their support from the more progressive landlords and the small but growing middle, professional, and business classes. The Kadets favored a con-

stitutional monarchy or even a republic. They regarded themselves as the Russian equivalents of the British Liberals. Most of the other political parties of any consequence—Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks—favored more drastic changes.

The Tsar sought the illusion of security by isolating himself with the High Command of the Army at Pskov; the Tsarina sought the illusion of power by surrounding herself with the court camarilla at St. Petersburg—or Petrograd, as the Russians now called their capital, having dropped the Germanic for the Russian name early in the war. Meanwhile, the Russian war effort disintegrated at the front and behind the lines. Soldiers refused to fight. Men and women in the factories refused to work. The peasants, who formed the backbone of the Army, had lost all hope of victory, all belief in the war. They wanted peace and land. But these sullen, weary millions had no leaders, no organizations. The Tsarist Government had sent most of the top Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks to Siberia. The rest had escaped to foreign exile. Discontent spread of its own accord. The army officers and the government officials could not stop it.

On January 29 a delegation of high British, French, and Italian officials arrived in Petrograd to co-ordinate the Allied spring campaigns. In spite of their enormous losses, the Russians still had more able-bodied soldiers than they could send to the fronts. In spite of military disaster and meager transport, munitions of war were arriving from the Allied world in a rising flood. But the Russian people had lost the will to fight. Lord Milner, the chief of the British delegation, kept murmuring, "We are wasting our time." The Allied delegates finally departed on February 21, leaving behind a series of recommendations about additional credits and munitions shipments. Two weeks later the final Russian collapse began. "End the war, since you don't know how to fight," had become the popular slogan of the hour.

On February 27 the Duma assembled after its Christmas recess. For a short time the Tsar seemed to be on the point of setting up a responsible Government. He summoned Prince Golitsyn to his winter palace at Tsarskoe Selo, near Petrograd, then suddenly left for general staff headquarters. On March 8 ninety thousand Petrograd workers celebrated International Women's Day. None of their leaders called for a general strike, much less a revolution. They planned nothing more than meetings, speeches, distribution of leaflets. Even the Bolsheviks cautioned against revolutionary action. They agreed with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries that they could get nowhere for the moment without the moderate, middle-class Kadet Party. But the men and women who took part in these demonstrations wanted more. Their leaders reluctantly ordered a general strike the next day.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Street Demonstration in Petrograd, 1917

On March 9 two hundred thousand Petrograd workers—half the workers in the city—took possession of the streets. Cries of “Down with autocracy” and “Down with the war” drowned out the cries for bread. Word had spread that the Cossacks, who had always broken up worker demonstrations in times past, would not shoot. The showdown came when Cossack officers tried to lead a charge into a crowd of twenty-five hundred demonstrators. Instead of deploying and attacking on a wide front, the Cossack soldiers followed in single file the narrow corridor their officers made through the crowd. Some Cossacks winked at the demonstrators; friendly conversations began. The Cossacks not only refused to charge, they let the demonstrators dive under their horses and make their way to the center of the city. Only the police remained loyal and Cossacks were reported to have turned against them.

On March 10 two hundred and forty thousand Petrograd workers demonstrated. This time mounted police fired on the crowds, and this time the Cossacks took up arms against the police, who soon disappeared from the streets. The Tsar, hearing of the disturbances in the capital, ordered them repressed within twenty-four hours, but the infantrymen followed the example of the Cossacks and refused to use their guns or bayonets on the crowds. During the night of March 10 and 11 the police arrested about a hundred of the strike leaders, as the army officers prepared, in earnest, to stop the demonstrations. On the

morning of March 11—a Sunday—the Tsarina telegraphed the Tsar: “The city is calm.” But by noon workers from the industrial suburbs were converging upon the center of the capital. Stopped at the bridges over the Neva, they made their way across the ice. The police, afraid to come out in the open, fired on the unarmed crowd from windows, balconies, and rooftops.


“In the course of the disorders,” said one of the police reports, “it was observed as a general phenomenon that the rioting mobs showed extreme defiance toward the military patrols, at whom, when asked to disperse, they threw stones and lumps of ice dug up from the street. When preliminary shots were fired into the air, the crowd not only did not disperse but answered these volleys with laughter. Only when loaded cartridges were fired into the very midst of the crowd was it found possible to disperse the mob, the participants of which, however, would most of them hide in the yards of near-by houses, and as soon as the shooting stopped come out again into the street.” The authorities finally ordered the Petrograd garrison to help the police clear the streets.

About two o’clock in the afternoon a few Petrograd workers entered the barracks of the Fourth Company of the Pavlovsky Regiment of the Imperial Guard. “Tell your comrades that the Pavlovsky, too, are shooting at us,” they cried. “We saw soldiers in your uniform on the Nevsky.” Four hours later the Fourth Company of the Pavlovsky Regiment left their barracks without permission under the command of a noncommissioned officer to try to persuade their comrades to stop firing on the demonstrators. The company encountered a detachment of mounted police and opened fire, killing one policeman and one horse. Eventually these soldiers returned to barracks and persuaded the entire regiment to mutiny. Premier Golitsyn ordered the Duma dissolved in the name of the Tsar. He already had the necessary, signed document before him and merely filled in the date: March 11—or, rather, February 26 by the old-style calendar, under which Russia still lived. The members of the Duma obeyed the letter of the order by disbanding and then reassembling in another hall, where they elected a Temporary Committee to restore public order and create an effective government.

The next day, March 12, the demonstrations became insurrection. Regiment after regiment of the crack Petrograd garrison mutinied: one hundred and fifty thousand men in all. Peasant soldiers and industrial workers joined hands, soldiers turning over their arms to workers, workers and soldiers freeing political prisoners from jail and arresting the officials of the last Tsarist Government. They took over the Tauride Palace, making the former bastion of reaction the headquarters of insurrection. The Petrograd Soviet set itself up in one part of the Tauride Palace, the Duma in another. Rodzianko, the conservative President of

the Duma, who used to refer to himself jovially as the fattest man in Russia, shook with helpless rage as mutinous soldiers arrested respectable Tsarist officials—"at whose orders is not recorded"—and handed them over to the Duma. Where else could they turn?

The old order, lacking substance, disintegrated like smoke. The insurrection had substance, but no leadership and no program. The people had grievances, demands, interests. Nearly all of them wanted bread and peace. The peasants wanted to dispossess the landlords. The industrial workers wanted an eight-hour day,



Leon Trotsky

UNDERWOOD

higher wages, more voice in management. The Tsarist Government stood for almost everything that most of the Russian people hated. It opposed almost everything they wanted most. But who could end the old order and create a new one? The Petrograd insurrectionists looked to the Duma, which already existed, and to their own Soviet, which was growing fast. On March 14 the Petrograd Soviet issued "Order Number One," which Trotsky in his *History of the Russian Revolution* calls "the single worthy document" of the time. "Its bold paragraphs, giving the soldiers an organizational mode of entry to the new highway, declare: that elective committees shall be formed in all military regiments; soldiers' deputies shall be elected to the Soviet; in all political acts the soldiers shall submit to the Soviet and its committees; weapons shall be in the control of the regimental and battalion committees and shall 'in no case be given up to the officer'; on duty, the severest military discipline—off duty, complete citizens' rights; saluting off duty and titling of officers is abolished; uncivil treatment of soldiers is forbidden, especially addressing them as *thou*." The admission of soldiers to the Soviet not only brought soldier and civilian together. It also brought together workers and peasants, since the Army recruited most of its strength from the peasantry.

The Petrograd insurrection had cost fourteen hundred and forty-three casualties, killed and wounded. Similar uprisings followed immediately in all the other major Russian cities, but with even less bloodshed. Only one-seventy-fifth of the population of Russia lived in Petrograd; only

one-fiftieth of the Russian armed forces belonged to the Petrograd garrison. Yet the Petrograd insurrection proved decisive for the whole country and the whole Army.

• IV •

ON MARCH 16, after several anxious days of backing and filling, the leaders of the Duma Executive informed the leaders of the Soviet Executive that the Duma would organize a Provisional Government. The Menshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party dominated the Soviet; the Kadet Party dominated the Duma. The leaders of both groups shrank back from assuming responsibility, until the insurrectionists forced them to act. Professor P. N. Milyukov, the head of the Kadet Party, became the new Government's strong man and Foreign Minister. He had a long and distinguished record. His open support of a constitutional monarchy had landed him briefly in jail during the early 1890's. He then taught and lectured on Russian history in Sofia, Chicago, and Boston, returning to Russia at the time of the 1905 disturbances and helping to found the Kadet Party. He edited a leading liberal magazine, belonged to the last two Dumas, supported the war, but attacked the Tsar's War Ministers, especially Stürmer whose dismissal he eventually forced.

With such a strong, sound man in the Russian Foreign Office, the Allies hoped for great things from the new Russia. Milyukov urged Nicholas II to abdicate in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. The Tsar abdicated, all right—on the same day the Provisional Government came into existence—but the Grand Duke refused to take the throne, and a few days later soldiers arrested Nicholas and took him to his former winter palace at Tsarskoe Selo. Plans to permit the reunited royal family to emigrate to England came to nothing. The Provisional Government also sent Grand Duke Nicholas to his Crimean estates, but retained General Alexeiev, whom the Grand Duke had hoped to succeed, as Commander in Chief.

The Provisional Government had a puppet Premier, fifty-five-year-old Prince Lvov, to whom the Tsar had once considered offering the same position. Prince Lvov was a liberal, honorable, and wealthy landowner who had headed the Zemstvos, or town councils. Alexander Guchkov, the new War Minister, headed the small Octobrist Party which had organized the first Duma back in 1905 and drew its support from the newly rich industrialists. The most spectacular member of the Provisional Government was the eloquent, excitable, thirty-five-year-old lawyer Alexander Kerensky, who became Minister of Justice and leader of the Social Revolutionaries. Kerensky also belonged to the Executive



Alexander Kerensky

UNDERWOOD

Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, as well as to the Duma, and thus acted as liaison between the two bodies. He had come from the same city as Lenin, and his father had sponsored young Lenin's application for admittance to the University of Kazan.

In his *History of the Russian Revolution* Trotsky offers this caustic analysis of Kerensky: "He had no theoretical preparation, no political schooling, no ability to think, no political will. The place of these qualities was occupied by a nimble susceptibility, an inflammable temperament, and that kind of eloquence which operates neither upon mind nor will, but

upon the nerves. His speeches in the Duma, couched in a spirit of declamatory radicalism which had no lack of occasions, gave Kerensky, if not popularity, at least a certain notoriety. During the war, Kerensky, a patriot, had looked with the liberals upon the very idea of revolution as ruinous. He acknowledged the revolution only after it had come and, catching him by his pseudo-popularity, lifted him aloft."

The mutiny in the Army, the arrest of the last Tsarist Government, and the abdication of the Tsar had removed the three supports of the old regime: the Army, the bureaucracy, and the Romanov dynasty. Two other powers had succeeded them: the Provisional Government, drawn from the Duma, and the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which included soldiers as well as workers. Most members of the Duma and all the members of the Provisional Government feared the revolution; they wanted to continue the war; they hoped to make Russia a democratic state and regretted the sudden disappearance of the Romanovs. A constitutional monarchy would have been more to their taste. They represented liberal landowners, like Prince Lvov, who favored some land reform, and the newly rich big bourgeoisie for whom Guchkov spoke. Young Michael Tereschenko, the new Minister of Finance, also came from this group. He belonged to Milyukov's Kadet Party and had amassed a fortune estimated at eighty million gold rubles.


Most members of the Provisional Government belonged to the well-to-do classes. The Social Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the

Bolsheviks—all of whom had some members in the Duma—had less representation in the Provisional Government. But these more radical parties dominated the Petrograd Soviet. Cheidze, the first President of the Soviet, belonged to the Menshevik group in the Social Democratic Party. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, regarded Cheidze as a German agent; the Bolsheviks regarded him as the lackey of the bankers, industrialists, and landowners. Not until the middle of March did any of the more experienced radical leaders appear in Petrograd. The Tsarist Government had imprisoned all those who had not fled abroad.

Most of these returned revolutionaries had a restraining effect. The Menshevik Tseretelli, who succeeded Cheidze as President of the Petrograd Soviet in late March, accepted Wilson's war aims and even the Bolsheviks called for a bourgeois democratic republic. At the time of the March uprisings the central Bolshevik staff in Petrograd consisted of two trade unionists and one young intellectual, a distant cousin and namesake of the composer Scriabin who had taken the name of Molotov. These three men supported the prudent decisions of the Petrograd Soviet while the rank-and-file Bolsheviks devoted themselves to arming workers and organizing soldiers. In late March, two more experienced Bolsheviks arrived from Siberia—Kamenev and Stalin. Kamenev, who had changed his name from Rosenfeld, came of an intellectual, middle-class Jewish family. He had spent many years abroad specializing in journalism, propaganda, and oratory. He had a gentle disposition and a constitutional aversion to violence.

Stalin, the son of a Georgian cobbler, had rougher tastes. His mother persuaded him to study for the priesthood, but he was expelled from the Tiflis Theological Seminary shortly before graduation and soon afterward joined the Social Democrats. He dropped his father's name—Dzhughashvili—and assumed several aliases, finally settling upon Stalin, meaning "steel." He spoke Russian with the accent of his native Georgia, knew only Georgian and Russian, and never lived abroad. The Bolsheviks of the Caucasus region rather specialized in bank robberies and holdups, and Stalin did not hold aloof. He accepted Lenin's leadership and proved a zealous organizer and faithful worker. Since 1900 he had spent more than half his time in jail or Siberian exile, passing several years above the Arctic Circle under conditions of solitude, cold, and hardship that drove many prisoners to suicide. Stalin, however, made himself an expert hunter, trapper, and woodsman. He survived.

When Kamenev and Stalin arrived in Petrograd they found Molotov and some of the rank-and-file workers beginning to criticize the cautious leadership of the Provisional Government in the columns of *Pravda*, the Bolshevik daily paper. Kamenev and Stalin at once ousted the younger radicals and backed the Provisional Government. Kamenev formulated



UNDERWOOD

Vyacheslav Molotov



UNDERWOOD

Joseph V. Stalin

policy; Stalin executed it. Kamenev laid down the Party line; Stalin took control of the Party organization. In March, 1917, this organization consisted of perhaps twenty thousand disciplined members—not more—who had survived not only the persecution of the Tsarist regime but their own internal dissensions as well. Their influence among the industrial workers far exceeded their own numbers, and that influence was growing fast. But *Pravda's* sudden change of line caused bewilderment—and worse.

Lenin, in Zurich, raged at *Pravda* and at his own forced inaction. On March 20, in the first of his "Letters from Afar," which appeared in *Pravda* on April 3, Lenin accused the British and French of promoting the early stages of the Russian Revolution in order to prevent the Tsar from making a separate peace. A few days later he described the Provisional Government as "the agent of Anglo-French capital which desires to keep the colonies looted from Germany and in addition to compel Germany to return Belgium and part of France." In spite of these attacks, the Provisional Government asked the Allies to give Lenin a transit visa to return to Russia, but the Allies refused.

Two Swiss Social Democrats then arranged, through the German Ambassador to Switzerland, for the Germans to grant Lenin the safe-conduct that the Allies had withheld. Dr. Helfphand—a German ex-Socialist who had taken the name of Parvus and had served as a German agent throughout the war—settled the details with Bethmann and

the German High Command. Many Russian exiles refused to accept the offer because the Petrograd Soviet had not given its approval, but Lenin and about two dozen other revolutionaries of various parties went ahead anyway, and Lenin himself laid down the terms that the Germans accepted. Lenin did not go through Germany like a trained seal in a sealed train, as his enemies asserted at the time, but in a single car to which the Germans granted extraterritorial status.

Lenin knew he exposed himself to the charge of being a German agent. Ludendorff and Hoffmann knew that they were taking as great a chance. "Our Government, in sending Lenin to Russia, took upon itself a tremendous responsibility," Ludendorff wrote afterward. "From a military point of view it was justified, for it was imperative that Russia should fall." Hoffmann put it even more bluntly. "Just as I send shells into the trenches of the enemy and discharge poison gas at him, I, as an enemy, have the right to employ the medium of propaganda against his garrisons." Hoffmann gambled that Lenin's propaganda would not spread beyond Russia. Lenin gambled that it would eventually blanket the world.

At first the Germans seemed to have got all the better of the bargain. When Kamenev boarded the special car in Finland, Lenin let him have it: "What's this you're writing in *Pravda*? We saw several numbers and gave it to you hot and heavy." Later, in Petrograd, he awkwardly handed a large bouquet of flowers to the Menshevik leader, Cheidze, with the words: "The Russian Revolution achieved by you has opened a new epoch. Long live the world-wide socialist revolution." Lenin then permitted himself a rare sentimental indulgence. He visited his mother's grave before going to Bolshevik headquarters, where he listened, with an ironic smile, to long-winded speeches of welcome before taking the floor for two hours with a far from cordial speech of his own. No transcript of his remarks exists, but the next day Lenin released a short written summary entitled *Theses of April 4*. Nobody else signed the document, not even Grigori Zinoviev, who had spent ten years with him in exile and had accompanied him from Zurich. Lenin and Lenin alone took responsibility for the views set forth, and not a single fellow Bolshevik stood publicly with him at the time.

Here is the way Trotsky summed up Lenin's first public utterance on his return to Russia: "The republic which has issued from the February revolution is not our republic, and the war which it is now waging is not our war. The task of the Bolsheviks is to overthrow the Imperialist Government. But this Government rests upon the support of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who in turn are supported by the trustfulness of the masses of the people. We are in the minority. In these circumstances, there can be no talk of violence from

our side. We must teach the masses not to trust the compromisers and defeatists. 'We must patiently explain.' The success of this policy, dictated by the whole existing situation, is assured, and it will bring us to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and so beyond the boundaries of the bourgeois regime. We will break absolutely with capital, publish its secret treaties, and summon the workers of the whole world to cast loose from the bourgeoisie and so end the war. We are beginning the international revolution. Only its success will confirm our success, and guarantee a transition to the Socialist regime."

Later Lenin himself summarized his remarks this way: "The peculiarity of the present moment in Russia consists in the *transition* from the first stage of the Revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie because of the insufficient class-consciousness and organization of the proletariat, to the *second* stage, which must give power to the proletariat and poorer peasantry." He denounced the "predatory imperialist war." He urged "No support for the Provisional Government; explanation of the emptiness of its promises, especially concerning the repudiation of reparations." He summed it all up in these few words: "A dictatorship of the proletariat exists, but nobody knows what to do with it."

For a one-man minority in a minority party to talk this way seemed, to both Lenin's friends and enemies, an act of madness. The Provisional Government had swept away the Romanovs and the bureaucracy through which they had governed. It had freed all political prisoners, guaranteed free speech, religious freedom, freedom of press and assembly. It had abolished all restrictions on the civil rights of soldiers. It had replaced the hated police with a people's militia. None of these measures had stirred any mass opposition. Six weeks after the first uprisings in Petrograd, the Revolution remained in the honeymoon stage. The other big cities had followed Petrograd's example with even less bloodshed, organizing their own Soviets and sending delegates to the capital. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet became the All-Russian Executive Committee, with nation-wide powers. But the leaders of the Committee and of the Provisional Government feared further revolution and favored further war. Only Lenin, among the Bolsheviks, warned against this trend. Only Kerensky, among the non-Bolsheviks, warned against Lenin. As for Lenin himself, he denounced the Second International and repudiated the name "Social Democrat." He called for the creation of a Third International and, for the first time, made the name "Communist" his own.

SUMMING UP

THE WINTER of 1916-17 saw an entirely new type of popular leader emerge—the world statesman as world messiah. President Wilson drew from his religion the faith that moves mountains. He also presumed to speak for the common people everywhere—in the Allied countries as well as in the United States, in enemy as well as neutral lands. He broke down national frontiers, transcended politics, gave the war new purpose. The exiled Lenin, leader of a tiny faction of Russian Bolsheviks, believed in world revolution as Wilson believed in a world made safe for democracy. Hatred of religion filled Lenin with as much passion as religious faith filled Wilson. Yet both men saw opportunity as well as catastrophe in the war; both men outlined unlimited utopias. Wilson called for war in the name of world peace; Lenin called for peace in the name of world revolution.

In personality, character, and creed Lenin and Wilson had little in common. Lenin assumed that the ends he sought justified any means he might use to attain them. He called freedom a "bourgeois prejudice" and even expressed contempt for the mass of the proletariat. He accepted the Marxist interpretation of history, regarded religion as the "opium of the people," and devoted all the waking hours of his life to promoting world revolution through a ruthless, disciplined dictatorship. Wilson prayed and sought God's guidance daily. He attended church every Sunday. He believed in democracy as he believed in Christian principles. He regarded the moral law as supreme: "Interest does not bind men together; it separates men. For the moment there is the slightest departure from the nice adjustments of interest, then jealousies spring up. There is only one thing that can bind people together, and that is common devotion to right." Because Wilson doubted that ends and means could ever be separated, he found it hard to believe that war could ever do more good than harm. Nevertheless, the course of events conspired with his own character to convince him that his leadership could transform the conflict he asked his country to fight into a new and different kind of war—a war to end war, a war to make the world safe for democracy. No less than Lenin, Wilson thus found himself using ruthless means to achieve lofty ends. The difference was that Lenin took naturally to ruthlessness.

Viewed from the perspective of Western Europe, the resemblances between Wilson and Lenin overshadowed their differences. To begin with, neither of the two men came from Western Europe; both had grown up in remote, alien worlds. Yet both Wilson and Lenin drew much of their inspiration from West Europeans: Wilson from nine-

teenth-century British liberals, Lenin from nineteenth-century German radicals. Much of what they had to say therefore sounded familiar—even old-fashioned—to West European ears. But Wilson, the product of the United States, and Lenin, the product of Russia, also spoke with universal accents, and no West European had done that. Above all, Lenin and Wilson brought faith back into the lives of men; they set others on fire with their purposes. Too little faith had all but wrecked the world. It remained to be seen whether Wilson and Lenin were now offering the world too much.

1917

*The United States begins to make war and Russia
begins to make peace in a year of disaster for all
and victory for none.*

PREVIEW

THE GERMAN SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN which brought the United States into the war did not knock Britain out. But French and British offensives on the Western front weakened the attackers far more than they weakened the defenders, and in the autumn Austrian and German troops, under German commanders, almost sent Italy the way of Russia. Soon afterward, the first mass tank attacks in the West and a skillful campaign in the Middle East revived British hopes. Everywhere in Europe peace sentiment was gaining ground. Most Americans, on the other hand, rather enjoyed their first year of war. Few of them saw that events in Europe had greatly strengthened Japan in Asia. Russia seemed even farther away, until the Bolshevik seizure of power in November suddenly produced, in Lenin, another world messiah with a program of world revolution to challenge Wilson's program to make the world safe for democracy.

• I •

THE GERMANS FAIL AT SEA; THE ALLIES, ON LAND

AT SEA and on the Western front the war in 1917 assumed a new character and more furious tempo. Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign, which had brought the United States into the fighting, seemed likely for several months to force Britain to sue for peace. British ship losses rose from over 300,000 tons in February to over 500,000 tons in April. Total Allied ship losses went up from 532,000 tons to 869,000 tons in the same period. "These figures," wrote Admiral William S. Sims when he arrived in London as head of an American naval mission, "indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those which were then being published in the papers. It is

expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by this disclosure. I was fairly astounded, for I had never imagined anything so terrible."

"Can the Army win the war before the Navy loses it?" speculated Lord Fisher, the former First Sea Lord. His successor, Admiral Jellicoe, held out little hope. When Sims commented, "It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," Jellicoe replied, "They will win unless we stop these losses and stop them soon." "Is there no solution for the problem?" asked Sims. "Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe answered.

By "we" Jellicoe meant the orthodox naval officers at the Admiralty, who refused to detach any destroyers from the Grand Fleet

to convoy large groups of merchant vessels through submarine-infested waters. But Lloyd George and Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet, finally succeeded in having groups of colliers sent in "controlled sailings" with destroyer escorts across the Channel. Losses at once dropped. Next, the merchant vessels plying between Britain and Norway went in convoys. Again losses went down. These demonstrations convinced Admiral Sims, who urged his Government to adopt the convoy system. In May the first British convoy made a successful journey to Gibraltar. By July the convoy system had gone into operation on all major sea lanes, with American destroyers carrying part of the burden. In spite of Admiral Jellicoe, the German submarine campaign had failed.

The same months that saw Germany's hopes for quick victory over England sink without a trace saw France on the verge of collapse. In December, 1916, Briand had reorganized his Government and installed General Lyautey, former Resident General of Morocco, as Minister of War. Lyautey had proved himself a great colonial administrator and fine soldier; but he refused to explain his plans for the French Air Force to the Chamber of Deputies, where his conservative political views had already made him suspect. On March 17 Lyautey



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Josephus Daniels, United States Secretary of the Navy, Seated at His Desk. Standing at his left is his young Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt

resigned rather than reveal his program, and Briand quit a few days later. Several of Briand's Ministers remained, notably Alexandre Ribot, who had held the post of Foreign Minister and now became Premier as well. Ribot had stern, Republican views. He handled himself well in the Chamber and had helped to establish closer relations with both Britain and Russia before the war. As his Minister of War he selected another man of the left—Paul Painlevé, mathematician, scientist, and former Minister of Education in charge of inventions.

But Ribot and Painlevé inherited from Briand and Lyautey a military plan in which they did not believe and which they had no time to change. In December, General Robert Georges Nivelle had replaced Joffre as Chief of Staff and had converted Briand and most of the other members of the Chamber of Deputies to a new strategy. Joffre had outlived his usefulness—no doubt of that. Like Hindenburg, he possessed a massive simplicity that commanded confidence. Unlike Hindenburg, Joffre had no Ludendorff or Hoffmann to do his thinking for him. Nivelle had distinguished himself at Verdun, where he had commanded a single army during the final victorious stage of that long-drawn-out battle. His audacious and overpowering artillery attacks persuaded him that the same methods could be applied on a much larger scale.

Nivelle convinced both himself and others, as eager as he, to believe in quick victory. His engaging manners captivated the members of the Chamber of Deputies; his optimism appealed to the war-weary people of France. Nivelle also spoke fluent English; he had an English mother who had brought him up in the Protestant faith. Members of the British Government—especially Lloyd George—had at last found a French general who spoke their language in more ways than one. They fell in with his schemes, but it was only with the greatest reluctance that Field Marshal Haig agreed to submit some of his forces to some of Nivelle's orders during some of the projected offensive.

Nivelle predicted he would break through the German lines within forty-eight hours and promised to call off the entire offensive if he fell behind schedule. He selected as his point of attack a German salient at the Lens-Nyon-Reims sector and hoped to make it primarily a French victory by relying primarily on French troops. One misfortune after another assailed him. First, he permitted some of the numerous copies of his plan to circulate into the front lines, where one of them fell into German hands in December, 1916. That meant he could no longer count on a complete surprise. Then it transpired that Ludendorff had already planned a bold and extensive withdrawal from the very salient against which Nivelle planned to strike. This withdrawal to the shorter, stronger "Hindenburg Line" started in February.



ACME

German Soldiers Marching through a French Village They Demolished


Nivelle launched his attack, as planned, on April 16. Slowly, cautiously, and with mounting fury his troops crept through a ravaged countryside. The retreating Germans had cut down fruit trees and burned or blown up every kind of building that might provide any shelter to the French attackers. Within two days Nivelle had lost one hundred and twenty thousand men and failed to dent the Hindenburg Line. Ignoring his own predictions and promises, he ordered more local attacks. His troops, feeling themselves betrayed, refused to obey. Nivelle himself refused to resign. On April 28 the Government appointed General Pétain, under whom Nivelle had served at Verdun, as his Chief of Staff. On May 15 Nivelle was dismissed and Pétain put in his place. More than twenty thousand soldiers had mutinied; they had received no leaves since February, and they knew that while munition workers and profiteers grew rich, their families lived in want. But the French soldiers did not turn their guns against their officers or demand peace and social revolution as the Russian soldiers had done. They felt that their officers had blundered and they simply refused to go on dying in vain.

War Minister Painlevé, though a devoted man of the left, had not hesitated to call in a conservative, professional soldier to restore order.

Painlevé admired Pétain's defense of Verdun. He remembered that Pétain had warned against Nivelle's offensive. And again Pétain made good. He stopped all the attacks, toured the whole front, listened to grievances, saw to it that the men got better food, lodging, allowances, and leaves. Funds raised by the American Red Cross for war relief went to the needy dependents of French soldiers. Pétain promised and punished as little as possible. Presently he ordered a few limited offensives that achieved limited results with limited losses. When he asked one young lieutenant in the presence of many superior officers what he thought was the main trouble with the Army, the man blurted out, "The neglect of the men by their officers." Pétain turned to the officers in the party: "Well, gentlemen, you heard that?"

During the rest of 1917 the British bore the brunt of the fighting on the Western front. The French had seven hundred thousand infantrymen holding four hundred and eighty kilometers in the center and the east. The British had five hundred thousand infantrymen holding two hundred kilometers at the northwestern end of the line. The British, with two-thirds of the strength of the French, held only one-third of the front. But it was the most active third. Seventy-nine German divisions faced the French; sixty-nine faced the British. Shortly before Nivelle launched his fatal offensive, the British Third Army under General Allenby made greater progress with smaller losses at Arras, but failed to break through. On July 31 Marshal Haig began what looked like the "Third Battle of Ypres." Four months later the British had advanced barely four miles on a twenty-mile front, having suffered almost four hundred thousand casualties before reaching the little Belgian town of Passchendaele, which gave the battle its name. When a high officer from General Headquarters saw the mud in which the entire action had occurred, he could not keep back the tears. "Good God," he wept, "did we really send men to fight in that?"

Lloyd George, in his *War Memoirs*, estimated that the Battles of Passchendaele, the Somme, and Verdun "were responsible for the death or mutilation of between two and three million brave men. The tale of these battles constituted a trilogy illustrating the unquenchable heroism that will never accept defeat and the inexhaustible vanity that will never admit a mistake. It is the story of the million who would rather die than own themselves cowards—even to themselves—and also of the two or three who would rather that the million perish than that they as leaders should own, even to themselves, that they were blunderers." The British historian Cruttwell has accounted for these futile offensives this way: "It always seems as if one more effort must produce the decision. The deadly fascination of butting perpetually against the wall selected for attack seemed to conquer every commander."



ACME

German Soldiers Constructing Barbed-Wire Entanglement

No commander on either side of the lines took all this bloodshed so phlegmatically as the seventy-year-old Hindenburg, in his new headquarters at the Rhineland town of Kreuznach. War, he frankly admitted, suited him "like a summer holiday." Allied casualties still ran ahead of German. The fighting on the Eastern front had petered out to such a point that, by autumn, the Germans had moved a million men and three thousand guns from Russia to France, where they outnumbered the Allies for the first time since 1914. The French had passed the top limits of their armed strength. The British could force theirs no higher. Of the one hundred and seventy-five thousand American troops who reached France during 1917, not more than thirty thousand had received training for trench warfare. By 1919 the United States would have five million troops in France: more than enough to crush the Germans. But throughout 1918 the advantage on the Western front seemed almost certain to lie with the Germans.

Developments in Italy during the fall of 1917 made Germany's



ACME

Hindenburg Visiting Wounded German Soldiers

chances look still better. For more than two years the Austrian and Italian Armies had maintained an almost static front in the high mountains that lay between their two countries. But the Vatican, with its pro-Austrian sympathies, and the Socialists, with their sympathy for the Russian Revolution, had weakened the Italian will to fight. The war had cut Italy's coal imports in two. The 1917 harvest had fallen behind expectations. In August, 1917, strikes broke out in Turin, and the Government punished the leaders by sending them in penal contingents to a quiet sector of the front, near Caporetto, some fifty miles north of Trieste. On October 24 General Giardino, the newly installed Minister of War, assured a cheering Chamber of Deputies that they could rely on the invincible Italian Army as their country's sure defense.

That night six German and nine Austrian divisions, under German command, broke through the Italian lines at Caporetto. Within a week the Italians had fallen back fifty miles on a fifty-mile front above Trieste. Within another two weeks they had fallen back a hundred


miles on a two-hundred-mile front with a loss of six hundred thousand men, including two hundred and fifty thousand prisoners until they held firm on the Piave River with the help of British and French troops. The Germans did not have the manpower and transportation to finish off Italy then and there. But it was a close thing.

The shock of Caporetto aroused the Italians to new efforts and brought all the Allies closer together. Since 1915 the Germans had directed and co-ordinated the war strategy of all the Central powers. Although outnumbered, they outplanned their enemies. For want of any single Allied strategy, Russia had been knocked out of the war and Italy almost annihilated, too. It became imperative for the Allied war leaders—civilians and soldiers—to get together. On November 4 all the Allied Premiers gathered at Rapallo and for the first time since 1914 laid plans to bring all their operations on the Western front under unified command.


• II •

THE YEAR ENDS WELL FOR BRITAIN ON TWO FRONTS

ALTHOUGH the Germans still had the better of the land fighting in 1917, British troops won two important victories. Early in the morning of November 20, German troops before Cambrai awoke to an unpleasant



The Italian Front, 1917: For more than two years the Austrian and Italian armies faced each other close to the frontier that divided their countries until the great Austrian break-through at Caporetto drove the Italians back to the Piave River in the fall of 1917



BROWN BROTHERS


Allied War Leaders, left to right: Marshal Foch, Premier Clemenceau, Prime Minister Lloyd George, Premier Orlando, and Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister

surprise. Almost four hundred British tanks, followed by a few infantrymen, rolled forward on a six-mile front. No artillery bombardment preceded the attack: the surprise was complete. The tanks crushed barbed wire, crossed trenches, machine-gunned Germans. But the British had thrown all their tanks into this first assault and had no reserves to exploit the three-mile breach they had made in the German lines. The next day the Germans counterattacked and regained much of the ground they had lost. More than a year had passed since the appearance of the first British tanks. Haig still regarded them as a "minor factor," and Ludendorff had not considered them worth imitating. But when the tanks attacked at Cambrai, Ludendorff prepared emergency orders for a general retreat and the church bells of London rang out to celebrate a victory that relieved some of the gloom of Passchendaele.

The second British victory of 1917 took place in December when General Allenby's army of one hundred and fifty thousand men defeated one hundred and seventy thousand Turks and Germans in Palestine and occupied Jerusalem. The British Government had sent Allenby from the Western front to the Middle East to block a Turkish attempt to recapture Bagdad and to boost civilian morale with an inexpensive but spectacular success. Allenby took three months preparing the campaign, and when he moved he moved fast, achieving political results of the first importance. The war had undermined the tottering Ottoman Empire, which the Allies had already agreed to partition among themselves, the Russians getting Constantinople, the French Syria and Lebanon, the Italians some of the Aegean islands and part of the Anatolian coast.

The British Government had agreed to this division of Turkish spoils. It had also staked its own claims—to Mesopotamia, to the Palestine ports of Acre and Haifa, and to a wide zone of influence among the Arab states. But the British had so many interests in the Middle East that they became entangled in a network of contradictory commitments. To begin with, the India Office and the Foreign Office worked at cross purposes. The India Office gave priority to Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and the good will of the Moslem world. Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf lay close to India; British rule in India required the support of the Moslem minority as a counterweight to the Hindu majority. The Foreign Office took a wider view. It had to consider Egypt, the Sudan, and the Red Sea. It had to make concessions to the Allied powers with interests in the Middle East. It had to find ways and means to speed the collapse of Turkey by backing the nationalist Arabs. But it also had to hold the Arabs somewhat in check.

The India Office favored the closest possible alliance with King Ibn Saud, who had brought most of the Arabian peninsula under his rule and had established himself as leader of the most puritanical, fundamentalist, and fanatical Arab Moslems. In January, 1916, Ibn Saud made his first bid to break entirely loose from Turkey and head an independent Arab kingdom when a single, inconclusive battle with a lesser pro-Turkish chieftain caused him to adopt, for the time being, a policy of prudent neutrality. Nevertheless, in July 1916, the British Government recognized Ibn Saud as an "independent sovereign" who had more real power than any other Arab leader, although he ruled over the most backward and sparsely settled region of the Middle East.



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

British Tanks Prepare to Attack on the Somme, 1917


The Arab world had always exercised a singular fascination over certain English eccentrics of genius. Charles M. Doughty's *Travels in Arabia Deserta* had become a late Victorian classic, and two younger men were already following in Doughty's footsteps. One of them, H. St. John Philby, had become a Moslem convert and attached himself to Ibn Saud; the other, T. E. Lawrence, attached himself to Sherif Husein of Mecca, who claimed descent from Mohammed. Both Philby and Lawrence had lived among the Arabs for years, knew their language, and respected their customs. The Foreign Office preferred Husein and Lawrence; the India Office preferred Ibn Saud and Philby. In October, 1916, Husein proclaimed himself "King of the Arab Countries," and in December the British Government recognized him as "King of the Hejaz."

Lawrence bewildered, infuriated, and impressed his superiors with his constant insistence that Britain espouse the cause of Arab independence. He worked up a kind of holy anti-Turkish war appealing to the younger Arab chieftains, notably Feisal, the son of Sherif Husein. General Allenby believed in Lawrence, and most of the Arab leaders who lived in the more populous regions north of Ibn Saud's domain accepted the promises of the British leaders. While Allenby fought an open, orthodox military campaign against mixed Turkish and German forces under the command of General Falkenhayn, Lawrence organized an even more successful guerrilla campaign among the Arabs of the desert.

The British Government might have come to terms with both Husein and Ibn Saud and persuaded them to come to terms with each other but for two sets of conflicting commitments. First, the British had agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence with their various European allies. They had made promises to the French, the Italians, and the Russians; they had also staked out claims of their own that ran counter to the pledges Lawrence had made to the Arabs. Second, in November, 1917, Foreign Secretary Balfour issued a Declaration that bore his name and that read as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Motives as mixed and subtle as Balfour's own character lay behind this declaration. The original draft suggested that the Zionists take part in the preliminary discussions; it stated that "Palestine should be reconstituted" as a national home for the Jewish people; it said nothing



The Middle Eastern War Theater: Notable for the Dardanelles Expedition, the Salonika front, the campaigns that led to the capture of Bagdad and Jerusalem

about the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish peoples. Edwin Montagu, a high British official of Jewish descent and anti-Zionist convictions, then persuaded the Cabinet to modify its proposals. As a British subject, he feared his country would antagonize the Moslem world; as a British Jew, he believed his people should try to assimilate themselves to their lands of birth or adoption and not try to create—or re-create—a nation of their own. Lloyd George later circulated the story that his Government issued the Balfour Declaration to reward Dr. Chaim Weizmann for chemical research he had contributed to the British war effort. Dr. Weizmann's autobiography, *Trial and Error*, makes no mention of this episode. Instead it stresses the disappointment the author felt when he first saw the final text of the Balfour Declaration. For this Weizmann blamed the anti-Zionist, "assimilationist" Jews, not the British.

The author of the Balfour Declaration understood, more clearly than most, the spirit as well as the letter of his words. It was in part a generous, humane spirit; it made an immediate appeal to the oppressed Jews of Europe, who finally saw in the war something more than a con-

flict between Slav and Teuton to lord it over the minorities of Eastern Europe. But to the Arabs the Balfour Declaration meant that Britain planned to establish a permanent foothold in strategic Palestine and in the city of Jerusalem, which Moslems—as well as Jews and Christians—revere. To the Arabs, therefore, the Balfour Declaration breathed the divide-and-rule spirit in which the Turks had governed Palestine for four centuries and in which the Europeans had controlled much more of the world almost as long.

• III •

THE POPE AND OTHERS PROPOSE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

IN THE Middle East, war and politics went hand in hand in the clear light of day. Nobody with eyes in his head could miss the connection. War and politics went hand in hand in Russia, too. Defeat at the front and corruption behind the lines had led to revolution. Indeed, the strain of three years of war was making itself felt from top to bottom in all the belligerent countries, while the sudden shift from a peacetime to a wartime status transformed the United States.

No European Government in 1917—or in any other year of the twentieth century—had such complete information on the state of mind of the European masses as the officials of the Vatican. Hundreds of thousands of parish priests knew the most intimate details of the daily lives of several hundred million Roman Catholic communicants in all the warring countries, in the few remaining neutral states, and in the New World, where most of the Latin-American republics were following the example of the United States and breaking with Germany. By virtue of his spiritual prestige and international following, Pope Benedict XV was in a unique position to initiate a peace move. Benedict belonged to an ancient and noble Italian family, the Della Chiesas. His predecessor, Pius X—a man of humble origin—had died at the end of August, 1914, and Cardinal Della Chiesa was elected by a large majority. Ancestors of the new Pope had served under French Kings, taking the name of de L'Église. A brother held the post of Rear Admiral in the Italian Navy.

Some students of Vatican history assert that the College of Cardinals tends to rotate in its election of Popes between liberals and conservatives. Pope Pius X had qualified as a conservative by fighting modernism, strengthening the authority of the Vatican over individual bishops, breaking off diplomatic relations with the Third French Republic, and looking with special favor upon the devout Emperor Francis Joseph.

Pope Benedict XV, on the other hand, possessed the tolerance of the born aristocrat and somewhat greater sympathy than his predecessor for the Italian state. This did not make him pro-Ally, but it made him less sympathetic than Pope Pius X toward Austria-Hungary.

By the summer of 1917 Pope Benedict decided that the time had come to make a serious effort to end the war. He saw, in Russia, what defeat and exhaustion might do to organized religion. He knew, through the experiences of millions of devout Catholics in all other parts of Europe, what the war was doing to the masses of the people everywhere. He hoped that his initiative might shorten the war and restore some of the political power and prestige that the Vatican had lost since the time of the French Revolution. He had not modified the strict neutrality of Pope Pius X, but he did show sympathy for Belgium, for the victims of German submarine attacks, and for the French and Belgian civilians whom the Germans had transported to work their factories and farms. His attempt to persuade all the belligerents to observe a Truce of God on Christmas Day, 1914, had come to nothing.

In May, 1917, Benedict dispatched another Italian intellectual of distinguished lineage, Monsignor Eugenio Pacelli, as his personal emissary, or Nuncio, to the court of the Roman Catholic King of Bavaria. Here Pacelli told the Bavarian Catholic leaders that Pope Benedict "had no more ardent wish than to hasten the hour of the much-longed-for peace" and proceeded, in June, to Berlin. To Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg Pacelli read a letter that Benedict had written to the Kaiser and inquired into the German Government's views on arbitration, disarmament, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, the Eastern question, and the freedom of the seas. Bethmann's replies pleased Pacelli, who hastened to the Kaiser's Supreme Headquarters at Kreuznach. The Kaiser agreed that the time had come to talk peace and welcomed the Pope's initiative. But Bethmann and the Kaiser counted for much less than Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and time was running out. The continuing ascendancy of these two commanders forced quick action. On August 1 the Pope's peace note went out, rather hurriedly, to all the belligerent Governments.

It satisfied nobody. The Germans did not like its insistence on the evacuation of Belgium and northern France, and the "general principle of the complete restitution of all occupied territories." The British did not like the insistence on freedom of the seas and the Allied evacuation of the German colonies. Wilson did not like the Pope's attempt to steal his disarmament and arbitration thunder. The Presbyterian Church, controlled as it is by the elders of each congregation, teaches its more devout sons to mistrust the authoritarian hierarchy of Rome. Wilson also agreed with most American Protestants that no church should ever



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King Albert of Belgium

concern itself with temporal power and affairs of state. Finally, he had every reason to believe that the kind of internationalism he preached could never be reconciled with the kind of internationalism the Vatican had practiced. Most of the other Allied leaders agreed with his conclusions, even though they had not reached them by the same paths, and as a result only the King of Belgium sent a personal letter to the Pope thanking him for his solicitude. By and large, the Allies regarded the Pope's peace note as an attempt to restore the prewar *status quo*; the Germans as an attempt to put them in a tighter

strait jacket than the one that had confined them before the war.

The war-weariness of the European masses virtually forced the Pope to act. He felt that his position and the condition of Europe compelled him to make some move toward peace. But the same war-weariness that stirred the Pope had everywhere brought to power the advocates of war to the bitter end. When the new Emperor and Empress of Austria also failed in their abortive efforts to make a separate peace they found themselves more subservient than ever to their German allies and masters. In like manner, symptoms of discontent in Germany weakened the moderates and strengthened the extremists.

Shortly after Pacelli reached Germany the Second Socialist International sponsored an International Socialist Conference at Stockholm to discuss peace. Lloyd George had granted three British Socialists, including Ramsay MacDonald, permission to attend, but the Seamen's Union refused to transport them and Lloyd George's enthusiasm evaporated. The French Government opposed the conference but began issuing visas to French delegates until President Wilson protested. The German Government encouraged members of the Social Democratic Party to attend, hoping thereby to show its pacific intentions.

When Philipp Scheidemann, leader of the dominant conservative faction in the Social Democratic Party, came back arguing that the Allies would not discuss peace until the German Government made radical domestic reforms, events moved fast. Matthias Erzberger, of the Catholic Center Party, who had backed the unrestricted submarine

campaign a year before, declared that it had failed and that Germany must make peace by winter. Erzberger, the son of a poor village schoolmaster, had gone into journalism and politics and easily made contact among his fellow Catholics in Austria as well as in Germany. During the summer of 1917 he visited the Eastern front, where General Hoffmann had warned of approaching disaster to the country and the Army. On July 19 the Centrists, the Social Democrats, the Progressives, and the National Liberals in the Reichstag joined in the support of a moderate peace resolution which called for "a peace of understanding and a lasting reconciliation among peoples" and denounced "violations of territory and political, economic, and financial persecutions."

When Hindenburg heard the contents of the peace resolution, he declared it would destroy the morale of the Army and demanded the dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg, whose support in the Reichstag had reached the vanishing point. After considerable discussion involving Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Crown Prince, and the Reichstag leaders, the Kaiser—at Ludendorff's dictation—replaced Bethmann with Dr. Georg Michaelis, the Prussian Food Commissioner. The appointment took almost everyone by surprise—especially Michaelis who received the news while on vacation and correctly regarded himself as the agent of the High Command. "I do not consider a body like the German Reichstag," he said, "a fit one to decide about peace and war on its own initiative during the war." He made no important decision until he had cleared it with Ludendorff. When the Reichstag finally passed the peace resolution, Michaelis gave it a heavily qualified endorsement, concluding with the words "as I interpret it."

During the hundred days that Michaelis served as Chancellor he approved an extension of the franchise in Prussia and helped draft the reply to the Pope's peace note. Since this reply ignored the fate of Belgium, to which the Pope had attached great importance, it amounted to a rejection. A series of near mutinies in the German Navy finally forced Michaelis to quit. He had not attacked several of the more radical Social Democrats in the Reichstag with sufficient vigor to satisfy the Nationalists, and by the time he did speak out he had lost everybody's confidence. Seventy-five-year-old Count von Hertling, the Roman Catholic Prime Minister of Bavaria, replaced him. The parties of the left regarded Hertling as an improvement over Michaelis. The Center Party backed him completely. Hindenburg and Ludendorff also approved. Hertling had considerably more moral authority than Michaelis, but he remained no less faithful to the High Command.


Germany had three Chancellors in 1917; France had four Premiers. Briand had given place to Ribot before Nivelle's offensive. But Ribot's refusal to permit any French Socialists to attend the International

Socialist Conference at Stockholm in June antagonized the parties of the left. His Minister of the Interior, Louis-Jean Malvy, then antagonized the Nationalists by what seemed to them a lax attitude toward certain defeatists, notably his old friend Joseph Caillaux. When Clemenceau joined the attack Malvy resigned on August 31, and a week later Ribot also quit as Premier. Painlevé replaced him, but the Italian disaster at Caporetto and the Allied Conference at Rapallo soon finished him off too.

The fortunes of France and the Allies had sunk to a new low. Poincaré decided that one man and one man only could save the country—his political enemy, the seventy-six-year-old Georges Clemenceau. On November 15 Poincaré invited Clemenceau to form a Government, and Clemenceau accepted. His fellow Ministers included several of Poincaré's opponents and excluded most of the men who had held high office since August, 1914. But it received a handsome vote of confidence—four hundred and eighteen to sixty-five. A minority of leftists actively opposed Clemenceau and twenty-five Socialists abstained. Clemenceau later remarked that he had no difficulty persuading Frenchmen to give up their lives for their country; his trouble, he said, came when he asked them to part with their money.

The German submarine campaign in the spring and the fighting between Ypres and Passchendaele in the fall brought the war into every British home. When ship losses reached their peak in April, the British had only about a month's food reserves left. But the average Briton did not know how near the Germans came to starving his country into submission and the food shortage made itself most acutely felt in the form of rising prices. This led Lloyd George to give enormous new powers to the Ministry of Food and to create a system of rationing, price-fixing, and subsidies, which had brought almost all food prices under control by the end of the year. When strikes threatened the war production schedule, Lloyd George recalled Winston Churchill, who had served briefly as a major on the Western front, to the Ministry of Munitions, where he soon persuaded labor and capital to pull together even more efficiently than they did when Lloyd George himself held the post.

Neither lack of food, high prices, nor labor troubles seriously affected the British war effort as a whole. Sporadic attacks on London by German Zeppelins served only to strengthen morale on the home front. It was the endless, growing casualty lists that caused the deepest concern. On November 27, 1917, the *Daily Telegraph* published a letter that Lord Northcliffe's superpatriotic *Times* had rejected. The author, Lord Lansdowne, had served as Foreign Minister under Balfour and had instigated the alliance with France. No one could call Lord Lansdowne



The Western Front, 1917: Showing the "Hindenburg Line," to which the Germans withdrew early in the year at terrible cost to the French Armies of General Nivelle. Note also the arrows indicating the costly British offensive outside Ypres, ending in the bloody swamps of Passchendaele

pro-German. Yet he wrote, in part: "We are not going to lose this war, but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilized world, and an infinite addition to the load of suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them? In my belief, if the war is to be brought to a close in time to avoid a world-wide catastrophe, it will be brought to a close because on both sides the people of the countries involved realize that it has already lasted too long." Lansdowne went on to argue that if agreement could be reached on "economic conciliation after the war, the freedom of the seas, a pact for the settlement of international disputes, etc.," the New Year might bring "a lasting and honorable peace." Lansdowne's fellow Conservatives denounced him, but many Liberal and Labor papers, many provincial papers, many independent periodicals, applauded. This did not mean that peace sentiment ran as strong in England as in France or Germany, not to mention Austria and Russia. It did mean that Lord

Lansdowne, and many others in high station and low, opposed those leaders who demanded a fight to the bitter end and who still controlled and directed the war on both sides of the lines.


• IV •

AMERICA'S FIRST YEAR OF WAR

NOWHERE did the war spirit run so high during 1917 as in the United States. First-hand acquaintance with the realities of war had sobered and disillusioned millions of Europeans. In France the most coveted literary award of the year, the Goncourt Prize, had gone to Henri Barbusse's bitter account of the trench warfare: *Le Feu*. In the United States, Arthur Guy Empey's *Over the Top* headed the best-seller lists and stimulated recruiting. Empey had served with the Canadians and made the fighting on the Western front seem like the highest adventure on earth. The American people and their Government had entered the war with the same blind enthusiasm that Europeans had shown in 1914, adding to this their own special combination of moral fervor and technical power.

President Wilson proved himself the ideal war leader. Like most of his countrymen, he had gone through a long period of doubt and hesitation, but when the moral issue at last became clear, he at once saw the unique role that America could play and devoted himself almost entirely to formulating America's war aims and making himself the spokesman for the entire Allied cause. Of military strategy he knew nothing; of the non-English-speaking world, hardly more. He kept control of high policy firmly in his own hands, but he knew how to delegate executive power since administrative details did not interest him. He gave the most important civilian war jobs to self-made men of means who no longer needed to make more money but had not lost the common touch. Wilson trusted these men completely. They trusted him. Each had his own, defined sphere of responsibility. Wilson also entrusted the fighting war to the professional soldiers, with the result that West Point graduates rode high.

To Newton D. Baker, the pacifist Secretary of War, fell the task of raising, equipping, and training a conscript army. Baker shared Wilson's lofty war aims and knew how to express them almost as eloquently as Wilson himself. Both men had seen, early in 1917, that if war came, conscription must follow. Together with Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder, they arranged to have the War Department secretly print and store ten million blanks to be filled out by future draftees. With the aid of energetic Major Hugh L. Johnson, they also worked out an



ACME

Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, Draws the First Number in the Draft

elaborate, democratic ritual to register and select able-bodied men for military service.

On January 13, 1916, Wilson had told a preparedness rally at Chicago: "I have been asked by questioning friends whether I thought a sufficient number of men would volunteer for military training or not. Why, if they did not, it is not the America you and I know; something has happened. If they did not do it, I should be ashamed of America. I am sorry for the skeptics who believe that the response would not be tremendous; not grudging but overwhelming in its abundant strength." Something had happened, all right. The country had gone to war—and Wilson soon saw, more clearly than most, what the kind of war that America was fighting entailed.

"In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies," said Wilson, "there are no armies in this struggle. There are entire nations armed. Thus the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less part of the army than the men beneath the battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war. It is a nation."


Voluntary enlistments and business as usual could not do the job. Neither could the military heroics of a Theodore Roosevelt. Wilson, the civilian idealist, understood better than Roosevelt, the amateur soldier,

the nature of the war America was fighting. Roosevelt knew how to rally his fellow jingoes, but they could be counted on to back any war. It took a Wilson to make pacifists into militarists, civilians into soldiers, businessmen into government officials.

He first made his leadership felt in connection with the program of military conscription which he and Newton D. Baker had worked out together. They easily persuaded Congress to pass a bill that continued to rely upon volunteering until such time as "a resort to a selective draft is desirable." No sooner had Wilson signed the bill, on May 18, than he released a proclamation that he and Baker had prepared calling upon all the young men of America between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one to register on June 5 at the nearest voting places in their local election wards. "It is essential that the day be approached in thoughtful apprehension of its significance and that we accord it the honor and meaning it deserves," the proclamation read. Ten million Americans registered at forty-five hundred draft boards.

In May the War Department also began to authorize construction of sixteen cantonments to house four hundred and thirty thousand men in barracks and sixteen camps to house another six hundred and eighty-four thousand men in tents. Private contractors did the work at a maximum fixed profit of not more than 3 per cent. Baker supervised this whole program and also saw to it that the new mass conscript army got food, clothing, equipment, and transportation. This meant the mobilization of industry as well as the mobilization of manpower, and that task the President assigned to Bernard Mannes Baruch, who had served as a member of the advisory National Defense Council since 1916. Baruch, still on the sunny side of fifty, had made himself a multimillionaire through stock-market speculation. His achievements had won him the respect of the business community, but, like his opposite number, Walther Rathenau in Germany, Baruch was much more than a successful businessman. He had the interests of an intellectual, the intuitions of an artist, the tact of a diplomat. Wilson gave him dictatorial power over every branch of American business, yet Baruch never even threatened to use this power. American industry co-operated, perhaps because government contracts guaranteed all costs plus limited profits.

Baker, the reformed pacifist, and Baruch, the reformed speculator, brought the Army and industry together. But they could never have achieved the wonders they did if the mass of Americans had not accepted the war and its purposes. Most of the credit for America's high morale belonged to Wilson, who had defined his war aims in words that set America and much of the world on fire. The day-by-day propaganda job Wilson turned over to chubby, curly-haired George Creel, who had made his mark as a muck-raking journalist and soon became known



ACME

One-Hundred-Gallon Gasoline Fuel Tank, U. S. Army Air Corps, 1917 Model

as "Wilson's press agent." Creel had humor, energy, temperament, and a passion for reform. Wilson put him in charge of the so-called "Committee on Public Information" and gave him the same free hand that he had given to Baker and Baruch. Wilson also put at Creel's disposition five million dollars of a fifty-million-dollar "President's Fund" that Congress had appropriated for Wilson to spend at his own discretion.

Creel gave Wilson his money's worth. He regarded the war as "a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure in advertising." His Committee handled all news releases of all government departments and followed a policy of "unparalleled openness," putting editors, publishers, and writers on their honor to censor themselves. Opposing censorship, Creel virtually created a public mood that assured co-operation. He persuaded the leading commercial artists to draw war posters that plastered the country. He lined up seventy-five thousand "four-minute men" to speak to all motion-picture and theater audiences about the war. He arranged for the preparation and publication of newspaper features, magazine articles, and books. He had spokesmen from abroad give the American public first-hand accounts of the war in Europe. He had Wilson's war speeches spread all over the world.

In 1916 everybody in America was singing "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier" (T.R. had said that it made as much sense to say "I Didn't Raise My Girl to Be a Mother"); by 1917 George M. Cohan's "Over There" swept the country, and Irving Berlin had joined the Army and written "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning." Theaters played "The Star-Spangled Banner" at the beginning of every performance, and audiences even began to learn the words. Most opera companies and symphony orchestras banned all German music. Some states stopped teaching German in their public schools. Sauerkraut became



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*Herbert C. Hoover as Food
Administrator, 1917*

"liberty cabbage"; dachshunds became "liberty pups"; German measles became "liberty measles." Stuart P. Sherman, Professor of English at the University of Illinois, warned against "Prussianism streaming into Anglo-Saxon communities through the forty volumes of Carlyle." Senator La Follette's two boys watched a crowd hang their father in effigy. When Balfour visited the United States in 1917, Frank L. Polk, Counsellor to the State Department, told him, "Mr. Balfour, it took Great Britain three years to reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade. You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great criminals as you are."

Not since Civil War days had Americans experienced such rapid and shattering changes as they went through in 1917; and being a mercurial people, inclined to go from one extreme to another, the

popular mood reflected the pressures of the time. On January 1, 1917, the regular Army had numbered one hundred thousand men, the National Guard about one hundred and fifty thousand. By the end of the year almost one million, two hundred thousand Americans had gone into uniform. The American private-enterprise system had submitted to government control, supervised by leading businessmen who served their country at the nominal salary of a dollar a year. Food and fuel were rationed. The wholesale prices of many raw materials were fixed. Baruch's War Industries Board had to approve every building contract of more than twenty-five hundred dollars. Agriculture boomed as the Government offered to buy at fixed prices all the grain the farmers could grow. Huge tracts of grasslands went under the plow. Shipyards, operating with cost-plus government contracts, started to build twelve million tons of emergency shipping. Wilson made Herbert Hoover Food Administrator. He put William G. McAdoo, his Secretary of the Treasury, in charge of the railroads. The Government also

took over the telephone and telegraph system and the coal mines.

Hoover's record as Food Administrator for Belgium had made him a world figure, until the American declaration of war on Germany put him out of a job. Like Baruch, Hoover had made himself a multimillionaire before he had reached the age of forty. His parents had died during his early childhood and he had received a Quaker upbringing from aunts and uncles in Iowa. He put himself through Leland Stanford University, where he studied engineering, and then spent most of his life abroad, working for British mining companies. Just before the outbreak of war he had received an offer to head one of the largest mining consortiums in the world, but he made up his mind to devote the rest of his life to public and humanitarian service. He dug up more than five thousand dollars from his own pocket to help stranded Americans home from Europe, and then accepted the post of Food Administrator for Belgium. He devised the title himself, and Ambassador Page credited him with having saved the Belgian people from starvation. Hoover had prevailed on the British Admiralty to let food through the blockade and on the German High Command to get it distributed. The people who had worked most closely with him admired him most.

During 1917 Hoover became a symbol to the American people. They did not save food; they "Hooverized." The man himself, however, made few public appearances, preferring to remain more or less in the background. Secretary McAdoo, a Georgia-born lawyer in his middle fifties, operated quite differently and no less effectively. He had made his fortune reorganizing the bankrupt Hudson River tubes connecting New York and Jersey City, and Wilson had taken him into his original Cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury. McAdoo had married Wilson's vivacious and much younger daughter Eleanor, and when war came he horrified and amazed the orthodox bankers by organizing a series of Liberty Bond drives, based primarily on mass, popular subscription. The first, two-billion-dollar loan went over the top. So did the second, four-billion-dollar loan. On December 28 Wilson made McAdoo Director General of all railroads.

McAdoo had political ambitions, but his political views did not always parallel his father-in-law's. He had favored a stronger attitude toward Germany and then leaped aboard the prohibition bandwagon which began to roll fast soon after the declaration of war. Both the House and Senate approved an amendment to the Constitution forbidding the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. More than half the country had already voted itself dry.

Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley saw trouble ahead. "King Alcohol no longer rules th' sea or th' land," he told his bar-tending friend Hennessy. "Take a dhrink, me boy, whether you need it or not. Take it



BROWN BROTHERS

William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, with Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., at the left

now. It may be ye'er last." Mr. Dooley went on to suggest that prohibition might not be so bad. Mr. Hennessy did not agree. "I don't believe in this here prohibition," said Mr. Hennessy. "Th' man who dhrinks modhrately ought to be allowed to have what he wants." "What is his name?" asked Mr. Dooley. "What novel is he in?"

Since neither Colonel Theodore Roosevelt nor General Leonard Wood needed any alcohol to stimulate their war spirit, the Democratic administration in Washington gave them the cold-water treatment. Roosevelt had never brought himself to call on Wilson in the White House until his deter-

mination to raise and lead a volunteer division to France made him pocket his pride. Letters to the War Department had got him nowhere. His only hope lay in putting the matter before Wilson, man to man. "I am going to tell Wilson," Roosevelt said to a friend; "that if he will give me this division, I will give him my promise never to oppose him politically in any way whatsoever." To another friend he declared, "I will promise Wilson that if he will send me to France I will not come back alive."

Wilson received Roosevelt with every courtesy, but the supplicant smelled a rat: "If I talked to another man as he talked to me," said Roosevelt, "it would mean that that man was going to get permission to fight. But I was talking to Mr. Wilson. His words may mean much, they may mean little." To a Brooklyn audience a few weeks later he said, "I ask only that I be given a chance to render a service which I know I can render, and nine out of ten of those who oppose me do so because they believe I will render it too well." Although Clemenceau entered a personal plea in Roosevelt's behalf, Wilson turned the suggestion down: "It would be very agreeable to me to pay Mr. Roosevelt this compliment, and the Allies the compliment of sending an ex-President, but this is not the time for compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision." When Roosevelt, shortly afterward, took to his bed,

Taft remarked, "I have no hard feeling toward Theodore. And if I had I could certainly wish him no worse luck than to be sick in bed while Woodrow Wilson runs his war."

General Wood felt that he had received even rougher treatment. He had gone to France in the summer of 1917 to receive special training and then returned to Camp Leavenworth to organize the First Division for action overseas. This became famous as the best-trained American outfit to go abroad, but just before it sailed Wood was relieved of his command.

He already felt the administration had passed him by when it appointed General John J. Pershing chief of the American Expeditionary Force in France. The fact was that Pershing had attended West Point, Wood had not, and West Point dominated the Army as the Democratic Party dominated Washington. Wood's personality also worked against him. As Wilson wrote to the editor of the *Springfield Republican* after Wood's removal from the First Division: "I have had a great deal of experience with General Wood. He is a man of unusual ability, but apparently absolutely unable to subordinate his judgment to those who are superior to him in command." Although it was Pershing and the West Pointers, not Wilson and Baker, who kept Wood on the sidelines, he felt that a hostile, small-minded Democratic administration had prevented him from earning wartime glory. And plenty of other Republicans—like their Party symbol, the elephant—did not forget.



UNDERWOOD

General Leonard Wood

• V •

THE IMPACT OF WAR ON ASIA; THE IMPACT OF REVOLUTION ON RUSSIA

THE JAPANESE had taken advantage of the war in Europe to seize Germany's positions in Asia and to force China to accept most of the notorious Twenty-one Demands. But they did not dare to go too far or too fast for fear the Allies would exclude them from the peace conference. Their diplomats therefore signed a series of open and secret treaties with Britain and France. The open treaties ruled out any sep-

arate peace. The secret treaties recognized Japan's claim to Germany's former rights in Shantung Province and to all German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Japan recognized British claims to the German Pacific islands below the equator.


The secret treaties and the Twenty-one Demands violated the Open Door doctrine, but the United States could only file empty protests until its declaration of war upon Germany made it a co-belligerent with Japan. In August, 1917, American pressure forced the reluctant Government of China to declare war upon Germany, whereupon China's Parliament quit Peking in disgust and set up a separate, rebel regime in Canton. At the same time the Japanese, recognizing that they, too, had to come to terms with the United States, sent one of their most accomplished diplomats, Viscount Ishii, to Washington. After two months of haggling, he and Secretary Lansing signed an agreement in which Ishii promised to respect the Open Door and not take advantage of the war to seek special rights or privileges in China, while Lansing acknowledged that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." But Lansing had mental reservations about the clauses favorable to Japan just as Ishii had reservations about the clauses favorable to the United States. Both men therefore bowed to the needs of the moment and signed a self-contradictory agreement, hoping for the best. The United States could not force Japan out of China and at the same time wage war upon Germany. Japan could not defy the United States without risking exclusion from the peace conference. The war in Europe compelled the two countries to postpone a settlement of their differences. The showdown awaited the outbreak of peace.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution strengthened the Japanese position farther north. During the twelve years that had passed since the Treaty of Portsmouth established zones of Japanese and Russian influence in Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, relations between the two countries had steadily improved. They had agreed, in effect, to partition North China between themselves. Now the Japanese had reason to hope that they might acquire all of Russia's Far Eastern holdings as they had already acquired all of Germany's. General Alexeiev, Russia's Supreme Commander, made no secret of his despair. "Let us be frank," he announced soon after the Provisional Government assumed power in March, "the fighting spirit of the Russian Army is exhausted. Only yesterday stern and powerful, it now faces the enemy in a trance of fatal inaction. A longing for peace and quiet has replaced the old, traditional loyalty to the country."

In the middle of May, Milyukov resigned as Foreign Minister and Kerensky became Minister of War. The new Government promised to speed up domestic reform and step up the war effort. General Brusilov replaced General Alexeiev as Commander in Chief, and Kerensky toured the fronts exhorting the soldiers to fight. In late June, Brusilov ordered an offensive against the Austrians, but the Germans soon counterattacked and by early August cleared Galicia and Bukovina of all Russian troops. Meanwhile, Bolshevik agitation increased behind the Russian lines. Trotsky, Vice President of the 1905 St. Petersburg Soviet, had arrived from the United States. He belonged to neither the Menshevik nor the Bolshevik faction, but threw his support to Lenin and soon proved himself second only to Lenin as an agitator and organizer.

The failure of Brusilov's summer offensive led the rank and file of the Petrograd Bolsheviks to ignore the advice of their leaders and attempt an insurrection that the police and troops of the Provisional Government suppressed. Trotsky, Kamenev, and other top Bolsheviks found themselves in jail. Lenin escaped to Finland. On July 25 Kerensky assumed the Premiership, and six weeks later General Kornilov, whom the previous Government had installed as Commander in Chief, tried to lead a counterrevolution. General Alexeiev described Kornilov as "a man with a lion's heart and the brain of a sheep." Kornilov held extremely reactionary views and permitted the Germans to take Riga almost without a struggle, while he gathered his most reliable troops for a march on Petrograd. But the Army refused to back him, and when Kerensky saw which way the wind was blowing he denounced Kornilov, had him arrested and jailed. Meanwhile the Provisional Government had resigned, and in its place Kerensky set up a five-man directory such as Kornilov had planned to create. "Kerensky," said Lenin, "is a Kornilovist who has accidentally quarreled with Kornilov, and continues in intimate union with the other Kornilovists." The five-man directory that Kerensky headed included one admiral, one general, one renegade Menshevik, and the young millionaire Tereschenko whose pro-war, pro-Allied views made him the ideal Foreign Minister of the newly proclaimed Russian Republic.

But the Kornilov plot put new life into the Soviets and vindicated the Bolsheviks. While Kerensky organized his five-man directory the Soviets organized a new "Committee of Struggle Against the Counterrevolution." Soon a delegation from this committee visited the imprisoned Trotsky to urge a general insurrection. "No, not yet," Trotsky advised. "Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle with Kerensky." Lenin said, "Not for Kerensky, but against Kornilov." On September 17 the vacillating Kerensky tried to appease the extremists by releasing Trotsky from prison. The Petrograd Soviet



UNDERWOOD

Alexander Kerensky, center, Reviewing Russian Troops in Petrograd

at once elected him President and went over to the Bolsheviks. It was the same story in Moscow, where the Bolsheviks won a majority of seats in the district Dumas and popular support of the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries shrank. The Social Revolutionaries split, the leftist minority cooperating with the Bolsheviks. Although Bolshevism made slow progress among the peasants, violence spread throughout the country. More and more mutinies broke out in the armed services, especially in the Navy. City workers went on strike and sacked food stores. Peasants burned manor houses and murdered their landlords. Since 1914 the war had cost over half a million Russian lives every six months. The summer offensive of 1917 added another fifty-six thousand to the toll. The figure seemed trivial compared to the great battles of 1914, 1915, and 1916. But that one futile demonstration cost twenty or thirty times as many lives as all the insurrections that had preceded and followed the abdication of the Tsar. "Ah, these Russians," exclaimed a French officer while observing some of the 1917 disturbances, "they are original. What a civil war! Everything except the fighting!"

Lenin, from his Helsingfors hiding place, saw events in a different perspective. He concluded that the time had come to overthrow Kerensky and set up a Soviet regime. "Not a Parliamentary Republic," he

declared, "a return to it from the Soviets of Workmen's delegates would be a step backward, but a Republic of the Soviets and Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates throughout the whole country."

• VI •


THE BOLSHEVIKS TAKE POWER

ON OCTOBER 23 twelve of the twenty-one members of the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee met secretly in Petrograd. Lenin attended, shorn of his goatee, and wearing a wig and spectacles. He had spent almost one hundred days in hiding but had followed all the papers, received reports from Party comrades, and written articles, pamphlets, and part of an uncompleted book, *The State and Revolution*, which he laid aside with the comment, "It is pleasanter and more profitable to be going through a revolutionary experience than to be writing about it." By this time the Bolsheviks controlled the local Soviets in the larger Russian cities and had even made some headway among the peasants. The slogans of immediate peace without annexations or indemnities, self-determination for all peoples, land to the peasant, bread to the worker, and all power to the Soviets were sweeping the country. The Petrograd Soviet was about to consider the creation of a Military-Revolutionary Committee to direct an uprising, overthrow the Provisional Government, and set up a Soviet Government in its place.

For ten hours the Bolshevik leaders wrangled over the line that their party, which dominated the Petrograd Soviet, should take. Most of those present counseled caution, but Lenin disagreed: "The success of the Russian and the world revolution depends on a two or three days' struggle," he argued. "The whole future of the international workers' revolution is at stake. The crisis is ripe." All the military leaders and all the intellectuals present, except Trotsky, opposed Lenin. Then an angry Petrograd workman spoke: "I speak for the Petrograd proletariat. We are in favor of insurrection. Have it your own way, but I tell you now that if you allow the Soviets to be destroyed, we're through with you." In the voting that followed, only Zinoviev and Kamenev opposed Lenin.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets planned to meet in Petrograd on November 7, and the Bolsheviks timed the insurrection to coincide with the meeting. Lenin became the brains of the insurrection, Trotsky its voice. In his *History of the Russian Revolution* Trotsky gives this picture of the Petrograd crowds that he addressed during these late October and early November days:

"The people of the slums, of the attics and basements, stood still by the hour in threadbare coat or gray uniform, with caps or heavy shawls



TRIANGLE

Last Session of the Russian Duma, Petrograd, 1917

still on their heads, the mud of the streets soaked through their shoes, an autumn cough catching at their throats. They stood there packed shoulder to shoulder, and crowding ever closer to make room for more, to make room for all, listening tirelessly, hungrily, passionately, demanding, fearing lest they miss a word of what it is so necessary to understand, to assimilate, and to do. It had seemed as though during the months past, the weeks—at least during the very last days—all the words had been spoken. But no! Today at least those words have a different sound. The masses are experiencing them in a new way, not as a gospel but as an obligation to act. The experience of the revolution, the war, the heavy struggle of a whole bitter lifetime, rose from the depths of memory in each of those poverty-stricken men and women, expressing itself in simple and imperious thoughts: This way we can go no further, we must break a road to the future.”

The Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet hastily organized itself and the city. But the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks took over the details and prepared to have armed workers and sailors from the near-by naval base at Kronstadt occupy the railroad stations, the power plants, the munitions and food stores, the waterworks, the bridges, the telephone exchanges, the Post and Telegraph Offices, the State Bank, and the larger printing plants. Kerensky's

five-man directory found itself more and more isolated. It had excluded the Kadets and the Bolsheviks; it was losing the support of the Mensheviks, and the Left Social Revolutionaries. The young American correspondent John Reed, whose Socialist connections gave him access to the revolutionaries and whose social connections opened the doors of the aristocrats, reported: "One evening I spent at the house of a Moscow merchant. During tea we asked eleven people at the table whether they preferred 'Wilhelm or the Bolsheviks.' The vote was ten to one for Wilhelm." Officers on the northern front told Reed they "frankly preferred a military defeat to working with the soldiers' committees."

But the soldiers—and sailors—refused to obey their reactionary officers. They also ignored the orders of Kerensky, who fled Petrograd early in the morning of November 7 after persuading the American Embassy to put an automobile flying an American flag at his disposition. Seating himself in his own private car, with the embassy car in the rear, Kerensky sped through the streets of Petrograd and made his way to army headquarters behind the front. "It is needless to say," wrote Kerensky of his exodus from Petrograd, "that the whole street—both the passers-by and the soldiers—immediately recognized me. I saluted as always, a little carelessly and with an easy smile." "Incomparable picture," commented Trotsky in his history. "Carelessly and smiling—thus the February regime passed into the kingdom of the shades." At the same moment the Military-Revolutionary Committee announced that the Provisional Government no longer existed and that all power belonged to the Soviets. Lenin's schedule had worked with perfect precision. When the All-Russian Congress of Soviets met on the evening of November 7 most of the remaining officials of the former Provisional Government had been arrested, and the power lay there for the Soviets to take. Kerensky's regime had vanished without resistance—almost without bloodshed.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets assembled in the Smolny Institute, a former girls' finishing school in the outskirts of Petrograd, where the Soviets had maintained headquarters. Since the first session of the Congress in June the Bolsheviks had acquired a majority of the delegates and therefore took charge of proceedings. The Menshevik and Social Revolutionary minority stalled for time; the Bolsheviks also wanted to wait until the last supporters of the Provisional Government had been cleaned out of the Winter Palace. At ten-forty in the evening, the meeting finally came to order. The damp, unwashed bodies of thousands of workers, soldiers, and peasants had given some warmth to the unheated hall. Fourteen Bolsheviks and seven Left Social Revolutionaries guided the proceedings. Lenin, still in his disguise, did not appear



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Bolsheviki: "We Are the Latest Russian Government." Cartoon by Raemaekers

announced that it would "at once propose an immediate democratic peace to all nations and an immediate truce on all fronts. It will assure the free transfer of landlord, crown, and monastery lands to the Land Committees, defend the soldiers' rights, enforcing a complete democratization of the Army, establish workers' control over production, ensure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the proper date, take means to supply bread to the cities and articles of first necessity to the villages, and secure to all nationalities living in Russia a real right to independent existence." It called upon the soldiers in the trenches to be "watchful and steadfast," to defend the Revolution "against all attacks of Imperialism," and to make active resistance against Kornilov and Kerensky.

Although the Congress voted to meet at one o'clock in the afternoon, it did not come to order until eight-forty. Most of the Bolshevik leaders wanted to set up an all-Socialist Soviet Government, with a minority of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. Lenin and Trotsky held out for an all-Bolshevik Government and finally prevailed. In *Ten Days That Shook the World*, John Reed, who witnessed all these events, wrote this description of Lenin when he appeared on the platform: "It was just eight-forty when a thundering wave of cheers announced the entrance of the presidium, with Lenin—great Lenin—among them. A short, stocky figure, with a big head set down in his shoulders, bald and bulging. Little eyes, a snubbish nose, wide, generous mouth, and heavy chin; clean-shaven now, but already beginning to bristle with the well-known

on the platform or speak. The Menshevik and Right Social Revolutionary leaders stayed away.

The meeting lasted until five in the morning as delegate after delegate endorsed the Bolshevik program. Finally, against the opposition of a few Mensheviks, it issued an appeal to all Russian workers, peasants, and soldiers and adjourned until the next afternoon. "The Provisional Government is deposed," said the declaration. It continued, "The Congress resolved: that all local power shall be transferred to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, which must enforce revolutionary order." The Congress

beard of his past and future. Dressed in shabby clothes, his trousers much too long for him. Unimpressive, to be the idol of a mob, loved and revered as perhaps few leaders in history have been. A strange, popular leader—a leader purely by virtue of intellect; colorless, humorless, uncompromising, and detached, without picturesque idiosyncrasies—but with the power of explaining profound ideas in simple terms, of analyzing a concrete situation. And combined with shrewdness, the greatest intellectual audacity.”

Kamenev again presided, and after he had reported the actions of the Military-Revolutionary Committee and half a dozen speakers had attacked and defended the Soviets’ assumption of full power, Lenin arose: “We shall now proceed to construct the Socialist order.” After a few introductory remarks he read the first proclamation of the new Russian Government of Workers and Peasants created by the Soviets. It ran to more than a thousand words and called for an immediate three-month armistice on all fronts to be followed by “a just and democratic peace,” self-determination of all nations, no annexations or indemnities, no secret diplomacy. The new Russian Government offered to enter into peace negotiations or discussions at once and in public. The proclamation closed with a special appeal to “the conscious workers of the three nations most devoted to humanity and the three most important nations among those taking part in the present war—England, France, and Germany.”

Two hours after the meeting had opened it adopted the proclamation by a unanimous vote. Lenin then read the “Decree on the Land” abolishing all private ownership of land immediately without compensation and turning all land over to the township land committees and the local peasant Soviets. At 2 A.M. the meeting adopted the decree with one dissenting vote, and half an hour later Kamenev announced the formation of a provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government to be known as the Council of People’s Commissars. The names of Lenin as President of the Council and Trotsky as Foreign Minister drew the most applause. The last name on the list of fifteen was Stalin, Chairman for Nationalities. Every member of the new Government belonged to the Bolshevik Party. All had spent years in exile or prison. And of these fifteen, eleven were middle-class intellectuals; only four came from the working class. Trotsky gave them the name of People’s Commissars, not Ministers. Their Government was not a Ministry or Cabinet, but a Soviet of People’s Commissars, or Sovnarkom, for short. Lenin found the word “minister” “a repulsive, worn-out designation.” When Trotsky suggested commissar he exclaimed, “That is splendid. That smells of revolution.”

Lenin did not want to head the new Government or hold any official title. He hoped to continue to make policy behind the scenes as a mem-

ber of the Central Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party. For once, however, his comrades voted him down and made him take full, open responsibility. On November 8 he and Trotsky issued and signed a peace decree that *Pravda* later summarized this way: "The Army of the Russian Revolution leans upon inexhaustible reserves. The oppressed nations of Asia (China, India, Persia) await just as passionately the fall of the capitalist regime of violence as do the oppressed proletarian masses of all Europe. To merge these forces into a world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the historic task of the workers and peasants of Russia."

• VII •

THE BOLSHEVIKS HOLD POWER

THE BOLSHEVIKS seized power in Petrograd before they seized power in Moscow and other cities. They called for an immediate peace and abolished private property in land before they nationalized industry. Within a week Kerensky fled the country disguised as a sailor. His attempt to lead a body of troops against Petrograd fizzled out. Even the civil servants who had stayed away from their jobs for a few days eventually drifted back. Trotsky soon got his hands on the Tsar's secret treaties and at once revealed some of the less idealistic war aims and methods of the Allies. The Allied Governments ignored Trotsky's peace proposals but quickly organized and financed counterrevolutionary Governments in Finland and the Ukraine that entered at once into secret negotiations with the Germans.

Not for the first time, the Bolsheviks also turned to the Germans. Lenin had entered Russia by the grace of the German General Staff. During the summer of 1917 he had no scruples about accepting more than fifty million gold marks from the Germans to promote Bolshevik propaganda. Naturally, the Bolsheviks did not publicize this transaction, but their official historians of the period never denied it. On November 26 the Bolsheviks approached the Germans again, this time with proposals of an immediate armistice and peace negotiations in line with the Bolshevik slogan of "no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination of peoples." General Ludendorff asked General Hoffmann, who had inherited the command on the Eastern front, "Is it possible to negotiate with these people?" Hoffmann replied, "Yes, it is possible. Your Excellency needs troops, and this is the easiest way to get them."


Ludendorff, who had become the real ruler of Germany, took Hoffmann's advice and an armistice was signed on December 16. By this

time German troops were already pouring from the Eastern to the Western front, while Russian troops scattered homeward, to the east. But Hoffmann and Ludendorff had quite different ideas about the peace terms. Hoffmann favored pulling German troops out of all the Russian and most of the Polish territories they had occupied and concentrating all available manpower on the Western front. Recalling that the Polish minority in eastern Germany had made nothing but trouble, he suggested the annexation of only a small strip of additional territory, with a population of one hundred thousand Poles, to protect the Silesian coal fields. The new Foreign Secretary, Richard von Kuhlmann, backed Hoffmann, pointing out that a generous German settlement with Russia would confound the Allied propagandists whereas a stiff settlement would stiffen the resolve of the Allies to continue the war. The Kaiser and Chancellor Hertling supported Hoffmann's and Kuhlmann's views.

When the Kaiser consulted Hindenburg and Ludendorff he discovered once again who really ruled Germany. Ludendorff spoke first, shouting at the Kaiser that he had no business consulting Hoffmann before taking the High Command into his confidence. "We must certainly think this matter over carefully," murmured Hindenburg. Five days later—on January 7—Hindenburg wrote the Kaiser: "The events of January 2 have been a cause of pain to General Ludendorff and myself, and have shown us that Your Majesty disregards our opinion in a matter of vital importance for the existence of the German Fatherland." The Kaiser capitulated. Hindenburg and Ludendorff insisted that Germany annex all territories that German arms had vanquished. When Kuhlmann asked him why he regarded the Russian provinces of Kurland and Lithuania as vital, Hindenburg replied, "I need them for the maneuvering of my left wing in the next war."

On the same day that Hindenburg and Ludendorff sent their ultimatum to the Kaiser, Trotsky appeared at German headquarters in the Russian-Polish city of Brest Litovsk for the final negotiations. He insisted on full publicity for all discussions, and Kuhlmann, hoping to expose the latent nationalism of the new masters of Russia, agreed. Hoffmann, as Kuhlmann's military adviser, delivered a strong speech outlining the hopelessness of Russia's military position. This delighted Trotsky, who gave it the widest publicity in order to prove to the Russian people—and the world—that the Germans were dictating peace at the point of a bayonet. As Kuhlmann summed up the position of the Russians, "They can only choose the kind of sauce with which they will be eaten."

When Trotsky saw the terms the Germans did propose, he and a majority of the Bolshevik delegation at Brest Litovsk wanted to reject



The Brest-Litovsk Peace Negotiations: A German artist's impressions

them. *Pravda* had declared that "Germany and its allies have no plans whatsoever of territorial aggrandizement, and similarly have no desire to destroy or limit the political independence of any nation." But Professor Pokrovsky, a member of the Russian delegation, now asked, "How can one speak of peace without annexations if Russia is being deprived of territories equal in size to approximately eighteen provinces?" General Sacalon, one of the Russian military experts, expressed his despair by committing suicide. Nevertheless when the Russian delegation went home for consultations, Lenin urged acceptance of the German terms.

By this time the Bolsheviks had liquidated most of the democratic liberties that the Russian Revolution had begun to establish. "We will destroy everything," Lenin told one of his friends, "and on the ruins we will build our temple. It will be a temple of happiness for all. But we will destroy the entire bourgeoisie. Remember this. We will stand on ceremony with no one. Remember that the Lenin you knew ten years ago no longer exists. He is dead." Two weeks after the Bolsheviks took power, Lenin's friend and supporter Maxim Gorky warned in his own newspaper, "The working class cannot fail to realize that Lenin is experimenting with its blood, and trying to strain the revolutionary mood of the proletariat to the limit to see what the outcome will be." Lenin met this kind of attack by suppressing most of the opposition press, be-

ginning with the Liberal, Social Revolutionary, and Menshevik organs. On December 1 he suppressed the Kadet Party.

Before the Bolsheviks came to power they had denounced the Provisional Government for its delay in holding general elections and summoning a constitutional convention. A date had finally been set—November 25, 1917—and the Bolsheviks went through with the election that they had continually urged the Provisional Government to hold. The Social Revolutionaries got 57 per cent of the popular vote and a clear majority in the Assembly. The Bolsheviks, whose strength in the trade unions gave them control over the Soviets, won only 25 per cent of the popular vote, the bourgeois parties less than 10 per cent. This was no victory for reaction. It was victory for a democratic revolution of the peasants over a dictatorial revolution of the industrial workers.

The Bolshevik Government, however, managed to postpone the opening of the newly elected Constituent Assembly until the middle of January, and when it did gather the Bolshevik delegation presented a resolution to put all state power in the hands of the Soviets, which the Bolsheviks controlled, and walked out in a body after a majority of the Assembly voted the resolution down. The meeting continued into the small hours of the morning, and when the delegates returned to continue their deliberations at noon the following day they found that the Bolshevik Government had barred all entrances with armed troops. At the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet, Lenin declared: "The people wanted the Constituent Assembly summoned and we summoned it. But they sensed immediately what this famous Constituent Assembly represented. And now we have carried out the will of the people which is All Power to the Soviets. . . . The Constituent Assembly is dissolved. The Soviet Revolutionary Republic will triumph at no matter what cost."

Privately Lenin told Trotsky: "We made a mistake in not postponing the calling of the Constituent Assembly. We acted very incautiously. But it all came out for the best. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Soviet Government means a complete and frank liquidation of the idea of democracy by the idea of dictatorship. It will serve as a good lesson."

To make the lesson stick Lenin began in late December to set up a Soviet secret police, known as the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Speculation, or Cheka, for short. At its head he placed Felix Dzerzhinsky, a frail, slender, stooped ascetic with bloodless lips, pointed beard, and pale, fanatical eyes. Dzerzhinsky, the son of a rich Polish landowner, had joined the Social Democratic Party and spent most of his life in jail. In his first speech before the picked men who worked under him he declared, "We have no need for justice

now. We need a battle to the death. I propose, I demand, the initiation of the revolutionary sword which will put an end to all counterrevolutionaries, not tomorrow, but today, at once." The Cheka lost no time in discovering real and imaginary plots against the new Government and executing all suspects.

On January 21, 1918, the Brest Litovsk delegation reported back to the Bolshevik Central Committee. Lenin urged acceptance of the German terms. Trotsky suggested the formula of "no peace, no war," and the Committee adopted his proposal by a majority of one vote. The delegation returned to Brest Litovsk, where Trotsky announced on February 10 that he would sign no treaty with the Central powers and that as far as Russia was concerned the war had ended. The Soviet Commander in Chief ordered all Russian troops in the field demobilized. The Kaiser ordered Kuhlmann to withdraw the German delegation from Brest Litovsk, and on February 18 the German Government denounced the armistice and Hoffmann ordered a general advance on all fronts. No Russian troops opposed him anywhere. Within a week the Germans had occupied the Ukraine, Estonia, and Livonia. One German army had pushed to within one hundred and twenty miles of Petrograd.

Dissension tore the Bolsheviks. Lenin favored peace with Germany at any price. A large minority wanted to put up a fight. Trotsky, when the final vote came, abstained. But Lenin carried the day, and another Russian delegation went to Brest Litovsk, where the Germans imposed even stiffer terms than they had demanded in January. When the Brest Litovsk delegation laid the text of the amended treaty before Lenin he exclaimed, "What, not only do you want me to sign this impudent treaty, but also to read it? No, no, never! I shall neither read it nor carry out its terms whenever there is a chance not to do so."

Under the final Brest Litovsk terms, the Russians ceded to Germany more than three hundred thousand square miles with a population of fifty-six millions, three-quarters of their coal and iron reserves, and one-quarter of their railways. But the treaty boomeranged on its authors. It confirmed everything the Allied propagandists had said about German ruthlessness. It also forced the Germans to keep a million occupation troops on war-ravaged Russian territory that yielded almost nothing in the way of supplies. Only the Turks benefited. They acquired the strategic provinces of Kars and Ardahan in the Caucasus and the Black Sea oil port of Batum.

At the time that Lenin was insisting that the Bolshevik Government sign any kind of peace with Germany, he had a talk with Captain R. H. Bruce Lockhart, whom the British Foreign Office had stationed in Russia to maintain contact with the Bolshevik leaders. Lockhart kept

trying to persuade his superiors to establish relations with the Bolsheviks and kept trying to persuade the Bolsheviks to support the Allies. Lenin remained skeptical, though personally friendly. "Our ways are not your ways," he told Lockhart, "we can afford to compromise temporarily with capital. It is even necessary, for, if capital were to unite, we should be crushed at this stage of our development. Fortunately for us, it is in the nature of capital that it cannot unite. So long, therefore, as the German danger exists, I am prepared to risk co-operation with the Allies which would be temporarily advantageous to both of us.

In the event of German aggression, I am even willing to accept military support. At the same time, I am quite convinced that your Government will never see things in this light. It is a reactionary Government. It will co-operate with the Russian reactionaries." The year 1918 had not run its course before Lenin's prophecy came true.



The Peace of Brest-Litovsk: What the Germany of Hindenburg and Ludendorff did to the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky

SUMMING UP

RUSSIA'S WITHDRAWAL from the war and America's entrance both prolonged hostilities. The Russian withdrawal gave the Germans new reason to hope for early victory. The American entrance gave the Allies more reason to believe that they would eventually prevail. At the end of 1917 the Germans could look back with satisfaction on Nivelle's disastrous offensive in the West and on the Italian rout at Caporetto. The Allies could look back with satisfaction on the failure of the U-boat campaign and on the collapse of Turkish power in the Middle East. The Bolshevik seizure of power took Russia completely out of the war, and the Peace of Brest Litovsk gave Germany complete control of Russia's richest territories. But the ultimate consequences of the Bolshevik triumph remained impossible to assess. Had the Germans overreached themselves at Brest Litovsk? Would the Russian Revolution sweep over all of Europe?

The further ahead the Germans looked, the darker their prospects

appeared. They must either win spectacular victories early in 1918 or make up their minds to the continued agonies of defensive warfare, with the odds against them steadily rising. By the same token, the further ahead the Allies looked, the brighter the picture. In time, the entrance of the United States into the war would much more than offset the defection of Russia. Already the United States Navy had proved its worth in defeating the German submarine menace, but the United States Army could not become a major factor on the Western front until 1919. In the long run, the power of America made Allied victory a sure thing—but how long would this run be? Much depended on the moral leadership of Woodrow Wilson and on his continued ability to make millions believe that the sacrifices they were making would not prove in vain.

6

1918

The year of Germany's collapse made Wilson the leader of world democracy and Lenin the leader of world revolution.

PREVIEW

PRESIDENT WILSON opened the year 1918 with a propaganda offensive. His Fourteen Points defined Allied war aims in detail and weakened the German will to fight. Ludendorff replied in March with a military offensive in the West, but superior Allied morale held Germany's superior might in check. By July the Germans had shot their bolt in the West and the tide began to turn against the Central powers on all fronts. In September and October, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria dropped out of the fighting, and finally a new and more democratic German Government sued for peace. Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution had given rise to terror, intervention, and civil war. The most serious threats to the new regime came from the Allied Expeditionary Force in Siberia and from Anarchists and Left Social Revolutionaries at home. In July the Bolsheviks executed the Tsar and all his family. In August an attempt on Lenin's life led to an intensification of the Red Terror. When Germany finally surrendered in November, Wilson believed the war had made the world safe for democracy; Lenin believed the war had made the world safe for revolution.

• I •

THE CENTRAL POWERS CRUMBLE ON ALL FRONTS

ON JANUARY 8, 1918, President Wilson made himself the leader of the Allied cause by giving the Allies what they had always lacked: a war program worth fighting for. He called this program the Fourteen Points, which he outlined, in his annual message to Congress, as the basis on which the United States would make peace. Some time later Clemenceau commented that the good Lord had given the world only ten commandments, but that Wilson could not do with less than fourteen.

Wilson's Fourteen Points at once became the most effective propaganda weapon in the Allied arsenal. They steeled the Allied peoples to make further sacrifices; they undermined the popular will to victory in Germany; they put the Bolsheviks on the defensive, forcing Lenin and Trotsky to denounce Wilson as a bourgeois hypocrite and a liberal mouthpiece for imperialist reaction. In one respect the Fourteen Points fell short of Wilson's hopes. They did not prevent Germany from dictating the Peace of Brest Litovsk.

In brief summary, Wilson's Fourteen Points ran as follows: 1. Open covenants openly arrived at; 2. Freedom of the seas; 3. Freedom of trade; 4. Disarmament; 5. Adjustment of colonial claims; 6. Evacuation and restoration of Russia; 7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium; 8. Return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; 9. Readjustment of Italian frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality; 10. Self-determination for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; 11. Evacuation, restoration, and self-determination for the Balkans and access to the sea for Serbia; 12. Continued sovereignty for the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire; "undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" for all other nationalities within the Empire; freedom of commerce for all nations through the Dardanelles under international guarantees; 13. An independent Polish state with access to the sea; and last but not least: "14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Chancellor Hertling of Germany made a point-by-point reply to Wilson's proposals. He refused to consider the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, insisted that Germany and Austria must determine the future of Poland, said that the Treaty of Brest Litovsk had settled the Russian question, and objected to the proposals on Italy, Turkey, and the Balkans. In Austria-Hungary, however, Foreign Minister Czernin described Wilson's proposals as "a considerable approximation to the Austro-Hungarian standpoint" and suggested that any differences could be composed. On February 12 President Wilson released a four-point program of general principles, emphasizing that permanent peace must be based on "essential justice," not upon "mere adjustment or compromise." By the end of March, however, the war of words had given way to the war of guns.


As long ago as November 11, 1917, Ludendorff and his staff officers had decided, in Hindenburg's absence, that Germany's sole hope of victory lay in "a gambler's throw" on the Western front. Hindenburg supported the plan and early in January demanded that the Kaiser give the orders and take the responsibility for a great spring offensive in the

West. As in the case of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Kaiser, Chancellor Hertling, and Foreign Secretary Kuhlmann all opposed the advice of the High Command, preferring to remain on the defensive in their strong Western-front positions, in the hope of negotiating a favorable peace while they still had a large army well entrenched on foreign soil. But once again the High Command prevailed.

Since 1914 each great battle on the Western front had surpassed the one before, in weight of gunfire, in casualties, in scope. New weapons and new tactics had appeared—airplanes, poison gas, liquid fire, tanks. The defender had always thrown back the attacker, and because the Allies had attacked more often than the Germans, they had suffered heavier casualties. By the spring of 1918 Allied losses in the West and the Russian collapse in the East gave the Germans an advantage they had not enjoyed since 1914. For the first time in almost four years they had superior manpower and gunfire. Although American troops were pouring across the Atlantic at the rate of one hundred and twenty-five thousand a month, the Germans were pouring a larger number of men from East to West. The number of British troops on the Western front had declined by one hundred and eighty thousand since 1917.

Ludendorff decided to strike soon and hard by concentrating his superior forces at certain key spots and trying to envelop and destroy the British and French Armies in a series of surprise break-throughs. He hit the British first, on March 21, when he threw sixty-three divisions, more than a thousand planes, and seven thousand artillery pieces into a forty-three-mile front before the railroad center of Amiens. The greatest war in history reached its supreme climax. The British, surprised, outnumbered, and handicapped by heavy fog, gave way. Ludendorff had broken through. Everything had gone according to plan—except human nature.

First, Ludendorff did not pursue the advantage he had gained at many weak points. Second, his troops lacked the stamina to carry on. Some gorged themselves on the rich food stores that fell into their hands. It shocked and discouraged them to discover their enemies so



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
Airplane Dogfight over the Western Front

well clad, so well equipped, so well fed. Confidence in their own propaganda and their own victory began to evaporate. And then the British rallied. For the first time in any major battle, German losses exceeded British losses by almost two to one. If Ludendorff had only followed Hoffmann's advice and pulled out of Russia, he would have had close to a million more men to throw against the Western front. As it was, the Germans advanced more than thirty miles to within less than five miles of Amiens, where the British lines at last held.

A month later Ludendorff ordered another offensive against the British in Flanders. "We are fighting with our backs to the wall," said Marshal Haig in one of his orders of the day as the Germans approached Calais and the Channel ports. Again the lines held. In May Ludendorff attacked the French at Chemin-des-Dames and pushed his troops ahead fifty miles to the Marne, but fell far short of his real objective—Paris. Two more offensives against the French, in June and July, also failed. In May Ludendorff had promised Prince Max of Baden, who had opposed the entire 1918 campaign, that he would warn the German Government before irretrievable disaster had arrived. "Everything," Ludendorff admitted to Prince Max, "depended on whether Germany went to the conference table with an army still capable of striking, so that she could make a further appeal to arms if impossible conditions were proposed. Before you take your last horse out of the stable, make an end."

By mid-July not many horses remained in the German stable. Ludendorff's offensives had cost one million casualties. On June 24 Foreign Minister Kuhlmann told the Reichstag that "a military victory by either side is impossible," and called for "diplomatic negotiations." Hindenburg and Ludendorff successfully demanded his dismissal, after an Independent Socialist in the Reichstag had asserted that Germany had come under the rule of a naked military autocracy which could not be made respectable by such "fig leaves" as Hertling and Kuhlmann.

By mid-July the Allies struck back. In April, under the shadow of disaster, the Allied Governments finally consented to "co-ordinate" all their armies on the Western front under General Foch. But General Pershing, the American commander, resisted the demands of the British and French, who wanted him to break up his divisions and use bits and pieces of them to repair some of their shattered units. In May the first American division to take part in a major engagement helped the British hold the Germans before Amiens. In June two more American divisions threw back the Germans at Château-Thierry on the Marne. General Pétain, the French commander, predicted, "If we can hold until the end of June, our situation will be excellent. In July we can resume the offensive; after that, victory will be ours." And so it was. On




BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Premier Clemenceau Congratulating General Pershing on American Advances on the Western Front

July 18 Pétain sent two French armies, which included several American divisions, to attack the western side of the bulge that the Germans had just driven in the French line above Château-Thierry and the Marne. By a curious paradox, the fiery Foch ordered the prudent Pétain to hold up his attack, but the progress made foreshadowed more trouble for the Germans in the near future.

On August 8 that trouble came. British troops, led by four hundred and fifty-six tanks, suddenly hit the Germans a few miles east of Amiens, on a fourteen-mile front. Thirteen divisions of infantry, three of cavalry, twelve tank battalions, and more than two thousand artillery pieces moved against six skeleton German divisions with not more than three thousand men in each. The German line at once sagged several miles. A general withdrawal soon followed. "I see that we must strike a balance," said the Kaiser; "we are at the end of our resources."

Ludendorff called August 8 "the black day of the German Army." Four days later he told one of his aides, "There is no more hope for the offensive. The generals have lost their foothold." But at a Crown Council with the Kaiser on August 14 Hindenburg sang a different tune: "It will be possible to maintain our troops on French soil and thereby enforce our will upon the enemy." Ludendorff, who also attended the meeting, said nothing about the military situation but blamed Germany's troubles on the home front. The Kaiser remarked, "We must take care to seize an opportune moment to come to an understanding with the enemy." The High Command also kept the Reichstag leaders in the dark and did



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A French Officer Interviewing Young German Prisoners, Western Front, 1918

not disclose that German troops being relieved from front-line duty were already shouting at the men who replaced them, "Strike-breakers! War-prolongers!"

Later Ludendorff wrote, "The conduct of the war thereafter took on, as I expressed it at the time, the character of an irresponsible gamble, one that I always looked upon as dangerous. The fate of the German people was too valuable for that game. The war had to be ended." But what he really said to Hertling was this: "In the course of the war I have been compelled five times before to withdraw troops but only in the end to beat the enemy. Why should I not suc-

ceed in doing the same thing a sixth time?" The answer came soon.

Allied armies took the offensive on all fronts. The Austrians fell back in Italy. The Turkish armies in Asia Minor and the Bulgarian armies in the Balkans faced utter destruction. On September 26 the news reached Germany that Bulgaria was about to ask for an armistice. Two days later Ludendorff told Hindenburg that Germany must do the same, and at once. It took some time for it to dawn on Hindenburg that Ludendorff had not succumbed to one of his periodic fits of depression, but when he understood the worst, his iron will and phlegmatic temperament sustained him—and Ludendorff, too. The next day they told the Kaiser that Germany's defeat must be proclaimed to the world at the earliest possible moment.

The Kaiser not only saw that the end had come. Wilson's statements had convinced him that he must turn over his absolute powers to a parliamentary government, and on September 28 he issued a proclamation to that effect. The following day Chancellor Hertling resigned, and Prince Max of Baden, a Prussian Major General and heir to a Grand Ducal throne, became the first Chancellor of Germany who was responsible to the Reichstag rather than to the Kaiser. "I thought I was coming five minutes before twelve," he wrote, "but I arrived five minutes after it." On October 4, at the insistence of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Prince Max appealed to President Wilson for an armistice. The generals at last admitted they had lost the war. Everywhere—and not in Germany only—civilian leaders were on the way back.

The year 1918 saw other battles, less bloody but no less momentous than the fighting on the Western front. In June the weary Austro-Hungarian armies launched a double offensive on the Asiago and Piave Rivers in Italy. The Piave offensive went ahead a little. The Asiago offensive collapsed and cost its commander, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, his job. In at least one Austrian division the weight of the average soldier had shrunk to an estimated one hundred and ten pounds. Even the officers lacked complete uniforms. They told their men that the worms in the meager army rations would not hurt their health.

Behind the lines, disintegration of the Dual Monarchy had set in. On July 14, when Emperor Charles dismissed Conrad from his post, the Czechs held a National Assembly in Prague and declared "the right of self-determination to form an independent, democratic, sovereign Czechoslovak State, with its own administration and parliament." By the end of the month, south Slavs (Yugoslavs), Poles, Sudeten Germans, and Austrian Social Democrats attacked the Government from the floor of the Austrian Reichsrat. In Hungary, Count Karolyi, a Magyar with radical, pacifist views, won wide support by demanding absolute independence from Austria. But General Díaz, the Italian commander, waited until October 24 before launching his final offensive. Within a week the Italians had driven a wedge between the Austrian armies on the Adriatic plain and those in the mountains. Routed on the field, Austria asked for an armistice on October 30. It was granted on November 4. Five days later, Emperor Charles abdicated.

The Bulgarian front collapsed even more rapidly. On September 15, Allied armies under a new French commander, General Franchet d'Esperey, opened a series of thrusts all along the line. Some went ahead faster than others, and by September 21—thanks largely to an attack launched by British aircraft on the narrow Kosturino Pass—they split the Bulgarian forces in two. The United States had not even broken off relations with Bulgaria, much less declared war, and the presence of an American chargé d'affaires in Sofia speeded the conclusion of an armistice on September 29. The Hapsburg Monarchy now lay open to attack from the southeast. On October 3 Tsar Ferdinand, who had led his country to disaster, abdicated in favor of his son Boris.

At the same time that Franchet d'Esperey opened his offensive against the Bulgarians in the Balkans, General Allenby attacked the main Turkish armies between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan, forcing the Megiddo Pass and taking Nazareth, headquarters of General Liman von Sanders, who commanded the Turks. Airplanes and Colonel T. E. Lawrence's Arabs, mounted on camels, turned the Turkish retreat into a rout. Damascus and then Aleppo fell. The Bulgarian collapse

threatened Constantinople, which had no army to defend it, and on October 30 a new Turkish Government from which the pro-German Young Turk Party had withdrawn signed an armistice and followed Bulgaria out of the war.

Something more than military defeat accounted for the capitulation of Germany's three allies. Everywhere, revolution and civil war had broken out behind the lines, often with the support of the Allied Governments, all of which had approved self-determination and independence for the "suppressed nationalities" of the Hapsburg Empire. In addition, the British, in the Balfour Declaration, had endorsed a Jewish National Home in Palestine and, through Colonel Lawrence, had led the Arabs to hope for independence. Most Austrians, most Bulgarians, and many Turks had lost the will to fight. But just as the Germans had opened and eased Lenin's path to power in Russia only to find that they had created a Frankenstein's monster, so the Allies had kindled flames of revolt that threatened to devour the fruits of victory.

• II •

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION LEADS TO INTERVENTION, CIVIL WAR, AND RED TERROR

THE YEAR 1918, which saw the Central powers go down to defeat on all fronts, also saw the Russian Revolution beat off attacks from several different quarters. The first threat came from the Far East when a Japanese cruiser anchored in Vladivostok on January 9 and her commander informed the Bolshevik mayor that he had come to protect Japanese citizens. Several other Japanese war vessels and one British cruiser also appeared. On February 25 General Foch declared, "Germany is walking through Russia. America and Japan, who are in a position to do so, should go to meet her in Siberia." On the same day General Semenov, who commanded about three thousand anti-Bolshevik Cossacks in Siberia, appealed to Tokyo for help. On March 9 Lord Robert Cecil, one of the foremost British advocates of a postwar League of Nations, delivered a strong speech urging Japanese intervention in Siberia. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, which the Soviet Congress finally ratified on March 16, seemed likely to bring Germany and Russia closer together. The French dreaded the prospect because they had always regarded Russia as a make-weight against Germany. The British dreaded the prospect because Germany and Russia together could outflank by land their whole imperial position in Asia.

On April 6, Japanese and British marines landed at Vladivostok to preserve order after the murder of two Japanese residents. At this time

the Soviets controlled the city as well as most of Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway. General Semenov's Cossacks made occasional trouble with hit-and-run raids, and the Chinese Government, yielding to Japanese pressure, permitted Semenov to organize these raids on Chinese soil. But it wasn't Semenov's three thousand Cossacks that worried the Bolsheviks at this time; it was fifty thousand Czechoslovak troops who had deserted the armies of the Hapsburgs to fight for the armies of the Romanovs. After the Peace of Brest Litovsk, the Bolshevik Government agreed to let these troops cross Russia on the Trans-Siberian Railway and sail from Vladivostok to take positions on the Western front. All went well until early April, when Semenov persuaded two companies of Serbs, then on their way to France by the same route, to join his war against the Bolsheviks. The Siberian Soviets, fearing that the Czechs would also join Semenov, tried to disarm them and fighting broke out. By July the Czechoslovaks virtually controlled the Trans-Siberian Railway from Samara, on the Volga, to the Pacific coast.

On May 29 Trotsky, who had shifted from the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of War, ordered the eastward movement of the Czechoslovaks halted and the possibility of shipping them from Archangel investigated. According to Allied leaders, Trotsky's action proved him a German agent. British, French, and Japanese pressure for intervention increased. President Wilson, who had resisted that pressure for months, at last gave way and permitted eighty-five hundred American troops to accompany the Allied Expeditionary Force, hoping that they might restrain the others, especially the Japanese. He also secured a Japanese promise to respect Russian sovereignty and to withdraw when the emergency had ended. But the Japanese claimed that Wilson had pledged only seven thousand men, and when eighty-five hundred appeared they announced that the original agreement no longer bound them and threw seventy-three thousand, four hundred men into the field. On September 9 the self-constituted anti-Bolshevik Government of Siberia, which had become a going concern, merged itself with other anti-Bolshevik elements and established a provisional, all-Russian Government at Omsk. The subsequent history of this Government belongs with the year 1919. So does the history of the Siberian expedition.

What the Allies tried to do in Siberia the Germans tried to do in the Ukraine. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, the propertied classes in the Ukraine set up their own Republic and signed a separate peace with Germany and Austria. The Bolsheviks at once sent some thousands of ill-equipped "Red Guards" into the Ukraine, whereupon the new, national Government appealed to "the peaceful and order-loving German people" to send their Army to the rescue. The Germans drove the Red Guards out and established their own military



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Street Fighting in Petrograd, 1918

government. By summer tens of thousands of Ukrainian peasants started sporadic uprisings against the Germans.

At the end of July a Left Social Revolutionary from Moscow threw a bomb at General von Eichhorn, the German military governor, and killed him. The Germans intensified their terror against the Ukrainian peasants, with the consent of the Ukrainian landlords. Not until the German armies on the Western front began to crack did the Bolsheviks finally add the Ukraine, with its black soil and rich deposits of coal and iron, to the Soviet Union. One Ukrainian Nationalist who worked with the Germans throughout the occupation finally commented, "When we threw off the Russian yoke, our alternatives were to join the Bolsheviks or summon the help of the Germans. We chose the latter course, but we would never have done so if we had known what the result would be."


The Finnish Nationalists had rather more success than the Nationalists of the Ukraine in playing off the Germans against the Russians. In Finland, as in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks had not gained complete power. In Finland, as in the Ukraine, the invasion of Bolshevik Red Guards led the propertied classes to ask for German aid, which took the form of twelve thousand troops commanded by General von der Goltz. But the Germans stayed close to the Baltic seacoast. Finland's own Baron Mannerheim, who had served as a cavalry general with the

Russians, had organized a native White Guard army that drove the Red Guards from Helsingfors and Viborg by the end of April. Mannerheim's troops also killed fifteen thousand men, women, and children in retaliation for a much less bloody Red Terror that had preceded the White.

By intervening in Finland's civil war, the Germans put themselves in position to blockade Russia in the Baltic Sea. They had also rewarded the Finns by requiring the Russians at Brest Litovsk to cede Finland a strip of territory, some thirty miles wide, leading to a harbor above the Arctic Circle. But the Finnish White Guards wanted more and proceeded to make their way eastward, toward the coast of the White Sea. The local Soviet, with Trotsky's approval, invited the British to send a small force of marines and engineers to the Russian port of Kola to repel the Finns. In April, Bolshevik leaders, Red Guard troops, and British and French marines and engineers threw back the Finnish White Guards.

By June, however, this Arctic honeymoon between the Allies and the Bolsheviks approached its end. The British suddenly stepped up their troop shipments. The Bolshevik leaders suspected intervention, invasion. In July twelve thousand assorted Allied troops had landed at the White Sea port of Archangel, where a broadly representative, anti-Bolshevik, pro-Ally Government had established itself. Bolshevism had little backing in this sparsely settled region, and the new Government had wide potential support. But when the British authorities objected to its democratic, socialistic reforms and demanded a march on Moscow and a resumption of hostilities against Germany, few recruits responded. The British therefore set up a Russian military government staffed by old-line Russian officers and ordered the southward advance to begin. Some units proceeded a few hundred miles, but the Bolsheviks threw them back without difficulty. In a military sense, the Archangel expedition proved a futile diversion; politically it made the bad relations between the Allies and the Bolsheviks still worse.

Outside attacks by Allied and German armies and inside revolts by Finnish and Ukrainian Nationalists made the Bolsheviks' first year in power a hectic one. In March they took two symbolic decisions. First, they moved the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. Second, they began to call themselves Communists, not Bolsheviks. Petrograd lay exposed to attack from abroad. Its history ran back only two centuries, to the time of Peter the Great, who made it Russia's window to the West in connection with his ambition to bring Russia closer to Europe. Moscow, on the other hand, connoted Mother Russia. Its associations ran back nearly a thousand years. But when the Bolsheviks decided to call themselves Communists, they chose a name that had universal rather than



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Soldiers of the Russian Revolution

Russian associations; they gave themselves an international, not a national, label. In April they restored compulsory military service and invited officers of all classes to help create not a new "Russian Army" but a new "Red Army" staffed by political commissars who had to fight like common soldiers on the battlefield and maintain the morale of officers and men behind the lines. Trotsky warned against creating "an army of lions, commanded by jackasses."

Most of the opposition to the Bolsheviks inside Russia came from rival revolutionaries. Most of the opposition to the Bolsheviks from abroad came from exiled re-

actionaries. Tsarist officials and officers, former aristocrats and supporters of Kerensky kept telling the Allied Governments that Bolshevism could not last and kept begging for intervention. As the year 1918 ran its course, the new masters of Russia therefore had no scruples about waging a more and more open "Red Terror" against the "class enemy" within.

The first and most effective opposition to the Bolsheviks came from the Anarchists of the extreme left, who wanted to make confusion worse confounded. They celebrated the New Year by issuing an appeal entitled "Create Anarchy" that expressed the mood of many frustrated revolutionists. "Ye prisoners and shackled," this Anarchist appeal read in part, "ye criminals, murderers, rippers, stabbers, pariahs, and outcasts. Rise up and revolt. Create anarchy. Village! ignore the orders of the city, disobey the center. Let the village become a city and the city become a village. Create anarchy. Woman! Slave of the kitchen and bedroom, free yourself. Assert your right to culture. Throw off the chains of childbearing, the slavery to pots. Away with housekeeping. Away with bringing up children at home. Be no man's slave, no man's doll. Be a human being. Create anarchy. Ye gulls of religion! Destroy the churches, those cells of the spirit. Tear from your necks the crosses, those stranglers of your freedom. Create anarchy."


To Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders this seemed like dangerous, romantic nonsense. But many Russians had always responded to appeals of this sort, and the outside world did not bother to draw dis-

tinctions between rival revolutionaries. In June the Left Social Revolutionaries broke with the Bolsheviks. In July the All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted a Constitution making each city dweller's vote count for as much as five rural votes and giving all power to the Soviets of Workers and Peasants. Since the Bolsheviks controlled the local Soviets, this meant that Russia had become a one-party state, ruled from top to bottom by the self-perpetuating Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, as the Bolsheviks had renamed themselves. Within this group of a few dozen officials differences of opinion did exist and were settled by majority vote.

At the same time the All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed a labor-draft law requiring all males between the ages of fifteen and forty-five to work behind the lines; those who received money from other sources had their food ration reduced, and many local commandants assigned the most menial tasks to the richest citizens. The Imperial family, whom the Bolsheviks had moved to Ekaterinburg, suffered a bloodier fate. In July the Moscow authorities, alarmed by the success of the Czechoslovak Legion, warned the local commissar at Ekaterinburg to keep the closest guard over the Tsar, the Tsarina, and their son and four daughters. The local Bolshevik officials, not wanting to take any chances, ordered all seven prisoners executed by their Lettish guards, who took them to a cellar by night, shot and bayoneted them, and then burned their bodies several days later at an isolated spot. The full details took some time to become generally known, but nothing the Bolsheviks had done gave them a blacker reputation in the eyes of the world. Most foreigners regarded the Tsar as a gentle, if stupid, man; his wife as a beautiful, if neurotic, woman; their children as blameless and harmless.

Lenin next turned his attention to the kulaks, or well-to-do peasants. On August 9 he issued this order: "It is necessary to organize an extra guard of well-chosen, trustworthy men. They must carry out a ruthless mass terror against kulaks, priests, and White Guards." Two days later Lenin urged forfeiture of surplus bread and grain by rich kulaks, who had to "answer with their lives for the speedy and thorough execution of their task." As he wrote in an article, "Civil War in the Villages," published at this time: "Doubt is out of the question. The kulaks are rabid foes of the Soviet Government. Either the kulaks massacre vast numbers of workers, or the workers ruthlessly suppress the uprisings of the predatory kulak minority of the people against the Government of the toilers. There can be no middle course."

Violence begot more violence. On the morning of August 30, 1918, Uritsky, the Commissar of the Interior, and Voloradsky, another high Bolshevik official, met their deaths at the hands of Social Revolutionary assassins. That same evening another Social Revolutionary—young Dora




Intervention and Civil War in Russia: Showing principal points of foreign attack

Kaplan—shot, wounded, and almost killed Lenin. Originally an Anarchist, she had joined the Social Revolutionary Party while sentenced by the Tsarist regime to hard labor in Siberia. As Lenin hovered for several days between life and death, hundreds of telegrams demanded swift and stern reprisals. The Soviets and the Bolshevik press took up the refrain. Scores of Social Revolutionaries, White Guards, and aristocrats were seized and executed out of hand. Hundreds more were held as hostages to forestall further attempts on the lives of Bolshevik leaders. As Trotsky remarked at the time, the “good-natured stage” of the Russian Revolution had ended.

Foreign Governments protested against the Red Terror. George Chicherin, a former Tsarist diplomat who had joined the Bolsheviks and replaced Trotsky as Foreign Commissar, did not deny their charges but cited the White Terror in Finland, the mass executions in the Ukraine. “In the entire capitalist world,” said Chicherin, “rules the White Terror against the working class. The working class of Russia has put an end to Tsarism, whose bloody regime never called forth the protests of neutral countries.”

Lenin used to ask his comrades, at this time, “Do you really think that we can emerge victoriously from the Revolution without rabid



and internal conflict during 1918

terrorism?" When his friend Maxim Gorky remonstrated, Lenin replied, "What would you have? Is humanity possible in such a furious struggle? Can we allow ourselves to be soft-hearted and magnanimous, when Europe is blockading us and the hoped-for assistance from the European proletariat has failed, and counter-revolution is rising against us on every side? No, excuse me, we are not imbeciles." Gorky did, however, record one occasion when Lenin pointed to a crowd of children at play and said, "The life of these children will be happier than ours; they will no longer have personal experience of much that we have lived through. Their fate will be less cruel. I do not envy them, however, for our generation has succeeded in work of enormous

historic significance. Circumstances have compelled us to be cruel, but later ages will justify us; then everything will be understood, everything."

In October, 1917, the Bolshevik leaders had gambled on revolution in Russia—and won. By October, 1918, the prospects for world revolution looked as bright as the prospects for revolution in Russia had looked the year before. On October 3 Lenin predicted a successful proletarian revolution in Germany. Trotsky went him one better. "The day after it becomes evident that the German working class has grasped power, barricades will rise on the streets of Paris. When Germany's military might had reached its peak, we foresaw the monstrous plans of conquest headed for sure disaster. Now, in the same manner, we express our firm expectation that Allied imperialism will also crash."

The Red Army that Trotsky had created from almost nothing had just driven the Czechoslovaks from Kazan. The Germans were quitting the Ukraine. The Allied expedition to Archangel had failed. The Bolsheviks had more than held their own in Russia. The impending collapse of the Central powers opened new possibilities in Europe. Would the Russian Revolution sweep Europe and the world or would the vic-

torious Allies crush the Russian Revolution? The Bolsheviks could see but two alternatives—we or they? And many of their enemies saw the future in just the same terms.

• III •

GERMANY CAPITULATES TO WILSON'S NOTES
AND ALLIED ARMS

PRESIDENT WILSON had more practical, immediate questions to decide. The first peace note from Prince Max's new German Government reached him on October 3. In it Prince Max tried to split the Allied coalition by addressing himself to Wilson personally and proposing a negotiated peace, not a surrender. Wilson replied that his Fourteen Points had laid down a basis for settlement, not a basis for negotiation. He demanded that the German Government accept all his principles explicitly; that all German troops withdraw at once from France and Belgium; and that Prince Max assure him that he spoke for the German people and not merely "for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war."

On October 12 Prince Max accepted Wilson's conditions and proposed a mixed commission to arrange the evacuation. On the same day a German submarine torpedoed the passenger vessel *Leinster*, plying across the Irish Sea, with a loss of nearly two hundred lives. Wilson's outraged second note pointed out that the torpedoing violated the principle that he had laid down when he called for "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world."

On October 15 more than seventeen hundred persons in Berlin had died of influenza. Philipp Scheidemann, leader of the moderate Socialists, said, "Better an end with terror than terror without end." Karl Liebknecht, leader of the extremists, declared, "If we get rid of the Kaiser we shall get a decent peace." On October 17 Ludendorff told the War Cabinet that "on his conscience" he regarded an Allied breakthrough as "unlikely." Hindenburg backed him up and urged that Germany fight a defensive war until spring. Prince Max hesitated. His second note had accepted Wilson's principles; now the High Command demanded that he withdraw that acceptance. What then?

Prince Max decided to capitulate entirely to Wilson, who at once transmitted their full correspondence to the Allied Governments and commanders. Hindenburg and Ludendorff said Wilson's notes boiled down to "a demand for unconditional surrender." They defied the Government and ordered their armies to fight on. The Kaiser announced,

"A successor to Frederick the Great does not abdicate." On October 24 Wilson informed Prince Max that if the United States Government "must deal with the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or is ever likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international relations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations but surrender."

Wilson had performed masterfully. He had retained and enhanced his own position as moral leader of the Allied cause. He had forced the German Government to accept his conditions of peace.

He had driven a wedge between the new and the old masters of Germany. He had given the Allied military commanders a free hand to impose their own armistice terms. Pershing opposed granting any armistice at all. He favored an Allied invasion of German soil. Haig believed that the German Army still had considerable powers of resistance, but saw no need of invading Germany. Foch took the most moderate view of all. He wanted to stop the fighting as soon as possible and did not insist upon occupying any more of Germany than the bridgeheads of the Rhine.

These three commanders spoke with different voices because their countries had undergone different ordeals. France had suffered the most, and Foch had not forgotten the mutinies of 1917. Britain had suffered far more than the United States, and Haig had not forgotten his "backs to the wall" order of the day of only a few months before. Neither Foch nor Haig wanted to let the Germans off easily, but they knew what four years of war had done to their weary fighting men and to their anxious home fronts. Only the Americans had the moral and material reserves to carry the fight to the finish, but they did not have enough troops in the field; they did not have enough of their own equipment to carry out such a big assignment in 1918.

On one point, however, all three commanders agreed. The armistice terms must make it impossible for the Germans to renew hostilities. On November 5 President Wilson sent a fourth and final note to Germany announcing that "Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive prop-



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Hindenburg: "Didn't I Tell You This Line Was Impregnable?" Cartoon by Raemaekers

erly accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice."

Meanwhile, events moved fast in the United States. President Wilson never appeared more confident; his leadership never looked more secure than during the months of September and October, 1918. When one of his nieces asked him to write a speech for her to deliver in connection with the Liberty Loan drive then under way, he sent her this eloquent message:

"Please tell the people for me that this seems to me to be a war in which the American people are privileged to play a singular and noble part, because they have no selfish ends to serve and are fighting for the principles and ideals which have always lain at the very foundation of our nation's life. We are trying to extend to the world the gift of liberty and conscience and disinterested service of mankind, which were intended to be the contribution of America to the world. If ever it was worth while to pour out blood and money and make every conceivable sacrifice, it is worth while now, and every dollar invested in the Liberty Loan is a dollar invested in the prosperity and liberty of men at home and throughout the nations of the world. We can withhold nothing, and we should give everything with the ardor of those absolutely devoted to a great cause."


A few days later the President spelled out his war aims for a Metropolitan Opera House audience in New York. "It has become a people's war," he declared. All who sit at the peace table must pay the price of peace—"impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed." And he spoke, too, of "that indispensable instrumentality," the League of Nations. He said the League Covenant, as he called it, must become a part, "the most essential part," of the Peace Treaty. A League of Nations formed in wartime would consist only of the Allied powers. To postpone the establishment of the League until after the peace would be to jeopardize the peace. The League must guarantee the peace. As for the United States, it must "enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations" but must "assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which the peace must henceforth rest."

Wilson's peace program disturbed the Allied leaders almost as much as it did the leaders of Germany. Ray Stannard Baker, who later became Wilson's official biographer, inscribed this entry in his notebook on October 15, 1918, while on a European mission for the President: "Wilson has yet to prove his greatness. The fate of the drama lies in its third act, and Wilson is now coming to that, the greatest of his career."

Can he dominate this seething mass of suspicion and disbelief? No European statesman, I am firmly convinced, believes in his inner soul that Wilson's program is anything but a wild dream, very pretty, but quite outside the realms of practical politics! They give it lip-service, but have it not in their souls. Can he 'put it over'? The leaders of Europe are also secretly irritated by the preponderance of Wilson in diplomacy, the way in which the Germans talk over their heads to the man in the White House, and the way in which, with that audacity which is the gift of the truly great, he takes the responsibility upon himself of a kind of arbiter of the world's destiny."

Baker, watching Wilson from Europe, saw the President's problems largely in European and world terms. Wilson, caught up in the armistice negotiations and the preparations for peace, saw them the same way. But Roosevelt, Lodge, and the more bitter Republican oppositionists never stopped chivvying. Wilson's first reply to the original German peace note left Lodge "keenly disappointed." "I believe in a dictated, not a negotiated peace," Roosevelt said. "I fear that the President's latest announcement will be treated as an invitation to further note-writing." Lodge and Roosevelt could not have been more mistaken. Wilson's "note-writing" finally caused Hindenburg and Ludendorff to cry out against the "dictated peace" that Lodge advocated. But mistakes by those in opposition receive less attention than mistakes by those in power. And Roosevelt and Lodge took quick and full advantage of that kind of mistake when Wilson made it.

On Tuesday, November 5, the American people had to elect a new Congress. Wilson had barely won the 1916 election. Both parties elected the same number of Representatives. The Democrats kept a slight edge in the Senate. With peace at last in sight, Wilson needed more than a thin Senate majority. Any peace treaty or plan for a League of Nations required the approval of two-thirds of the Senators. Wilson could not expect the Democrats to win two-thirds of the Senate seats in the 1918



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American Liberty Bond Poster, 1918

elections; he could not even count on solid, automatic Democratic support. A two-thirds vote in the Senate required considerable Republican as well as wide Democratic backing.

Wilson had written and taught American history. He knew—none better—the shortcomings of the American Constitution. Back in 1900 he had seen the Bryan Democrats line up with the McKinley Republicans and vote for the annexation of the Philippines. Eighteen years had passed. What Republican support, how much Republican support, did he need, and how should he get it?

On October 24, Roosevelt sent identical telegrams to Senators Lodge, Poindexter, and Hiram Johnson opening with these two sentences: "As an American citizen, I most earnestly hope that the Senate of the United States, which is part of the treaty-making power of the United States, will take affirmative action against negotiated peace with Germany and in favor of a peace based upon the unconditional surrender of Germany. I also earnestly hope that on behalf of the American people, it will declare against the adoption in their entirety of the fourteen points of the President's address of last January as offering a basis for a peace satisfactory to the United States."

What if Hindenburg and Ludendorff characterized Wilson's last note to Germany as "a demand for unconditional surrender"? What if the Fourteen Points had given the whole Allied world new hope and weakened the will to fight among the Central powers? Roosevelt and Lodge had made up their minds to play partisan politics with the peace. They may have shown bad judgment and bad patriotism; they had not shown bad faith. They called their shots for Wilson and all the world to see. And Wilson made up his mind to play the game the Roosevelt and Lodge way. On the same day that Roosevelt's telegram to the three Senators appeared in the press, Wilson composed a message of his own appealing to the American people to elect a Democratic Congress. "I would not send it out," his wife warned him; "it is not a dignified thing to do." "That is what I thought at first," Wilson replied, "but it is too late now. I have told them I would do it." Mrs. Wilson was not the only person close to the President to deplore his decision. He had not even consulted his most experienced advisers and had ignored the counsel of those with whom he did talk. Perhaps he was too absorbed in the war; perhaps he was too convinced of his own righteousness. In any case, he did not take his decision with great seriousness. He wrote ex-President Eliot of Harvard that he acted "merely under the impulse to be frank with the people I am trying to serve."

Into the appeal itself went a strange mixture of apology and arrogance. "I have no thought," Wilson declared, "of suggesting that any political party is paramount in matters of patriotism. I feel too keenly

the sacrifices which have been made in this war by all our citizens, irrespective of party affiliations, to harbor such an idea. I mean only that the difficulties and delicacies of our present task are of a sort that make it imperatively necessary that the Nation should give its undivided support to the Government under a unified leadership and that the Republican Party would divide that leadership."

Roosevelt read Wilson's appeal and whooped for joy. "I am glad Wilson has come out in the open," he wrote Lodge. "I fear Judas most when he can cloak his activities behind a treacherous appeal to non-partisanship." Will H. Hays, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and as devout a Presbyterian as the President, took up a favorite Wilsonian weapon—moral indignation: "A more ungracious, more unjust, more wanton, more mendacious accusation was never made by the most reckless stump orator, much less by a President of the United States, for partisan purposes. It is an insult not only to every loyal Republican in Congress but to every loyal Republican in the land."

One eminent American who had not identified himself with either of the two major parties at that time preferred Wilson's views to the views of Will Hays. A week after Wilson had issued his appeal, Food Administrator Herbert Hoover wrote: "In the issues before us there can be no party politics. It is vital that we have a solid front and a sustained leadership. I am for President Wilson's leadership not only in the conduct of the war but also in the negotiations of peace, and afterward in the direction of America's burden in the rehabilitation of the world."

For the first—but not for the last—time, the American people ignored the advice of the "Great Humanitarian." The Republicans won a safe majority in the House of Representatives and controlled the Senate by two votes. Even before the war against Germany had ended, Wilson had declared another war on the extremist Republican leaders. Nettled and needled by their attacks, he had sunk to their level, and antagonized the moderate, independent vote that had given him his margin of victory in times past. Victory over Germany lay just ahead. Agreement among the Allies remained to be achieved. But when Wilson's supreme opportunity arrived, he attacked his bitterest political enemies with their weapons and went down to defeat at home before the final contest abroad had even begun.

The scene now shifts to Germany. On October 24 Prince Max learned from Wilson that the notes they had exchanged had gone to the Allied Governments. Germany could only wait for the Allies to lay down the exact armistice terms. At this point Hindenburg and Ludendorff tried to kick over the traces. The same men who, weeks before, had de-



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Four German Prisoners and Their American Captors

manded an armistice within forty-eight hours now ordered their commanders to fight on. Prince Max and his entire Cabinet at once submitted their resignations and the Kaiser summoned Hindenburg and Ludendorff to Berlin. Ignoring Hindenburg, the Kaiser berated Ludendorff, who had no alternative but to resign on the spot. Hindenburg, in sole command, issued no more orders to fight to the finish. He also got a new Quartermaster General in the person of Wilhelm Gröner, who had organized the German Army's food supplies since 1916 and conducted himself so fairly that the trade-union officials would work with no other general. Gröner came from Swabia, not Prussia; his father had served as an army paymaster, not as an officer. But his humble, non-Prussian origins, which had prevented Gröner from winning the position to which his abilities entitled him, now became his chief assets. Thanks to his arrangements, German troops fell back across northern France and Belgium in orderly fashion, sometimes repelling Allied attacks with heavy losses. They were preparing the way for one of the armistice conditions demanded by President Wilson—evacuation of all occupied territories.

The democratic order that Wilson had called for inside Germany also began to take shape. Prince Max's Cabinet, which withdrew its resignation after Ludendorff quit, included representatives of all the major Reichstag parties. For the first time several Social Democrats held

government posts. Before the war the Kaiser had recommended exiling all Social Democratic leaders and treating them like traitors. Now he greeted them cordially and when he met Philipp Scheidemann exclaimed, "We surely were at school together at Kassel." But Scheidemann, like most other Social Democrats, wanted the Kaiser to abdicate and the Crown Prince to renounce the throne. A constitutional Hohenzollern monarchy, headed by one of the Kaiser's younger sons or by the eldest son of the Crown Prince, looked like the least violent solution at the moment. As Friedrich Ebert, one of the three Socialist Cabinet members, put it, "If the Kaiser does not abdicate, social revolution must come. I don't want it. I hate it like sin."

The Social Democrats showed the same tolerance toward their opponents on the left as they showed toward the Hohenzollerns. They demanded the release of Karl Liebknecht and other Spartacists, as they called themselves, from jail. The Spartacists wanted to lead the same kind of proletarian revolution in Germany that the Bolsheviks had led in Russia. Lenin banked heavily on Liebknecht, but Scheidemann believed the Social Democrats could beat the Spartacists in an open struggle. "My Party," said Scheidemann, "will take care that Bolshevism does not come to Germany."

The political atmosphere in Berlin made the Kaiser so nervous that he left for General Headquarters at Spa on October 30. Here, on November 1, Dr. Drews, the Minister of the Interior for the State of Prussia, told the Kaiser the truth that no member of his entourage had yet dared to speak. He must quit at once or see the entire dynasty go under. The Kaiser not only rejected the advice; he berated Drews for giving it: "How can you, a Prussian official, reconcile such a mission with the oath you have taken to your King?" Gröner, who could not bring himself to urge his sovereign to abdicate, hoped the Kaiser would seek death in the front-line trenches. "He should go to the front," said Gröner, immediately after the Drews interview, "not to review troops or confer decorations, but to look on death. He should go to some trench which was under the full blast of war. If he were killed, it would be the finest death possible. If he were wounded, the feelings of the German people toward him would completely change."

On November 4, British troops broke through the German lines near Valenciennes. German troops could no longer even accept battle. At the same moment German naval units in Kiel, Lübeck, Hamburg, and half a dozen other ports began to mutiny. On October 29 the German Admiralty, without consulting the German Government, had ordered the fleet to put to sea on a final "death voyage." Some officers even hoped for a miraculous, last-minute victory. The men not only refused to obey. They demanded the immediate abdication of the Kaiser, peace,



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German Workers Army, November, 1918

amnesty, and the right to vote. Some of the sailors went ashore with their arms. Some were placed under arrest. Others seized and shot their officers, some of whom, however, supported the mutineers. The revolt spread to soldiers at home on leave and to workingmen. The Socialists backed the demands of the sailors, soldiers, and workers, but they tried to keep the revolution within constitutional bounds. They preferred to work through the Reichstag rather than through the revolutionary committees that had begun to spring up in the larger cities.

On November 6 Gröner painted a black picture of Germany's prospects for the benefit of Hindenburg and the Kaiser. They still could not quite take in what had happened, but Hindenburg did recognize the need for an immediate armistice. Weeping, he begged Matthias Erzberger as Secretary of State in Prince Max's Cabinet to follow the instructions in President Wilson's note of November 5 and head the German Armistice Commission, to which Marshal Foch would present his terms. The appeal took effect, and Erzberger accepted the unpopular, humiliating assignment.

By the following evening—November 7—all of Germany's top military and political leaders, except Hindenburg, had become convinced the Kaiser must resign. The longer he hung on, the more he discredited the entire dynasty. And with revolution threatening the country, the Kaiser might finally meet the same fate that had overtaken Tsar Nicholas of

Russia, only a few months before. It was a prospect that made more than one crowned head in Europe uneasy, but the Kaiser merely proposed remaining at Spa and then, after the Armistice had been signed, putting himself at the head of his Army and restoring order. The prospect appealed to the dutiful Hindenburg until Gröner convinced him the next day that the German Army would support the Kaiser no more. Councils of Soldiers and Workers were taking over railways and storehouses. The present supplies could not last more than three or four days. At last even Hindenburg saw that the Kaiser must go.

On the morning of November 9 Hindenburg appeared at the Kaiser's château. With tears streaming down his cheeks, he begged his sovereign to accept his resignation as Supreme Commander because only then could he speak his mind. When this request was refused, he urged the Kaiser to hear and heed what General Gröner, as spokesman for the High Command, had to say. Gröner described the civil war on the home front; the mutinies, the Army's unwillingness and inability to fight. He did not mention abdication, and the Kaiser, failing to get the point, proposed remaining at Spa until the Armistice had been signed and then leading the Army quietly home. "Sire," replied Gröner, "you no longer have an Army. The Army will march home in peace and order under its leaders and commanding generals, but not under the command of Your Majesty, for it no longer stands behind Your Majesty."

"Excellency," retorted the Kaiser, "I shall require that statement from you in black and white, signed by all my generals, that the Army no longer stands behind its Commander in Chief. Have they not taken the military oath to me?"

"Sire," Gröner sadly pointed out, "in circumstances like these, oaths are mere words." Two other officers began to challenge Gröner, forcing the reluctant Hindenburg to his support. Suddenly a telephone message arrived from Berlin: "All troops deserted, completely out of hand." The Kaiser adjourned the meeting. Three hours later word came that Prince Max had announced the Kaiser's abdication and turned over the Chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert, who had agreed to serve. The Kaiser, however, raged at Prince Max for announcing a decision that he had not yet made. But the Kaiser had not only lost control of Germany; he had lost contact with Germany. Karl Liebknecht had proclaimed the German Soviet Republic from the Imperial Palace in Berlin. Philipp Scheidemann replied by proclaiming the German Socialist Republic from the portico of the Reichstag. Scheidemann feared that Liebknecht would lead an insurrection. Ebert, on the other hand, denounced Scheidemann for having exceeded his authority. Thus, one German Social Democrat took action because he feared a Communist uprising


while another Social Democratic leader deplored any deviation from strict legality.

What happened around the Kaiser at Spa during the afternoon and evening of November 9 remains a mystery of no great importance. What mattered was that in the early morning hours of November 10 the Imperial train carried him and his family across the Dutch frontier. Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, heeding the appeals of the British royal family, granted him sanctuary in the castle of Doorn, after the Dutch Cabinet had given its approval at an emergency session. The royal houses of Europe, faced with the prospect of international revolution, had formed an international protective association of their own. Not until several weeks later did the Kaiser formally abdicate, and by that time he was blaming his flight on Hindenburg and Prince Max.

As the German war machine disintegrated—at the front, within the fleet, and behind the lines—the Russian Revolution exercised a growing fascination on all classes. By September, 1918, the Bolsheviks had fifty times as many agents in Germany and Austria as in all the Allied countries. Lenin had always anticipated a German revolution, a European revolution, and a world revolution, in that order. He regarded the Russian Revolution as merely the first step. The Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets met at Moscow on November 6 in an atmosphere of high hope and excitement. "A complete victory of a Socialist Revolution is unthinkable in any one country," Lenin told the Congress. "It requires at least the co-operation of several advanced countries, and Russia is not one of them." He added, "We can see already how the fire of revolution has broken out in most countries—in America, in Germany, in England." He warned that "the peace which the rapacious imperialists of England and France are going to inflict on conquered Europe will be a more humiliating and crushing one than the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, but this peace will be their undoing, because it will rouse the revolutionary feelings of the world proletariat."

While more and more Europeans were preparing for revolution, the American people threw themselves into a premature peace orgy. On November 8 the energetic Roy W. Howard, part owner of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain and of the United Press news service, cabled from France that the Germans had signed an armistice. The report set off a series of popular celebrations, and it was not until the next day that the general public learned it had blown off steam too soon.

This much had happened. At noon on November 7 a five-man German armistice delegation, headed by Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger of the Center Party, had crossed the Allied lines in an automobile flying a flag of truce and had gone straight to Foch's railway



BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Foch's Railroad Car, in Which He Received the German Surrender

car in the Compiègne forest. "What has brought these gentlemen here?" Foch inquired. "What do you want?" Erzberger replied that they had come to receive the Allied armistice "proposals." Foch interrupted, "Tell these gentlemen I have no proposals to make to them." One member of the German delegation wearily pointed out that they had come to receive the armistice "terms." That satisfied Foch, who asked his Chief of Staff, General Weygand, to read them. The Germans, with seventy-two hours to make up their minds, refused an Allied proposal to suspend hostilities while they decided. Foch and Weygand represented France; Admiral Wemyss, the British First Sea Lord, and two other naval officers represented Great Britain. No other Allied representative attended.


The armistice terms required the Germans to withdraw from so much territory and to surrender so much equipment as to make further resistance impossible. Hindenburg demanded "a fiery protest and an appeal to Wilson"—but "conclusion of the agreement nevertheless." The German armistice delegation returned to Foch's car in the forest of Compiègne at two o'clock in the morning of November 11. Three hours later the five German delegates and Marshal Foch and Admiral

Bolshevism?" The Allies finally agreed to let the Germans keep more machine guns to preserve "order." Erzberger also asked and received permission to read a brief statement that concluded with the words, "A nation of seventy millions suffers but does not die."

"*Très bien*," said Foch and closed the session, handing the signed document to Clemenceau with the words: "My work is finished; your work begins."

Later that morning, when Wilson received the news of the signing in Washington, he ordered a holiday for all government employees and then wrote, in pencil, this announcement to the American people: "The Armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world."

At the same moment the same events led Lenin to record this prediction: "Although revolutions are never made to order, the Inter-



The Western Front, 1918: Showing the Hindenburg Line, from which the Germans launched their last great offensive, and the furthest advances they made. Note that these advances did not go quite so far as the first assault in 1914. The final line in the rear shows the positions occupied by the Germans and the Allies at the time of the 1918 Armistice

national World Revolution is near. Imperialism cannot delay the world revolution. The imperialists will set fire to the whole world and will start a conflagration in which they themselves will perish if they dare to quell the revolution."


The two world messiahs whom the war had created could not both be right. It was not impossible for both to be wrong.

SUMMING UP

"THE WAR will last one hundred years: five years for fighting and ninety-five for winding up barbed wire." This soldier proverb expressed the mood of Europe at the time of the 1918 Armistice. The fighting had not lasted quite so long as the soldiers expected, but more than barbed wire remained to be wound up. For a whole century following the fall of Napoleon Europe's peace had rested on a delicate and precarious balance of power, and now Europe's civilization lay in ruins. Ambassador Page summed up his impressions in a letter to President Wilson: "You will recall more clearly than I certain horrible, catastrophic, universal-ruin passages in Revelation—monsters swallowing the universe, blood and fire and clouds and an eternal crash, rolling ruin, enveloping all things—well, that's all come. There are, perhaps, ten million men dead of this war, and perhaps one hundred million persons to whom death would be a blessing. The hills about Verdun are not blown to pieces worse than the whole social structure and intellectual and spiritual life of Europe. I wonder that anybody is sane."

The emergence of Wilson and Lenin as world messiahs revealed the utter bankruptcy of Europe, especially Western Europe, which had so long led the world in so many fields. Neither victorious Britain nor victorious France produced a democratic leader to compare with Wilson. If the world were to be rebuilt on a democratic foundation, the leadership would have to come from the United States. Neither defeated Germany nor defeated Austria produced a revolutionary leader to compare with Lenin. If the world were to be rebuilt on a revolutionary foundation, a Russian would lead the way. The war had made such a shambles of Europe as to rule out a return to its prewar order or a revival of its prewar power.

Three of the four great empires that the war laid low had shown symptoms of decay before 1914. The Russian Empire had barely escaped revolution after suffering defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905. The Young Turks had overthrown Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908, only to be defeated by a Balkan coalition four years later. By 1914 fear of the growing Pan-Slav movement had led the rulers of Austria-Hungary



UNDERWOOD

The Barbed Wire of No Man's Land

to attack Serbia and thus destroy the peace of Europe—and themselves. The Russian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian Empires all belonged primarily to Eastern Europe; most of the Russian and Turkish Empires lay in Asia. The German Empire had one foot in Western Europe, the other in Eastern Europe. Both before and during the war Germany had shown far greater strength and vitality than any of the other defeated powers; nevertheless, the German leaders in 1914 could not restrain their Austrian allies and, in spite of vast preparations and heavy sacrifices, their country had finally gone down to defeat. The Hohenzollerns fled; the Social Democrats prepared to organize a German Republic.

Much that the war destroyed in Germany and points east and south had long outlived its day. Much that happened in those regions during the war years fulfilled the prophecies of either Wilson or Lenin. On the negative side, the war overthrew corrupt dynasties and broke ancient tyrannies. On the positive side, it gave new hope to new nations and subject peoples. It cleared the way for democratic republics or revo-

lutionary dictatorships. And most Eastern Europeans had so little to live for that any change, even a violent change, might well prove a change for the better.

Western Europe had gone to war with less to gain than Eastern Europe, and more to lose. The French then won back their lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine; with the aid of their allies they beat their traditional German enemies to the ground. But in wrecking Germany, the French had also wrecked themselves. They might repair the physical damage—in time. They could never replace more than a million young men killed in action. The British, too, achieved their principal war aim: the destruction of German sea power. But they had lost almost as many lives as the French, and although the Germans never invaded and ravaged the British Isles as they laid waste northern France, the war had cost Britain nothing less than its world pre-eminence. Italy, with close to half a million killed and more than a million wounded, emerged with somewhat shoddy claims to bits and pieces of the former Austrian and Turkish Empires. What price "*sacro egoismo*"?

To President Wilson such words were foreign in every sense. He had led the United States to war, not for any "selfish purpose" but to "make the world safe for democracy." Only time could tell whether Wilson would be able to make his hopes and promises come true, but there could be little doubt, on Armistice Day, 1918, that the United States was emerging from the war incomparably the strongest nation on earth. More than fifty thousand American fighting men had died in action; the national debt had risen from barely a billion dollars before the outbreak of war to more than twenty billions at the time of the Armistice; the United States had also poured priceless natural resources into the struggle—petroleum, metals, topsoil. Nevertheless, the gains far outran the losses. The war had left the United States with the largest, most modern industrial plant in the world. The country had paid off its prewar debt to Europe and had become, instead, Europe's creditor. Bismarck himself might have learned from Wilson how to make war pay. There was reason to suspect that Wilson, whose first undergraduate thesis dealt with Bismarck, might have profited from a course in *Realpolitik*.

The Japanese had also made a good thing of the war, on a somewhat smaller scale. They lost few lives and no material wealth, but did establish claims to certain Pacific islands and to certain zones of influence in China. They had also done just enough for the Allies to assure themselves a seat at the Peace Conference. All of Russia's immense sacrifices, on the other hand, had apparently gone in vain. No other country suffered comparable losses—of life, of territory, of wealth. Yet the very completeness of the Russian defeat had its compensations.

The war rid the Russians of the Tsarist regime. It cut them loose from Europe. It started them on a drastic revolution which revealed extraordinary vitality and even threatened to spread abroad.

Tiny Portugal had entered the war at Britain's request in August, 1914. Exactly three years later vast China had entered the war at the request of the United States. Forty thousand Portuguese troops had fought the Germans in Africa; another forty thousand fought on the Western front. Portugal also helped equip the Allied armies and took some part in the war at sea. The Chinese made no comparable contribution, but the Government which declared war on Germany hoped at least for American protection against Japan. On Armistice Day, 1918, the Portuguese and the Chinese had more reason to welcome peace than to celebrate victory. Portugal had gone through several minor revolutions and changes of government; in China, the revolution that had begun in 1911 still continued. As in Europe, an old civilization had gone into decay—in China slowly and completely, in Europe rapidly and in spots.

The European neutrals—Spain, Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian nations—counted themselves lucky to have escaped the fate of Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the national minorities who had lived and died under Romanov and Hapsburg rule. The British Dominions and India contributed troops and raw materials to the British war effort and came out of the war considerably stronger than they had gone in. The Dominions made substantial sacrifices, and gained substantial freedom of action. India remained a more passive factor in world affairs. So did the Latin-American countries. Brazil had declared war on Germany, and some Brazilian destroyers took part in the anti-U-boat campaign. Argentina showed its independence by remaining neutral. All parts of Latin America enjoyed varying degrees of wartime prosperity.

In 1914 and 1915 non-Europeans spoke of the European War. By 1918 it had become the Great War or the World War. Almost all the war's losses fell upon Europe, but every continent felt the effects. When the fighting at last stopped, few parts of the world had reason to expect good things in the near future. People celebrated the Armistice because it marked the end of the darkest period most of them had ever known. A wave of relief, rather than a wave of hope, swept round the world. Earlier European wars had likewise affected the whole world. It had happened in Napoleon's time at the start of the nineteenth century and during the Seven Years' War, half a century earlier. This latest war, however, differed from any other in at least two respects. Everything had become so specialized that fewer parts of the world could remain untouched. In the second place, the nations that did become involved

soon found themselves completely involved. Civilians and soldiers became equally essential to the war effort.

Rapid communications had brought the people of the world closer together, physically. The wireless, the telegraph, and the popular press made it possible for ideas and information to circulate freely, too. More than two thousand years ago, Aristotle had said that the influence of the statesman carried no further than the sound of his voice. The words of twentieth-century propagandists quickly reached most of the world, but only two statesmen emerged from the war with messages to which the whole world gave ear. In spite of all their other differences, Wilson and Lenin shared one unique conviction: the time had arrived to organize the entire world into a single community, or, as the French writer Paul Valéry put it some years later, "*Le temps du monde fini commence.*" ("The time of the completed world begins.")

Both Wilson and Lenin also provided new faiths to fill the vacuum created by the war: faiths that went beyond the local, the regional, the national, the racial, to the universal; faiths that had to do with the whole of this world and not with any part of a world to come. Like most pioneers, they went to extremes, and history was not likely to prove either one of them completely right or completely wrong. Time and circumstance would certainly modify some of their doctrines. Like most pioneers, both men carried over certain assumptions of the generation that had gone before them—notably the widespread nineteenth-century faith in material progress and human perfectibility. Here again, as in their emphasis on global solutions, Wilson and Lenin had much in common.

The breakdown of the old order in Europe and the bold claims of Wilson and Lenin encouraged the belief that the postwar world had to choose one of two utopias—world democracy or world communism. Those who took this view, however, overlooked a third possibility: that the "time of the completed world" had perhaps not yet arrived. And if neither American-style democracy nor Russian-style Communism could unify the planet, how create a new balance of power to replace the old which had rested on the primacy of Europe? For the Europe that had loomed so large in the vanished world of 1900 counted for measurably less in the emerging world of 1919.

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QUINCY HOWE was born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1900, attended St. George's School at Newport, Rhode Island, and received his A.B. degree from Harvard in 1921. The next year he spent abroad studying at Christ's College, Cambridge, and traveling in Europe. Returning to the United States in 1922, he worked until 1929 with the Atlantic Monthly Company. Here he devoted most of his time to translating and reprinting articles from the foreign press for *The Living Age*, of which he became one of the editors in 1926. Two years later, the magazine was sold to a new owner in New York and Mr. Howe remained for six months as assistant to the editor of the Atlantic Monthly. After a few months with the advertising agency of Pedlar and Ryan in New York, he rejoined *The Living Age* as editor, a post he held until 1935. His first book, *World Diary: 1929-1934*, appeared in 1934.

From 1935 to 1942 Mr. Howe worked as head of the editorial department for Simon and Schuster and wrote three more books: *England Expects Every American to Do His Duty*, *Blood Is Cheaper Than Water*, and *The News and How to Understand It*. From 1939 to 1942 he also served as news commentator for radio station WQXR in New York. In 1942 he moved to the Columbia Broadcasting System as news analyst and since 1949 has devoted most of his energies to television. He began work on his *World History of Our Own Times* in 1944 and hopes to complete it by 1952. He is the son of the biographer and historian M. A. DeWolfe Howe, and the brother of the novelist Helen Howe and of Professor Mark DeWolfe Howe of the Harvard Law School. He married Mary L. Post of Boston in 1932 and they are the parents of a son and a daughter.

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